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Logic and Reality in the Philosophy of John Stuart Mill - abstract
This study of the leading principles of Mill's empiricist metaphysics 
and philosophy of logic aims to provide accurate (and often revision­
ary) exegesis and criticism of his theories, and to show their pert­
inence to current philosophical debates. Mill's views on the attain­
ment of knowledge by inference, the problems of suasive syllogisms, 
and the possibility of inductive inference are first discussed, and 
it is argued that his philosophy of logic is informed by a realist 
theory of error. Subsequently, attention is paid to his uncompromising 
rejection of a priori avenues to knowledge about objective reality, 
and his allegiance to a radical empiricist principle that all know­
ledge is of phenomena alone. A scrutiny of Mill's theories of the 
experienced world and of the experiencing self: brings the discussion; 
to the point at which it emerges clearly that there is a deep tension 
within his thought between a form of empiricism which approximates 
to a variety of scientific realism, and another which leans towards 
sensationalistic reductionism.
IV
I N T R O D U C T I O N
’Nobody reads Mill today,* wrote a reviewer in Time magazine a 
1few years ago. One could scarcely praise Mr Melvin Maddocks, who 
penned that remark, for his awareness of the present state of Mill 
studies, for of all nineteenth century philosophers who wrote in 
English, it is J.S. Mill who remains the most read today. Yet it 
would not be so far from the truth to say that very few people pay 
much serious attention nowadays to Mill's writings about logic and 
metaphysics (as distinct from those on ethical and social issues), 
despite the fact that Mill put enormous effort into their composition 
and through them exerted a considerable influence on the course of 
European philosophy for the rest of his century. But the only sec­
tions of A System of Logic (l843) and An Examination of Sir William 
Hamilton's Philosophy (I865) to which much reference is now made 
comprise only a small proportion of those very large books, and the 
prevailing assumption is that Mill's theories about logical and met­
aphysical questions are, with few exceptions, of merely antiquarian 
interest.
Bertrand Russell once said that Mill's misfortune was to be born 
at the wrong time (Russell (195I), p.2). It can certainly appear 
that Mill chose an inauspicious time to attempt a major work on 
logic. The greatest revolution in logical studies since Aristotle 
lay just a little ahead when the early editions of,the Logic were 
rolling off the presses, but Mill failed to anticipate, nor in his 
later years did he show much sympathy with, the great developments 
in symbolic logic with which his younger contemporaries Boole, De 
Morgan, levons and Venn were associated. Shortly before his death he 
described the attempt to provide an improved symbolic presentation 
of logic as a 'vice,' and declared that it implied 'the existence 
of greater precision in the data than.the questions admit o f  
(letter to John Elliot Cairnes, I^, p.1862). This blindness to the 
merits of symbolic logic has very understandably raised doubts in
the minds of twentieth century philosophers as to whether what 
Mill had to say about deductive logic could still be of much int­
erest. Russell’s dismissive judgement was that, ’Everything that 
Mill has to say in his Logic about matters other than inductive 
inference is perfunctory and conventional' (Russell, loc. cit.).
Even his philosophy of induction (to which the bulk of the Logic 
is devoted) has in recent years tended to fall out of view as an 
increasing amount of attention has been paid to the theories in 
this area of Mill's arch-rival Whewell, who had a more detailed
knowledge of the sciences of his day and, arguably, a deeper appr-
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ehension of the actual methods of scientific investigation.
Had Mill set out to write a study of the inductive sciences a 
few years later, it is possible, that a consideration of their 
rapid recent progress would have led him to construct a somewhat 
more adventurous philosophy of science than is found in the Logic. 
Then again, his views on epistemological.and ontological issues are 
often thought to be badly, even fatally, flawed by depending, 
allegedly, on an associationist psychology which was respectable 
enough when Mill wrote but which was./shortly : to, be utterly discr­
edited by such critics as F.H. Bradley and James ,'Ward. It has been 
remarked by John Passmore that the education Mill:received from his
' "7
father, the philosopher and political economist James Mill, had the 
object of turning him into an eighteenth century philosopher 
(Passmore, p.13); and that, one might suppose, is just the trouble 
with him: his thought is fundamentally backward rather than for­
ward looking, and by our contemporary standards impossibly outdated.
A major purpose of the present study is to show that the pre­
vailing neglect of Mill's logical and metaphysical writings is un­
fortunate and unjustified. Mill tackled, in a very systematic and 
thorough way, a great mapy of the issues which remain of concern to 
the modern student of the philosophy of logic and of metaphysics, 
and his treatment of these issues is often very profound; indeed in 
some instances it is the most searching to be found anywhere. And 
if many of the topics which interested Mill have not gone out of 
date, neither has the essential spirit of his approach to them (what­
ever may be said about its details) becomb outmoded. As everyone 
knows, Mill was the quintessential empiricist, and while many people 
prefer their empiricism in'a more muted form than his, some twent­
ieth century philosophers of great eminence, such as W.V. Quine 
and John Anderson, have adopted species of empiricist theory hardly
less radical and thoroughgoing than the Millian variety. Even where 
the psychological theories which Mill saw as adjuncts to his empir­
icist views are rejected, his motivations can seem as fresh and attr­
active as ever. In a letter of I854 to Theodor Gomperz (who transl­
ated the Logic into German), Mill spoke of his intention to develop 
a philosophy which would succeed in 'placing metaphysics and moral 
science on a basis of analysed experience, in opposition to the 
theory of innate principles' (LL, p.239). Elsewhere he wrote of his 
desire to press the defenders of a priori knowledge as hard as poss-
A
ible, and to drive them even from 'ground on which they had prev­
iously been deemed unassailable,* by showing that it is properly 
'experience and association' which explain 'that peculiar character
of what are called necessary truths, which is adduced as proof that .
their evidence must come from a deeper source than experience' (AU, 
p.233). These motivations are shared, in greater or lesser degree, 
by many modern philosophers in search of a theory able, in Crispin 
Wright's words, to 'liberate us from the mysterious aura which seems 
to envelop the traditional notion of necessity' (Wright, p.318). 
Neither Mill's problems nor his responses to them are without signif­
icant parallels in the work of contemporary philosophers.
An important motif of the present essay is that Mill's philosophy
is far less damaged than one might have expected it would be by its
inclusion of such archaic features as the identification of formal 
logic with the logic of the syllogism, and the postulation of a psych­
ology of association. Like many great philosophers. Mill possessed 
the ability to transcend the limitations of false or inadequate the­
ories he had inherited from his predecessors, and to penetrate through 
them to major new insights. Even the inconsistencies of detail which 
his views sometimes contain (though the often heard allegation that 
he was an unusually inconsistent philosopher is exaggerated) test- 
ify to a faculty of invention which saved him from a too hidebound 
adherence to theories bequeathed him by his father and other early 
intellectual mentors such as Bentham. The most fundamental springs 
of Mill’s thought are in any case a set of motives and beliefs which 
are sustained with great constancy and resolution, and whose appeal 
is felt anew by kindred spirits in every fresh generation of philos­
ophers. While certain elements of Mill's thinking have, it is true, 
taken their final bow from the philosophical stage some time ago, it 
would be quite wrong to suppose that he has no longer anything inter­
esting to say to us.
The truth is that J.S. Mill is the greatest philosopher to have 
attempted to develop an empiricist view of knowledge and reality to 
the point at which all rival conceptions are completely excluded from 
the field. His is a wholly unmitigated empiricism, reminiscent indeed 
in many respects of eighteenth century empiricisms such as Locke's, 
hut.more far-reaching (Mill would have no truck, for instance, with 
Locke's qualification to empiricism that mathematical knowledge is 
certain because it arises from a kind of infallible contemplation 
of mental archetypes rather than the ordinary objects of experience 
(Locke, vol.2, pp.l68-69).) ^ Possibly Mill was hardly aware of the 
extent of his ovm radicalness. At any rate, he described himself as 
a follower of what he called the dominant eighteenth century theory 
of knowledge, namely:
that proclaimed by Locke, and commonly attributed to 
Aristotle - that all knowledge consists of generaliz­
ations from experience. Of nature, or anything whatever 
external to ourselves, we know, according to this theory, 
nothing, except the facts which present themselves to our 
senses, and such other facts as may, by analogy, be inf­
erred from these. There is no knowledge a priori ; no 
truths cognizable by the mind's inward light,;; and groun­
ded on intuitive evidence. Sensation, and the mind's 
consciousness of its own acts, are not only the exclu­
sive sources, but the sole materials of our knowledge 
(CO, p.125).
This is empiricism with a vengeance. Moreover, it is empiricism with 
a special, though arguably natural, twist towards a strongly reduc- 
tivist metaphysics of the idealist or phenomenalist variety: Mill is 
saying not just that all knowledge comes through sensation and reflec­
tion on sensation, but alpo that all knowledge is knowledge of sensat­
ion and reflection on sensation. Mill's leaning towards idealism, 
and his enthusiasm for the philosophy of Berkeley, impart a flavour 
to his empiricism which is likely to be uncongenial to many otherwise 
well disposed to views of an empiricist type. To what extent the idea­
list strain in Mill is detachable from his general empiricist stance 
is a question of some complexity which will occupy us by and by ; for 
the time being it is sufficient to remark that the fact that Mill 
moves from empiricism into idealism may reasonably make us wonder 
whether there is not some very basic kinship - to express the point 
rather loosely for now - between these positions.
At the very deepest level of Mill's philosophical motivations
5
is a profound incredulity about the notion of a priori knowledge.
Yet it is difficult to find anywhere in his writings any really 
direct argumentation against the a priorist claim that there can 
be, and is, a priori or intuitive knowledge. To be sure, Mill has 
on hand an alternative account of knowledge to offer which, rooting 
all knowledge in sensation, makes no use of a priori faculties; but 
an alternative to a theory is not the same as a refutation of it.
Nor is a theory falsified by showing that unfortunate or undesirable 
political or social consequences follow from taking it to be true, 
as Mill argues that a belief in knowledge by intuition is
in these times, the great intellectual support of false 
doctrines and bad institutions. By the aid of this theory, 
every inveterate belief and every intense feeling, of ■ 
which the origin is not remembered, is enabled to dispense 
with the obligation of justifying itself by reason, 
and is erected into its own all-sufficient voucher and 
justification (AU, p.233).
Perhaps so; but if this provides a motive for wanting the 'intuit­
ional philosophy' to be false, it does not justify.ssbelieving it to 
be so - though it should be noted that Mill never(claimed that it 
did. The fact is that Mill's opposition to a priorism is itself 
based on something uncomfortably close to the kind of intuition which 
he constantly derides. What redeems his position, though, luckily 
for him, is that he can at least point to the absence in a. priorist 
accounts of any really clear and precise explanation of how the 
mind is capable of attaining knowledge by a priori means; and if 
this is something less than a direct refutation of a priorism, it 
does entitle him, being armed with a detailed alternative theory, 
to protest that the onus c^ f proof now comes to rest on his opponents. 
He complains;
We see no ground for believing that anything can be the 
object of our knowledge except our experience, and what 
can be inferred from experience by the analogies of exp­
erience itself; nor that there is any idea, feeling, or 
power in the human mind, which, in drder to account for 
it, requires that its origin should be referred to any
other source (GO, pp. 128-29).
Empiricism being, in Mill's opinion, much less mysterious than the 
doctrine of the school of intuition, it*is up to the a priorists
to prove the inadequacy of empiricist theory, and to establish the
need for their own.
To sustain his position against the a priorists, Mill considered 
that he required a theory with two complementary parts, correspon­
ding to the two modes in which, in his view, knowledge is attained. 
•Truths,’ he wrote in the Introduction to the Logic, • are known to 
us in two ways: some are known directly, and of themselves; some 
through the medium of other truths. The former are the subject of 
Intuition, or Consciousness; the latter, of Inference* (SL, p.6). 
(Mill’s word ’Intuition,’ incidentally, is misleading - he does not 
here mean a faculty of a priori apprehension, but simply of sens­
ation, as the context makes abundantly clear.) To place empiricism 
on an impregnable footing, it needed to be shown that the knowledge 
which a priorists claimed was achieved by the exercise of pure con­
sciousness was actually attained by inference from a basis of sen­
sations, Accordingly, this meant showing that a priorism was untenable 
(in Mill's terminology) in both .the fields of 'Metaphysics' and of 
'Logic,' the former being concerned with determining 'what part of 
the furniture of the mind belongs to it originally' (as distinct from 
by inference)(SL, p.8), and the latter dealing with the conditions 
of valid inference of new knowledge from those truths we know directly, 
What Mill aimed to show was that the' only immediate knowledge we poss­
ess is knowledge of our sensations, and that these are the sole basis 
from which all our other knowledge is, by inference, derived. If a 
sufficiently powerful system of logic could be delineated, it would 
become evident that it was theoretically gratuitous to postulate, as 
Coleridge and others had done, a pure a priori origin for a whole 
host of truths, including 'the fundamental doctrines of religion 
and morals, the principles of mathematics, and the ultimate laws even 
of physical nature' (CO, p.126). A well constructed science of logic, 
coupled with a cogent, reasoned account of the sensational basis, 
would, Mill trusted, establish to the satisfaction of those who appr­
oached the matter without prejudice that an empiricist philosophy was 
wholly adequate both to explain and to justify the structure of hum­
an knowledge.
The significance of the System of Logic needs to be assessed in 
the light of this broad purpose of vindicaj^ing an empiricist theory 
of knowledge. To some extent, the title of the work is misleading, 
as it can disguise the very heavy epistemological orientation it poss­
esses, Still, the book is not intended to present a complete theory 
of knowledge; Mill's concern in the Logic is to study the attainment
of new knowledge by inference, and he largely disregards in it ques­
tions about the nature of our original data. As he said in a letter 
to John Sterling in 1839? when work on the book was in progress:
I have endeavoured to keep clear so far as possible of 
the controversy respecting the perception of the highest 
Realities by direct intuition, confining Logic to the 
laws of the investigation of truth by means of extrinsic 
evidence whether ratiocinative or inductive (EL, p.406). 
However, in other respects the Logic did join battle with the 
a priorist position, most notably in the extended argument in 
Book II for an experiential basis for our knowledge of mathematical 
propositions. But only in the critique of Hamilton, written several 
years later, did Mill reveal in the fullest way the extent of his 
empiricist sympathies, and produce his most general and uncomprom­
ising strictures on a priorism. He clearly presumed thatga great deal 
of what he said in the Logic would go down well even with those not 
well disposed to empiricism; 'Logic,* he wrote hopefully in the Intro­
duction to that work, 'is common ground on which the partisans of 
Hartley and of Reid, of Locke and of Kant, may meet and join hands'
(SL, p.14)» In so far as empiricists and a priorists need not be at 
variance over the generalised conditions of sound deductive and ind­
uctive arguments, that is perfectly true of course. But while by no 
means everything in the Logic is aimed at the direct confutation of 
a priorist views, the overall purpose of the book was nevertheless, 
as Mill later publicly admitted, to provide 'a text-book of the opp­
osite doctrine - that which derives all knowledge from experience'
(AU, loc. cit.).  ^ If it is not on every page taking issue with a 
priorism, certainly on no page does it make the slightest concessions 
to that view.
A proper apprehension,^of the primary concern of the Logic to con­
tribute the theory of inference to the program of empiricist epist- 
emology can save us from disappointment that it does not give us 
things we ought never to have expected it would. When Russell compl­
ained that only in his treatment of inductive inference was Mill more 
than 'perfunctory and conventional' he failed to see that Mill was not 
intending to provide some highly technical' account of formal logical 
techniques. What Mill was trying to do - and what, I shall argue, he 
did in a very insightful way - was to. investigate how in principle 
deductive and inductive modes of inference could produce new knowledge, 
and, to establish the respective contribution of each mode to the
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7furtherance, specifically, of scientific knowledge. It was there­
fore of much less importance to Mill to present a fully articulated 
survey of Aristotelian deductive logic - still less to attempt to. 
refine that system of logic - than to probe deeply into some of the 
most fundamental questions ; in the philosophy of deduction, such as 
how, in principle, deductive inference can be productive of new know­
ledge, and whether it is possible to avoid the fallacy of petitio 
principii apparently present in every deductive proof. It-is, perhaps, 
tempting to think that had Mill been sympathetic to the efforts of 
the early symbolic logicians he might have achieved even greater 
profundity in his philosophical speculations on deductive logic; 
but the important issue is how much he actually did achieve, not 
what he might have done in other circumstances. In any case, as 
Russell himself had to admit, the Logic's treatment of inductive 
metho[ds of inference, which Mill considered more important than 
deductive methods in the pursuit of knowledge, is extremely compre­
hensive and detailed as well as being philosophically stimulating.
If the chief purpose of the Logic is to investigate how inference 
serves the pursuit of knowledge, that of the Examination of Sir Will­
iam Hamilton's Philosophy is the completion of the empiricist prog­
ram by proving that it is from a sensational basis that knowledge 
arises. The later book is a far more'openly polemical work than the 
earlier one, for Mill felt by the l860s that the time had come for 
a 'hand to hand fight' between the philosophies of experience and of 
intuition (AU, p.270). Whereas the Logic is frequently eirenic in 
tone, the Examination is persistently combative. For Mill, the mag­
isterial figure of Sir William Hamilton (1788-I856), Professor of 
Logic and Meta-physics at Edinburgh from 1836 to his death, represen- , 
ted the embodiment of the views of the school of intuition. Mill, des­
cribed the man as 'the great fortress of the intuitional philosophy
4 I
in this country' (ibid.), and his thought as 'representative of the
best form of Germanism' (LL, p.763). Hamilton's quite extraordinary 
erudition (he was probably the most learned English-speaking philos­
opher of his own, and possibly of any century) had an almost mesmeric 
effect on his contemporaries, and before Mill's blistering attack his 
philosophy had attracted very little significant adverse criticism.
The book broke the spell which Hamilton had cast over a whole intell­
ectual generation, and Mill was able to show how the older philosoph­
er’s thought was riddled with inconsistencies. Mill felt able to comm­
ent by the early '70s: 'On the whole the book has done its work: it
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has shown the weak side of Sir W. Hamilton, and reduced his too 
great .philosophical reputation within more moderate hounds' (AU,
p . 271).
An important key to the Examination, and indeed to Mill's whole 
understanding of the nature of knowledge and reality, is a principle 
which, after Hamilton, he termed that of the 'relativity of human 
knowledge.' ^ This principle, whose precise interpretation and role 
in Mill's philosophy will he the subject of a later chapter of this 
essay, had already appeared, though not under that label, in his 
1840 essay on Coleridge, from which we have already quoted a version 
of it, and a little later in the Logic, where he summed it up succ­
inctly as holding that 'of the outward world, we know and can know 
absolutely nothing, except the sensations which we experience from 
it' (^, p.62). The principle asserts that all our knowledge of an 
outer reality is knowledge of sensations (this is what is intended 
by saying that such knowledge is 'relative to' sensations), and Mill 
understood this to contradict the notion that we can have any know­
ledge of external objects, if these are construed as things in them­
selves which are irreducible to1 the;r,p»henbmenal presentations of sense. 
In fact. Mill normally treated the relativity principle as applicable 
not lust to outer but also to inner experience (that is, experience 
of the self and its states), in which broader form it can be used to 
support the denial that the mind or self consists in anything irred­
ucible to its own conscious states. But while he explicitly regarded 
the relativity principle as excluding our knowing anything about 
putative entities, such as noumenal bodies or egos, of an experience- 
transcending sort, it is actually possible that he saw it, more br­
oadly still, as the principle which excludes our possessing a priori 
knowledge about mathematics and science, religion and morality, which 
philosophers of the 'intuitional school' assert (that %welhave. For!in 
his discussions of a priori knowledge, it is precisely the claim 
that the mind's only real knowledge is of sensational experience, and 
what can be inferred from this, which is constantly aired in disproof 
of the existence of knowledgelfromca%priori sources; and it is this 
claim which is made in the explicit.)formulations of. the relativity 
principle, though they are directed at the more specific target of 
clarifying the nature of the objects, of outer and inner experience.
On the broadest possible construal of it, therefore,.-the relativity 
principle can be considered not merely as supporting Mill's very 
stripped-down view of the objects of our experience, but as the 
deepest and most resonant doctrine of his empiricist philosophy.
Mill's doctrine of the relativity of knowledge could easily be 
employed in support of an idealist world view; for if in outer exp­
erience we know only our sensations, then it is unclear with what ; 
right we could uphold the existence of a world of physical objects 
not reducible to sensations. (Acceptance of an idealist point of 
view forces a reconstrual of the notion of 'outer experience' of 
course, but this is not - as Mill forcibly argued to Herbert Spencer 
(Lb, p.1090) - in itself‘an argument against idealism.) Oddly enough, 
as we shall see below in Chapter Eight, M,ill was by no means unres­
ervedly committed to idealism, though he admired Berkeley's philos­
ophy immensely.  ^ Perhaps certain vaguenesses in some of his various' 
formulations of the relativity principle prevented his being quite 
clear about the appropriate metaphysical views to associate with 
his relativist epistemology. It may be significant, too, that Mill 
was not "by nature inclined to scepticism, and had no ambition to 
produce philosophical theories which common sense would frown upon.
(In this connection it is interesting to note that he was seemingly quite 
unmoved by Hume's philosophy, and that extensive though his writings
are, they make veryufew references tq Hume, or indeed to any other
1 0 '  ' , ' 
sceptical philosophers.) '- While Mill was alway^ keen to resist
what he saw as illicit; claims to knowledge, as offered, for.: instance, 
by a priorists, he was not inclined to disbelieve in the possibility 
of knowledge. He believed, presumably, that a carefully constructed 
system of knowledge on empiricist principles would lack vulnerable 
points at which a sceptic could attack; by remaining metaphysically 
abstemious, it would be offering no hostages to fortune. Yet we shall 
see later how Mill was undecided about just how abstemious an ontol­
ogical theory should be to remain consistent with the relativity prin-
Every man has a love pf his own opinions, but Mill's dislike of 
unfounded pretensions to knowledge led him to take criticisms of his 
own arguments very seriously; later editions of his major works are 
strewn with footnote discussions of objections made to points in 
earlier ones. Mill was candid enough not to cling obstinately to 
positions which others had shown him to be untenable. Especially 
noteworthy in this regard is his readiness to acknowledge the draw­
backs' of the associationist psychology which was an intellectual in­
heritance from his father. Associatipnism appeared to provide just 
what the keen empiricist required, a comprehensive theory of the
workings of the mind which posited a natural attraction among simple
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mental contents in order to explain the formation of complex concep­
tions and beliefs, in completely eschewing any reference to a priori 
faculties while yet purporting to explain, in an a posteriori manner, 
the full range of human ideas and beliefs, associationism promised 
to add conviction to empiricism by challenging any uneasy suspicion 
that a purely empiricist theory would prove inadequate to accounting 
for all that we know or believe. Mill was fully aware of the advan­
tages to be gained from supporting empiricism by associationist psych­
ology, and in an essay entitled 'Bain's Psychology* of 1859 he noted 
that the relativity principle had been, thought by some to be able to 
dispense with direct proof so long as it could rest on the 'general 
evidence' of associationism (BP, p.343).
A common view is that Mill never deviated from associationism, and 
that it formed a determining feature of his philosophy. John Passmore, 
for instance, has said that 'if, at any point. Mill's philosophical 
reasonings threaten what he regards as the foundations of empiricism 
or bring into question the adequacy of associationism, his recoil is 
immediate, at whatever cost to consistency' (Passmore, p.15). And 
Richard Wollheim, in commenting on the? empiricists' need to explain 
how individual mental contents become linked together, lumps John 
Stuart with James Mill (and Hume) in holding that-the trick is worked 
by 'inference':
Their treatment of ^ inference^ takes the form of trying 
to explain the multiplicity of human argument by appeal 
to certain simple and rigorous laws describing the succ­
ession of ideas in the human mind: for every time the mind 
moves from premiss to conclusion, this is a case of one set 
of ideas following upon and ousting another. In the form­
ation of these laws, the Empiricists once more resort to
, 11
the principle or pjpinciples of Association (Wollheim, p.23). 
True enough, perhaps, about James Mill, but certainly not about his 
son. The younger Mill was sufficiently clear sighted to realise, and 
honest enough to admit, that associationism created severe embarrass­
ments to anyone wanting to preserve a distinction between a move­
ment of thought which is simply compulsive or automatic, and a rat­
ional inference. Mill's unhappiness about "the tendency of associa­
tionism to collapse this distinction arose, characteristically, out 
of an empirical observation: he noticed that a belief set up by 
association can often be rejected on the basis of rational consider­
ations, and that even in the. case of the strongest associations, 'a
11
mind exercised in abstract speculation can reject the belief, though 
unable to get over the association' ,p. 368). But this admission
of a faculty which thus 'subdues belief into subordination and due 
proportion to evidence* (^, p.370), threatens to complicate Mill's 
philosophy exceedingly - a fact of which he was not unaware. Later 
in this study we shall explore in depth the implications of this 
lapse from the official doctrine of the 'school of experience.' It, 
will be seen that Mill is .drawn towards■two different and conflicting 
forms of empiricist view, the more radical one of which has strong 
links with metaphysical positions of an idealist kind, while the 
other is much closer to a form of scientific realism. On this inter­
pretation, Mill's philosophy will be seen to have a great geological 
fault running through it - and .a fault, remarkably, of which he seems 
to have been only intermittently, and then very imperfectly, consc­
ious. Associationism helps to-articulate (though without .being its chief
supporting principle) One only of these conflicting strands of thought.
Mill's failure to come to terms withfthis deep cleavage in his 
empiricism can provide some important lessons for contemporary emp­
iricist theories. What is at issue, as will become obvious later, is 
no mere shallow inconsistency resulting “from muddled thinking, but 
a serious problem of principle about thegbest way tpfdevelop an emp- 
iricist position. Mill's oscillation between two incompatible views 
is thus a fruitful inconsistency able to. generate interesting further 
speculation. Not all his inconsistencies are as illuminating as this 
one, unfortunately. He has always suffered, and more than most other 
major philosophers, from accusations that his work is rife with incon- 
sistencies, and while a great many of these accusations are demonstr- 
ably based on careless interpretation, it has to be admitted that he 
sometimes displayed an irritating tendency to drift between different 
and not wholly compatible■formulationsnofoaniidea.: There are perhaps 
two main reasons for this filing. First of all, he composed most of 
his works at very great speed. His total output of books, reviews, 
essays and letters is enormous (it will fill over thirty large vol- 
umes in the definitive Toronto University Press edition), and given 
the pace of production it is inevitable that his writings sometimes 
display flaws which might have been avoided^had he worked more slowly 
and deliberately. A clue to a second, rather different reason emerges 
from a complaint he made of Bentham. !He could not bear,' Mill remar­
ked,' 'for the sake of clearness and the reader’s ease, to say, as 
ordinary men are content to do, a little more than the truth in one 
sentence, and correct it in the next* (gS, p.H4). Bentham was in the
12 .
habit of employing very complex grammatical constructions in order 
to get all the truth into one sentence, and to make sure that that 
truth was precisely expressed. Mill * s complaint will probably strike 
most twentieth century philosophers, brought up,as they are to value 
exactitude above the more superficial virtue of an easy style, as a 
somewhat unprofessional one. If Mill himself thought it right to 
emulate the 'ordinary man,’ and valued readability more than rig­
orous consistency, that explains at once his own exceptional fluency 
of style and his occasional lapses into inconsistency or confusing 
looseness of phrasing; it also explains why, in reading'him, one often 
has the feeling that one has grasped his meaning straightway - until 
one stops to reflect about it, on which doubt sets in. In a subject 
wherein great issues can oft en hang on the making of fine distinctions.
Mill's preference for a lucid but loose style is unwise and inapprop-
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riate, and his serious readers must regret it.
Despite the slackness of statement which one often encounters in 
Mill’s writing, his works on logical and metaphysical themes contain 
a multitude of ideas and inspirations which remain of the greatest : 
interest. The present essay does not attempt to be a comprehensive 
survey of Mill’s doctrines in these areas, which,f^ould require a far 
longer work. Its concern - which has been indicat;ed; in the preceding 
pages - will be with the manner in which Mill, always consistently 
with empiricism, accounts for the attainment of knowledge via infer­
ence, and with his empiricist treatment of certain other fundamental 
issues in the philosophy of logic and epistemology; and it will be 
shown how his views on these topics are related to his account of 
the nature of reality. There will be no attempt to provide a general 
treatment of his philosophy of natural and social science, and cert­
ain metaphysical questions with which he was much involved, such as 
the free will problem and (at the end of his life) the existence of 
God, will not be dealt with.
One further issue which will be absent from these pages is that of 
the bearing of Mill’s theories in logic and metaphysics on his views 
about social and political issues. It has often been noted that 
Mill's empiricism is far from being a doctrine with consequences
t
solely for logic and metaphysics. For Mill, empiricism represented
an option with immense implications for t he or i sing about.politics and
society. To admit the possibility of a priori sources of knowledge
was, in his opinion, to open the door to all manner of claims that 
this or that (usually strongly conservative) view about morals or
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religion or the state of society did not require to he warranted hy 
experience hut was instead intuitively;obvious. It is therefore per­
fectly correct to consider that ; Mill hoped that the defence of emp-' 
iricism in the Logic and the Examination would, by exhibiting the sup­
eriority of that doctrine over its a priorist rival, assist the pol­
itical campaign against the forces of reaction; the difference betw­
een the schools of Intuition and Experience, wrote Mill in his Auto­
biography, 'is not a mere^'matter of abstract speculation; it is full 
of practical consequences, and lies at the foundation of all the 
greatest differences of practical opinion in an age of progress’ (AU, 
p.269). Nevertheless, it is to .fall into a serious misunderstanding 
of the logical and metaphysical writings to suppose, as some critics 
have done, that Mill’s primary motive in composing them was to supply 
ammunition for the political cause. This interpretation of those works 
subtly disparages both them and their author, for it insinuates that 
under the guise of an academic and disinterested investigation of their 
ostensible objects of concern. Mill’s real purpose was to concoct an 
elaborate battery of theories to employ against his political oppon­
ents. There would be nothing much amiss, it is true, in utilising
general arguments against a priorism in the pursuit^of political obj-
M
ectives where they are found to be relevant to the\purpose. But the 
suggestion made by some of Mill’s commentators is that the doctrines 
of the Logic and the Examination are moulded not so much by properly 
logical and metaphysical considerations, as by the exigencies of find­
ing persuasive props for political positions.
Thus R.P. Anschutz, whose book on Mill has been much read, said of 
him: ’He never wrote anything on any subject without considering its 
bearing on the politics of the day,* and added: * As war is sometimes 
said to be an extension of policy, so philosophy'for Mill was an ext­
ension of politics’ (Anschp-tz (1953), PP«6l, 62). Iii similar vein, 
Passmore, after commenting that Mill’s empiricism .’is more than an 
epistemological analysis; not to be an empiricist is to adhere to 
’the Establishment’ - to be committed to the protection of ’sacred’ 
doctrines and institutions,’ goes on to assert that it is for that 
reason that Mill refuses ever to allow any doubt to threaten the 
’foundations of empiricism* or the ’adequacy of associationism* (Pass- 
more, p.15). If Mill really proceeded in this manner, he was guilty of 
great disingenuousness. As a third instance, Ernest Nagel judged that
’even more technical theoretical analyses were controlled by
the aim of removing the obstacles which, false philosophies placed in
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the path of social progress*; and he went so far as to assert that 
Mill had ’frankly acknowledged’ that ’ulterior social objectives’ 
were ’controlling the composition of the Logic* (Nagel (195O)) PP»- 
XV, xxxii).
But there is no good reason to suppose that the interpretation of 
Anschutz, Passmore and Nagel is correct* While Mill undoubtedly kept 
an eye open for possible bearings of his logical and metaphysical 
researches on his campaign against conservatism and obscurantism in 
the political arena, there is no basis for the allegation that the 
primary motives behind those researches were other than what they 
seemed to be - namely, desires to achieve correct theories about the 
logical or metaphysical issues under discussion; and Mill certainly 
never ’frankly acknowledged* that his governing motivation was a 
political one. In fact, in a letter written to Robert Barclay Pox 
in 1842, when he was hard at work on the Logic, he remarked that he 
had ’scarcely been thinking at all except on the two subjects I have 
just mentioned. Logic and the Romans. As for politics I have almost 
given up thinking on the subject* (EL, p.543). A strange observation 
for someone writing a book with an ulterior political motive: There
f
is really a complete absence of evidence for the view, which is more­
over initially quite implausible, that the Logic(and the Examination 
were produced with the chief intention of supporting a political 
cause. As the onus of proof clearly bears on. those wishing to uphold 
the interpretation at issue, and as that proof has not been provided, 
I shall proceed in this essay on the not very daring assumption that 
Mill discussed logical and metaphysical questions because he was int­
erested in logic and metaphysics.
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O N E
K N O W L E D G E  BY' I N P E R E F  C E
Early in A System of Logic Mill suggested that new knowledge is 
acquired in one or other of two manners. Some truths are known hy 
immediate consciousness,* and whatever is known in that way ’is known 
"beyond possibility of question* (SL, p.7)» Truths about our 'bodily 
sensations and mental feelings* are knowable in this manner; Mill’s 
examples are the propositions that I was vexed yesterday or that I am
hungry today (ibid. ) « But the greater** part of our knowledge, he thought,
is acquired not in this immediate way, but rather |by.inference from 
other truths we already know. Inferentially obtained knowledge, further­
more, is not merely theoretically but also practically important to 
us. 'To draw inferences,’ Mill reported approvingly, ’has been claimed 
to be the great business of life’:
Every one has daily, hourly, and momentary need of asc­
ertaining facts which he has not directly observed; not 
from any general purpose of adding to his stock of know- 
ledge, but because the facts themselves are of importance
to his interests or to his occupations (SL, p.9).
After distinguishing^knowledge by inference from knowledge by 
’immediate consciousness,’ Mill felt that a definition of the prov­
ince of logic could now be given:
Logic ... is the science of the operations of the understand—
•ing which are subservient to the estimation of evidence: 
both the process itself of advancing from known truths 
to unknown, and all other intellectual operations in 
so far as auxiliary to this (^, p. 12).,
I*L.e logician’s concern, however, is not with the psychological descr­
iption of reasoning processes, but only with the evaluation of inf­
erence as soundly or unsoundly carried éAt :
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Logic has no interest in carrying the analysis be­
yond. the point at which it becomes apparent whether 
the operations have in any individual case been rightly 
or wrongly performed (ibid.).
Mill's picture of knowledge is of a structure rooted in the data of 
immediate consciousness and extending upwards and outwards from 
those roots by inference. The logician's task is to assist both the 
ordinary man and the scientific re as oner in their quest for truth 
by providing a systematic account of the conditions under .which inf­
erence is correctly carried out. As for the 'facts which are the 
objects of intuition or consciousness* rather than the products of 
inference, the logician need not worry himself about identifying 
and analysing those ; that is a problem which can be left to 'another 
and a perfectly distinct department of science,' namely 'metaphysics* 
(SL, p.8).
At first sight, this is a neatly rounded account of the nature 
of logic. Its practical bias is obvious: Mill's primary concern in 
logic was with inference, which is what people engage in who want 
to know things, and he was interested An the logical relation of 
implication not as an end of inquiry in itself, but because he wan­
ted to explain when inferences are sound. He would;have taken no 
delight in the modern development of uninterpreted logical calculi 
and artificial languages which are of interest to the pure logician 
but which have no, or slight, practical application; such things would 
have seemed to him outre and pointless. On the other hand, he thought 
that the logician could not ignore questions of a semantic or an 
epistemological nature when they bear on the relation of thought and 
inference to reality. Thus he considered that the logician must pay 
attention to issues about term and proposition meaning, the nature 
of classes and kinds and |he categories of existence, and also to 
facts about the epistemic capacities and limitations of human 
truth-seekers; the fact, for instance, that a finite human intell­
igence cannot survey an infinite, or an indefinitely large, class of 
cases to verify certain kinds of generalisation by direct inspection 
exerted a large influence, as we shall see later, on his theory of 
proof. *
While Mill’s conception of the province of logic is legitimate 
enough, his presentation of the contrast between knowledge by immed­
iate consciousness and knowledge by inference is somewhat unclear.
It is obvious that he did not think very carefully through the
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question of what kind of 'immediate* knowledge would provide a suit­
able basis for inferential knowledge about outer reality. His exam­
ples of knowledge obtained via immediate consciousness concern sub­
jective states such as being vexed or feeling hungry. Now it is true 
that I know that I am vexed' or that I am hungry, if I am so, without 
needing to infer this from evidence (though it is not so clear, incid­
entally that Mill’s example of knowing that I was vexed yesterday 
can be wholly non-inferential, for the temporal location of the sen­
sation can be plausibly held to require determining inferentially). 
Such propositions about my subjective states (waiving problems about 
references to specific temporal locations) are what we might call, 
after Sydney Shoemaker, 'noncriterial,* being knowable by a primitive 
faculty of reflexive self-consciousness (Shoemaker, Ch.6). But it is 
evident that if all the products of immediate self-consciousness wehe 
of this kind, inference could not take us to knowledge of a reality 
beyond our subjective states: for conclusions about outer reality 
cannot be drawn, by any system of inference, however subtle, from 
premises solely about inner states. Presumably Mill never really int­
ended to assert that all immediate consciousness is directed on states 
of the subject, but he forgot to say, though he must have believed, 
that we also have immediate knowledge of outer reality. His frequent 
references to our sensational awareness of ’objects’ (for instance, 
when he is stating the principle of the relativity of knowledge) make 
it reasonable to suppose that he regarded as immediately known the 
kind of conceptually simple presentations of sense which later phil­
osophers spoke of as expressible by ’sense-data’ reports. Indeed, his 
description in the second chapter of the Examination of the sensory 
ingredients in the experience of seeing, handling and eating an orange 
reads very similarly to the kinds of sense-data analyses which early 
twentieth century philosophers were fond of producing (EH, pp.5-6). 
Mill is explicitly describing what the senses tell us immediately, 
and without the aid of inference,'about the orange; and it is likely 
that he really intended to draw the same distinction between immediate 
and inferential knowledge in the Logic, but misstated it.
Mill’s examples of ’truths which we know only by way of inference’ 
are ’occurrences which took place while we'were absent, the events 
recorded in history, or the theorems of mathematics’ (^, p.?). In 
the first two cases, our inference proceeds from 'the testimony add­
uced, or from.the traces of.those past(occurrences which still exist,* 
in the last, from the definitions and axioms) of the science. He also
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observed that the sphere of inference may be wider than we might init­
ially suppose; for instance, we may believe that it is by direct sen­
sation that we know the distance of objects from us, whereas it is. 
actually more likely that judgements of distance are inferences, with 
the eye providing no more than a ’variously coloured surface' (ibid.) 
No wonder, then, that Mill stressed the practical importance of corr­
ect inference; without the ability to infer, a person could hardly 
form a view of reality..at. all. It is true that many important infer­
ences are spontaneously made (inferences to the distances from us of 
things seen are a case in point), but some require a carefully contr­
olled intellectual effort. In Mill's view, the function of logic is 
to assist us in correctly performing inferences of the latter type.
II
Given the respect which is paid today to logical studies, it is hard 
to think oneself back to the situation in the earlier nineteenth cent- 
ury, when logic was a despised subject. Yet one can sympathise with 
those critics, particularly in the tradition of Locke, who looked on 
syllogistic formal logic as moribund, and doubtedAwhether after two 
millenia it would yield any further real discoveries of either method­
ological or philosophical significance. Much though he admired Locke's 
thought, Mill dissented from him about the value of logical science.
It seemed to Mill that logic can throw light on the manner in which 
inference enables us to increase our knowledge, and by doing so afford 
practical guidance to us in reasoning. A major inspiration on his 
early thinking about logic was Richard Whately's Elements of Logic,
first published in 1826, which was the most philosophically adept
4 .
study of the subject to be produced for many years. Mill reviewed
the book for the Westminster Review in 1828, and his essay - which
was his first publication on logic - was later fulsomely praised by his 
friend and protege Alexander Bain as 'a landmark not merely in the 
history of own mind, but in the history of logic' (Bain
(1882), p.36). Despite Bain's praise, this was not reallyTa highly)- 
original article, and many of Mill's ideas on the philosophy of logic, 
while occasionally going deeper than Whately's, were directed - some­
times misdirected - by the older philosopher's work.
I
Mill wholly concurred with Whately's condemnation of the disdainful 
attitude to formal logic which Bacon, Locke and their followers had
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made customary in British intellectual circles. To Whately and Mill, 
the dispraise which usually fell to logic's lot was especially 
ill-deserved and foolish Because it was not accompanied By any alt­
ernative theory with pretensions to characterise the conditions of 
valid inference. Mill complained;
Had the philosophers who treated with so much contempt 
the idea of trying the validity of an argument By resol­
ving it into a series of syllogisms, Been aware that there 
is no other way in which its validity can Be tried, and 
that this, and no other, is the process actually perfor­
med, so far as is necessary for the purpose, whenever a
fallacy in argument is discovered and pointed out, they 
would proBaBly have spared some portion of the ridicule 
which they have heaped upon the syllogistic theory 
(m, p. 10).
The reference here to resolving.an argument into 'a series of syllog­
isms* testifies to Mill's adherence to the now obsolete view that 
deductive logic is coextensive with the logic of the syllogism; yet 
no one today world think of quarrelling with the claim that it is to 
logic that one should look for a description of the conditions of 
valid inference. If this claim is now a commonplace, the efforts of 
Mill and Whately have helped to make it so. t
But if Whately and the young Mill were right about the importance
of logical theory for providing standards By which the validity of
reasonings could Be assessed, they nonetheless exaggerated the scope 
of deductive methods in this connection. Enthusiastic to defend ded­
uctive reasoning against the attacks of the empiricist school, What­
ely went so far as to deny that the induction; Beloved of the empir­
icists was a form of inference at all; all genuine reasoning is syll­
ogistic, he argued, while induction is simply a form of enquiry or 
investigation which turns up general statements which can then Be emp­
loyed' as major premises in deductive syllogisms (Whately, Bk.IV.ch.i). 
The essence of induction, on this view, is 'the process of investig­
ation and of collecting facts' (Whately, p.230), including, finally, 
general facts from which, with suitable minor premises, we can ded­
uce new conclusions. The mistake here lies in thinking that there is 
no inference of a non-deductive kind involved in the derivation of 
general statements on the Basis of the. examination of individual inst­
ances of a kind. It is not objectionable to describe as 'induction' 
the empirical investigation of members.of some kind for possession of 
a certain characteristic, for instance the investigation of swans
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to establish their colour; but an inference of a non-deductive kind 
is involved in projecting from a sample of cases (e.g. white swans) 
to a generalisation about all members of the same kind (’All swans 
are white’). By the time he wrote the Logic, Mill had completely 
abandoned Whately’s position, yet in his 1828 article he showed an 
unquestioning acceptance of the view that induction is not a form of 
inference, but merely of collection of data. ’The syllogistic logic,’ 
he vjrote, ’affords the only rules’ which can contribute to ’-the corr­
ectness of our reasoning’;
It is, to use Dr. Whately’s words, not ^  art of 
reasoning, but the art of reasoning ... Syllogistic 
reasoning is not a kind of reasoning, for all corr­
ect reasoning is syllogistic; and to reason by induc­
tion is a recommendation which implies as thorough a 
misconception of the meaning of the two words, as if 
the advice were, to observe by syllogism (WE, pp.14-15)*
That there is a distinctive form of inference involved in induction, 
and that one can speak of an inductive logic, were, of course, facts 
perfectly familiar to the Mill of the System of Logic. Indeed, in the 
fifteen years separating the Whately review and the Logic, Mill dep­
arted from the Whatelyan viewpoint in an even more' radical way, by 
coming to doubt whether the syllogism was really a form of inference 
at all! Yet, as we shall see, while Mill was eventually to reverse 
completely Whately’s view of the status of deduction and induction, 
he did so as a consequence of a train of philosophical reflection
for whose inspiration he was indebted to Whately’s book.
The beginnings of Mill’s train of thought lay in pondering on; i'p 
Whately’s query how genuine epistemic advance is produced by inf­
erence. Regarding Whately’s answer as unsatisfactory, but failing to 
find a better explanation of how we can increase our knowledge by the 
use of deduction, Mill finally felt obliged to conclude that the 
only genuine inference must be inductive. There is a long and complex 
story behind Mill’s shifting opinions about deduction. The scene for 
its opening was set by Whately’s attempts to respond to Locke’s obj­
ections to syllogistic logic. Locke had claimed that syllogistic rea­
soning ’discovers no proofs, but is the art, of marshalling and ranging 
the old ones we have already.’ He had continued sarcastically; 
Syllogism, at best, is but the art of fencing with the 
little knowledge we have, without making any addition
to it. And if a man should employ, his reason all this
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way, he will not do much .otherwise than he who,
'having got some iron out of the bowels of the earth, 
should have it beaten all up into swords and put it 
into his servants’ hands to fence with and bang one 
another. ... And I am apt to think that he who shall 
employ all the force of his reason only in brandishing 
of syllogisms will discover very little of that mass 
of knowledge which-lies yet concealed in the secret ’ 
recesses of nature ... (Locke, vol.2, p.272),
Although Locke’s criticisms were directed specifically at syll­
ogistic reasoning, and as such have a large measure of cogency (for 
if reasoners were restricted to syllogistic methods alone, the amount 
of enlightenment they could expect from their inferences would be 
severely limited), they touch upon a deeper and much more general 
issue concerning the usefulness of deductive inference. In resp­
onding to the Lockean criticism of the syllogism, both Whately and 
Mill identify this deeper issue, which is a live one in the philos­
ophy of logic even at this present day. In performing deductive inf­
erences, we display in our conclusion^ the implications of our prem­
ises - and this whether the inferences are syllogistic or not. And
I y . ■
sometimes we make enlightening discoveries in this;way, turning up
ly '
unexpected implications of premises we had already' accepted. But how is 
it that we can find such processes to be illuminating? How is it 
that we can fully understand a set of premises and yet, by a deduc­
tive operation on them, obtain knowledge we did not have when we 
merely knew the premises? Why is deductive reasoning so often not 
merely a matter of fencing, as Locke alleges, with the knowledge we 
already have?
Whately’s rejoinder to Locke began by making the important obser­
vation that deductive reasoning is often enlightening. He criticised 
Locke for not seeing that there is a distinction to be drawn between 
two kinds of discovery of truth. Firstly, there are ’such Truths as 
were, before they were discovered, absolutely unknown, being not 
implied by anything we previously knew, though we might perhaps sus­
pect them as probable.’ But in addition; ’That which may be elicited 
by reasoning, and consequently is implied in that which we already 
know, we assent to on that ground, and not from observation or test­
imony.’ A teacher of mathematics, for instance, ’seems only to lead 
us to make use of our own stores, and point out to us how much we had 
already admitted’ (Whately, pp.243-44)* ’While we might wonder how
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Whately thought that syllogistic reasoning could accomplish so much, 
we can grant that it can he illuminating, by deduction: ■
to expand and unfold all the assertions wrapt up, as 
it were, and implied in those with which we set out, 
and to bring a person to perceive and acknowledge 
the full force of that which he has admitted; - to 
contemplate it in various points of view; - to admit 
in one shape what he has already admitted in another; - 
and to give up and disallow whatever is inconsistent 
with it (Whately, p.239).
As Mill realised, such an account is not really an explanation of 
how deductive reasoning may be productive of epistemic advance; .but 
it is at least an improvement on Locke’s view which denied that int­
eresting discoveries even in the science of geometry are attained thr- 
ough ’common logic’ (Locke, loc. cit.). To recognise that deductive 
reasonings frequently are illuminating is undoubtedly a step in the 
right direction, yet it leaves the nature of epistemic advance via 
deduction still unclear. How is it illuminating ’to expand and unfold 
all the assertions wrapt up ... and implied in those with which we 
set out’? And what does it mean to bring someone to acknowledge, by 
dint of deductive reasoning, ’the full force’ of |’,that which he has 
already admitted’? - for if he has already admitted something, and 
understood what he admitted, how can it be that he has not ipso facto 
grasped its ’full force’" without needing to engage in a subsequent 
passage of reasoning?
Ill
In his review of the Elements of Logic, Mill sided with Whately’s 
view that deductive reasoning can uncover ’new truths’ (though a 
better label would be ’new knowledge’), but professed himself diss­
atisfied with Whately’s characterisation of illuminating reasoning 
processes. Alan Ryan has wrongly accused Mill of being confused
about the distinction drawn by Whately between two senses of ’new
- '
truth,’ but Mill never in fact criticised deductive processes for 
being unable to produce new knowledge of the sort characteristic of
■y
perceptual or inductive processes (Ryan (1974), p.79)* Like 
Whately, he was impressed by the capacity of mathematical studies
23
reasoning does not enable us to discover truths which
ained for ever as completely unkno™, as if ' 
hey did not result from the knowledge we previously
■ Poesessed Of this fact, the whole science of mathematics 
IS a perpetual proof (WE, p.33)
— »...
le ore in an undiscovered mine is possessed by the 
owner of the ground wherein it lies (ibid )
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through the distorting glass of his syllogistic prejudice a general 
problem about deductive inference which has seemed quite genuine to 
a present day philosopher with a much more sophisticated understand­
ing of the varieties of inference than Mill possessed. Michael Dumm- 
ett has written that there appears to be a 'tension* between what we 
need to account for the legitimacy of deduction, and what we need to 
account for its usefulness. For a deductive inference to be legitimate, 
notes Dummett, 'the process of recognising the premisses as true 
must already have accomplished whatever is needed for the recognit­
ion of the truth of the conclusion* (Dummett (1978), p.297)* But now 
it is puzzling how deducing the conclusion can provide us with new 
knowledge; for the satisfaction of the legitimacy condition is appar­
ently at odds with the maintenance of the kind of epistemic gap betw­
een premises and conclusion which is necessary for deduction to be 
illuminating. Mill did not explain his problem in quite these terms, 
but it was in essence the same; like Dummett, he sensed that satis­
faction of the formal conditions for the validity of an inference 
would seem to prevent that inference being capable of providing new 
knowledge. And yet, as in 1828 he was fully aware, deductive inference 
frequently does lead to epistemic advance.
IV
As Mill continued to reflect on the nature of deductive inference 
in the years following the composition of his review of Whately’s 
Elements, he became increasingly doubtful that a satisfactory explan­
ation could be given of how deductive inference can lead to new know­
ledge. The ’mist’ which Whately and others had ’left hanging over the 
subject’ (jW, loc. cit.) appeared thicker than ever, and he began to 
think that the problem was not soluble in the terms in which it had 
been set up. According to the Autobiography, it was a rereading of 
Dugald Stewart which supplied a clue to what seemed to him a better 
theory (ibid.), and from that point he abandoned the view that ded­
uction is ever really responsible, by itseff, for producing new know­
ledge, even in a science like geometry. Mill’s radical and surprising 
view that deduction is not properly inference at all is expounded 
and defended in Bk.II.ch.iii of the Logic.
By his own account. Mill proceeded to write out the second Book
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of the Logic immediately after gleaning from Stewart the hint as to 
how to develop the theory of syllogism (ibid.) But this Book poss­
esses a very curious feature; while its third chapter presents the 
new theory of deduction as something Mill calls ’interpretation’ 
rather than inference, the second chapter is devoted to the analy­
sis- of syllogistic inference! It is hard to see,, on the face of it, 
why Mill bothered to write a chapter about syllogistic inference 
(or why he retained the chapter, if it was already written) once he 
had decided that there was really no such thing as deductive infer­
ence. This question becomes more pressing still once it is noted that 
one of Mill’s major purposes in ch.ii is to refute the traditional 
view that the principle known as the Dictum de omni et nulle is the 
principle of syllogism, on the grounds that if this were its princ­
iple, syllogising certainly could not bring us to new knowledge; but 
instead of using this discussion to reinforce the claim that the 
syllogism is not properly a form of inference at all, he follows it 
by urging that a quite different principle should be taken as the 
principle of syllogistic reasoning.
Fortunately, this anomalous situation can be explained in a way 
which saves Mill from the charge of being grossly/inconsistent. Des-
' ■ I - ' ■
pite his confusing language, his real objection tqj the Dictum de omni
et nullo is that it misrepresents the semantic/character'of the prop­
ositions of a syllogism; and this objection by no means becomes redun­
dant after the rejection of the conventional concept of syllogism as 
a form of inference. Even posterior to that rejection, there is, in 
Mill's view, a role for a ’principle of syllogism,' though its purpose 
is to characterise the semantic structure of the interrelating prop­
ositions of the syllogism, not to analyse it as an inference. Now it 
is likely that Mill was unwilling to risk puzzling the reader of his 
discussion of the Dictum introducing, before he had the opportunity 
to develop it fully, his revolutionary idea that the syllogism was not 
a kind of inference. Therefore he presented his criticism of the Dictum 
in terms which the reader would readily understand, and raised some 
essentially semantic issues about the meaning of the propositions inv­
olved in a syllogism in a manner which gave no indication that a pro­
found reappraisal of the significance of syllogistic processes was 
shortly to follow. However, the effect of such a strategy was merely
to postpone the moment of perplexity; for the reader arriving at the
ch.iii discussion of the syllogism as interpretation, not inference, 
would inevitably wonder retrospectively'what Mill had been up to in
«
ch.ii. It would have been altogether better if Mill had supplied much 
clearer signposts to his intentions.
Mill's discussion of whether the Dictum is the principle of syll­
ogism remains of some interest today as a topic in the philosophy of 
logic in so far as some deductive inferences - though, of course, not 
all, as Mill believed - are syllogistic in form. And we can read that 
discussion of the Dictum as a discussion of the principle of syllog­
istic inference (which-is. in any case what it ostensibly is!) even if 
we have no inclination to side with Mill's view that syllogising is 
not really inferring at all. With regard to the study of Mill's own 
philosophy of logic, ch.ii of the Logic is important as a stage in 
the development of his thinking about interlocking issues concerning 
inference, meaning, thought and epistemic advance. In the light of the 
perspective more clearly set out in ch.iii of the second Book, it is 
apparent that Mill's anxieties about how a legitimate syllogistic 
inference could be anything other than trivial had led him to an even 
more fundamental worry about whether syllogising couidcreally be a 
worthwhile process of any kind. And it seemed to him that the answer 
to this deeper question must be no, if the semantic structure of a 
syllogism is characterised by the Dictum.
Although Whately had approved the claim of the. Dictum to be the 
principle of informative syllogistic inference, Midi inclined rather 
to the view of Dugald Stewart that the Dictum was a very trivial 
proposition; consequently either, as Stewart maintained, the syllogism 
whose principle it was could only be a trivial affair, or, as Mill 
preferred to believe, the true character of syllogism could not be 
encapsulated in the Dictum. Following Thomas Reid, Stewart gave the 
Dictum in the form: 'Whatever is affirmed or denied of the whole genus, 
may be affirmed or denied of every species and individual belonging to 
it'; and he observed of it that, 'This is a principle of undoubted 
certainty, but of no great depth* (Stewart, vol.3, p.190; cf. Reid, 
p.699). Worse, an actual example of a reasoning in one of the Arist­
otelian syllogistic forms turns out to be nothing but 'some self-evid­
ent or identical puerility' (Stewart, vol.3, p.l9l)* Mill accepted 
that syllogisms would indeed be utterly trivial affairs if the Dictum 
were their principle. The Dictum appeared .to him to amount to no more 
than 'the identical proposition, that whatever is true of certain 
objects, is true of each of those objects'; and he contended that:
If all ratiocination were no more than the application 
of this maxim to particular cases, the syllogism would
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indeed be, what it has so often been declared to be, 
solemn trifling. The dictum de omni is on a par with 
another truth, which in its time was also reckoned of 
great importance, ''Whatever is, is'' (SL, p.175).
Later, in the Examination, he was to return to the attack, arguing 
that:
a doctrine which defined one of the two great 
processes of the'discovery of truth as consisting 
of the operation of placing objects in a class and 
then finding them there, can never, I think, have 
really satisfied any competent thinker, however 
he may have acquiesced in it for want of a better
(m, p.391).
There would be no point in syllogising, thought Mill, if the Dictum 
were its principle, for as a trifling verbal manoeuvre it would be 
of no more use in the pursuit of knowledge than the traditionally 
distinguished forms of 'immediate inference,' such as the obversion 
and conversion of propositions, which he regarded as involving no 
more than the 'repetition of the same, or part of the same, assert­
ion' (SL, p.158). But, unlike Stewart, he concluded from this that 
the Dictum could not provide the correct analysis of the content and 
relationship of thé propositions oft à syllogism. ' ;.
In arguing that the Dictum is not the principle of syllogism. Mill 
reveals rather clearly the epistemic charge to his concept of inf­
erence. As we saw, inference is for Mill one of the two modes in 
which knowledge is attained, and he believed, further, that no oper­
ation on propositions was worthy to be termed inference unless it 
was capable of leading to new knowledge; in particular, he held that 
one should not speak of inference where a process produced a concl­
usion which was identical to a proposition in the premise set. The 
undefended but plausible assumption underlying this position is that 
if the conclusion is a 'new' proposition, then someone in suitable 
circumstances might be illuminated by deriving it from the premises.
It is worth saying that Mill's notion of inference is close to popular 
ideas of what inference is all about, but it is not identical to that 
held by most modern logicians. The present day logician would be more 
likely to explain inference in terms of implication than in terms of 
the capacity to produce epistemic advance. That is, he would normally 
say that a correctly infers q from p where p logically implies q; 
so as p logically implies p, he would'allow that we can correctly
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talk of inferring p from itself, even though this obviously fails to
satisfy the epistemic condition which Mill laid on inference. (To '
infer p from p is, of course, to make a very trivial inference - but
\ 4on the standard modern view it is to make an inference nonetheless.)
In support of the modern outlook is the fact that we do not have a 
satisfactory criterion of propositional identity of the sort Mill 
required in order to distinguish'rbetween what was and what was not 
inference. A vivid illustration of this is provided in the contrast 
between the views of Mill and of a logician in many ways inspired by 
him, H.W.B. Joseph, on so-called /immediate inference.' Mill argued 
that 'immediate inferences' are not really inferences, because 'The 
fact asserted in the conclusion is either the very same fact, or part 
of the fact, asserted in the original proposition' - and hence 'there 
is in the conclusion no new truth' (SL, p.l60). Joseph, on the other 
hand, while accepting the Millian claim that it is not inference 'to 
repeat in fresh words our original statement,' held that in immediate 
inference we ^  derive a new proposition,,by dint of altering the 
relation of the terms in the original premise: hence there is genuine 
inference here (Joseph, p.232), Such a dispute is tricky to settle; 
but the modern logician typically handles the notion of inference in 
a manner which enables him to avoid becoming embroiled in it.; A
Following Stewart and Reid very closely, Mill construed the Dictum 
(slightly incorrectly, as we shall see) as asserting 'That whatever 
can be affirmed (or denied) of a class, may be affirmed (or denied) 
of everything included in the class' (SL, p.174)* Mill's substitution 
of 'class' for Stewart's 'genus' is merely a stylistic change; both 
words for both men in this connection simply meant 'collection.' The 
nub of Mill's objection to the Dictum, which explains why he thought 
that it could not be the 'principle' of syllogism, whether syllogism 
is inference or not, is t^at it fails to link in with the fact that 
our thought is not merely about things and collections of things, but 
is also about the properties or attributes which things have. General 
terms have a kind of meaning for which Mill borrowed the scholastic 
word 'connotation,' and explained as their implying possession of att­
ributes (^, Bk.I.ch.ii.sect.5). ^ A term like 'white, ' for example, 
he held to denote all those things which ahe white, and to connote 
the attribute whiteness ; the word 'white,' he explained, 'is not pred­
icated of the attribute, but of the subjects, snow, &c.; but when we 
predicate it of them, we convey the meaning that the attribute white­
ness belongs to them' (SL, p.3l). The trouble with the Dictum was 
precisely that it ignored connotation, and in Mill's opinion this
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disqualified it from being an adequate characterisation of the syllog­
istic process.
Mill believed that the Dictum had its natural basis in what he 
called the ’ultra-nominalism' of Hobbes and Condillac which, on his 
rendering of it, construed general terms as non-connotative class 
names, and subject-predicate propositions as having the function of 
arbitrarily assigning objects to classes (attributes or properties 
not being countenanced by the theory) (SL, Dk.I.ch.iv.sect.2,3; Bk.II. 
ch.ii.sect.2,3), The result of such doctrines, he contended, was 
that one took to thinking that 'the investigation of truth consist/s/ 
entirely or partly in some kind of conjuration with ... names,' and 
that epistemic advance in, deductive reasoning 'consists in the mere 
substitution of one set of arbitrary signs for another' (SL, pp.175“ 
76). The Dictum, holding, in accordance with these nominalist views,, 
that the minor premise of a syllogism asserts that something belongs 
to a class, and the major premise that that class is included in 
another class, takes the conclusion to affirm no more than that 'what 
was included in the lower class is included in the higher, ' and thus 
that 'the classification is consistent with itself ; and this, Mill
f
urged, is only acceptable if we believe that a sufficient account
of the meaning of a proposition is that it 'refers something to, or
excludes something from, a class' (SL, p. 177) * He.'vcontinued:
Every proposition which conveys real information asserts
a matter of fact, dependent on the laws of nature, and not
on classification. It asserts that a given object does or
does not possess a given attribute; or it asserts that
two attributes, or sets of attributes, do or do not
(constantly or occasionally) coexist. Since such is the
purport of all propositions which convey any real
knowledge, and since ratiocination is a mode of acq-
uiring real knowledge, any theory of ratiocination which
does not recognise this import of propositions, cannot,
' we may be sure, be the true one (ibid.).
Had classes been entities 'per se' (by which Mill appears to have
meant, had they possessed some kind of transcendental reality in
6the manner of Plato's forms), the Dictum would not, he conceded, 
have been in such a plight, for it would have expressed what he 
somewhat obscurely termed 'the intercommunity of nature' (SL, p.174), 
which would obtain if such transcendental realities existed. But 
since they do not, the Dictum, while not false, is quite unillumin-
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ating as to the nature of the syllogistic process.
The Examination repeated the criticism of the Dictum, and intro­
duced some new terminology in which to state it. Mill recalled that 
what Hamilton had called an 'intensive or Comprehensive' reading of 
a proposition construes the notion of the subject as containing that 
of the predicate, and while he rejected such readings on the ground 
that they wrongly interpret the predicate notion as being part of 
the meaning of the subject term, he adopted the label 'comprehen­
sive' for that reading of a proposition which reveals the. connotat- 
ive significance of its general terms, and consequently the charac­
ter of the thought that it conveys. To read a proposition 'in Ext­
ension,' on the other hand, is, according to Mill, to read it by an 
artificial principle of abstraction which ignores attributes in 
favour of classes, which are no more than their pale shadows:
To say, all men are bipeds, is merely to say, given the 
attributes of man, that of being a biped will be found 
along with them; which is the meaning in Comprehension.
■ ... When I say. All men are bipeds, what has my assert­
ion to do with the class biped*"as to its Extension?
Have I any concern with the remainder of the class, 
after Man is subtracted from it? ,.I am thinking of no 
such matter, but only of the attribute two-footed, 
and am intending to predicate that (EH, p.340).
If the foregoing criticism of the Dictum is read as criticism of 
the Dictum qua principle ,pf syllogistic inference, it can be seen to 
involve a serious non-sequitur. Let it be granted for the sake of arg­
ument that propositional meaning cannot be fully analysed without 
reference to attributes (which is indeed a highly plausible thesis): 
still, it does not follow from this that an account of inference 
has to refer to attributes, as Mill claimed. Even if ascribing att­
ributes to objects is conceptually prior, to assigning objects to 
classes, this does not imply that it is not class relationships which 
are the most crucial thing for inference. My assigning Socrates to 
the class of men may be conceptually posterior to my ascribing to 
him the attributes of man (or, perhaps,' the attribute of being a man),
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but if I infer that he is mortal from the premises that he is a man, 
and that men are mortal, the form of my argument, on the most straight­
forward construal of it, involves classifying Socrates as a man,, and 
men as mortal beings, and so concluding that Socrates is a member 
of the class of mortal beings. To challenge this. Mill would need 
to do more than simply point to the fact that the propositions of 
a syllogism contain connotative terms; for that is just not incomp­
atible with an extensional account of the structure of syllogistic 
inference. (This is not to deny that there can be syllogisms-in-inten- 
sion, but it is to counter Mill's claim that actual reasonings are 
never syllogisms-in-extension.) Even if the importance of a syllog­
istic conclusion is that it is a newly established proposition to 
the effect that an individual object, or class of objects, possesses 
a certain attribute, it cannot be presumed that its derivation was 
non-extensional. If syllogistic reasoning can be most simply, but 
still adequately and validly, carried out without involving thought 
about attributes, there is no good reason why it should not be. It 
would certainly not be a sound objection to this to say that if ext— 
ensional syllogising is a very simple process, then it is hard to 
see how it can ever be an illuminating one. The problem of how ded­
uction is capable of leading to genuine epistemic advance remains 
in need of solution, but it would only be a fraudulent response to 
it to pretend that deductive reasonings are really more complex than 
they are. Given extensional syllogising as a possibility, there is 
no hope of finding an answer to the problem along these lines.
This rejoinder to Mill's objections to the Dictum as the principle 
of syllogism, while effective against the ipsissima verba of his dis­
cussion, needs to be reconsidered if his deeper intention was, as I 
have suggested, to deny that the Dictum correctly characterised the 
content and relations of the propositions of a syllogism considered 
as something other than an inference. If his underlying purpose was 
not to show that the Dictum was, not the logical principle of syllog­
istic inference, but to establish that the semantic character of non- 
inf erential syllogistic processes could not be captured by it, then 
what has so far been said is not suf*ficient to demonstrate the fail­
ure of his attempt. If syllogising, as Mill wanted to explain it, 
essentially involved thought about objects and their attributes, 
then it would indeed appear that the.Dictum could not provide an 
adequate analysis of it. In fact, while Mill's positive theory of 
the syllogism, as we shall see in Chapter Three below, does make
reference to attributes, it does not do so essentially: that is,
■
it would be possible to reconstruct the account in purely extension­
al terms without altering its basic thrust. And that being so, it 
cannot be said that the Dictum is incapable of serving as the prin-. 
ciple of syllogism even on Mill's somewhat odd view of what syllogisms 
are; though on the other hand one might judge it not impermissible 
to prefer to it, as Mill did, a non-extensional alternative principle.
But there remains something unsatisfactory about Mill's method 
of objecting to the Dictum as trivial on the ground it does not mention 
attributes. Its not mentioning attributes might be objectionable if 
it is to be accounted as a principle about the meaning of the prop­
ositions of a syllogism regarded in the way Mill eventually wanted 
to regard it, that is, as a process of 'interpretation' rather than of 
inference (though, as I have hinted, an extensional interpretation of 
the syllogism seems perfectly possible even then). But on either the 
standard or the Millian view of what.a syllogism is, it is hard to 
see why Mill should equate extensionality and triviality. It may be 
that he fell into the error described above of thinking that if syll­
ogising were to involve thought about attributes, it would be a more 
arduous and thus more significant affair. Yet not only is the arduous­
ness of a thought process not a guarantee of its significance; it is 
not at all clear that merely by : admitting- attributes would syllog­
istic thinking become more difficult. It will be recalled that Mill 
stated the Dictum in the form:
(D1) Whatever can be affirmed (or denied) of a class, may be aff­
irmed (or denied) of everything included in the class.
But this principle can easily be rewritten to introduce a reference 
to attributes:
(D2) Whatever attributes can be affirmed (or denied) of a class,
may be affirmed (or denied) of everything included in the class.
The second version of the principle does not eliminate classes, but
.f
at least it does not suppress attributes, which was the nub of Mill's 
complaint against the first form of the Dictum. It is true that the 
mention of attributes in (D2) would not appeal to those who wish to 
preserve the Dictum in a purely extensional guise. But the point of 
present interest is that the introduction in (D2) of reference to 
attributes has scant tendency, to make us feel that (d 1) and (D2) 
differ in any marked way in respect of their obviousness; furthermore, 
it would appear less than even-handed to deny that (D2) was trivial 
while asserting that (D1) was.
The erroneousness of seeking for the .profundity of thought in 
the presence in it of a concern with.attributes can be further seen
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if we reflect on a point which, for simplicity's sake, has been ign­
ored in the discussion so far. Both (D1) and (D2) are actually miss­
tated, and are even false as they stand. For certain affirmations 
(or denials) can be made about a class which cannot be made about 
its members individually, though this contradicts (Bl) and (D2).
For instance, I might correctly affirm about a certain class that it 
is ten-membered (or, in the terminology of (D2), that it has the 
attribute of being ten-membered), but it does not follow that each 
of its members is also ten-membered. To cope with this difficulty,
(Bl) and (D2) might be rewritten thus;
(Bl') Whatever can be affirmed (or denied) individually of all the 
members of a class may be affirmed (or denied) of each individual 
included in it ;
(B2') Whatever attributes can be affirmed (or denied) individually 
of all the members of a class, may be affirmed (or denied) of each 
individual included in it.
But these seem even more obvious than did the misstated versions (D1) 
and (B2); and again it is significant that the second principle, which 
mentions attributes, does not score over the first in respect of app­
arent profundity.
It is plausible to suggest that Mill betrayed a:fundamental mis-
W '
understanding about what is required to vindicate syllogism as a. . 
useful thought process. What is needed for this purpose is not the 
identification of a principle of syllogism which is unobvious and 
profound, but rather the location of contexts of thought in which 
syllogising, trivial though it may seem when considered in abstr­
action from any setting, can play a valuable role. I shall argue in 
the following chapter that Mill, in spite of himself, did succeed in 
identifying a context of argument within which the syllogism, simple 
though its structure is, ÿilays an important and indeed indispens­
able role in advancing knowledge.
VI
Having weighed up the Dictum de omni et nullo and found it want­
ing., Mill proceeded to look for a non-extensional principle of syll­
ogism. The principle he lighted on came, he suggested, in two versions, 
which he sanguinely hoped that 'the intelligent reader' would see
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amounted to the same thing (SL, p.l8l). On the first version, the 
principle is (for syllogisms with affirmative major premises) that 
*a thing which coexists with another thing, which other coexists ■ 
with a third thing, also coexists with that third thing'; or (where 
the major premise is negative) that * a thing which coexists with 
another thing, with which other a third does not coexist, is not 
coexistent with that third thing* (SL, p.I78). On its second version 
the principle runs rather, differently:
^l^^hatever has any mark, has that which it is a mark of.
Or, when the minor premise as well as the major is univ­
ersal, we may state it thus: Whatever is a mark of any 
mark, is a mark of that which this last is a mark of
(^, p.181).
Mill added that the second form of the principle was the more reveal­
ing, and in an important footnote inserted in the 18?2 edition of 
the Logic he identified these 'axioms' with the principle tradition­
ally expressed in the wordh: Nota notae est nota rei ipsius (SL, p.. 
182).
Faint additional light is shed on these not very perspicuous form­
ulae by some earlier remarks in the Logic about the semantics of prop-
Î
ositions. In Bk.I.ch.vi Mill asserted that universal propositions can 
be looked on either as 'portions of speculative truth,' or alternat­
ively as 'memoranda for practical use,' and he explained the distin­
ction by saying that 'All men are mortal' can be read as affirming 
that 'the attributes of man are always accompanied by the attribute 
mortality, ' or that 'the attributes of man are .evidence of, are a - 
mark of, mortality; an indication by which the presence of that att­
ribute is made manifest' (SL, pp.116-1?). 'These two forms of expr­
ession, ' he insisted, 'are at bottom equivalent; but the one points 
the attention more directly to what a proposition means, the latter 
to the manner in which it is to be used' (SL, p.11?). But he failed 
to clarify this distinction betwe.en meaning and use beyond saying that 
in reasoning it is the 'practical use' of propositions which is of 
greater significance (ibid.).
Some perplexing questions arise over Mill's two accounts of the 
meaning of universal propositions, and ovpr the two versions of the 
principle of syllogism which stem from themo What precisely did he 
intend by his distinction between the meaning of a proposition and 
the manner in which it is used? On what basis did he believe that 
the meaning and use versions of the analysis of universal propositions ,
.
or of the principle of syllogism, were equivalent -, a claim which in 
neither case is prima facie plausible? And how did he hope to supp­
ort the view, which initially seems out of the question, that 'All. 
men are mortal' can be taken to affirm that manhood is evidence of 
mortality? Even if one allowed that something's being a man could be 
regarded as evidential of its being mortal, it does not seem to be 
this claim about evidence which 'All men are mortal' is making, but 
rather one about objects.„and attributes to the effect that if some­
thing is a man, then it is mortal (i.e. has the attribute of mortal- 
. ity). In fact. Mill's responses to these questions are nugatory.
Certainly he did not manage to sustain his claim that his versions 
of Nota notae represented an improvement on the Dictum as principles 
of syllogism. The first formula, that 'A thing which coexists with 
another thing, which other coexists with a third thing, also coex­
ists with that third thing,' he presumably intended to be understood 
as a principle about attributes, .in accordance with his first inter­
pretation of the meaning of universal propositions. Alexander Bain 
in his own Logic stated the Nota notae principle, as Mill did, in 
terms of 'things,' but explicitly observed that the coexistence at 
issue was one of attributes (Bain (l895)> p.157)* But, as Bain pointed 
out. Nota notae understood this way is too clumsy fto distinguish, 
as an adequate principle of syllogism should, between the 'total and 
partial coincidence of terms, the observation of which is the essen­
tial precaution in syllogizing' (ibid.; cf. Jackson ( 1941a), pp.72-73. The 
formula is far too hazy about matters of distribution which are crit­
ical in syllogistic reasoning, and blurs the important feature that 
the terms of a valid syllogistic argument do not have to be coexten­
sive, Thus if I argue that Socrates is mortal- from the premises that 
Socrates is a man and men are mortal, it is necessary to the validity 
of my inference that there should be no men who are not mortal, but 
it is indifferent whether there are any mortal beings who are not men.
- a feature not identified by Mill's formula which, if anything, gives 
a misleading impression that for the validity of the inference all 
mortal beings should be men. Mill responded to Bain in the 18?2 edition 
of the Logic by remarking that this unclarity in the first statement 
of Nota notae would in practice be unlikely to lead anyone astray 
(SL, pp.181-82), This, however, by his own testimony must be an ignor- 
atio elenchi, for he had said that the first statement of the prin­
ciple was intended not as a guide to practice, but as a theoretical 
account of the 'ground of the legitimacy* of syllogisms, and as such 
it is unsuitably imprecise (SL, p.1?8).
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Mill further commented that his second, or 'practical,* form of 
the Nota notae could hardly lead anyone astray in the manner envis­
aged by Bain; for:
No one would be in any danger of inferring that because 
a is a mark of b, b can never exist without a; that 
because being in a consumption is a mark of being about 
to die, no one dies who is not in a consumption 
(SL^ p.182).
Maybe so; but there are other good reasons for doubting the adequacy 
of the second form of the principle. It has already been pointed out 
that it is not really plausible to read the proposition 'All men are 
mortal' as asserting that the attribute of manhood is evidential of 
the attribute of mortality (that is^ in the terminology of 'marks,' 
that manhood is a 'mark' of mortality). But such an analysis i^ even 
more strikingly impossible in the case of many other propositions.
It will not do, as Mill himself was aware, for singular propos­
itions, The contribution which 'Socrates is a man* makes in a syllog­
ism cannot be rendered as 'Socrates is a mark of man'; so instead 
Mill construed it, with scant regard for consistency, as 'Socrates 
has the marks of man' (SL, p.l80). And while he did not mention part—
icular propositions in this context, a proposition: like 'Some men are
- ' U  '• ■ .
mortal' would have to be treated analogously to 'Socrates is mortal, '
for it cannot be held to assert, or in any way imply, an evidential
relationship between the attributes of manhood and of mortality (for
if it did so, it would be incompatible - which it is not - with 'Some
men are not mortal'). The chances thus come to seem remote that Mill's
theory of propositional significance will provide any satisfactorily
unified account of predication. But there is worse still in store.
Mill's evidentialist interpretation of universal propositions cannot
reasonably be applied even to all propositions of the form 'All Ps
’(
are G,' Such a proposition as 'All people in this room have black 
hair' is a specimen of a generalisation which, if it is true, is so 
accidentally only, and it is inadmissible to suppose it to assert 
that there is an evidential relation between being a person in this 
room and having black hair. Yet such a proposition can obviously stand 
as the major premise of a syllogism. Therefore what Mill describes as 
the 'general formula' of syllogism, namely:
Attribute A is a mark of attribute B,
The given object has the mark A, 
therefore ,
The given object has the attribute B
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(ibid.), does not provide an analysis of the syllogism:
All people in this room have black hair,
Charles is a person in this room, 
therefore 
Charles has black hair, j 
On the other hand, the Dictum supplies an accurate account of its 
structure. Mill's theory, then, cannot cope with major premises which 
are accidentally true "and<notelawlike propositions.
The failure of Mill's principle of syllogism can be seen from an­
other angle too. Talk of evidence and marks sounds more appropriate 
in the context of inductive than of deductive argument, and we often 
speak of one proposition's being evidence for another, or of a 
thing's possessing some attribute as evidence for its possessing some 
other attribute, where we do not consider that the conclusions we 
draw from the evidence follow with deductive certainty. It might be, 
for instance, that a careful investigation has revealed that every 
time that an object has been observed to have the attribute A, it 
has also had the attribute D; and on this basis it is reasonable to 
say that possession of A is inductive (though not conclusive) evid­
ence for possessing B - which in more Millian language can be expr­
essed by saying that A is a mark of B. Now the ar^ment :
■ :
Attribute A is a mark of attribute B, • '
The given object has the attribute A, 
therefore
The given object has the attribute B 
will, on these presuppositions, be a strong inductive argument, but 
it is not a deductive one as the premises could be true and the con­
clusion false. Yet this schema is just Mill's 'general formula' of 
syllogism again! That formula, then, fails to represent a deductive 
structure.
It would not help Mill to mend matters to specify that the major 
premise of a deductively valid syllogism has to express a wholly 
watertight evidential relation, such that one attribute is a mark of 
another only if where the former is found, the latter is never abs­
ent. This leaves Mill without a theory of-the structure of syllog­
isms whose major premises express something other than exceptionless 
or lawlike connections of attributes. Moreover, the account still 
fails to characterise a deductive structure. There may be a law of 
nature relating two attributes which is so well attested that one 
may, with the utmost safety, be taken as a mark of the other, yet the 
schema:
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Attribute A is a (wholly reliable) mark of the attribute B,
The given object has the mark A,
therefore •
The given object has the attribute B 
characterises a limiting case of inductive argument still, and ded­
uctive arguments are not to be identified with such limiting cases. 
Inductive arguments (waiving Hume's objections to them for the pres­
ent) may be ranged on a spectrum of strength, but a deductive argu­
ment is different in kind from even the strongest inductive argument,- 
and only where an argument is deductive is it formally self-contrad­
ictory, to accept the premises and reject the conclusion. It is worth 
remarking that the traditional understanding of the Nota notae prin­
ciple was considerably different from Mill'$, and that the problems 
with his account have little relevance for the evaluation of this
non-extensional principle of deductive syllogistic inference as
. 7understood by Aristotle and later- logicians. As Mill interprets 
it, however, it quite fails to challenge in any serious way the Dictum's 
claim to provide the most perspicuous principle of thè;syllogistic 
process. ^
This verdict stands even when we recall that Mill ultimately meant
A'. . . ' :
to deny that syllogisms are genuine inferences. Regarded not as the 
principle of syllogistic inference, but rather of syllogism in the 
role of a process of 'interpretation,' Mill's laboured account of Nota 
notae still fails to give a plausible account of the significance and 
mutual relations of the propositions of a syllogism. His semantics 
of 'marks' provides no persuasive readings of syllogistic proposit­
ions, and we have seen that the proper place for the notion of-marks, 
or evidence, is in the discussion of inductive reasoning. Yet it is 
interesting to note that Mill returns to the subject of marks when 
expounding his theory that real inference is always inductive in nat- 
ure; and he there states the view that^the role of syllogistic major 
premises is to serve as 'memoranda.' of evidential relationships we 
have discovered to hold - e.g. between the attributes of men and the 
attribute of mortality (SL, Bk.II.ch.iii.sect.4)- But although he 
speaks of using a proposition like 'All men are mortal' as a 'memo­
randum' that we have found the attributes of men to be a mark of the 
attribute of mortality, he refers no more to Nota notae, and stops 
short of saying that asserting that all..men are mortal is asserting 
that such an evidential relation holds. In fact it is difficult to 
tell whether Mill has now abandoned his.earlier view of Nota notae 
altogether, or whether he intends to preserve it (though in a guise
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still further removed from that of its traditional acceptation) in 
the watered-down form of a principle not about the semantic signif­
icance of the propositions of a syllogism, but merely to .the effect 
that universal propositions can be useful in summing up the tendencies 
of inductive investigations. Such a (weak) statement is no doubt unob­
jectionable, though we shall see that it can hardly be the whole 
truth about the function of universal propositions in the pursuit of 
knowledge. Furthermore, it is hot even strictly necessary that the : • 
view of major propositions as memoranda rather than premises should 
be delivered in non-extensional terms. Although Mill fails to mention 
the fact, a universal proposition could be regarded as a record of 
the results of an inductive investigation in the form of a memoran­
dum that all examined members of one class had been found to be mem­
bers of another. And such a view would have the merit of avoiding 
altogether any taint of suspicion of being connected with a false 
evidentialist account of propositional significance.
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Mill's dissatisfaction with the claims of the Dictum de omni et 
nullo to represent the structure of the syllogistic process arose 
from his conviction that an adequate principle of syllogism must 
mention attributes: whether or not to syllogise is to infer, it will, 
on his view, be a perfectly trivial thought process if it is concér- 
ned only with objects and'classes. In the previous chapter I have 
argued that Mill's objections to the Dictum are mi-sconceived and 
his proposed alternative non-extensional'principle'/of syllogism un­
satisfactory. But now we must turn, as Mill did after completing his 
discussion of the Dictum, to the question of whether syllogism is 
really a form of inference at all.
The notorious claim, in Bk.II.ch.iii of the Logic, that syllogism 
is not inference has had few defenders, and it may seem too obviously 
implausible to be worth discussing. Nevertheless, even unacceptable 
doctrines are sometimes based on considerations of intrinsic inter­
est, and that is the case here. Mill felt forced into adopting this 
view of syllogism by his despair of being able to vindicate the claim 
that syllogistic processes can produce epistemic advance; and it will 
be recalled that for Mill, nothing was to be allowed the status of 
inference which did not further knowledge. It is true that if we did 
not insist on this necessary condition for inference, we could retain 
the notion of syllogising being a mode of inferring even if we thought, 
like Mill, that it was incapable of leading to new knowledge. But 
the deeper question Mill was raising does not turn on the definition 
of 'inference'; it is the question of whether (and if so, how) by 
syllogising we can advance in knowledge. Or rather, this was just the 
specific form in which Mill was addressing a more fundamental issue
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still, namely whether deductive processes can he genuinely illumin­
ating, and, if they can, what it is about them which enables them to 
be so.
In his 1828 review of Whately’s Elements, Mill was convinced that 
syllogising did lead to new knowledge, but was puzzled about: how it
could do so, as it appeared to involve nothing more than a very str­
aightforward unpacking of the content of premises already knovm to us. 
But by the date of the first edition of the Logic, he had abandoned 
the idea that such a process could actually be productive of any real 
illumination, and with it the notion that new knowledge could be the 
fruit of deduction. In one respect, however. Mill’s despair can seem 
quite justified, given that his theory of deductive logic admitted only 
the limited repertoire of syllogistic methods. He believed that the 
relation between a set of premises and its consequences was always 
that which holds between a universal proposition and the instances it 
subsumes ; thus it seemed surprising in the extreme that;
mankind may correctly apprehend and fully assent to a
general proposition, yet remain for ages ignorant of
myriads of truths which are embodied in it, and which, 
in fact, are but so many particular cases of that which, 
as a general truth, they have long known (WE, p.34).
This concept of the relationship between premises and consequences 
has long ago been discarded as a general account of deductive struc­
tures, but a pre-modern logician who held it certainly had some reason 
for doubt about the prospects of finding an explanation of how deduc­
tion could lead to the development of such sciences as geometry. Mill 
saw that a purely syllogistic logic could hardly be ascribed respon­
sibility for the derivation of all the theorems which geometers have 
arrived at. One might wonder at this juncture whether it ever occurred 
to him to suspect that th^re might be some radical but reparable 
defect in his notion of deductive method, particularly as he had so 
resolutely asserted in 1828 that, ’All geometry is in reality implied 
in the axioms and definitions, and all mechanics in the three laws of 
motion, and that of the composition and resolution of forces’ (WE, 
p.33). But whether or not it ever did. Mill finally failed to preserve 
the insight that theorems in geometry are the result of deduction 
(only not, or not at any rate exclusively, syllogistic deduction), and 
abandoned the idea that they were the product of deduction altogether. 
This was a false step; yet it may be that he partly felt driven to take 
it because he glimpsed, through the more specific problems of the
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syllogism, a quite general problem of understanding how in principle 
deductive reasonings can bring enlightenment.
There was, in any case, another and a very important motivation ' 
behind his contention that syllogistic inference cannot advance know­
ledge. This was his conviction that every syllogistic argument des­
igned to prove its conclusion inevitably commits a fallacy of petitio 
principii, or begging the question. In fact it is not quite correct 
to describe Mill as hol’ding the petitio objection to syllogism to be 
another reason for disbelieving in the capacity of deductive reason­
ing to produce epistemic advance. Rather, he regarded the petitio 
complaint as simply a sharp way of presenting the objection that syll­
ogistic. methods are incapable of advancing knowledge. There is no 
mention of petitio in the review of Whately, although Whately’s book 
actually discusses this objection to syllogism; apparently Mill in 
1828 had not become impressed by it in the way he was to do so later 
on. Whatever he thought of the petitio objection in 1828 (if he thought 
of it at all), it was unfortunate that in the Logic he viewed it as 
in essence indistinguishable from the problem about new knowledge. I 
shall attempt to show that this was a mistake, and one which had ser­
ious consequences for his final view of the nature/.of syllogism and 
deduction. The ground on which he argued that every syllogistic arg­
ument intended as a proof of its conclusion commits a petitio is, 
properly considered, quite distinct from that which might make us 
wonder how it is that a deductive process can take us to interesting 
new knowledge. By confusing two different problems about deductive 
logic. Mill made it more difficult to see a way out of either.
The fact that Mill confused two different problems had the espec­
ially unfortunate consequence that it prevented him from seeing that 
to one of them - the problem about apparent syllogistic petitio - 
he had, without realising^it, an answer to give^ and an answer, more­
over, superior to any of the others which have from time to time been 
offered in the defence of syllogism against the petitio charge! That 
he failed to draw out that answer properly and recognise it for what 
it was is due to his confusion of the petitio issue with the problem 
about informativeness to which he did not have an answer. Unsurpr­
isingly, Mill’s failure to realise that he'could answer the petitio 
objection has effectively disguised from his commentators the fact 
that he had an answer. Mill’s way out of the petitio problem, as we 
shall see, consisted in showing how even the most apparently vulner­
able syllogistic proofs are in practice usually saved from begging 
the question by the nature of the contexts in which they opcur.
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Although Mill was not the first philosopher of note to take up 
the issue of whether syllogistic arguments to prove conclusions are 
inevitably question-begging, the extended and intriguing discussion 
in Bk.II.ch.iii of the Logic has with some justice become the locus 
classicus for later students of the problem. Sixteen centuries earl­
ier the sceptic Sextus Empiricus had urged that every syllogistic 
proof commits a petitio (Sextus Empiricus, Bk.II, 195-97)^  but Mill 
was probably stimulated to' address the issue by reading about it in 
Dugald Stewart; in fact both Stewart and Whately derived their own 
interest in it from the very articulate resurrection of the charge 
in George Campbell’s Philosophy of Rhetoric of I776. On the basis 
of the confusion to which I have referred. Mill felt obliged to con­
cede that syllogisms qua proofs of their conclusions would indeed beg 
the question. Yet present also in his chapter is a second line of 
argument which, if it had been more sharply drawn into focus, would 
have brought him to realise that His concession was unjustified. In 
order to disentangle Mill’s complex and difficult views, it is nec­
essary first to return to his reflections on the issue of the infor­
mativeness of deduction. . *
II
A well-known passage in Mill’s Autobiography recalls his specul­
ations on deduction in the period between the review of Whately and 
the first edition of the Logic:
I ... puzzled myself, like others before me, with the 
great paradox of the discovery of new truths by general 
reasoning. As littlp could it be doubted, that all reas­
oning is resolvable into syllogisms, and that in every 
syllogism the conclusion is‘actually contained and 
implied in the premises. How, being so contained and 
implied, it could be new truth, and how the theorems 
of geometry, so different in appearance from the def­
initions and axioms, could be all contained in these, 
was a difficulty which no one, I thought, had suffic­
iently felt, and which, at all events, no one had 
succeeded in clearing up (AU, p.189).
Whately and others, he continued, had offered explanations which gave 
’a temporary satisfaction,’ yet they ’left a mist still hanging over
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the subject’ (ibid.).
Hill’s ’great paradox’ is presented here in a subtle and penetrating 
way. Mill realised, as undoubtedly many other philosophers of logic 
have not, that the question ’How may deductive inference be product­
ive of new knowledge?* is not really cleared up by saying - though it 
is quite correct to say - that deducing conclusions from premises 
is informative where those conclusions are, so to speak, hidden con­
sequences of the premises.- To reveal hitherto unknown consequences 
of a set of premises by deductive reasoning is indeed to advance know­
ledge by deduction; and to recognise this fact is, at one level, to 
have an answer to the question of how deduction can be informative.
But Mill saw that to provide such an ’answer’ is actually just to 
sharpen our focus on the original problem. Deductive reasoning reveals 
hidden consequences, and is thereby informative: but the question 
now outstanding is how consequences can be hidden in premises. How,^ 
for instance, as Mill asked, can ^ all the theorems of geometry, ’so 
different in appearance from the definitions and axioms,’ be all con­
tained in these? To have a proper and satisfying explanation of how 
deductive inference can produce new knowledge, it is necessary to 
have an explanation of deduction’s capacity to reveal previously unsus­
pected implications of premises. Mill’s view in 1^43 /and after was
I 'i % '
that deductive reasoning only seem.s to reveal hiddéh consequences 
but does not really do so - a surprising view at first sight, but 
less so once its aetiology has been clarified; But as soon as : 
he had adopted this line. Mill had to conclude that deduction could 
not be productive of new knowledge, could therefore not be (on his 
terms) a form of inference at all, and must thus be a process of some 
other, non-inferential kind.
The problem about hidden consequences arises out of a feature of 
the relationship between the premises and the conclusion of a valid 
deductive argument which Mill described by saying that the premises 
of such an argument contain and imply the conclusion. The root prob­
lem is: How is it that we can understand a set of premises and yet 
not know that it implies some proposition which it does imply? Or, 
in the idiom of containment (though this seems more appropriate in 
some cases than others): If the premises of valid deductive arguments 
contain their conclusions, then why are deductive inferences not so 
obvious that they do not really bring about an epistemic advance?
It might seem that if we really understood a proposition or set of 
nronositionS; we would automatically recognise what is contained and
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implied in it. Mill wanted to know how the science of geometry could 
take a long time to complete if all its theorems were contained and 
implied in axioms and definitions we feel we understand perfectly.
A natural expectation would he that either the fruit of deductive 
reasoning would not he interesting new knowledge, hut simply a rep­
etition in a verbally different form of what was known when the 
premises were known; or, if the conclusion did represent an epistemic 
advance, it must have been obtained through means other than by 
deduction from premises containing and implying it. Mill eventually 
settled for the second of these alternatives, though both are mis­
guided.
People sometimes use the idiom of containment when explaining the 
difference between deductive and inductive consequence (to wit, the 
nremises of deductive arguments contain the conclusion, those of ind­
uctive arguments do not), or when attempting to account for the nec­
essity of deductive inference (deductive inference is necessary bec­
ause the conclusion is already contained in the premises, and only 
needs to be revealed). It is hard to deny that such talk does, at 
least initially, assist our intuitive grasp of the nature of deduc­
tion. Even the most highly sophisticated philosophers occasionally 
talk about the containment of conclusions in premises; we have seen 
that Frege spoke of the whole of mathematics being contained in a 
small number of primitive truths *as in a kernel,’ while Dummett 
appears to accept the notion of containment as being serviceable as 
a metaphor, if in need of elucidation (Dummett (1978), p.300). Fur­
ther, the idiom seems defensible by reference to our common habit of 
talking of the content (i.e. informational content) of propositions. 
Roughly, the content of a proposition is what it means, what it can 
be used to assert; and it seems a natural extension from talking of 
a proposition’s explicit content - what, so to spea.k, it is saying on 
the surface - to talk of its implicit content, which is still part 
of what it it is saying, but not what it says openly, so that we need 
to employ inferential techniques to reveal it.
But talk of containment is not always equally appealing. It cert­
ainly seems perfectly apposite to say about the argument 
p & q, therefore p . *
that the premise contains the conclusion; here the conclusion, ’p', 
is actually present as one item of the conjunction ’p & q ’ which 
forms the premise, and in inferring it we are extracting part of the 
content of the premise. But then, it is’also valid to argue 
' p, therefore p or q,
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yet it no longer seems so intuitively satisfactory to describe the 
conclusion as contained in the premise. Moreover, there is not really 
much of a perspicuous analogy between logical and physical contain-- 
ment to help things along. Premises do not contain conclusions in 
the way a house contains ten rooms or a box a hundred nails. It is 
quite true that I can be familiar with the outside of a house or of 
a box while being ignorant about its contents. But deductive reason­
ing can hardly be like entering the house or opening the box-to survey 
the inside. For one thing, a house or a box does not have an infinite 
number of contents, but each proposition has infinitely many logical 
consequences. And even where we have not deduced many or even any 
consequences of a set of premises, we often feel reasonably entitled 
to hold that we understand those premises, and our situation here 
does not seem very closely analogous to that of confronting an unop­
ened box or standing before a house we have not entered, (it is more 
akin, apparently, to opening the box or goingiinto the house and then 
somehow still not perceiving the contents.) It could be argued that 
we should not talk of fully understanding, or fully penetrating into 
the meaning of, any propositions, on the ground that to understand a 
proposition fully involves knowing all its consequences, and this we 
can never do because they are infinite in number; however, whether or 
not we choose to handle the notion of fully understanding a propos­
ition on this very rigorous line, the salient point at present is 
that we can surely speak quite legitimately of understanding, say, 
Peano’s postulates, while having to admit that we have so far recog­
nised only a few of their consequences. And while the young Mill was 
not puzzling as to why we do not immediately grasp all the consequences 
of the propositions we understand, he was reasonably enough concerned 
to enquire why deductive reasoning from premises we understand _so 
often produces enlightenment. In one sense, it seems that we already
----   ,f
have the consequences in having the premises from which they can be 
inferred; yet we may need to perform complex step-by-step deductions 
to learn what those consequences are.
But would these difficulties disappear if we abandoned the contain­
ment idiom, and simply spoke of premises implying conclusions? Is it 
less mysterious to suppose that we can be ignorant of all or most of 
the conseouences logically implied by a set of premises we understand, 
than it is to suppose that we can be ignorant of all or most of the 
consequences contained in those premises? Perhaps the problem stands 
out more when raised in terms of a relation of containment between
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premises and conclusions, but it does not really evaporate if that f t 
talk of containment is jettisoned. If we think of premises as cont­
aining their conclusions, this can set up the expectation that those 
conclusions should in all cases be fairly obvious, so that if we thor­
oughly understand our premises, we should be immediately aware of num­
erous of their consequences - as if understanding must be an act of 
instant revelation of contents. But while the fact that the conseq­
uences of premises frequently are not as immediately accessible as 
the containment idiom might perhaps lead us to expect casts doubt on 
the appropriateness of that idiom, it remains puzzling just how con­
sequences can be obscure. Merely to say, 'Well, that's just in the 
nature of implication; it's a brute fact that premises can imply 
consequences which are far from obvious,* fails to get to grips with 
the issue. That consequences can be well hidden is not in question, 
but what continues to seem mysterious is, as Dummett has written, how 
we can have accomplished all that is needed by way of the granting 
of premises sufficient for drawing a conclusion (we also require here, 
of course, a suitable rule of inference), and yet still find it enl­
ightening to draw that conclusion (Dummett (1978), p.297)» Whether we 
say that the conclusion is contained in, or just that it is implied 
by, our premises, it seems right to say ,that in having understood and 
granted the premises we must then be in some sense in possession of 
the conclusion. And yet it may take much time and effort before we 
actually recognise that conclusion, and we may then find that we have 
derived something both unforseen and enlightening. The problem of 
how a person can understand a set of premises without knowing, of a 
given proposition implied by them, that it is implied by them, which 
we may label the 'hidden consequences problem^* is not merely a prob­
lem which arises when we press the idiom of premises containing concl­
usions; it remains even iff we abandon the attempt to characterise 
the nature of implication in terms of containment. It is most properly 
classified as a problem for the theory of meaning, where the theory
of meaning is conceived as having a responsibility for clarifying
1
the nature of linguistic understanding.
We saw in Chapter One that Dummett has been impressed by the prob­
lems which exercised Mill, and has spoken 'of a 'tension between what 
seems necessary to account for [ÿci£] legitimacy [of deduction/ and 
what seems necessary to account for its usefulness' (ibid.). Susan 
Haack has recently disputed Dummett*s claim that there is a tension 
in this area, and in effect .dismisses the hidden consequences problem
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as bogus. After pointing out that there is no direct contradiction 
between holding that deductive implication is necessary and that 
deductive inference is informative, she denies that there is any 
indirect contradiction either, holding it to be unproblematic that 
’understanding comes in degrees' and that a person can have 'suffic­
ient understanding of a proposition for it to be true to say of him 
that he believes it, without his having the complete understanding 
that might require him.to.recognise all its logical consequences' 
(Haack, p.227). (She adds - irrelevantly, if what has been said above 
is correct - that Dummett may be misled by taking too literally the 
notion that a valid argument is one in which the conclusion is con­
tained in the premises.) To some extent, Haack is distorting Dumm­
ett 's view by interpreting his word 'tension' as 'contradiction,' 
and while her view is quite closely reasoned, she appears not to 
have grasped fully the basic issue of concern to him (and to Mill).
As she concedes, we can have an understanding of a proposition suff­
icient for our being able to believe it while yet being unaware of 
many of its logical consequences. Now the striking thing about
such understanding is the way in which it characteristically excludes
*
the feeling that there is anything residually cryptic or obscure 
about the proposition understood: when we understand a proposition 
in this way we feel that we know our way around it.:' and that it has 
no dark corners into which we cannot see. Is this feeling merely 
illusory? At any rate, it needs to be explained how this can be our 
feeling, whilst it is also true that even simple deductive inferences 
from premises that we feel to be thoroughly unobscure and bathed in 
the light of understanding can be informative. My suggestion is not 
that we have to confess that there is something quite ineluctably 
paradoxical here, but only that we have more to learn about the 
nature of understanding before we can fully characterise what happens 
when we make an illuminating deductive inference. Haack, then, has 
not established that the hidden consequences problem is unreal.
One possible misunderstanding of the hidden consequences problem 
is worth noting. Mill pointed out, very realistically, that deduc­
tive sciences advance by means of chains of deductions, interim 
conclusions serving as premises of later inferences (SL, Bk.11.ch.iv). 
(However, what Mill, following convention, called chains of deduc- 
tions he actually insisted on construing as inductive in their inf­
erential aspects.) In providing a comprehensive answer to the question 
of how deduction brings us new knowledge it would be appropriate to 
refer to the fact that it is actually through chains of deductions
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that many of the more interesting results in deductive theories 
emerge'; and it is a further point of interest that as chains of 
inferences can he difficult to construct, such results may take a - 
long time to derive. At one, reasonably superficial, level, there 
is in the latter consideration an answer to Mill's question why a 
science like geometry takes such a long time to develop. But it is 
important to avoid thinking that the recognition of the need for 
chains of deductions in deductive sciences ena,bles us to solve the 
hidden consequences problem. It is not because chains of deduct­
ions are hard to construct that consequences are hidden. Rather, it 
is because consequences are often non-obviously implied by premises 
tha.t deductive reasoning can be difficult - and chain reasoning 
especially so. (Hence the ultimate answer to the question of how 
deduction can be illuminating remains that consequences of premises 
can be unapparent - so unapparent, indeed, that it may require a 
chain of reasoning to reveal them, as in the case of many of the 
theorems of geometry derived from the axioms and definitions of that 
science.) To explain why consequences can initially be remote from 
view by the difficulty of constructing deductive chains which reveal 
them would be like explaining the original presence of ore deep in 
a mine by the difficulty of constructing the mine,: ' ;
W :
III
Once he had become unsure whether syllogistic reasoning could 
really reveal hidden consequences of the premises, Mill came to doubt 
whether syllogising could be genuinely illuminating. Unfortunately, 
he confused (as it is eas^ to do) the "problems: of how syllogising 
can produce new knowledge and how it can avoid begging the question. 
In Bk.111.ch.iii of the Logic, he.showed no awareness that he was 
running quite different issues together:
It is universally allowed that a syllogism is vicious 
if there be anything more in the conclusion than was 
assumed in the premises. But this is, in fact, to say 
that nothing ever was, or can be, proved by syllogism, 
which was not known, or assumed to be known, before.
Is ratiocination, then, not a process of inference?
And is the syllogism ...% really, entitled to be called 
, inference at all? This seems an inevitable consequence
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of the doctrine, admitted hy all writers on the 
subject, that a syllogism can prove no more than 
is involved in the premises (^, p.183).
This passage demonstrates Mill’s growing feeling that deduction (or 
syllogising at any rate) can achieve no more than trivially ’reveal’ 
obvious,consequences of premises. But he immediately went on to 
redescribe the difficulty he had just mentioned (and which he said 
vjas the reason why so many people ’have been led to impute uselessness 
and frivolity to the syllogistic theory’) as that of the petitio 
principii apparently present in every syllogism (ibid.). It is true, 
as Mill said, that a syllogism, considered as a proof of its concl­
usion, would be fallacious if the content of its conclusion outran ' 
that of its premises. It would in that case be formally invalid; but 
the charge of petitio Mill thought would hold even against formally 
valid syllogistic proofs, where the content of the conclusion did not 
extend beyond that of the premises. Mill’s account of this ancient 
charge against syllogistic proofs is admirably clear:
It must be granted that in every syllogism, considered 
as an argument to prove the conclusion, there is a 
petitio principii. When we say.
All men are mortal, , i-
' ■ " 7  i
Socrates is a man, 
therefore
Socrates is mortal; 
it is unanswerably urged by the adversaries of the 
syllogistic theory, that the proposition, Socrates is 
mortal, is presupposed in the more general assumption,
All men are mortal: that we cannot be assured of the 
mortality of all men, unless we are already certain of 
the mortality of efvery individual man: that if it be 
still doubtful whether Socrates, or any other indiv­
idual we choose to name, be mortal or not, the same 
degree of uncertainty must hang over the assertion.
All men are mortal: that the same general principle, 
instead of being given as evidence of the particular 
case, cannot itself be taken for true without exception, 
until every shadow of doubt which could affect any 
case comprised with it, is dispelled by evidence 
aliunde; and then what remains for the syllogism 
to prove? (^, p. 184)..
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At first sight it may be less than obvious how this petitio 
difficulty differs from the problem that Mill had identified just 
before. For both problems appear to arise if one holds with Mill that 
'nothing ever was, or can be, proved by syllogism, which was not 
known, or assumed to be known, before’ (SL, p.l83)j or as Dummett 
has characterised the predicament of concern to Mill, that ’in any 
case in which someone knows, in the strict sense, the truth of the 
premisses of a valid deductive argument, he must already know the 
truth of the conclusion’ (Dummett (1978), pp.305-06). ^ And so the 
common difficulty would seem to be just this: a syllogistic proof 
cannot take us to anywhere we are not already at ; and this can be 
described either by saying that syllogising cannot lead us to new 
knowledge, or that every syllogistic proof begs the question by pur­
porting to establish what must already have been acceptable for the 
premise set to be acceptable. So Mill was right to talk as if he had 
one problem about syllogism, not two.
But two quite different issues are being conflated here. Actually 
the formulations quoted from Mill and Dummett are both ambiguous, 
their sense turning on how we take the word ’before’ in Mill’s and 
’already’ in Dummett’s. Read one way, the assertion is that the con- 
elusion has to be known in advance of the premiseqset being knovm, 
and if this were true, then every syllogistic proof would beg the 
question. On the other reading, what is being said is that the con­
clusion is known as soon as the premises are known - but not that it 
is known in advance of them. If this second claim is correct, then 
a syllogistic deduction of the conclusion may be pointless and triv­
ial (or, at any rate, may be argued to be so), but it is not quest­
ion-begging, as the premises can be known without the conclusion 
first having to be known. Thus Mill’s and Dummett’s dicta can point 
us to two rather different problems, depending on how we read them,, 
one that of the alleged petitio committed by syllogistic proofs, the 
other that of the alleged pointlessness of syllogistic deduction - 
and indeed of deduction in general.
Mill’s tendency to conflate the petitio problem and the problems 
revolving round the issues of hidden consequences and the informat­
iveness of deduction surfaces very clearly in a note which he added 
to the 1862 edition of the Logic ;
1 hold it an abuse of language, to say, that the proof 
that Socrates is mortal, is that all men are mortal.
, Turn it in what way we will, thfs seems to me to be 
asserting that a thing is the proof of itself.
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Whoever pronounces the words, All men are mortal, 
has affirmed that Socrates is mortal, though he 
may never have heard of Socrates; for since Socrates, 
whether known to he so or not, really is a man, 
he is included in the words. All men, and in every 
assertion of which they are the subject (SL, p.206).
When Mill complains that a ’thing* (i.e. a proposition) is being 
employed as a proof of itself, he clearly means to allege that a 
petitio is being committed; and in the sentence beginning ’Whoever 
pronounces the words he is locating what he takes to be the
source of the petitio. But that sentence does not really support a 
petitio charge, for it merely says that the generalisation ’All men 
are mortal’ subsumes as an instance ’Socrates is mortal.’ Now reflec­
tion on the subsumption relation leads us to see that the premises 
of the syllogism ’All men are mortal / Socrates is a man / Therefore 
Socrates is mortal’ imply (contain?) the conclusion, and may sub­
sequently make us wonder how syllogism brings about epistemic advance. 
But it does not warrant a petitio allegation, for that needs something 
more than the fact that the premises‘of a deductive argument cannot 
be accepted without a decision on the conclusion/being thereby fore­
closed - it requires the truth of the different claim that the 
premise set cannot be accepted unless a decision on the conclusion
has been previously made; but that claim is certainly not expressed
.
by the sentence ’Whoever pronounces ...’
There is some excuse for Mill’s confusion in the fact that earlier
writers had also succumbed to it, and' he was very likely misled by
them. The same drifting between the issues which one finds in Mill
can be observed also in the following passages from other authors.
For instance, Dugald Stewart wrote :
Is it possible tcf conceive an understanding so formed
as to perceive the truth of the major and the minor
propositions, and yet not ‘to perceive the force of
the conclusion? /problem about the apparent triviality
' of syllogism/... / ^ t  must appear evident that, in the
very statement of the major proposition, the truth of the
conclusion is presupposed; insomucfi, that it was not
without good reason that Dr Campbell hazarded the
epigrammatic, yet unanswerable, remark, that ’’there
is always some radical defect in the syllogism,
which is not chargeable with that species.of sophism
known among logicians by the name of petitio
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principii (Stewart, vol.3, p.74? cf*vol.2, p.30). 5
Again, for Whately:
... since even the objectors to Logic make it a 
subject of complaint, that in a Syllogism the 
Premises do virtually assert the Conclusion, 
it follows at once that no New Truth /in the sense 
of ’something neither expressly nor virtually 
asserted before//.can be elicited by any process 
of Reasoning.
It is on this ground, indeed, that the justly
celebrated author of the Philosophy of Rhetoric
^ampbeli/ and many others, have objected to the
Syllogism altogether, as necessarily involving
a petitio principif. ... (Whately/, p.239)«
(Whately proceeds to display his confusion by citing the fact that
deductive reasoning is often illuminating in practice as an argument
against Campbell’s petitio allegation.) And although this may not
have been a text familiar to Mill, it is interesting to see that
Descartes appears to have made the same mistake. In the tenth of
his Rules for the Direction of the Mind he wrote:^.
... this style of argument /i.e. syllogistic/
contributes nothing at all to the discovery of
the truth ... we must note that the Dialecticians
are unable to devise any syllogism which has a
true conclusion, unless they have first secured
the material out of which to construct it, i.e.
unless they have already ascertained the very
truth which is deduced in that syllogism
/this explanatory clause seems to switch from the
issue of triviality to that of petitio/. Whence 
>(
it is clear that from a formula of this kind they 
can gather nothing that is, new (Descartes, vol.l, p.32). 
Finally, an example from a work written after Mill’s Logic, and 
greatly influenced by it: Alexander Bain wrote that:
It is the peculiarity of the syllogism, that the 
conclusion does not advance beyond,the premises.
This circumstance has been viewed in two lights.
On the one hand, it is regarded as the char act-: 
eristic excellence of the syllogism.
On the other hand, it is represented as con­
stituting a petitio principii (Bain (l895)? p.207).
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(In justice to Bain, it should be said that his following remarks 
indicate that he might have had a shadowy awareness that the triv­
iality and petitio objections to syllogism were distinct.)
IV
' Kill had no original characterisation to give of the fallacy of 
petitio principii. In the lengthy chapter of the Logic devoted to 
fallacies, the section on petitio stays very close to Whately, whom 
Mill begins by quoting: petitio principii is the fallacy ’in which 
the premise either appears manifestly to be the same as the concl­
usion, or is actually proved from the conclusion, or is such as 
would naturally and properly so be proved’ (SL, p.820). ^ It is a 
member of the class of fallacies which Whately calls ’material,’ 
which occur either ’when the Premises are such as ought not to have 
been assumed,’ or ’when the Conclusion is not the one required, but 
irrelevant’ (Whately, p.162). Material fallacies are to be distingu­
ished from ’logical fallacies,* which occur when a^ conclusion is inf­
erred from premises which do not logically imply ;it - e.g. the fall­
acy of undistributed middle (Whately, p.l6o). It deserves saying that 
Mill was quite clear about the logical/material distinction, and 
never regarded the petitio objection as directed against the formal 
validity of syllogistic implication; he never denied that considered 
as ’formal inferences’ of the kind studied by ’Formal Logic* (also 
called by him the ’logic of consistency’), syllogisms in the tradit­
ional moods and figures possess unimpeachable credentials (SL, Bk.II. 
ch.iii.sect.9; of" ch.xxiii). But to him the formal validity of 
the traditionally sanctioned syllogistic forms was insufficient to 
make them worthy of concern; his interest in logic was of an essent­
ially practical kind, and so the thought which naturally weighed with 
him was that if syllogistic inference is materially fallacious, 
then it is useless to the practical task of proving things.
The term petitio principii is conventionally translated as ’begging 
the question,’ but it has not always been 'understood in just the same 
way. What matters here is only what it meant for Whately and Mill.^ 
After quoting Whately, Mill sums up his understanding of petitio 
this way: it is ’the employment of a proposition to prove that on 
which it is itself dependent for proof’ (SL, p.820). Actually, what
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Mill is calling petitio principii can be more precisely described as 
hysteron proteron, which is a special form of begging the question.
The learned Sir William Hamilton had a surer grasp of the traditional 
nomenclature of fallacies than had Whately and Mill. In his Lectures 
on Logic the generalised fallacy of petitio principii is described 
as occurring when the rule of ’Probation* is breached that ’Nothing 
is to be begged, borrowed', or stolen; that is, nothing is to be pre­
supposed as proved, which itself requires a demonstration’'(Hamilton(1874). 
vol. 4; pp.50-51). The special form hysteron proteron occurs where 
there is an infringement of the rule that ’No proposition is to be 
employed as a principle of proof /by this Hamilton means no more than 
premise/, the truth of which is only to be evinced as a consequence 
of the proposition which it is employed to prove* (ibid.). Now it is 
this rule which is broken by syllogistic proofs if a major premise 
like ’All men are mortal’ cannot properly be known until all singular 
propositions of the form ’Socrates is mortal’ - i.e. propositions 
of the kind drawn as conclusions of the syllogistic process - are 
kno\m. But as Hamilton goes on to say, petitio principii, hysteron 
proteron and arguing in a circle (i.e^ using a proposition ’for its 
own probation’) are ’only various modifications -..only special cases’ 
of the infringement of ’one general law,* namely,, i’That no proposition 
be employed as a Principle of Probation, which stands itself in need 
of proof* (Hamilton (ibid.),pp.51-52). So to avoid any confusion, I 
shall continue to talk, in the remainder of this chapter, in the 
conventional way of the petitio charge against syllogism.
Mill wrote that it is the syllogism ’considered as an argument to 
prove the conclusion’ which invites the petitio charge. He intended 
by this expression to mark a contrast with syllogisms regarded as 
records or ’memoranda’ of inductive inferences, but it can also serve 
very well to delimit tha^ distinct and important class of syllogistic 
arguments which Dummett calls ’suasive’ ones (Dummett (1978), p.296).
A suasive argument is one employed to persuade someone to accept a 
conclusion on the basis of premises he already accepts; as Dummett 
puts it, ’the epistemic direction must coincide with the consequential 
one: it is necessary that the premisses of the argument be proposit­
ions already regarded as true by the person v7hom we wish to persuade 
of the truth of the conclusion’ (ibid.). A suasive argument commits a 
petitio if the conclusion has to be knovm for one or more of its prem­
ises to be known, for in that circumstance the epistemic direction is 
not genuinely running from premises to 'conclusion, though it purports
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to do so.
One of the greatest oversights of Whately and Mill was that they 
failed to grasp the fact (familiar to Aristotle) that syllogisms often 
play an explanatory role, their premises serving not to persuade 
someone of the truth of a conclusion not previously accepted, hut 
to provide a reason why a conclusion already known is true. For inst­
ance, I might he perfectly aware that Bahy William is growing fat, 
hut want to know why.' Someone who produces for me the syllogism:
All babies who eat Growbaby brand foods grow fat.
Baby William eats Growbaby brand foods, 
therefore 
Baby William grows fat,, 
will not be persuading me to believe that Baby William is growing 
fat - for I know that already - but he will enlighten me as to the 
cause of William’s growing fat (namely, by relating his case to a 
quasi-law about babies who eat Growbaby brand foods). The significant 
feature of an explanatory syllogism like this one is that it is indif­
ferent whether it would be question-begging considered suasively, 
because it is not intended as a proof,of what I do not know on the 
basis of what I do, but as an explanation of why a.proposition I 
already accept is true. Very often, as Dummett has remarked, our only 
reason for accepting the premises of an explanatory argument may be 
that they provide a plausible explanation of the final line, and even 
here, though the epistemic direction runs precisely contrary to the 
direction of logical consequence, there would be no point to a charge 
of petitio. In fact, a threat of petitio against explanatory syllogism 
seems to loom just when the epistemic direction is not opposed to 
that of the consequence relation, when, that is, the conclusion is not 
part of the epistemic basis of the premises which entail it. Face 
Haack (p.219), it is untr-qe that in every explanatory argument the 
epistemic direction runs counter to that of logical consequence; it 
sometimes happens that we have already accepted the premises on ind- , 
ependept grounds when it occurs to us that they can serve to explain 
the conclusion, and here it is misleading to speak of the epistemic 
direction running from conclusion to premises (indeed, it is mislead­
ing to speak of an epistemic direction within the argument at all).
But this raises again the question whether it is ever possible to 
know a universal proposition without first knowing individually all 
its instances - for this is what we should be presupposing to be poss­
ible if we accepted a proposition of the form ’All As are B’ without 
reference to whether we first accepted some one of, its instances,
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which we then proceeded to explain by means of a syllogism with the 
universal proposition as major premise. Even though we would not be 
employing the major premise in the proof of the conclusion (so a - 
charge of hysteron proteron would not lie), we could be accused by 
the upholders of syllogistic petitio of illicitly helping ourselves 
to a major premise independently of knowing the conclusion (that is, 
knowing one of its instances).
But it is not just"a certain kind of explanatory syllogism which 
stays clear of the petitio objection; an interesting category of 
suasive ones does so as well. This is the category of suasive syllog­
isms whose major premises can unproblematicaily be known without their 
instances being first knovm, because they express stipulations of 
one sort or another, e.g. orders, laws, permissions and prohibitions. 
Mill was aware, probably from reading Stewart, of the existence of 
such cases where 'the generalities /the major premises/ are the orig­
inal data’ (SL, pp.193-94; _cf. Stewart, vol.3, p.203), and while he 
rather oddly did not dravr attention to the fact that here the petitio 
allegation does not apply, he can hardly have failed to recognise 
it. There is nothing even prima facie, question-begging about the 
syllogism:
All U.K. citizens over the age of 18 can vote in parliamentary 
elections,
Jim is a U.K. citizen over the age of l8, 
therefore
Jim can vote in parliamentary elections.
The major premise of this syllogism can be known without an empirical
investigation of the age structure of U.K., voters; expressing a law
passed by the British legislature, it can be straightforwardly learned,
by consulting the statute book. The syllogism could therefore play
the role of a non-questiqn-begging suasive argument to persuade some-
9
one that Jim is entitled to vote in parliamentary elections. (As it 
happens, it could also in other circumstances perform an explanatory 
function: someone who knew that Jim was entitled to vote but wanted 
an explanation of his entitlement would have it supplied by the prem­
ises.) Some philosophers, though not Mill, would maintain that suasive 
syllogisms with stipulative major premises are far from exhausting 
the class of suasive syllogisms whose major premises can quite clearly 
be known without their conclusions first having to be knovm, and vjhich 
are thus immune to the petitio criticism. According to these philos­
ophers, some general truths (e.g. ’All^triangles have three sides,’
’All things which are coloured are extended’) are knowable a priori,
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and.if this is correct then it would be plausible to suggest that 
syllogisms incorporating such propositions as major premises cannot 
be accused of begging the question, for knoviledge of these proposit­
ions does not wait on knowledge of their instances. Mill, of course, 
could not have accepted this, for he denied that any propositions 
were known a priori.
V
Before turning to Mill’s strategy for resolving the petitio obj­
ection to suasive syllogism, it is worthwhile to consider some int­
eresting and ingenious attempts to show the problem to be miscon­
ceived. Two of these, I shall argue, are unsuccessful, but a third 
attempt at dissolving the problem will force a certain modification 
in its statement.
It has sometimes been held that Mill thought (suasive) syllogism 
problematic only because he did not pay sufficient attention to the 
role of the minor premise in the derivation of the conclusion. This 
view was famously put forward in De Morgan’s Formal Logic (pp.300-01), 
where Mill was accused of holding the false belief/ that the conclusion 
of a syllogism follows from the major premise alone. De Morgan conten­
ded that someone might find out that all men are mortal, then that 
a particular named individual was a man, and put these two pieces of 
information together to advance to the conclusion that the named ind­
ividual is mortal, the process begging no questions, on De Morgan’s 
thinking, because the conclusion is obtained not from one premise 
but two (whereas a conclusion has to be inferred from itself, accord­
ing to De Morgan, for a genuine petitio to occur). But this fails to 
get to grips with Mill’s worry. Mill was not, of course, under the 
impression that the minor premise of a syllogism was superfluous to 
the proof, and in the 1862 edition of the Logic he indignantly repud­
iated De Morgan’s suggestion that he was (SL, pp.207-08). Mill thought 
the petitio allegation cogent not because he believed that the concl­
usion of a syllogism was wrapped up in one^premise, the major, and 
proved from it alone, but because he felt that one should not be acc­
epting a proposition like ’All men are mortal* if one remained genuin­
ely open to a proof that a particular named man was mortal. On Mill’s 
view. De Morgan was too sanguine in supposing there to be nothing 
questionable about finding out thaf all men are mortal before one has
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found out that Socrates is mortal; thus the threat of petitio has 
indeed to do with the major premise in a way it has not to do with 
the minor, but that is not to say that the minor premise is a redun­
dant element in the proof.
A quite different attempt to dissolve the petitio problem is due 
to John Corcoran (private communication). According to Corcoran,
Mill’s argument for the syllogism being a petitio is self-refuting.
A crucial assumption underlying Mill’s case, he says, is this one:
(a ) Every known universal proposition presupposes knowledge 
of its instances.
It is because Mill assumes (a ) that he proposes that the major prem­
ise of a syllogism cannot be known before its conclusion, for the
conclusion is an instance of the major premise. But now consider (a )
itself. Corcoran argues:
On Mill’s own view, this (being a universal proposition) 
presupposes acquaintance with each and every universal 
proposition. So it would seem that any attempt to prove
that the syllogism considered as a proof begs the quest­
ion would itself beg the question.
The first problem which some will have with Corcoran’s argument 
is that it construes (a ) as capable of being an instance of itself, 
which breaks rules against self-referential language uses designed to/ 
obviate the semantic paradoxes. Those not convinced that self-refer­
ence is always and everywhere wrong might prefer to press a different 
line of criticism, (a ) is a very strong principle indeed - and in 
fact it is certainly stronger than anything accepted by Mill, as we 
have seen that he was ready to admit that some universal propositions 
express ’original data.’ So what principle, if not (a ), would he have 
been relying on when setting up the petitio problem? From the examples 
he used it appears that ^e had in mind a problem besetting those 
syllogisms whose major premises are propositions normally confirmed 
by empirical investigation of their instances. Hence one might suppose 
that instead of (a ), a critical principle in his argument was :
(A’ ) Every known empirical universal proposition presupposes 
knowledge of its instances.
But (A’) is not itself a proposition of the kind verified by an inv­
estigation of its instances; it is a philosophical rather than an 
empirical claim, a proposition of whose truth or falsity we become 
convinced by conceptual considerations rather than by empirical inv­
estigation of the instances it subsumes. Therefore, Corcoran’s argum­
ent fails, for, irrespective of prohibitions against self-reference,
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it is clear that (A’) does not fall under itself as an instance, as 
it is not an empirical proposition. However, while this counter to 
Corcoran is an effective one, Mill could not himself adopt it with­
out embarrassment to his thesis that all universal propositions 
(except stipulative ones) are empirically based. Admittedly he does 
not always live up to the boldness of that claim, and it is concept­
ual rather than empirical considerations which prompt him to accept 
a principle like (A’).'But, strictly speaking, his official radical 
empiricist stance is incompatible with his defending his argument
i. ’
for syllogistic petitio against Corcoran's objection along the line 
I have sketched, for it cannot accommodate the strategy of denying 
that (A'), as a non-empirical proposition, falls under itself.
Here is an intriguing tension in Mill's thought, but for present 
purposes the important point is that unless we take up an extreme 
empiricism, we need not be convinced by Corcoran's claim that the 
case for syllogistic petitio is self-refuting.
A third objection to Mill's account of the petitio allegation 
cannot be dismissed before an important modification has been made 
to that charge. Mill believes, very plausibly, that in a suasive arg­
ument the epistemic direction coincides with the consequential one: 
someone who is to find a syllogistic proof persuasive first knows the 
premises, and is convinced of the conclusion by deriving it from them. 
The worry about petitio arises because principle (A') asserts that 
one cannot know an empirical universal proposition before knowing 
its instances, which Mill takes to. exclude•the possibility that one 
could genuinely know an empirical major premise of a syllogism before 
knowing its conclusion. Whether Mill was right to maintain (A') is 
a matter we shall come to shortly; but for the moment we may waive 
doubts about the truth of that principle and ask whether it really
does support the petitio charge in the way he believed it did.
" 4
I am indebted to John Corcoran for the recognition that Mill has
11
committed a subtle error here. Consider again the argument to prove 
the mortality of Socrates from the premises that he is a man and 
that all men are mortal. Mill's claim was that the proposition 'Soc­
rates is mortal' has to be known before 'All men are mortal* can be 
reasonably asserted. But does it : - even if, we accept the truth of 
(A')? What (A') requires is that before the mortality of all men can 
be known, the mortality of each individual man needs to be established; 
the picture here is of an investigation being carried out into indiv­
idual cases seriatim, which has to be completed before generalisation 
can be attempted. ( Additionally, of course, before it can be asserted
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that all men are mortal, it needs to be known that the survey of 
individuals has been exhaustive, and that no cases of men remain 
uninvestigated. That is to say, not only must a complete survey be. 
taken, but it must be known that the survey is complete.)' Among the 
individuals whose mortality has to be settled in the course of the 
survey is. the individual we call Socrates, But is this the same 
thing as establishing the truth of the proposition 'Socrates is 
mortal' - which is what -Mill and others have assumed? Corcoran 
points out that we should distinguish between knowing that a certain 
thing, which happens to be called 'a', has a certain property M, 
and knowing that the proposition expressed by 'Ma' is true. Now what 
(A') really requires to be known is not the truth of the proposition 
'Socrates is mortal,* but simply that the individual, who happens 
to be called Socrates, has the property of mortality. This is because 
it is not necessary to the completion of the appropriate survey that 
the individual whom we call 'Socrates' should be surveyed under that 
name ; it would be quite adequate for him to be picked out under 
another name or identifying description, or, indeed, for him to be 
picked out by mere ostension, providing it is noted that he, as an 
individual man, is mortal. But this means that suasive syllogisms 
do not beg the question in the way Mill supposed:', for it is not nec­
essary to satisfaction of principle (A') that individuals referred to 
in the conclusions of such syllogisms should have been picked out in 
the surveyal process under just the same names or descriptions as 
are employed of them in the conclusions. Thus a crucial presupposition: 
of Mill's argument for suasive syllogism committing a petitio is 
mistaken.
Corcoran's argument is, I believe, a sound one, and it is a sig­
nificant contribution to the debate about syllogistic petitio. But
what exactly has Corcoran established? Has he shovm that all Mill's
•f
worries about suasive syllogism were groundless, and that syllogistic 
arguments to prove their conclusions are wholly free of fallacy? In 
fact what Corcoran has actually established in pointing out that 
accepting the major premise of a syllogism does not, even on Mill's 
presuppositions, require that we first accept the proposition drawn 
as the conclusion of the syllogistic argument, is that suasive syllog­
isms do not commit the fallacy of hysteron proteron. We have seen thab 
although Mill speaks of syllogistic petitio, it is more accurate to 
regard his charge against syllogism as one of hysteron proteron, as 
defined by Hamilton; and Corcoran has shovm that this charge is mis­
conceived. However, Corcoran's argument does not prove that many
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suasive syllogisms do not commit a broader kind of petitio fallacy.
For the argument does not dispute Mill’s claim (A’), that every known 
empirical universal proposition presupposes knowledge of its instan­
ces, though it shows that this should not be taken to mean that in
order to accept such a proposition as ’All men are mortal,’ one needs
first to know all such propositions about individual men as ’Socrates 
is mortal,’ ’The Duke of Wellington is mortal,’ and so on. It is 
granted, that is, that before being able to accept ’All men are mor­
tal ’ one has to know whether the individuals, whom we happen to refer
to by ’Socrates,’ ’The Duke of Wellington,’ etc., are mortal, though 
it is denied that one has to know that they are mortal under these 
names. But what if we attempt to syllogise from the major premise 
’All men are mortal’ without having first carried out the investig­
ation into the mortality of each individual man? It will be recalled 
that Hamilton described a fallacy of petitio principii as occurring 
when there is an infringement of the rule of proof that ’Nothing is 
to be begged, borrowed, or stolen; that is, nothing is to be pre­
supposed as proved, which itself requires a demonstration.’ If (A’) 
is correct, then if we do not carry odt the requisite survey into the 
mortality of individual men, we shall be guilty of/begging the quest­
ion, in the broad Hamiltonian sense, if-we syllogise from ’All men 
are mortal.’ We would be reasoning from a premise which we had not 
established, and infecting our proof with petitio, where we accepted 
an empirical universal proposition without surveying the cases it 
subsumed.
It is obviously not possible to survey all cases of past, present 
and future men in order to verify ’All men are mortal’ in the manner 
required by (A’). But if many empirical universal propositions are 
practically unverifiable in this way, not all are. It would be poss- , 
ible to verify, by a survfey of instances, a proposition such as ’All 
coins now in John’s pocket are pennies’ (possible, at least, at the 
moment referred to). Yet while ’All coins now in John’s pocket are 
pennies’ could be non-question-beggingly utilised as the major premise 
of a suasive syllogism, it appears that such a syllogism escapes the 
Scylla of petitio only to encounter the Gharybdis of triviality: for 
if we argue. All coins now in John’s pocket are pennies. Coin C is 
a coin in John’s pocket, therefore Coin G is a penny, it is unlikely 
that in deriving the conclusion we will consider that we have learnt 
anything worthwhile which we did not learn when we made our survey 
of the coins in John’s pocket. To say this is not to disregard Corcor­
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an’s distinction between knowing that a certain thing, happening to 
be called ’a’, has a certain property M, and knowing the truth of the 
proposition ’Ma’. It is, rather, to assert that often in practice our int­
erest in an individual thing is, so to speak, a transparent one ; that 
is, we are often interested directly in a particular thing, a res, 
and its properties, rather than in whatever-object-falls-under-a- 
particular-name-or-description (indeed, we might not even know any 
label convent ion ally >-v.applied to the object in which we are inter­
ested). Having found, in our initial survey, that the coin which 
happens to be the one we later refer to as’C'is a penny, it is prob­
able that we have found out a,ll that we ever will want to know about 
it ; once we know it under the label *C’, we can derive syllogistic— 
ally (and without begging any questions) the conclusion that ’Coin C 
is a penny,’ but given the transparency of our interest in the coin, 
this brings us no significant new knowledge. It can be admitted, how­
ever, that there may be circumstances in which a reasoner is partic­
ularly interested in establishing that whatever falls under a certain 
name or description possesses a certain property, and if that name 
or description is the minor term of a^syllogism, it could be both 
non-question-begging and illuminating for him to deduce the conclus­
ion from the major and minor premises, for in previously surveying 
the actual case in fact referred to by the minor term, he might have 
been ignorant that this was the case referred to by that term. This 
possibility, which Mill entirely missed, becomes apparent only when 
Corcoran’s distinction is carefully noted.
VI
4 /
Corcoran has shown that principle (A’) does not, when properly 
understood, require that the conclusion of a syllogism be already 
known before its major premise can be accepted. Nevertheless, if he 
has shown that a hysteron proteron charge against suasive syllogism is 
misguided, he has not demonstrated that at least many non-trivial 
syllogistic proofs do not commit a petitio, in relying upon an imp­
erfectly warranted major premise.
It is fairly clear that a completely satisfactory defence of suas­
ive syllogism is going to have to take issue with principle (A’).
Now rather surprisingly for a principle which has sustained an
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objection to syllogistic proof which not only Mill but many others 
have found convincing, (A’) is actually not only false but even 
obviously so - once it is regarded from the right angle. The reason 
why Mill and other people have believed the principle to be true is 
almost certainly that they have confused it with another, true prop­
osition, as we shall see in the next section. But while Mill’s off­
icial acceptance of (A’) prompted him to adopt his notorious theory 
that syllogism is nob a method of proof (which we shall examine more 
closely in the following chapter), he did occasionally in the Logic 
display a much sounder grasp of the epistemic preconditions of gen­
eralisation, and in the light of that better understanding he indic­
ated a powerful line of defence of suasive syllogism against the 
accusation of petitio.
At several places in the Logic, including Bk.II.ch.iii where the 
petitio problem is discussed (see sect.5j of. Bk.III.ch.i.sect.2,- 
Bk.III.ch.iii.sect.l),, Mill acknowledged that a universal propos­
ition about things of a kind can often legitimately be accepted on 
the basis of a limited sampling of things of that kind - that, for 
instance, the proposition that all men are mortal can be accepted 
as an inductive projection from those cases of human mortality of 
which we have had experience. This recognition is,'commonplace in 
itself, but it alerted Mill to the possibility of-construing many 
syllogisms as the second stages of two-stage proof structures, of 
which the first comprises an inductive projection from a set of 
propositions about individual cases to a lawlike universal propos­
ition about things of their type, and the second a syllogistic 
process from the universal proposition, together with a suitable 
minor premise, to a conclusion about an individual not included in 
the original sample. Such a proof sequence is evidently free from
the danger of petitio, if we consider the matter in Mill’s terms
(for there is no need to know the conclusion before being able to 
accept the major premise); and it is immune equally to the charge of 
petitio as revised in the light of Corcoran’s argument (because 
there no longer remains any good reason for worrying that the major 
premise has been accepted as true without^an adequate justification). 
Because he never properly disentangled this response to the petitio 
objection from his less satisfactory account of the role of syllog­
ism, Mill preferred to call the second stage of this ’double operat­
ion’ by the name ’interpretation’ rather than ’inference’ (SL, p.197), 
yet he did achieve the critical insight that the whole process
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consisted of ’an induction from •.. known cases to a general propos­
ition, and a subsequent application of that general proposition to 
the unknown case’ (ibid.). •
He further observed that: .
An induction from particulars to generals, followed 
by a syllogistic process from those generals to other 
particulars, is a form in which we may always state 
our reasonings'if-we please. It is not a form in 
which we must reason, but it is a form in which we 
may reason, and into which it is indispensable 
,to throw our reasoning when there is any doubt of 
its validity ... (SL, p.1$8; £f. p.202)
One may doubt the claim that all reasonings can be cast into this 
form, but it is at least interesting to see Mill holding that those 
reasonings which do follow this pattern will be valid - by which he
apparently meant free not just from formal but also from material 
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fallacy. Once he had formulated this theory in the Logic, Mill
never entirely forgot it, though he was usually very hazy about its 
distinctness from his less successful ^accounts of inference. One 
especially succinct statement of his conception oc.curs in the review 
article ’Crete’s Aristotle’ which was one of the last writings he 
produced: here he speaks of ’the operation which establishes a con­
clusion by showing that it comes within the scope of a generalisation 
that has already been assented to on evidence deemed sufficient’
(GA, p.479).
Mill’s defence of suasive syllogism against the petitio allegation 
consists, then, in identifying a kind=of context in which a syllogis­
tic proof begs no questions. Mill clearly believed that such contexts 
of occurrence of syllogistic arguments are common; and that is a per-, 
fectly plausible opinion,^the application of inductively warranted 
universal propositions to new individual cases being a standard inf­
erence process. Oddly, however, such inducto-deductive reasonings have 
not received attention in the traditional logic textbooks. This is 
possibly because setting one out in full would be an intricate bus­
iness. The second, syllogistic stage provides, of course, no diffic­
ulties; but the inductive first stage from#a number (perhaps very 
large) of propositions about individual cases to the universal prop­
osition which will form the major premise of the syllogistic compon­
ent is another matter. Such hybrid part-inductive, part-deductive 
structures have maybe failed to appeal,to logicians who like arguments 
to be neat and tidy. Be that as it may, a neglect of the larger
contexts in which suasive syllogisms frequently appear can easily 
lead to worries about petitio, for taken by itself a syllogistic 
proof with an undefended major premise and a conclusion which is an 
instance of that premise might well appear to be upturning the nor­
mal order of epistemic dependence of universals on individual cases. 
Yet leaving tacit the inductive first stage of a Millian inducto- 
deductive argument is permissible (and, indeed, often a practical 
necessity) provided that-its existence is not forgotten; thus a 
syllogism can often be quite properly regarded as a kind of enthy- 
mematic inducto-deductive argument, the inductive first stage not 
being explicitly presented.
But not all syllogisms can be so regarded. Those with stipulative 
major premises cannot be. And nor can those whose major premises are 
merely accidentally true generalisations which are incapable of 
being inductively inferred from a sample of individual cases, for they 
are clearly not the second stages of inducto-deductive proofs. Where 
nothing less than a complete enumeration of instances would suffice 
to justify the major premise, that proposition should not be employed 
as a premise of a suasive argument before being confirmed by such an 
enumeration; but if petitio is avoided by carrying out the enumeration 
before utilising the major proposition in this role, it is a further 
question whether the deduction of the conclusion Will be truly ill­
uminating. For where the case referred to in the conclusion has been 
already surveyed before the major proposition is accepted, the syll­
ogistic process will.produce new knowledge only in the special sit­
uation in which it matters to us to have that case brought under a
minor term of whose applicability.: we were : not. madei aware: by the orig- 
. , 13m a l  survey.
Mill’s conception of inducto-deductive methodology reflects his 
captious, conservative philosophy of science. To be acceptable, the 
universal propositions which become the major premises of non-quest- 
ion-begging suasive syllogisms have to appear reasonable projections 
from samples of their instances in the sort of way that ’All men are 
mortal’ derives support from past experience of human deaths, (All 
such inductive projections, in Mill’s view, are warranted by the 
overall uniformity of nature., which he calls ’the ultimate major 
premise’ of all inductions (SL, p.308).) Later philosophers of science 
have tended to sympathise much more with Whewell’s more adventurous 
policies for the admissibility of hypotheses in scientific investig­
ation, and it is hard to deny that if scientists adhered to Mill’s 
very circumspect and rather unimaginative methodology, then the pace
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of research would he impeded. Mill was not unaware of V/hewell’s views 
on method, hut he distrusted their ability to produce sound science,, 
believing Whewell too fond of the suspect Kantian notion that the 
order of nature is in large measure imposed on it by man. . He described 
Whewell’s position with fair accuracy when he stated that Whewell 
allowed as acceptable those inductions which lead to a ’general prop­
osition which binds together the particular^ facts, and makes them, 
as it were, one fact,’ this being ’not the mere sum of those facts, 
but something more, since there is introduced a conception of the 
mind, which does not exist in the facts themselves’ (SL, p.294). Of 
present interest is the point that ^  Whewell’s conception of induc­
tive support is sound, then a passage of inducto—deductive reason— 
ong whose major premise was a universal proposition achieved through 
a Whewellian rather than a Millian form of induction would be equally 
safe from a charge of begging the question; that major premise would 
be adequately grounded even though no survey of its instances, as 
required by (A’), had taken place. Whewellian inducto-deductive reas­
oning offers more hostages to fortune in its first stage than does 
the more stolid Millian variety, but Its second stage is no more 
open to objection. (These forms of inducto-deduct'ive methodology are 
to be distinguished,. incidentally, from hypothetico-deductive meth­
odology, A syllogistic process may be employed to deduce testable 
consequences from an assumed hypothesis whose truth remains still in 
question, and here the syllogism is not intended as a suasive. demon­
stration of the conclusion.)
"VII
But now we have to face up to the most puzzling aspect of Mill’s 
resolution of the problem of syllogistic petitio. Why, if he had 
an answer to the complaint that suasive syllogisms beg the question, 
did he fail to see that he had one, and continued to talk about syll­
ogisms construed as proofs of their conclusions committing a petitio? 
How is it that having seen that principle (A’) need not be accepted, 
he remained seemingly unable to draw the appropriate conclusions?
It is not en answer to this question to say.simply that Mill had 
made up his mind that syllogism was not truly a form of inference at 
all, but rather a species of ’interpretation’ of inference (SL, Bk.II.
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ch» iii • sect• 5) ; for we need, to know what pressure Mill felt forced 
him to take this unlikely line. It is worth noting that the second 
stage of a Millian inducto-deductive argument does not fail to fulfil 
Mill’s condition that inference must always he epistemically advan­
cing: to move syllogistically from knowledge of a generalisation to 
knowledge of an individual instance not previously known is obviously 
to advance in knowledge. Furthermore, Mill sometimes seems to be 
having the greatest difficulty in explaining his notion of ’inter­
pretation’ in such a way that ’interpreting’ is not merely inferring 
under a different name. To be sure, his official view is that the 
only real inference is inductive inference ’from particulars to part­
iculars,’ but when he writes that, very often:
a single careful interrogation of experience may
suffice, and the result may be registered in the
form of a general proposition, which is committed 
■to memory or writing, and from which afterwards we 
have only to syllogize (SL, p.I98)
-this syllogising being represented as interpretation, rather than 
inference - we are extremely hard pressed to give any content to 
the claim that the syllogistic stage interprets the major proposition 
in some non-inferential manner, . i;
So what was it which forced Mill to take up the implausible and
uninviting view that to syllogise was not to infer? The answer must
lie in his confusion, described earlier, of the petitio problem about 
syllogistic proof with problems about hidden consequences and the 
informativeness of deductive inference. We saw that Mill, in company 
with certain other philosophers, failed to spot the ambiguity latent 
in such locutions as: if we have accepted the premises, we have already 
determined the conclusion; when we accept the premises, we have already 
foreclosed the question whether the conclusion is true ; we cannot 
accept the premises without settling the acceptability of the concl­
usion. All these locutions, read one way, are true, for where prem­
ises logically imply a conclusion, it would be logically inconsis­
tent to accept the premises and refuse to accept the conclusion. But 
read another way, they can be taken to say that we must have settled 
whether the conclusion of a suasive deductive argument is true before 
deciding vihether to accept its premise set. And on this second reading 
they are false.
I suggest that it was because Mill mistakenly conflated the logical 
fact that the major premise of a syllogism like that about Socrates’
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mortality subsumes the case referred to in the conclusion as an 
instance, with the (false) principle that (except in the special cases 
of universal propositions true by stipulation) knowing a universal 
proposition requires first knowing all its instances, that he bel­
ieved that suasive syllogism could not be successfully defended 
against a charge of petitio. In other words, a fact about logical 
implication got misread as the ground of a petitio charge against 
suasive deductive arguments, and once he had succumbed to this mis­
take, no amount of insight into the potentialities for advancing 
knowledge of hybrid inducto-deductive structures could,save Mill 
from thinking that it was in deep principle impossible to rescue 
suasive syllogistic inference from the petitio charge. Whatever could 
be said in favour of suasive syllogism, Mill must have felt, would 
in the end come up against the unanswerable objection that in know­
ing the premises, we have already settled the truth of the concl­
usion. Nothing short of a full realisation of the ambiguity of such 
a formulation could have prevented Mill from falling into error, or 
redeemed him from it once he had so fallen.
Hence Mill came to think that the only way to preserve the resp­
ectability of the syllogism was to deny it to be a form of inference 
at all: if syllogising is to be legitimate and useful, it must be 
doing something other than inferentially revealing what is already 
implied by the syllogistic premises. Real, non-question-begging inf­
erence cannot consist in the tracking down of the logical implicat­
ions of known premises, but must, instead, be inductive in character. 
Just what Mill thought real inference was, and how he eventually 
conceived of the function of the syllogism, will be the topics of the 
next chapter of this study.
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T H.R E E
M I L L ’ S P O S I T I V E  T H E O R I E S  O P  
I N F E R E N C E  A N D  T H E  S Y L L O G I S M
As great oaks from little acorns spring, a single mistake can 
sometimes generate a large amount of erroneous theory. Mill’s mis­
reading of a logical fact about implication as an epistemic condit­
ion on the acceptability of universal propositions not only prevented 
his seeing the potential of his conception of inducto-deductive meth­
odology to vindicate suasive syllogism against the charges of triv­
iality and petitio; it also led him to construct an elaborate account 
of the nature of inference and the role .of the syllogism which, though 
in many ways intriguing, is ultimately both wrong-headed and unnec­
essary, While occasionally he seems to have come close to seeing 
this, the powerful undertow created hy his basic confusion always 
managed to draw him back to the view that inference cannot be syll­
ogistic, and that to syllogise must be to do something other than to 
infer,
A philosopher of weaker will might now have capitulated to Lockian 
criticism of the syllogism. For the nub of Locke’s complaint had been 
that ’men, in their own inquiries after truth, never use syllogisms 
to convince themselves* (vol.2, p,268); and this was just what Mill 
had felt forced to concede in his study of the petitio allegation.
But Mill intended no surrender to Locke, If syllogism is not infer­
ence, then, lo, it is something else — and something important tool 
Moreover, what inference really is can be explained much more clearly 
than it was by all Locke’s visual metaphors of seeing the connections 
of ideas. Mill presented his positive views on inference and the syll­
ogism in the later pages of the long third chapter of the second book 
of the Logic,
To succeed in producing convincing new,accounts of inference and 
the syllogism, Mill rightly saw that it was necessary to give a per-
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suasive theory of the role of universal propositions in our thinking, 
and, in particular, to show that universal major propositions of suasive 
syllogisms were not to be thought of as premises. To the objection 
that this was denying what was virtually undeniable, and that it was 
highly eccentric to dismiss the traditional view that the major prop­
osition was a premise from which, with the minor premise, the concl­
usion was to be inferred. Mill would have replied that preservation 
of the traditional picture of the major proposition made it imposs­
ible to defend suasive syllogism from the charge of petitio.
According to Mill’s revised view, acceptance of the conclusion of 
a suasive syllogism does not rest, despite appearances, on acceptance 
of its major proposition. Our ground for affirming that a living man 
(Mill’s example was the Duke of Wellington) is mortal is not that 
all men are mortal, but that in the past men have died - every man, 
as Mill rather quaintly put it, ’in whose case the experiment had 
been fairly tried’ (SL, p.18?). This is arguing, as Mill described 
it, ’from particulars to particulars’ (or, in more standard modern 
terminology, from singulars to singulars), and it is clear from his 
exposition that he saw his account of reasoning as obtaining support 
from the tenet of empiricism that in the beginning was i?he particulars 
in other words, that particulars (to use his terms); precede generals 
in the order of knowledge. But if the major proposition of a syllog­
ism never contributes to the proof of the conclusion, then the obvious 
question arises as to what role it does play. Disregarding the sugg­
estion that it is actually redundant, Mill proposed a number of char­
acterisations of its role, leaving it initially somewhat obscure 
whether he believed these came to the same thing, or whether he took 
the major proposition to perform different functions in different 
settings. The major proposition, he declared, could be looked on as 
a memorandum of past observations (SL, pp.186, 193f.), a check on 
argument (e.g. p.l96f.), an instruction for understanding new cases 
(p.l93f.), and an assertion of the sufficiency of evidence for a new 
conclusion (pp.200, 204f*) — all of which conceptions stalwartly 
eschew the idea that the major proposition is a premise.
The theory that all ’real’ inference is from particulars to part­
iculars is presented in its most radical colours in the following 
passage:
The mortality of John, Thomas, and others is, after 
all, the whole evidence we have for the mortality of 
the Duke of Wellington. Not one iota is added to the
7.
proof by interpolating a general proposition# Since 
the individual cases are all the evidence we can 
possess, evidence which no logical form into which 
we choose to throw it can make greater than it is; 
and since that evidence is either sufficient in 
itself, or, if insufficient for the one purpose, 
cannot be sufficient for the other; I am unable to 
see why we should be forbidden to take the shortest 
cut from these sufficient premises to the concl­
usion, and constrained to travel the ’’high priori 
road,*’ by the arbitrary fiat of logicians 
(^, p.187).
Any plausibility this passage may appear to have is only superficial# 
It may not be immediately clear why we cannot do as Mill says, and 
reason directly to the mortality of the Duke of Wellington from the 
evidence of the past instances of individual men who have died — 
that is, infer this without requiring a universal proposition as int- • 
ermediary. But consider some different cases# I have a pocketful of 
coins, and the few I have drawn out up to now have been pennies; am 
I entitled to infer that any coins I subsequently take from my pocket
will be pennies also? Or I have spun a coin and it has landed heads
four consecutive times: should I infer that it will land heads next 
time too? In fact, I can only draw these inferences rationally if I 
have some ground for thinking that the past regularities are not 
quite random ones? and that is to say, if I have the right to believe 
that all the coins in my pocket are pennies, or that the coin I am 
spinning has somehow acquired a bias to fall heads regularly. It is 
possible that Mill might complain that the samples in these instances 
are small and consequently untrustworthy compared with the much longer 
unbroken run of human deaths which ground the inference to the mor­
tality of the Iron Duke. '^ But what is important about such long runs 
is precisely that they provide an inductive ground for the belief 
that certain regularities are not merely accidental but represent 
patterns explicable by laws. The evidence of individual cases supports 
a new individual conclusion only by inductively warranting such a 
generalisation as that all men are mortal,^ from which, together with 
the premise that the Duke of Wellington is a man, we can deduce that
the Duke of Wellington is mortal.
A distinction can therefore be drawn between reasonable and unreas­
onable inductive extrapolations, the rational reasoner’s projecti­
ons being governed by general conceptions about the kinds of pattern
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2and lawlikeness to be expected in nature. By failing to leave room 
for such general considerations, Mill’s account of reasoning left 
obscure the difference between intelligent, truth-attaining infer­
ences and blind, or even insane, mental vagaries. Mill very unwisely 
tried to back up his account by remarking that even children and 
animals, being incapable (he alleged) of forming general conceptions, 
must reason in the manner he described (SL, Bk.II.ch.iii.sect.3), 
but Vlhewell made the inevitable objection that their mental processes 
are hardly ideal models of rational thinking. In a note added to 
the 1851 edition of the Logic, Mill conceded as much, disclaiming 
’the application of such terms as induction, inference, or reasoning, 
to operations performed by mere instinct, that is, from an animal 
impulse, without the exertion of any intelligence’ (SL, p.287); but 
this disclaimer only serves to emphasise the poverty of his most rad­
ical account of inference from particulars to particulars, for within 
its exiguous provisions it is impossible to draw the distinction 
between intelligent and unintelligent reasonings which he had to 
confess was important.
But there is also in the Logic a less radical theory of inference 
from particulars to particulars which is much less susceptible to 
the foregoing objections. This account likewise denies that the major 
proposition of a syllogism is a premise; but it acknowledges the 
importance of discipline and direction in reasoning by describing 
the major proposition as functioning, in effect, as a rule of infer­
ence governing the transitions from particulars to particulars. This 
role of the major proposition was set out by Mill as follows;
All inference is from particulars to particulars:
General propositions are merely registers of such 
inferences already made, and short formulae for making 
more; The major pifemise of a syllogism, consequently, 
is a formula of this description; and the conclusion 
is not an inference drawn from the formula, but an 
inference drawn according to the formula; the real 
logical antecedent, or premise, being the particular 
, facts from which the general proposition was coll­
ected by induction.... According to the indications 
of this record j/i.e. the major propositioi^ we draw 
our conclusion: which is, to all intents and purposes, 
a conclusion drawn from the forgotten facts (SL, p.193).
Mill’s suggestion that the major proposition of a syllogism can be
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regarded as an inference rule rather than a premise has appealed to 
certain twentieth century philosophers, who have termed universal 
propositions accorded this role ’material* inference rules to dist­
inguish them from such ’formal’ rules as the Dictum de omni et nullo. 
Sometimes support for the view that in actual reasoning people tend 
to employ material rather than formal rules is drawn from the alleged 
fact that syllogising by means of a formal rule would be, in Locke’s 
word, a very ’cumbersome’ affair. A recent and typical statement of 
this position is by Bruce Aune:
Outside of logic texts explicit inferences are 
remarkably rare. Thus instead of reasoning acc­
ording to the explicit pattern 
All men are mortal.
Socrates is a man.
Therefore, Socrates is mortal, 
a real person would no doubt reason according to 
a pattern like this:
Socrates is a man.
So, he is mortal. ^
In conforming to this shorter pattern a person 
would be reasoning in accordance with the premise 
’’All men are mortal,’’ and he would no doubt 
volunteer this premise if asked to justify his 
inference (Aune, p.13).
(Aune’s talk about the major premise here is misleading; his 
thesis is properly that the major proposition is functioning in 
everyday reasoning as a rule.) The contention that inferring by 
means of a material rule is quicker or easier than inferring by 
a formal rule is, as we shall see, very much open to question, but 
it is not in fact urged Jiy Mill. For in one important respect his 
theory is unlike most other theories of material rules of inference 
in that it takes a conclusion like ’Socrates is mortal’ to be inf­
erred, by the formula ’All men are mortal,’ not from ’Socrates is a 
man’ alone, but from the conjunction of that minor premise with a 
host of premises of the form ’a is mortal,’ ’b is mortal,’ and so 
on, these last normally being suppressed in the expression of the 
argument, which thus must be regarded as an enthymeme. But this means 
that Mill’s theory, unlike typical twentieth century accounts of 
inference by material rules, is intended as a theory of inductive 
rather than deductive reasoning. Thus it is patently not designed, 
as the later accounts often are, to establish that actual reasonings
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are less complex than they would he if they followed standard deduc­
tive forms as described in the textbooks. Oddly enough, the form of 
argument Mill describes is actually quite incapable of doing what it 
was intended to do, namely to remove the suspicion of petitio which 
beset (in his view) standard-form syllogistic proofs. For whether 
’All men are mortal’ is taken to be the premise of a deductive, or 
a rule of an inductive, argument, the question arises as to whether 
it can be justifiably acoepted before one has verified all proposit­
ions about the mortality of individual men! It is simply not plausible 
to hold that while we have to take care that we do not accept ’All 
men are mortal’ on inadequate or question-begging evidence when we 
want to use it as a premise, we c ^  be indifferent to its grounding 
when we take it as a rule (of. Kyburg, p.lOl). Premise or rule, ’All 
men are mortal’ states a matter of fact, and it is impossible to 
see how we could rationally remain indifferent to the truth of that 
fact when employing it as a rule of inference to draw conclusions we 
could trust in, just as it is impossible to conceive ourselves being 
reasonably satisfied to use it as a premise if we lacked solid grounds
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for thinking it true. Now it was argued in the preceding chapter 
that Mill was really in error in thinking that ’All men are mortal’ 
could not be employed as a premise in the argument to the mortality 
of Socrates without petitio occurring. And the defence against the 
petitio charge when ’All men are mortal’ was read as a premise is 
equally applicable when it is construed as a rule. But from Mill’s 
perspective, from which suasive syllogisms appear question-begging, 
it cannot mend matters to insist that the major proposition is a 
rule and not a premise, for either way the same objection, which 
concerns the epistemic relations between universal propositions and 
their instances, appears to arise against the purported proof.
At this point one coul^d well be forgiven for wondering whether 
there is in reality anything more than a merely terminological diff­
erence between reasoning from the major proposition, and.reasoning in 
accordance with it. Whately was one philosopher who believed the 
difference to be a verbal one only. Some people, he noted, had ’denied 
that the conclusion is inferred from the universal premiss. But then, 
they acknowledge that the truth of that premiss is an indispensable 
condition of such inferences ...’ Yet if the truth of the major prop­
osition is the important thing, Whately continued, it could hardly 
matter which prepositional expression one employed to characterise the 
use made of it:
And so ... if any one chuse to maintain that the
76
conclusion is drawn from the one premiss, or 
through, the other premiss, this would he accounted 
merely a needless and unimportant innovation in 
phraseology (Whately, p.15).
Whately’s claim that it makes no difference whether we talk of 
arguing from or by (= in accordance with) the major proposition 
needs taking seriously - much more seriously, in fact, than it has 
been by many who have upheld the notion of material rules of infer­
ence. Is there really a substantive distinction at issue here, or 
have many philosophers merely misconstrued a distinction which is 
properly regarded as verbal only? At first it might seem that Aune 
and other such latter-day Lockians have a ready answer to Whately. 
Aune’s contention was that it was much simpler to employ ’All men are 
mortal’ as a rule than as a premise; and if there genuinely is such 
a practical difference between major propositions used as rules and 
as premises, it will be hard to deny that arguing from and in accord­
ance with the major proposition must be different in some significant 
way. But on examination Aune’s claim looks very doubtful. He proposes 
that if ’All men are mortal’ is a rule, it can be thought ’tacitly,’ 
whereas if it is a premise, it needs to be thought explicitly. But 
this seems gratuitous. Presumably his (unexplained) use of the word 
’tacitly' is intended to mark some distinction among levels of con­
sciousness, and his idea is that if we employ ’All men are mortal’ 
as a rule of inference, we do not need to be thinking it with the 
same high level of conscious attention that we normally devote to 
premises. Now it is indeed quite possible that some aspects of our 
conceptual schemes are so thoroughly internalised that, though we use 
them, we barely notice them; perhaps our beliefs in basic logical laws 
are of this character, constantly in service shaping and modifying 
our notions, but scarcely ever themselves being entertained in any 
highly conscious way. It seems on the surface much less likely that 
a material proposition like ’All men are mortal’ would ever become 
so internalised, but even if that point is waived as a concession to 
Aune, what certainly should not be waived is the objection that he 
has not explained why it should be that ’All men are mortal’ can only 
be thought ’tacitly’ (to use his somewhat misleading term) when it is 
a rule, and not when it is a premise.. Probably Aune is borne along 
by a false analogy: because formal rules of inference are, arguably, 
’tacit’ in our reasonings, then material rules will be so as well.
But this is not at all obviously so, and it is very difficult to see 
what further argument could establish that material rules can be
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thought ’tacitly* though material premises cannot.
However, there is some reason for thinking that Whately was wrong 
in holding that it makes no difference whether we talk of arguing 
from or in accordance with the major proposition. To secure a subst­
antive content to the distinction, we can think of the material rule 
as replacing a formal rule as the enabling principle of an argument.
A syllogism whose rule of inference is its major proposition is dep­
endent neither on the Dictum nor bn Nota notae, and someone who infers 
the conclusion by means of a material rule need not be thinking the 
Dictum or Nota notae even at some subordinate level of consciousness. 
Furthermore, as an account of what goes on in actual processes of 
reasoning this may seem to be supported by the fact that it is able 
to accommodate, by virtue of its economy, the feeling of Lockians 
that actual syllogising is a very straightforward affair. For while 
the traditional account recognises both the major proposition (as a 
premise) and the Dictum or Nota notae (as the rule of inference) as 
parts of the machinery of syllogistic inference, the present view
dispenses with the latter when it elevates the former to the status 
5of a rule. »*
Against this, it may be said that if the Dictum (as the favourite 
traditional principle of syllogism) is really as ; obvious and trivial 
as Mill alleged, then its absence from the syllogistic process 
hardly represents much of a saving in intellectual machinery. But the 
real objection to the view that the Dictum can be dropped from the 
process is that, however trivial it might appear, it is really not 
at all a redundant device which can be relinquished without loss, 
but a wholly essential enabling principle of rational syllogistic 
inference. Those who have defended the notion of material rules of 
inference have missed a subtle but crucial point about the conditions 
of rational inference. A question which needs to be asked is: What 
makes it rational for someone who has accepted that all men are mor­
tal to infer subsequently that a given individual man is mortal? To 
answer that he can rationally make the inference because he is rat­
ionally entitled to treat the proposition ’All men are mortal’ as a 
rule of inference is unsatisfactory, because it does not explain 
how he becomes rationally entitled to adopt this proposition as a 
rule. This objection will, of course, be resisted by defenders of 
material rules; they will say that it can be rationally accepted as 
a rule because it is both universal and true. But this is not an 
adequate reply. The rational adoption of ’All men are mortal’ as a 
rule essentially needs to be informed by the thought that if all
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members of a class have some property, then any given individual bel­
onging to that class will have it. If this thought is absent, then 
the rationale behind the material rule is absent too, and its adop­
tion can only be zombie—like. But this rationale is just what is 
expressed by the Dictum! A re as oner who had not grasped that if all 
members of a class have a property, then an individual member will 
have it, would simply not possess the conception which would give 
point to taking ’All men are mortal* as a rule by which to infer the 
mortality of Socrates from his manhood; it would have to remain 
obscure to him how the rule could be an appropriate instrument for 
delivering the conclusion. But this means that the Dictum cannot, 
after all, be dispensed with; and if there really are any inferences 
drawn according to material rules, they must, so to speak, be drawn 
within the shadow of the Dictum. But it must now become doubtful 
whether there really is any syllogising by material rules: for if 
the Dictum cannot be dropped from thought, then not only will major 
propositions be premises of Dictum—governed inferences, but any fur­
ther functioning of them as rules of inference would be utterly sup­
erfluous — if, indeed, it would make sense now to talk of material 
rules, given Whately*s criticism, with the Dictum still in the offing.
A reasonable conclusion from this is that the notion of inference 
by material rules is a logician’s unicorn - a sheer piece of myth­
ology. It is in any case, as we saw, not a notion which is in prin­
ciple capable of doing anything to assist Mill to counter the petitio 
charge against suasive syllogistic processes, given his understanding 
of the ground on which that charge rests. So we must now recognise 
that both his accounts of inference from particulars to particulars, 
the radical and the less radical versions, fail to be viable alter­
natives to standard accounts of the nature of inference.
II
At the beginning of Book III of the Logic, entitled ’Of Induction,’
Mill declared that: ,
all Inference, consequently all Proof, and all 
discovery of truths not self-evident, consists 




What Induction is ... and what conditions render it 
legitimate, cannot hut he deemed the main question 
of the science of logic -the question which includes 
all others (SL, p.283).
Inference from particulars to particulars is inductive inference, 
capable, in Mill’s account, of ’interpretation’ by syllogistic forms.
Of the two versions of his theory of inference, it is perhaps the 
more radical one which received the greater stress; the less radical 
version, which characterised major propositions as rules of (inductive) 
inference, is less in evidence in the pages of the Logic - though it 
may well be that Mill never wholly thought through the distinction 
between the two accounts. It would appear to be the more radical line 
he had in mind when he spoke of major propositions as providing checks 
on inference. Here the idea is that when we are making inductive pro­
jections from a sample of cases, we should take care to consider 
whether we would be willing to accept the projection to all cases of 
the kind involved in the sample; if we would be reluctant to do that, 
we should then hesitate about projecting to further individual cases, 
(see, e.g., SL, p.197). lu a certain very loose sense, we might 
speak of inductive reasoning of the sort Mill was describing here 
as being ’in accordance with’ a rule provided by a universal propos­
ition; yet there is in fact a great difference, though he did not advert 
to it, between the claim that the major proposition is a material 
rule of inference and the claim that it provides a check on inferences 
in the former role, it is, or at least purports to be, the principle 
by which a conclusion is inferred; in the latter role, it is, strictly 
speaking, not an essential element of the inference at all, for it 
is neither an inference rule nor a premise, but rather an external 
criterion by which to judge whether a certain reasoning is a sound 
one or not. Indeed, as Mill in this connection speaks of the major 
proposition being proved along with new individual cases, and from the 
same evidence (e.g. at pp.196,' 284, 572), he cannot be regarding it 
as playing any role in the inference to any individual conclusions: 
for it is not available for that purpose in advance of individual 
conclusions. Interestingly, not:only can the major proposition so 
regarded not play a part in the making of an inference to a fresh 
individual conclusion, but it cannot, either, be employed without 
circularity to provide a retrospective justification, given that its 
own justification, in Mill’s view, relies on precisely the same 
passage of inference.
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But if a major proposition does not assist in the initial making 
of an inference, and cannot justify an inference retrospectively 
either, it is not clear that there can he much content to the idea 
that it provides a check on inference. Mill’s account would have been 
plausible if he had modified it in one important respect. It is not 
unreasonable to suggest that an inductive procedure might be vindicated 
by constructing a syllogism with a major premise reached on the 
lines Mill describes, from which testable consequences are inferred; 
this is in fact just that inducto-deductive methodology which he 
occasionally supported, and which was described in the previous chap­
ter. The problem with this, of course, is that it runs counter to 
his official view that there is no legitimate deductive inference.
Thus the inductive process from particulars to particulars remains 
without any appropriate vindication, and what Mill regarded as a 
’check’ on it is inoperative, because for that purpose it has to be 
possible to deduce testable consequences from the major premise, but 
this is precisely what he disallowed. The mere production and contem­
plation of a proposition like ’All coins in my pocket are pennies’ 
cannot in itself vindicate a Millian inference from the fact that 
all coins in ray pocket so far examined have been pennies to the con­
clusion that an unexamined coin x in my pocket will be a penny. What­
ever Mill claimed, the universal proposition has not been assigned 
a determinate mode of function here, and it is no more than an 
unattached cog in the machinery. But it would be apt for vindicating 
an inductive process if it were considered as a premise from which, 
with the minor premise ’x is a coin in my pocket,’ the conclusion 
*x is a penny’ - a testable proposition - could be deduced. Mill, in 
short, wanted the major proposition to play a role for which he had 
not assigned it enough operating capacity.
The notion that syllogistic processes, albeit not themselves inf- 
erential, can somehow support and vindicate real inferences from 
particulars to particulars is the common core to Mill’s various 
characterisations of the role of syllogism. He never made any attempt 
to locate any significant differences among his descriptions of 
syllogistic major propositions as providing a check on inference, 
as being ’memoranda’ for understanding the,direction taken by a 
passage of reasoning from particulars to particulars, and as pres­
enting instructions for dealing with fresh cases. The problem with 
the common line of thought here remains that of explaining how syll­
ogistic processes could provide any justification of inferences from 
particulars to particulars if they are not themselves valid deductive
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arguments: Mill was attempting the impossible task of buttressing 
weak arguments by what are not, on his account, arguments at all.
Any plausibility his views may seem to have derives entirely from ' 
our inevitable tendency to slip back into thinking, despite his 
explicit rejection of the view, that the syllogistic processes he 
describes are really suasive arguments.
Non-standard though it is. Mill’s view of the syllogism is not, 
as Locke’s is, a dismissive one. Having described the petitio threat 
to suasive syllogism. Mill could still honestly declare a wish to 
’enter a protest, as strong as that of Archbishop Whately himself, 
against the doctrine that the syllogistic art is useless for the 
purposes of reasoning’ (SL, p.196). As a check on real inference, 
the syllogism could still, in his opinion, play an important practical 
role in reasoning. Syllogisms are therefore not merely the concern of
the theoreticians of logic, as they would be if they did no more than 
provide some abstract characterisation of the acceptable patterns of 
inductive reasoning which were in practice never carried out with any 
reference to syllogistic rules; rather, they are crucially involved 
in all good reasoning, not, to be sure, as reasonings themselves, but 
in the guidance of the reasoning. ^ Mill’s view is that real infer­
ence is always from particulars to particulars, but in ’interpreting’ 
our.’memorandum’ (i.e. the major proposition), we remind ourselves 
of the direction which our inductive projection from particulars has 
so far been taking. Thus the proposition ’All men are mortal’ is a 
memorandum, apt for interpreting, which ’shows that we have had exper­
ience from which we thought it follovred that the attributes connoted 
by the term man, are a mark of mortality’ (SL, p.194). It is a fair 
objection that Mill’s terminology of/’interpretation’ and ’memoranda’ 
does little to explain his intentions here, but he is not the first 
theorist to have marred t|ie clarity of a brave new idea by wrapping 
it up in misleading language.
Ill
Finally, two notes on Mill’s positive theories of reasoning and
the syllogism, one logical and one historical.
(a ) In Chapter One it was observed how Mill preferred to consider
real inference as intensional rather than extensional in nature. The 
Dictum de omni et nullo he considered unsuitable as a principle of
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syllogism ‘because it failed to "bring out the fact that our thinking 
is concerned with ascribing attributes to objects rather than assign­
ing objects to classes. It is therefore not at all surprising that 
his account of real inference from particulars to particulars is 
couched in terms of individuals and their attri'butes: the possession 
of a certain attribute ‘by individuals already examined grounds the 
inference to the possession of that attribute by other individuals.
As well as things and their attributes, Mill also accepted the exist­
ence of real natural kinds, and the entry of these into our reasoning. 
In Book IV of the Logic he explicitly attested his belief in kinds 
which were not merely conventional or arbitrary classifications of 
things, but which were determined by possession of naturally assoc­
iated attributes (Bk.IV.ch.vii). A major proposition like ’All men 
are mortal* mentions a kind, that of men, which Mill would have bel­
ieved to be a real one; and the force of the proposition, as a memo­
randum in the reasoning process, would on his view be to record the 
direction in which our experience of members of that kind, in respect 
of the attribute of mortality, is tending. ^
Nevertheless, it is worth remarking»* that an account of inference 
from particulars to particulars could alternatively be delivered in 
purely extensional terms. Talk of attributes would be replaced "by 
talk of class membership, and the major proposition of a syllogism 
would be construed as a memorandum that all members of one given class 
were also members of another given class. From propositions about 
individuals being members of a class, conclusions would be drawn about 
other individuals being members of that class.(and this without the 
assistance of a universal proposition as a premise). Such an account 
would be as well able as Mill’s actual account of.’real inference* to 
overcome the threat of petitio which he held to be unanswerable so 
long as major proposition^ are regarded as premises of proofs; but it 
would in no way be capable of evading the insurmountable problems 
which we have seen beset the theory of inference from particulars to 
particulars in its intensionalist guise. To the present-day logician, 
then, it must count as no less unacceptable than the theory which Mill 
actually offers. It is, however, no more unacceptable; and - to recur 
to a theme of Chapter One - Mill would not 'have been entitled to argue, 
as he might have wished to, that the Dictum could not be the principle 
of syllogism (in the broader sense of a characterisation of the content 
and relations of the syllogistic propositions, rather than of a form 
of inference), on the ground that ’real inference’ must be concerned 
with attributes and kinds; for inference from particulars to partic-
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ulars could equally well, for all he has shown, he construed in an 
extensionalist manner.
(b ) Mill noted in his Autobiography (jpp.l89/l9l) that the inspir­
ation for his theory of syllogism and real inference came from Dug- 
ald Stewart’s Elements of the Philosophy of the Human Mind. After 
years of reflection upon the problem of how inference advances know­
ledge, the rereading of Stewart suggested a clue;
I came upon an idea of his respecting the use of axioms 
in ratiocination, which I did not remember to have
before noticed, but which now, in meditating on it,
seemed to me not only true of axioms, but of all
general propositions whatever, and to be the key of
the whole perplexity. From this germ grew the theory 
of the Syllogism propounded in the Second Book of 
the Logic; which I immediately fixed by writing 
it out (AU, ibid.).
It is hard to say to what extent Stewart anticipated Mill’s theory
in detail; the discussion in the Elements is brief and unclear, and
it is not surprising that Mill, by his own account, did not grasp
the sense of Stewart’s ideas until many years after his first acquain­
tance with them.
There are two sections of Stewart’s text which must have specially 
intrigued Kill. In the first of these, Stewart claimed that certain 
beliefs which epistemology typically regards as extremely fundamental, 
such as those in the continuance of nature’s laws, in our own identity 
over time, and in the trustworthiness of memory, are, in a sense, 
assumed in all our reasonings, though normally only ’a metaphysician 
or a logicimi’ would think of explicitly stating them (Stewart, vol.
3, p.37)* Such fundamental truths, and with them the ’axioms’ of the 
sciences (including geometry), do not figure as premises of our 
actual reasonings, but they function as ’vincula,’ or chains, which 
’give coherence’ to our inferences (pp.37-39). Unfortunately, Stewart 
gave no precise explanation of what he meant by ’vincula,’ though he 
clearly believed that ’axioms’ and ’elemental truths’ in some way 
contribute unity and structure to our reasonings, while not figuring 
explicitly in them. Perhaps, indeed, he had no very precise theory 
to give,
A later passage in the Elements resembles Mill’s own discussion 
more overtly, and is worth quoting at length. Stewart is talking 
about mathematical reasoning, and evidently thinking specifically 
of geometry; 84
/l/n order to arrive at a general conclusion in 
mathematics, (and the same observation holds with 
respect to the sciences,) two different processes 
of reasoning are necessary. The one is the demon­
stration of the proposition in question /i.e. stating 
an individual c a s ^ ; in studying which, we certainly 
think of nothing but the individual diagram before 
. us. The other is, the train of thought by which we 
transfer the particular conclusion to which we have 
thus been led, to any other diagram to which the 
, same enunciation is equally applicable. As this 
last train of thought is, in all cases, essentially 
the same we insensibly cease to repeat it when the 
occasion for employing it occurs, till we come at 
length, without any reflection, to generalize our 
particular conclusion, the moment it is formed; ...
When this habit is established, we are apt to imagine 
... that the general conclusion is an immediate 
inference from a general demonstration; and that, 
although there was only one particular diagram 
present to our external senses, we must have been 
aware, at every step, that our thoughts were really 
conversant, not about this diagram, but about 
general ideas ... (Stewart, vol.3, pp.90-91)*
Having made a discovery in one instance, for example about a geomet­
rical property of a diagram, we come to expect the same property in 
other similar diagrams, according to Stewart, and after a while we 
succumb to the illusion of thinking that our conclusions about part­
icular diagrams are based not, as in fact they are, upon the evidence 
of the particular diagrams themselves, but upon some kind of general 
principle about diagrams of their sort. This line of thinking, which 
was in fact not wholly original to Stewart, being suggested in Thomas 
Beddoes* Observations on the Nature of Demonstrative Evidence publ-
Q : ■
ished in 1793, anticipates Mill in its rejection of the view that 
universal propositions are required as premises in reasoning, though 
it remains somewhat obscure whether Stewart wished to substitute a 
view of real inference being from particulars to particulars, in Mill’s 
sense. Part of what Stewart writes indicates he may have believed 
that while experience of individual cases sets up expectations about 
other individual cases not yet examined, each fresh case has never­
theless to be scrutinised and assessed on its own evidence alone.
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Confronted with new cases, we initially employ a ’train of thought ... 
essentially the same’ as that which we used on the first case - which 
suggests Stewart is thinking not so much of an inference, hut of the 
repetition of a basically observational process. But in time we cease 
to bother repeating this train of thought at all, and directly affirm 
the conclusion when we face a new case. Yet if this looks a little 
more like a real inference, it may rather be that Stewart takes there 
to be here a complete'absence of reasoning, and only a purely non-rat­
ion al step to the conclusion (perhaps one governed by a mechanism of 
psychological association). However, it is a further possibility that 
he was altogether hazy about the distinction between inductive infer­
ence and a successive inspection of individual cases, and would have 
described as a series of inferences about new cases what was really 
just a process of inspection of them seriatim (albeit one governed by
expectations set Up by experience).
It is evident that there is some kinship between the ideas of Mill 
and Stewart, but it is probably more reasonable to regard Mill as 
being inspired by Stewart than as borrowing from him in a substantial 
way. Stewart’s views were not highly /leveloped, and what Mill can 
have gained from him was less a theory than a hint as to the direction 
in which a theory could be sought. In place of Stewart’s brisk dis­
missal of the notion that reasoning essentially involves universal 
propositions. Mill devoted many pages to the analysis of the role 
which such propositions play if they do not serve as premises of 
suasive arguments. If he failed ultimately to arrive at a satisfac­
tory account, it was not from any deficiency in his grasp of the 
importance and complexity of the issues.
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P O U R
T H E  P O S S I B  I L-I T Y D P  I N D U C T I V E  
R E A S O N I N G
Although all real inference, in Mill’s opinion, is from particul­
ars to particulars, he was ready to concede that scientific enquiry 
is normally interested in the establishment of universal propositions 
- to wit, in the discovery and demonstration of natural laws.
Indeed, induction may even be defined. Mill said, as ’the operation 
of discovering and proving general propositions’ (SL, p.284)* But 
this does not mean that the scientist’s inferences are different in 
some fundamental way from the inferences from particulars to partic­
ulars which had been described in the second Book of the Logic; for 
induction in science is merely a ’form of the very same process,’ 
’generals’ being ’but collections of particulars, definite in kind 
but indefinite in number.’ Where our evidence entitles us to draw an 
inference about ’even one unknown case,’ wrote Mill, it will also 
justify us in ’drawing a similar inference with respect to a whole 
class of cases’ (ibid.).
Still, the task of providing a comprehensive account of an ideal 
methodology of science, which Mill set himself in the later Books of 
the Logic, understandably required a good deal of elaboration of the 
theory of inference outlined in Bk.II. Science’s special objective of 
reducing the multitudinous phenomena of experience to a law-governed 
system demands for its satisfaction that the scientific investigator 
be a highly sophisticated reasoner as well as a careful observer; 
like a detective attempting to unravel a particularly clever crime, 
the scientist must seek intelligently for significant but often elusive 
clues, while avoiding numbers of false trails. As Mill recognised, 
scientific progress is only possible when the investigator has some 
basic conceptions about the way in which nature is organised, so that
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his research is guided to fruitful results hy his expectations about 
what he will find. Pre-eminent, in Mill’s view, among the notions 
which the successful scientific researcher needs to have in mind are 
those of the uniformity of nature, and of the existence of a cause for 
every event. Accordingly, he took pains in Bk.III to defend the claim 
that these notions are presuppositions of all successful inductive 
reasoning in science — and in fact of all successful reasoning, whether 
motivated by theoretical or practical interests, aiming at knowledge 
of the world. Borrowing a Kantian idiom, we could say that the prime 
purpose of the third Book of the Logic is to explain the possibility 
of successful inductive reasoning. Alternatively, though it is to 
risk misunderstanding by using a dangerously ambiguous expression, 
we might describe Mill in Bk.III as concerned with the justification 
of induction.
The phrase ’the justification of induction’ can reasonably be read 
in a number of ways. Most commonly nowadays, one hears talk of just­
ifying induction when it is Hume’s famous attack on the soundness of 
inductive reasoning which is up for discussion. It is sometimes said 
that the chief business of Western philosophy has been the contrib­
ution of footnotes to Plato; whether or not that is so, it would 
certainly be accurate to regard most twentieth century studies in the 
philosophy of induction as footnotes to Hume. The importance of his 
treatment of induction is scarcely disputed even by those who refuse 
to go along with his sceptical contention that there can be no such 
thing as a sound inductive argument; for it is generally recognised 
that unless that powerfully supported claim is refuted, or in some 
May circumvented, no system of inductive logic, no matter how ingen­
ious, rests on anything better than sand. Yet the refutation of Hume 
was not an objective of Mill, even though he did regard himself in 
Bk.III as justifying inductive inference. Indeed, Mill did not even 
grasp what Hume’s problem was, and his chief concern was to explain 
how inference from particulars to particulars, despite its appear­
ance of slightness, was really the only form of inference which sci­
ence either needed to, or could, admit.
It is possible to single out three strands of thought in Bk.III 
which are suitably described as concerned with the justification of 
inductive inference. None is designed to rebut Hume.
(a ) Not all inductive extrapolations from examined instances are 
justified; but how do we establish which ones are legitimate, and, 
in particular, how should we decide what kind of projections to make
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in an area of research of which we have had no or little direct pre­
vious experience? (it will he seen that in tackling (a ), Mill is at 
last, in Bk.III, making up for his failure in Bk.II to raise the 
question of what distinguishes rational and irrational inductive 
projections.)
(b ) Inductive inference (believes Mill) is legitimised in prin­
ciple by the existence of uniformity in the causal structure of 
nature. But are inductive reasonings justified when the reasoner has 
no explicit consciousness of this uniformity?
(c) Mill maintains that ’the uniformity of the course of nature 
... /is/ the ultimate major premise of all inductions’ (SL, p.308).
But what is the logic of the support which the uniformity of nature 
provides for inductive reasoning, given that by the theories of 
Bk.II universal propositions do not deductively warrant any concl­
usions?
A fourth very important strand in Bk.III is concerned less with 
justification than with psychological explanation. Mill is interested 
in the question of the origin of the notion of uniformity, and he 
urges that we should seek a source for it in experience rather than 
in some form of rational intuition. We would have,no belief in unifor­
mity, Mill considers, if we were not confronted by evidence for it in 
experience. Characteristically, Mill also holds that it is experience 
which justifies the belief in uniformity, and thus opens himself up 
to the criticism that he is proposing an inductive justification of 
the very principle which he takes to warrant our inductive practices. 
However, we shall see that this circle is more apparent than real, 
because he does not take the uniformity principle to warrant induc­
tive reasonings in any standard sense; nor, in fact, does he regard 
the basic soundness of inductive reasoning (which Hume challenged) as 
being in question at all. I shall argue that it is never scepticism 
of the Humean type, but always one of the issues (a) - (c), or the 
psychological question about the origin of our belief in uniformity, 
which Mill is concerned with in Bk.III. Thus the discussion in this 
Book of the Logic is more continuous with that of the preceding Book 
than is allowed by those who think that Mill has now switched his 
attention from the presentation of a theory of inference to the task 
of defending it against the radical Humean criticism; rather, he is 
without any apprehension that inductive reasoning is subject to fun­
damental objection on the lines laid down by Hume, and is solely 
concerned with the further articulation• and elaboration of the account 
of inference sketched in Bk.II.
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II
The problem about inductive reasoning we normally ascribe to Hume 
was actually known to the ancient Tyrrhenian sceptics. Sextus Emp­
iricus wrote;
It is also easy, I consider, to set aside the method of 
induction. For when they propose to establish the 
universal from the particular by means of induction, they 
will affect this by a review either of all or of some 
of the particular instances. But if they review some 
the induction will be insecure, since some of the 
particulars omitted in the induction may contravene 
the universal; while if they are to review all, they 
will be toiling at the impossible, since the partic­
ulars are infinite and indefinite. Thus on both 
grounds, as I think, the consequence is that induction 
is invalidated (Sextus Empiricus, Bk.II.sect.204? my emphases).
y
The central issue here, as in Hume’s treatment of induction, is:
When we make inductive projections from a sample, what guarantee 
have we that further particulars will resemble those already exam­
ined (in other words, what guarantee that uniformities hitherto 
observed will be preserved)? In the view of Sextus and of Hume the 
answer is: None.
Now the fact is that there was nowhere a lively interest in this 
sceptical problem of induction before the publication of the Green 
and Grose edition of Hume’s works in 1874 - and by that date Mill 
was dead. Although Hume before 1874 could hardly be described as 
an unread author, the new impetus given to Hume studies by this ed- 
ition enabled the true character of his ideas to emerge more clearly 
than it had done previously; in connection with induction, it grad­
ually now became clear that Hume’s main concern had been with the 
justification of inductive reasoning in the sense at issue in Sextus, 
rather than with psychological explanation of inductions, as had 
previously been thought (See Appendix to this Chapter). Judging by 
the paucity of references to him. Mill seems to have taken very little 
notice of Hume’s philosophy, though he possessed both the Treatise 
of Human Nature in its first edition (London, 1739-40), and the 
Essays and Treatises on Social Subjects (Edinburgh, 1793), of which 
the second volume contains the Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding.
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Yet the view that he was concerned to discuss Hume’s problem of 
induction has dominated accounts of his philosophy of inductive 
inference. Here is a small selection of the opinions of recent sch­
olars.
H.W.B. Joseph took Mill to be engaged in the ’impossible’ task 
of proving a uniformity principle that is necessarily presupposed 
hy our inductions (Joseph, pp.421-25). R.P. Anschutz alleged that 
Mill ’endeavours to combat the widespread scepticism of his pred­
ecessors and contemporaries regarding the possibility of formulating 
a demonstrative theory of induction’ (Anschutz (1953), P*97)- Acc­
ording to Karl Britton, ’The problem of induction, as Mill sees it 
at its widest, is to determine what kind of connexion justifies 
/th// transition from evidence to generalization. To this question,
Mill makes a characteristic answers the transition is justified when
there is a uniformity of nature - a law, a universal fact’ (Britton (1953),
pp.149-50). H.J. McCloskey (who appears to take the whole of Mill’s
study of induction as little other than an attempt to rebut Hume)
wrote; ’Mill accepted that he was involved in explaining by what
right we infer from the known to the unknown. Mill ••. was right
in this, that the problem is an important one which does not admit
of facile dissolution as a pseudo-problem in the ways suggested by
such dissolutionists as P. Edwards and P.P. Strawson’ (McCloskey,
p.49). Fred Wilson has recently tried to convince us that Mill is
not ’being foolish in what he says about justifying induction’ gainst
Humean-type strictures, though he ’has often been criticized for
his inductive ’justification’ of induction’ (Wilson, pp.1-2). Lastly,
Alan Ryan and A.P. McRae have accepted that Mill was anxious about 
the Humean problem of induction, even though they have quite rightly 
pointed out that it could never have been his intention, given his 
account of the role of universal propositions in reasoning, to justify 
inductive reasonings by representing them to be tacitly deductive: 
that is, Mill would not have thought it right to try to buttress 
inductive arguments by adding to their premises a uniformity principle 
by whose assistance their conclusions can be derived deductively 
(Ryan (1974), p.83; McRae (1973), pp.xxxiv-xxxv). But all these writers, 
including the last two, have misunderstood the tone of Mill’s dis­
cussion by assuming that he was alert to, and impressed by, the 
sceptical difficulties raised by Hume.which have attracted so much 
attention in the present century. And because they have pressed an 
interpretation which is essentially anachronistic, they have mostly
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felt that his ’solution* is a dire failure: in arguing that inductive 
reasoning is justified hy the uniformity of nature, a principle 
whose warrant is itself inductive, Mill - the usual story goes — •
gets inextricably involved in circularity. Yet it is hard to believe 
that Mill could have given such a transparently silly argument unless 
his mind was truly as irrational as Jevons notoriously alleged; and 
that is a slur which a careful reading of his philosophy does not 
bear out.
At the outset of Bk.III Mill addressed himself to a question about 
the justification of inductive reasonings - but it is a question 
about justification in sense (a ) he was concerned with. He complained 
that the detailed study of inductive methods had been hitherto neg­
lected; some of the ’generalities of the subject’ had been discussed, 
but previous analyses of the ’inductive operation’ had ’not been 
specific enough to be made the foundation of practical rules, which 
might be for induction itself what the rules of the syllogism are 
for the interpretation of induction’ (SL. p.283). Mill’s interest 
here was in locating sound methods of inductive enquiry - a search 
that culminated in his statement of the famous canons of induction - 
and his investigation of uniformity, causation, laws, the signific­
ance of observation and experiment, etc., which forms the content of 
Bk.III, was pursued for the sake of its bearing on the practical task 
of distinguishing sound from unsound modes of enquiry. It is noteworthy 
that to some later philosophers, the task in which Mill was here 
engaged concerns the only worthwhile puzzle about induction. For 
example, Keith Campbell has written that ’The genuine problem of 
induction is that of finding criteria Whereby acceptable procedures 
ma;^ r be distinguished from unacceptable. There are instances of both 
types’ (K. Campbell, p.148). Whether or not one goes along with Cam­
pbell in dismissing the l^umean problem of induction, one can see that 
he and Mill are certainly identifying a significant research project 
concerned with the justification of induction; only, it is not the 
same project as that undertaken by those who wish to counter the 
Humean critique of induction in general. Indeed, the success of the 
Mill/Campbell project presupposes that Hume’s scepticism is ultimately 
without foundation: for it is impossible t-o distinguish sound from 
unsound inductive methods if there cannot in principle be any sound 
ones.
It would be wrong to suggest that Mill’s commentators have failed 
in all cases to see that he had an interest in finding criteria for 
distinguishing acceptable from unacceptable inductive arguments. But
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in regarding him as having a central interest in the Humean problem 
of induction they have been guilty of ascribing him their own con­
cerns. In fairness, however, it needs to be said that there is some 
excuse for their misinterpretation, for Mill undoubtedly says many 
things about inductive inference which could easily be misunderstood, 
even by a cautious reader.
One source of misunderstanding is Mill’s great interest in the 
principle of the uniformity of nature, which frequently figures in 
discussions of Hume’s problem. Mill tended to speak almost inter­
changeably of the principle of uniformity and the law of causation, 
because he regarded patterns of uniformity in nature as depending on 
the causal relationships generalized "ty the law of causation: ’There 
is, however, no other uniformity in the events of nature,’ he wrote, 
’than that which arises from the law of causation’ (SL, p.577; of> 
pp.323-27, 562, 567)* Moreover, when in Bk.III.ch.xxi he redeemed a 
promise made in ch.iii to speak later ;of the evidence for the principle 
of the uniformity of nature, ’the fundamental axiom of induction,’ it 
was the evidence for the law of universal causation, as the presupp­
osition of all inductive methods, which he discussed. Mill explained 
the principle of uniformity as an ’assumption with regard to the 
course of nature and the order of the universe; namely, that there 
are such things in nature as parallel cases; that what happens once, 
will, under a sufficient degree of similarity of circumstances, happen 
again; and not only again, but as often as the same circumstances 
recur’ (SL, p.3,06). Some pages later, he said that it is the law of 
causation on which ’depends the possibility of reducing the inductive 
process to rules,’ and characterised the law as follows:
To certain facts, certain facts succeed. The invariable 
antecedent is termed the cause; the invariable consequent, 
the effect. And the universality of the law of causation 
consists in this, that every consequent is connected in 
this manner with some particular antecedent, or set of 
antecedents. Let the fact be what it may, if it has 
begun to exist, it was preceded'by some fact or facts, 
with which it is invariably connected (SL, p.327).
This close association of thé two principles is natural and reasonable 
to an empiricist like Mill who disbelieved in the existence of cau­
sal necessity (SL, pp.326-27); causal relationships will consist, for 
such a philosopher, in some variety of constant conjunctions of
phenomena, and the uniformity of nature as a whole is simply the sum 
of those uniformities. ^
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Bk.III.ch.iii, »Of the Ground of Induction,’ was Mill’s attempt 
to answer the question: How is inductive reasoning possible? The 
title of the chapter might lead one to expect that it is going to 
be an essay on Hume’s problem, but it is not. After referring to 
the assumption of uniformity involved in every induction. Mill rev- 
ealingly continued:
And, if we consult the actual course of nature, we find 
that the assumption is warranted. The universe, so far 
as is knovm to us, is so constituted, that whatever is 
true in any one case, is true in all cases of a certain 
description; the only difficulty is, to find what des­
cription (SL, p.306; my emphases).
The words I have emphasised here are not an aberration on Mill’s 
part; there are several parallels to them, and they make plain that 
he saw no good reason for scepticism about the truth of the unif­
ormity principle / the law of causation. He went on immediately to 
speak of uniformity as a ’universal fact’ (ibid.), and a little 
below spoke of ’the uniformity which we know to exist in nature’
(SL, p.310; my emphases). Later in the'Logic he talked of the law 
of causation as standing ’at the head of all observed uniformities, 
in point of universality, and therefore ... in point of certainty,’ 
and proceeded to say that:
we shall find ourselves warranted in considering this 
fundamental law, though itself obtained by induction 
from particular laws of causation, as not less certain, 
but on the contrary, more so, than any of those from 
which it was drawn (SL, p.570).
And:
We may even, I think, ... regard the certainty of 
that great induction /the law of causation/ as not 
merely comparative, but, for all practical purposes, 
complete (SL, p.573).
(in the Press-copy manuscript of the Logic, Mill had gone further 
still, suggesting that the law of causation stands ’on an equal 
footing in respect to evidence with the axioms of geometry itself’ 
(SL, p.571).)
Mill was, it is true, willing to admit that we can conceive of 
the universe’s dissolving into chaos (SL, pp.565-66); but this rem­
ained for him a bare conceptual possibility, and was not at all what 
it is if Hume’s argument is correct, namely a prospect which we have
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absolutely no good reason for "believing to be less likely than the 
alternative prospect of continued order. On Mill's way of thinking, 
we can deny that there is any likelihood of a collapse into chaos 
with something very close to certainty, the 'progress of experience" 
having 'dissipated the doubt' that might have hung over the univer­
sality of the law of causation in those days 'before there were suff­
icient grounds for receiving it as a certainty' (SL, p.574). Then 
with a dash of nineteenth century confidence Mill declared in a note 
inserted in the 1872 edition of the Logic that:
the number of natural agencies in this part of the univ­
erse known to us is not incalculable, nor even extremely 
great; ••• we have now reason to think that at least the 
far greater number of them ••• have been made sufficiently 
amenable to observation, to have enabled us actually 
to ascertain some of their fixed laws; and that this 
amount of experience justifies the same degree of ass­
urance that the course of nature is uniform through­
out, which we previously had of the uniformity of 
sequence among the phenomena best known to us
(SL, pp.576-77). /V
In the same note of 1672, Mill also set out to refute the contention 
he attributed to Reid, Stewart and W.G. Ward that, 'whatever knowledge 
experience gives us of the past and present, it gives us none of the 
future,' declaring that, 'I see no force whatever in this argument'
(SL, p.577). ^ If one takes the argument at issue to be Hume's arg­
ument, here is more evidence that Mill failed to grasp what Hume was 
saying, for however one responds to that argument, one can hardly 
dismiss it as airily as that. Mill simply saw nothing amiss with the 
notion that past experience offers a wholly reliable guide to the fut­
ure, Joseph Priestley, he ./contended, had settled the issue by pointing 
out that "though we have had no experience of what is future, we have 
had abundant experience of what was future* (ibid.). Our predictions 
about the future, he continued, are invariably found to be verified 
by experience when the experience comes. Mill's treatment of the 
issue displays very clearly his insensitivity to Hume's problem. Let 
it be granted to Priestley and Mill that "present futures' are con­
stantly becoming "past futures," and that we have so far found that 
predictions we have made about what was presently future, presupposing 
uniformity, have, when those futures arrived, been seen to be correct. 
Yet, properly considered, this past experience of the correctness of
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predictions is not a sufficient ground for confidence that our pred­
ictions about what is future to us now will turn out equally reliable; 
for there is a sound inductive argument from the past correctness of 
predictions to the future reliability of predictions only if the patt­
erns of uniformity that have hitherto held continue to hold; but it 
is precisely this assumption that they will hold that Hume recognised 
we are unable to defend rationally - and this is a point that Priest­
ley and Mill failed to see because they were concerned not with Hume's 
problem but different ones. Priestley, Mill and their opponents 
assumed that knowledge of the future is possible, warranted by the 
uniformity of nature - a uniformity which they agreed could be known 
with certainty, though they disagreed about the source of that know­
ledge. The moral of Hume's discussion, hy contrast, is that there is 
no adequate warrant for the belief in the continuing uniformity of 
nature, and hence no warrant for any of those beliefs which presuppose 
it.
Ill
Two reasons why commentators may have misunderstood Mill on induc­
tion are that he did admit that it is hard to establish just what 
patterns of regularity in nature we are rationally entitled to expect, 
and that he thought it incumbent on him to spend a whole chapter 
discussing the grounds of our belief in the law of causation. That he 
engaged in such tasks might appear to indicate that he believed the 
uniformity of nature to be suspect in the light of the Humean argument ; 
however, a close reading of the text does not bear out this interpret­
ation.
The first of these tasks, that of isolating trustworthy patterns 
of regularity, is concerned with justification in the first of the 
senses earlier distinguished - that is, sense (a ) - and Mill approached 
it in a largely perceptive manner. He did not betray any doubt that 
nature is, in a degree to make possible the practice of induction, a 
regular affair, but he noted that 'the proposition, that the course 
of nature is uniform, possesses rather the brevity suitable to pop­
ular, rather than the precision requisite in philosophical language,' 
and that 'Every person's consciousness assures him that he does not 
always expect uniformity in the course of events' (SL, p.31l). We do
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not, for instance, believe that the succession of rain and fine 
weather will be the same every year, or that we will have the same 
dreams every night. 'The course of nature,* said Mill, 'is not only 
uniform, it is also infinitely various' (ibid.), and in another place 
he observed with a touch of hyperbole that, 'The order of nature, 
as perceived at first glance, presents at every instant a chaos foll­
owed by another chaos' (^, p.379). Moreover, some instances of ind­
uction that have been, felt to be trustworthy have later been discov­
ered to have led to false conclusions, as, for example, the argument 
to the conclusion that all swans are white; yet sometimes we are 
prepared to reason with great confidence to a generalisation on much 
less evidence than was had of white swans, as when a chemist in a 
single experiment determines the properties of a newly discovered 
substance that we thereafter trust will be found in every sample of 
that substance (SL, pp.313-14). Mill rightly noted that he who would 
construct a 'scientific theory of induction' (the task K. Campbell 
upheld as the 'genuine problem of induction') should ponder cases 
like these, and seek to establish the conditions under which sound 
generalisations can be offered. The 'problem of induction,' Mill
concluded, which even the wisest of the ancients could not solve, was
/
to answer the question: 'Why is a single instance, in some cases, 
sufficient for a complete induction, while in others, myriads of con­
curring instances, without a single exception knovm or presumed, go 
such a very little way towards establishing an universal proposition?' 
(SL, p.314). Such a problem can only be set up on the assumption 
that nature basically possesses a large degree of uniformity - that 
it has, so to speak, a 'deep structure' of uniformity beneath its 
often confusingly complex 'surface structure.' This is Mill's assump­
tion, but not, of course, Hume's.
The name of 'empirical laws' can be given. Mill wrote, to 'those
•f
uniformities which observation or experiment has shown to exist,' 
but which cannot wholly be relied on 'in cases varying much from 
those which have been actually observed, for want of seeing any reason 
why such a law should exist' (SL, p.516). Such laws we can in prin­
ciple expect to be able to explain in terms of more ultimate laws 
concerning universal causal relations, but^ before we have achieved 
this kind of explanation of an empirical regularity we must maintain 
a healthy caution about whether it is likely to hold in cases spatially 
or temporally distant from those we have observed. It can even happen 
sometimes that the greater the understanding we obtain of the causal 
basis for an empirical regularity, the more we are inclined to cir­
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cumscribe the limits within which we expect it to hold; thus the more 
we learn about the causal background to the movements of the heavenly 
bodies, the less willing we become to expect that the pattern of 
alternation of day and night that we have observed to hold so far 
will continue to hold for all time. In Mill's opinion, we are unwise 
to venture to affirm that regularities we have observed concerning 
tides, weather conditions, the expansion of bodies by heating, the 
poisonousness of substances containing a high proportion of nitrogen, 
and many others, will be maintained in cases which are not temporally 
and spatially 'adjacent' to those already experienced (perhaps one 
far distant day, changes in movements of the bodies in the solar sys­
tem will cause the pattern of tides on Earth to alter; or maybe some 
new substance discovered by chemists will be found non-poisonous even , 
though it contains a lot of nitrogen). On the other hand, there is 
no such problem with regard either to inductions concerning 'ultimate 
laws,' which can be expected to hold always and everywhere in a stric­
tly uniform fashion, or to those about the maintenance of empirical 
regularities in 'adjacent' cases: thus, 'We have ... the warrant of 
a rigid induction for considering it probable, in a degree indisting­
uishable from certainty, that the known conditions requisite for the 
sun's rising will exist to-morrow' (SL, pp.516, 551)* In no part of 
this discussion is there any awareness of the Humean grounds for 
scepticism about induction; throughout his account of the perils of 
extrapolating empirical regularities to non-adjacent cases Mill was
quite unmotivated by any thought that there was something problematic
4about the belief in ultimate uniformity.
The second reason why commentators may have thought that Mill meant 
to justify inductive reasoning in general against sceptical doubts is 
that he devoted Bk.III.ch.xxi to an explanation of the grounds of 
our belief in the law of pausation - his 'axiom of induction.' It 
might seem that there would be little point in his taking the trouble 
to vrite this chapter if he were really convinced that the belief in 
the law was beyond sceptical attack. In fact, his intention was quite 
different: he wished to take advantage of another opportunity to coun­
ter the a priorist school that sought to explain some of our most 
important conceptions about the nature of things, logic, mathematics 
and morality by means of rationalist theories of non-empirical, a 
priori apprehensions. Mill was, by contrast, the single-minded empiric­
ist, aiming to drive a priorism even from its bastions in the phil­
osophies of logic and mathematics. When in the Logic and elsewhere
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he argued the case for laws of logic and mathematics being empirical 
in character, it was not because he, or anyone else, thought the truth 
of those laws needed defending against sceptics; his purpose was 
rather to destroy the notion that their truth was to be established 
by pure intellect without the assistance of experience.
Similarly, the purpose of Bk.III.ch.xxi was not to defend the 
law of causation against any doubts about its truth, but to vindicate 
the thesis that our knowledge of it is empirically grounded. The tar­
get of Mill's criticism was identified early in the chapter: it was 
'the school of metaphysicians who have long predominated in this 
country,* and who have affirmed that:
the universality of causation is a truth which we cannot 
help believing; that the belief in it is an instinct, one 
of the laws of our believing-faculty. As the proof of this, 
they say, and they have nothing else to say, that everybody 
does believe it; and they number it among the propositions, 
rather numerous in their catalogue, which may be logically 
argued against, and perhaps cannot be logically proved,
but which are of higher authority than logic, and so
*
essentially inherent in the human mind ... (^, p.563).
After this sarcasm, which was probably directed chiefly against Reid 
and Stewart, though they are not named. Mill proceeded to make some 
acufe remarks about evidence which anticipate Wittgenstein. Our bel­
iefs, he insisted, cannot be looked on as self—certifying. Rational 
beliefs have to measure up to some kind of outward standard, something 
independent of the mere fact of their seeming right:
Belief is not proof, and does not dispense with the 
necessity of proof ... To say /as the a priorists d ^  
that belief suffices for its own justification is 
making opinion the test of opinion; it is denying the 
existence of any outward standard, the conformity to 
which constitutes its truth (SL, p.564)* ^
In Bk.III.ch.xxi, Mill was fighting a battle in his continuing war 
against the a priorists, not attempting to refute Humean scepticism.
It was not the thesis that uniform causation is in principle incap­
able of being established as a rational belief, but the a priorist 
thesis that belief in it is, in Stewart's phrase, a 'principle of 
our constitution' (Stewart, vol.5, p.lOl), to which Mill was respon­
ding in the chapter.
Yet at the beginning of the same chapter occurs a passage that has 
surely misled many readers into thinking that Mill intended primarily
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to discuss Humean scepticism about induction. As the passage is an 
important one, I shall quote it in full:
But is this assumption /sc. of the law of causation/ 
warranted? Doubtless (it may be said) most phenomena 
are connected as effects with some antecedent or cause, 
that is, are never produced unless some assignable fact 
has preceded them; but the very circumstance that complic­
ated processes b f  'induction are sometimes necessary, 
shows that cases exist in which this regular order of 
succession is not apparent to our unaided apprehen­
sion. If, then, the processes which bring these cases 
within the same category with the rest, require that 
we should assume the universality of the very law 
which they do not at first sight appear to exemplify, 
is not this a petitio principii? Can we prove a prop­
osition, by an argument which takes it for granted?
And if not so proved, on.what evidence does it rest?
(a, p.563).
Mill here claims that a petitio threatens if we assume phenomena, _ 
to be subject to a law of uniform causation that we should not take 
to be a law unless we are entitled to be sure that there are no exc­
eptions to it. This claim certainly seems very close to that freq­
uently made in discussions of Hume's problem that we have no right to 
affirm uniform causation outside the narrow realm of phenomena we 
have experienced. This conventional complaint that we can only beg, 
not prove, the question in favour of uniform causation seems to be 
just the objection which Mill was making. So how can it be said 
that he was insensitive to Hume's problem?
Despite surface appearances, it was not Hume's problem that Mill 
was concerned with in th^s passage. Later pages of the chapter make 
quite plain that he did not intend to cast any doubt on the thesis 
that our experience provides massive evidence for the general preval­
ence of uniform causal relations, and in fact puts that thesis into 
the camp of certainties. The problem Mill was raising in the passage 
quoted is one of more limited scope than those inclined to find in 
him an awareness of Hume's problem would sbppose: it is the problem 
of whether we are justified in carrying our belief in the existence 
of underlying uniformity of causal patterns even into those realms 
where we are at first hard put to it to detect any regularity; that 
is, whether we may legitimately persist in the search for ordering 
principles in areas that initially defy us to find any. But this is
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still a question about the justification of induction in sense (a ).
Can we without begging the question, Mill was asking, justifiably
deny that there are in nature any random events? His answer was that 
even in the difficult cases, we may rationally, and without petitio, 
assert that the law of causation holds, on the inductive basis — 
and note that he betrayed no diffidence about the soundness of this 
inductive argument - that the course of scientific research has so 
far provided no grounds for doubting that all phenomena are governed 
by causal laws, the tendency of previous investigations being always 
to lead to the discovery of causal regularities; it has not yet 
proved necessary, and so it is not likely in the future to prove 
necessary, to postulate the existence of any random events. 'When 
every phenomenon,* wrote Mill,
that we ever knew sufficiently well to be able to ans­
wer the question, had a cause on which it was invariably 
consequent, it was more rational to suppose that our 
inability to assign the causes of other phenomena 
arose from our ignorance, than that there were phen­
omena which were uncaused ... (SL, p.574).
Discoveries in physics since Mill's death have proved wrong his 
expectation that science would never uncover indeterminacy in nat­
ure, and yet that expectation was not an unreasonable one in the 
light of the rapid advances of the science of his day; assuming the 
soundness of inductive argument, it was quite rational for him to 
infer that human ignorance rather than any intrinsic randomness in 
things was the correct explanation of the fact that for some classes 
of phenomena deterministic laws could not (yet) be stated.
IV
Also amenable to serious misinterpretation if approached in the 
false belief that Mill meant to respond to the Humean problem of ind­
uction is the first section of Bk.III.ch.iii, 'Of the Ground of Ind­
uction.' Mill began, as we have seen, by asserting that the uniformity 
of nature is presupposed in every induction (SL, p.306). This assump­
tion, he went on, is a warranted one, as we see if we consult the 
actual course of nature. But next:
Whatever be the most proper mode.of expressing it, the 
proposition that the course of nature is uniform, is the
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fundamental principle, or general axiom, of Induction.
It would yet be a great error to offer this large gen­
eralization as any explanation of the inductive process.
On the contrary, I hold it to be itself an instance of 
induction, and induction by no means of the most obvious 
kind. Far from being the first induction we make, it is 
one of the last, or at all events one of those which 
are latest in attaining strict philosophical accuracy 
(gL, p.307).
This passage is a chief source of the interpretation of Mill as 
attempting an inductive justification of induction. And it must be 
confessed that the interpretation draws much plausibility from this 
passage and its context. For Mill has said that the belief in unif­
ormity is warranted, and then has claimed that it is itself a prod­
uct of inductive reasoning; so it is natural to think that he must 
have considered that induction could somehow supply its own justif­
ication. If one thinks this, one's next thought is likely to be that 
Mill has chosen a perfectly hopeless way to defend induction, and one 
will be amazed that he could have failed to grasp the crass circul­
arity of his strategy after he had devoted so much sensitive discussion
in earlier pages of the Logic to the related fallacy of petitio prin-
6cipii in regard to deductive logic.
But there is another interpretation that is preferable because it 
renders Mill's position much more intelligible. Like his predecessors, 
he simply failed to see that it may be questioned whether inductive 
inference is in principle trustworthy; he assumed, as they had done, 
that it trustworthy. Even so, one will want to press the question 
why at this stage it did not become apparent to him that there was 
something wrong with maintaining that the warrant for inductive reas­
oning is an inductively warranted uniformity principle; surely the 
circularity of the position he was putting forward had now become inescap­
ably evident. So, even if it had not been apparent before. Mill should 
have realised here that there is more of a problem about the justif­
ication of inductive reasoning in principle than he had suspected.
This line of thinking falls down, however, because it disregards 
the special and unusual sense which Mill gave to the claim that the 
uniformity of nature (or the law of causation) warrants inductive 
reasoning. No charge of circularity can be laid at Mill's door in the 
present context, because he never supposed that a uniformity principle, 
as a universal proposition, featured as a premise (of a standard 
sort) of a justificatory argument; in his view, it was not available
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in advance as a proposition which could serve in the support of part­
icular inductions, hut was itself proved along with them. As we shall 
see helow, this raises the sharp question of what he really did mean 
when he held that uniformity warrants inductions. But it is at least 
clear that he did not mean anything which could invite a charge of 
circular reasoning - whatever other objections might be raised against 
his view.
Resolution of this misunderstanding enables a sounder reading to be 
given of the passage at p.307 of the Logic. The purpose of this and 
the ensuing discussion was not to provide an inductive justification 
of induction in answer to Humean scepticism, but to guard against 
the false impression that the uniformity principle is the axiom of 
induction in the sense of a principle that has to be present to con­
sciousness if a person is to be able to make inductions. If this were 
so, then the substantial objection could be made to Mill's position 
that as the content of the principle is too sophisticated for it to 
be remotely plausible to claim that it could be the earliest of a 
person's inductions, it is obscure how his first inductions could 
rationally come to be made (or, indeed, be made at all). Mill's pre­
dilection for an empiricist explanation of the belief in uniformity 
in opposition to the a priorist explanations of Reid and Stewart had 
produced a need for a justification of induction of type (b): a just­
ification, that is, of a person's early inductions, made before he can 
possibly be aware (via induction) of the general causal uniformity 
holding in the world. As Mill plausibly said, a conviction of the 
existence of general uniformity is secondary, in the order of evidence, 
to the discovery of uniformities in particular contexts:
We should never have thought of affirming that all phen­
omena take place according to general laws, if we had not 
first arrived, in the^case of a great multitude of phen­
omena, at some knowledge of the laws themselves ...
(ibid.).
The uniformity principle is a generalisation about generalisations, 
and some people doubtless never attain to any kind of explicit aware­
ness of it. At most, in Mill's opinion, it could be the guiding force 
behind the making of inductions at the cutting edge of scientific 
research.
And yet the uniformity of the causal relationships in nature, if it 
is not a principle often consulted in the making of inductions (and 
not at all before a person has grasped - if indeed he ever grasps - 
that nature has a uniform structure), remains the fundamental warrant
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.2^  2Ü. inductions. How it can serve in this role is the question about 
justification of induction I labelled (c), and it can be seen 
that in Mill's view it absorbs question (b) as a special case. Induc­
tions made without explicit reference to the uniformity principle can 
1*® warranted by it, because it is not a necessary condition of 
its providing such warranty that it be known in advance, (in fact, 
given Mill's position on the subject of syllogistic petitio, it cannot, 
as a major premise, strictly speaking be known at all in advance of 
the conclusions it supports.) But now, just how does it warrant ind­
uctive reasonings?
Hill's answer to this question involves a direct application of 
the theory of reasoning and the syllogism developed in Bk.II;
As Archbishop Whately remarks, every induction is a 
syllogism with the major premise suppressed; or (as 
I prefer expressing it) every induction may be thrown 
into the form of a syllogism, T%r supplying a major 
premise. If this be actually done, the principle which 
we are now considering, that of the uniformity of nature, 
will appear as the ultimate major premise of all 
inductions, and will, therefore, stand to all inductions 
in the relation in which, as has been shown.at so 
much length, the major proposition always stands to 
the conclusion; not contributing at all to prove 
it, but being a necessary condition of its being 
proved; since no conclusion is proved, for which 
there cannot be found a true major premise (^, pp.307-08).
Mill explained carefully what he understood by the Whatelyan idea that 
an induction is a syllogism with the major premise suppressed. We can 
argue by a sound induction from the mortality of John, Peter and other 
individuals to the mortali^ty of all mankind, and need no other premises 
for our inference than the propositions about the mortality of the 
sampled individuals. But we can, if we choose, throw our argument into 
syllogistic form by inserting a major premise, in the following manner: 
John, Peter, etc., are mortal.
What is true of John, Peter, etc., is true of all mankind, 
therefore "
All mankind are mortal (cf. p.310).
The major premise 'What is true of John, Peter, etc., is true of all 
mankind,' while not essential to the proof of the conclusion according 
to Mill, serves a useful purpose as a kind of signpost to the conc­
lusion our premises entitle us to draw; and if it were false, that
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conclusion would not be a safe induction from the premises. Such a 
major premise could usefully be termed (though Mill does not so term 
it) a 'local uniformity principle.* Like the general principle of the 
uniformity of nature, local uniformity principles should not be regarded 
usually as more than approximations to the truth, as it is quite poss­
ible that sampled members of a class may have a property (for instance, 
John, Peter and other men in our sample may all have the property of 
being right-handed) which some members of the class lack. Yet we might 
agree with Mill that local uniformity principles do play a legitimate 
role in our thinking, though we should be suitably guarded about how 
absolutely we take them.
But how are local uniformity principles justified? By reference to 
the overall uniformity of nature, said Mill:
The real proof that what is true of John, Peter, &c. 
is true of all mankind, can only be, that a different 
supposition would be inconsistent with the uniformity 
which we know /sic/ to exist in the course of nature 
(ibid.).
When he wrote that the uniformity principle is the 'ultimate major 
premise of all inductions' (SL, p.308), what he presumably meant was 
that local uniformity principles can be represented as the conclusions 
of syllogistic arguments of the following type:
All propositions of the form (a ): 'If sampled members of class 
C are P, then all members of C are P* are true.
The proposition (b ): 'What is true of John, Peter, &c. is 
true of all mankind' is a proposition of form (a ), 
therefore 
The proposition (b ) is true.
The major premise here is a rendering of the general principle of the
uniformity of nature, (it was at this point that Mill candidly admitted
>(
that the notion of uniformity needs to be handled rather carefully, 
and called it 'the problem of induction' to refine our understanding 
of the ultimate uniformities of nature that underlie the confusing 
surface mixture of constancy and flux (SL, p.314)#)
Although Mill followed Whately in asserting that inductive infer­
ences can be thrown into syllogistic form by interpolation of .a suit­
able major premise, he was not aiming thereby to represent the major 
premise as a premise of a proof; rather, it is itself supported hy the 
same evidence about individual cases which directly supports the con­
clusion. We have seen in Chapter Three what Mill intended by such a 
view, and what its drawbacks are. The basic difficulty is that Mill's
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refusal to allow universal propositions to function as premises, and 
his insistence that 'real' inference is always from particulars to 
particulars, leaves him without any effective criterion for distin­
guishing rational inductive projections from irrational ones. The 
exclusion of universal propositions from the process of proof proper 
entails the exclusion of considerations of lawlike regularities which 
are an essential component of rational inductive thinking. In a vain 
attempt to counter this objection, Mill professed himself happy to 
countenance universal propositions in the ancillary role of 'memo­
randa' or 'checks on inference'; but this was to no avail, as his 
anxieties about syllogistic petitio and his resulting determination 
to hold that universal propositions could only be proved along with
particular conclusions from the same evidence, made it impossible for
7them to play any real role in justifying inductive conclusions.
Yet in Bk.III, Mill proposed that the uniformity of nature is the 
'fundamental principle' of induction (SL, p.307), and urged that 
the 'proof of local uniformity principles is that their denial would 
be inconsistent with the general uniformity principle (SL, p.310).
But what substance is there to these claims if generalisations about 
uniformity can function only in the restricted manner in which he 
argued major premises always do function? The only positive suggestion 
Mill offered here was that while uniformity principles do not contr­
ibute to the proof of inductive conclusions, they are a 'necessary 
condition' of their being proved, since, as he held, 'no conclusion 
is proved, for which there cannot be found a true major premise' (SL, 
p.308; £f. p.310). If a major premise is a premise only in name, and 
not in real function, then the sense which has to be given to Mill's 
talk about necessary conditions of proof is that the premises of an 
inductive argument support a 'particular' conclusion only if they 
support the universal proposition which subsumes it. (Thus, the mort­
ality of John, Peter, etc., is good inductive evidence for the mort­
ality of the Duke of Wellington only if it is good inductive evidence 
for the mortality of all men.) It is not, however, that one needs to 
reflect, when engaging in inductive reasoning, whether one's evidence 
would support a universal conclusion; what is necessary is just that 
it would in fact do so. Mill's point appears to be that were nature 
not uniform, induction would not work (an observation which, if cons­
idered more fully, might have led him to grasp Hume's problem); yet 
legitimate inductive inference can proceed without reference to unif­
ormity. The answer to question (c) is, then, that the truth of the 
principle of the uniformity of nature is the fundamental condition of
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the success of inductive reasoning, though it is not necessary to con­
sult the principle in one's actual inferences.
But it is at this juncture that Mill's peculiar theory of reasoning 
leads him into substantial error. For despite his admission that unif­
ormity is a condition of the success of induction, he is prevented 
from giving this consideration due weight by his conviction that the 
legitimacy of inductive inference cannot, on pain of petitio, depend on 
prior presumption of tifie""truth of any principle which would enter an 
argument schema as a major premise. A universal proposition - even that 
asserting the general uniformity of nature - cannot. Mill has con­
vinced himself, offer in any ordinary sense a justification for drawing 
a conclusion about an individual case; the only real justification 
for either proposition is the inductive evidence on which they both 
alike rely. The uniformity of nature. Mill held, is, like other 
universal propositions, reached by inductive reasoning not in advance 
of, but along with the 'particular' conclusions (in the case of the 
general uniformity principle, these are local uniformity principles) 
supported by the same evidence. Therefore, although Mill talked of 
major premises figuring as necessary conditions of the soundness of 
inductive arguments, he persistently recoiled from admitting that
they possess any kind of potential to justify their conclusions,
8
which he took to belong alone to the inductive premises. Clearly there 
is something very unsatisfactory about this position, but he prob­
ably missed seeing this because he never really doubted that inductive 
reasoning is a sound form of inference; thus even when he spoke of the 
uniformity of nature as the 'fundamental principle' of induction, he 
felt entitled to propose without qualms that this was itself an ind­
uctively established truth - albeit one which then throws light on 
the condition under which inductive inference will be fruitful. Within 
Mill's philosophical schemp, the soundness of inductive reasoning in pr­
inciple (though with a qualification on the score of problem (a )) stands 
as a cornerstone, and while its conditions of operation are held to be 
worth some explanation, its basic legitimacy is never up for question.
A significant passage in the Logic runs;
The assertion, that our inductive processes assume the 
law of causation, while the law of causation is itself 
a case of induction, is a paradox, only on the old theory 
of reasoning, which supposes the universal truth, or 
major premise, in a ratiocination, to be the real proof 
of the particular truths which are ostensibly inferred
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from it. According to the doctrine maintained in 
the present treatise, the major premise is not the 
proof of the conclusion, hut is itself proved, 
along with the conclusion from the same evidence 
(SL, p.572).
Were one to take this in isolation, one might well suppose that Mill 
was talking about the difficulty ('paradox*) involved in attempting 
to justify inductive reasoning by reference to the law of causation 
(equivalent in Mill's view, it will be recalled, to the uniformity 
of nature), when this law is itself a product of induction. But the 
context shows once again that this is not his intention. As usual, 
there is no indication that Mill has the slightest doubt about the 
soundness in principle of inductive reasoning, and there is no attempt 
made to justify it. Even though the claim is repeated that the law 
of causation is something which our inductive inferences 'assume,' 
he comes no closer than at any other time to holding that the truth 
of the law has therefore to be settled before inductive inference 
can be declared legitimate. This law, he reiterates, is one which 
becomes inductively established over the course of time (^, pp.572- 
75); and it is evident that in speaking of a 'paradox,' he intends 
again to refer to problem (b) about induction, namely, how people 
can make legitimate inductions before the 'axiom of induction* has 
been established.
One might grant to Mill that the overall uniformity of nature need 
not be thought about in every sound inductive argument (though it is 
less clear that sound inductive inferences can proceed without refer­
ence to local uniformity principles). But this recognition does not 
relieve him of the onus of providing a clear account of what he meant 
by talking of uniformity as a 'necessary condition' of sound ind­
uctive reasoning. It is natural to understand this to mean that without 
the existence of uniformity (irrespective of whether uniformity is 
thought about or not), inductive conclusions would not be justifiably 
reached. So, for each inductive argument which is sound, a syllogistic 
structure of just the sort Mill describes could in principle be prod­
uced, with a major premise expressing a uniformity - but a major prem­
ise which functions in the conventionally understood sense, and assists 
in warranting the conclusion. But of course Mill's theory of the syll­
ogism and of the place of universal propositions in reasoning led him 
confidently and repeatedly to assert that uniformity does not warrant 
inductive inferences in the manner in which a genuine premise of a 
suasive argument serves in warranting the conclusion. But this means
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that he did not have an intelligible account to,offer of the sense 
in which uniformity is a 'necessary condition' of successful inductive 
inference.
Hamstrung by his faulty theory of inference, Mill remained unable 
to take the measure of his own insight that uniformity is a precond­
ition of successful inductions. He believed this could not mean that 
inductive reasonings are justifiable by an appeal to uniformity as a 
premise, on pain of committing a fallacy of petitio. But if the def­
ence of inductive inference cannot cite the uniformity of nature as 
a supporting principle, it remains quite obscure what could be meant 
by holding that if nature were not uniform, induction would not be 
successful. Yet apparently Mill was never struck by the difficulties 
of construing, in the light of his theory of inference, his claim 
that uniformity is a necessary condition of truth-attaining induction. 
Had the problems occurred to him, it is possible that he might have 
been inspired to doubt the correctness of that theory of inference; 
and if he had questioned the adequacy of that theory, he might then 
have apprehended the existence of the Humean problem of induction!
But unfortunately this chain of reflection never occurred to him.
Appendix
Mill's insensitivity to the Humean problem of induction is easier 
to understand once it is realised that his predecessors and contemp­
oraries were equally unmoved by it; the problem was simply not one of 
those in the air when Mill wrote. It was not that Hume's discussions 
in the Treatise and the Firpt Inquiry were unknoim to philosophers, 
but rather that they were seen as posing a primarily psychological 
question about the mental processes at work in inductive thinking; 
Hume's sceptical critique of induction was either not grasped at all, 
or grasped so slightly that it was felt it could be dismissed as in­
sane.
George Campbell regarded the proposition that 'The course of nature 
will be the same to-morrow, that it is to-day' as one to which it is 
'impossible ... for a rational creature to with-hold his assent,* and 
cited Buffier as his authority that to doubt such a proposition is 
'insane' (G. Campbell, vol.1, pp.113-14)•'And if a man, said Campbell, 
should tell you 'with a serious countenance, that the sun which sets
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to-day will never rise again upon the earth,* that might indeed raise 
doubts in your mind, but only * doubts as to the soundness of the 
man's intellects' (ibid., pp.l60-6l). Although he treated Humean 
scepticism with ridicule, Campbell probably came closer than his 
successors to grasping the main intention of Hume's discussion.
Dugald Stewart seems not to have apprehended that Hume's treatment 
of induction had a sceptical tenor at all, taking the issue between 
himself and Hume to be simply whether the expectation of 'the perm­
anence or stability of the order of nature' arises from the associa­
tion of ideas or, as Stewart believed, it is an original principle 
of our constitution (Stewart, vol.5, pp.lOlff.; cf. vol.3, p.I58).
Thomas Reid likewise missed the point of Hume's discussion, apparently 
believing that the Treatise account of induction was a kind of red- 
uctio argument against the hypothesis that the belief in uniformity 
is reached by reasoning from experience (as, for instance, Joseph 
Butler had held (Butler, pp.20-21)); the moral of Hume's account, 
on Reid's view, was that 'our belief of the continuance of nature's 
laws ... is an instinctive prescience of the operations of nature,' 
upon which 'not only acquired perceptions, but all inductive reason­
ing, is grounded.' In other words: 'Antecedently to all reasoning, 
we have, by our constitution, an anticipation that there is a fixed 
and steady course of nature' - which enables us to carry on inductive 
reasoning, about whose legitimacy in principle Reid did not entertain 
the least anxiety, never doubting the uniformity of nature (Reid, p.l99)« 
Philosophers of the earlier nineteenth century came no nearer to 
the crux of Hume's discussion. Sir William Hamilton produced a 
typically opaque theory, probably intended to be similar to those of 
Stewart and Reid, to the effect that inductive arguments, while not 
being valid by deductive laws of thought, yet achieve the status of 
being 'formally legitimate' by being clothed with a subjective nec­
essity (Hamilton (I865), vol.2, p.344). Hume would have been unimpressed 
by this, Thomas Brown rightly understood that Hume had sho\m that 
experience:
which is of the past alone, does not render the extension 
through futurity less indefinite, nor the future itself 
a more distinct object of our knowledge. It leaves us 
the past, which we know, and the future, which we do 
not know (Brown (I8I8), pp.355-56).
But this did not matter to Brown, for there remained intuition to do 
the job of revealing the future to us: 'it is intuition only,' he 
continued in some singularly purple prose, 'that passes over the
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darkness which is impenetrable to our vision, and speaks to us, as 
from another world, of the things which are beyond' (ibid., p.356).
I do not think we should treat this as just a particularly bad att­
empt to answer Hume; it is too stunningly insensitive to the epist- 
emological issues which Hume raised, and is better looked on as a 
further contribution, though a weak one, to a continuing psycholog­
ical debate about the explanation of inductive reasoning. A similar 
judgement should be made of the account offered by Samuel Bailey. He 
argued tha,t the uniformity of nature must be 'necessarily assumed or 
taken for granted,' as Hume had demonstrated that it could not be 
inferred from any other truth. But he went on very revealingly to 
remark that what Hume had done was to show that there was 'a step 
taken by the mind which required explanation' (Bailey, pp.195; 198; 
my emphases); once again, it is a psychological rather than an epist- 
emological question which Hume is taken to have brought up for dis­
cussion; and that he intended to cast the most fundamental kind of 
doubt on whether anything could provide a suitable warrant for our 
inductive projections is not noticed.
Kant took Hume's reflections on causation and induction extremely 
seriously, and declared that it was these which awakened him from 
a 'dogmatic slumber* of many years (Kant (1915), p. 7); and he crit­
icised other philosophers for misreading Hume. But even Kant took 
the main point at issue to be that of the origin of the conception 
of causation as involving necessity, and he thought Hume wrong in . 
consenting to recognise no more than a mere force of habit to draw 
causal inferences. This does justice to Hume's claim that we cannot 
rationally derive from experience alone a belief in objective causal 
necessity, but it is not clear whether Kant fully grasped the fact 
that Hume was contending that inductive arguments were, strictly, 
without justification; it jaay be that he too thought that Hume was mainly 
puzzling about the psychological machinery involved in the practice of 
an unquestionably sound mode of inference, and which he himself 
explained in terms of the theory of the categories of the understanding.
William Whewell's position is obscure. He treated Hume less simpl— 
istically than other British philosophers did, but it is still not 
clear that he had more than the vaguest idea that there was more to 
Hume's treatment of induction than merely psychological analysis - 
it is significant that he was no more inclined than others were to 
suppose that the rationality of our inductive practices could ser­
iously be called into question. Whewell had a complex theory to exp­
lain our inductive practices, a neo-Kantian story of the imposition
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of order on experience in accordance with certain 'Fundamental Ideas' 
we bring to bear on it; the universality of the laws of motion, for 
instance, is not something contributed by experience but is 'implied, 
in the nature of knowledge' - they gain their 'form' from the 'Idea 
of Causation' (Whewell (l847)y Bk.III.ch.viii). But could we, asked 
Whewell, after seeing a thousand stones fall to the ground, find one 
that does not? His reply was that we could not even conceive this 
happening unless we could,.imagine 'some peculiar cause to support 
it' (Whewell, ibid., vol.1, p.252). His reasoning for this was that 
'our experience is bound in by the limits of cause and effect,' so 
that we can never even conceive of general causal laws as not existing 
for all the phenomena we encounter (ibid., p.253). This smacks too 
much of cutting the Gordian knot for it to be plausible to ascribe 
to Whewell a proper appreciation of Hume's problem, even if he had 
some slight inkling of what it was. Mill could hardly have learnt 
what Hume's problem was from Whewell, but he would have regarded 
Whewell's psychological ideas as major targets for attack.
Before Hume, Sextus Empiricus knew that there was a problem about 
induction that cast doubt on its rationality. After Hume, the first 
philosopher I know of to display a clear grasp of it was T.H. Green, 
who by no coincidence was one of the editors of the 1874 reissue of 
Hume's works. Pointing out that in inductive reasoning we generalise 
from a sample to all instances of the kind of thing sampled. Green 
put his finger on precisely the point that Hume had seized on but 
which his successors had missed, namely;
But how do v/e know that the instances, with the 
examination of which we are always dispensing on 
the strength of the /inductive/ rule, might not 
be just what would invalidate it if they were
examined? (Green, vol.2, p.282).
•/
Thus Green recognised that the central philosophical problem of 
induction is not to explain the origins of our conceptions about , 
uniformity in nature, but to provide a satisfactory justification 
for the belief that uniformity will continue. Since Green's day, the 
latter problem has never been out of the philosophical limelight.
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F I V E
*I can conscientiously affirm,* wrote Mill in closing the Intro­
duction to the Logic,
that no one proposition laid down in this work has been 
adopted for the sake of establishing, or with any refer­
ence to its fitness for being employed in establishing, 
preconceived opinions in any department of knowledge or 
of inquiry on which the speculative world is still unde­
cided (^, pp.14-15)# p
Logic, Mill hoped, could provide a * common ground*/.On which proponents 
of different views of 'ultimate facts' could 'meet and join hands'
(SL, p.14). Differences on metaphysical questions could be laid aside 
when purely logical matters were up for discussion, the concern of 
logic being only with the validity of inferences and not with the 
truth of their premises (cf. SL, p.13).
Mill nevertheless admitted that in practice it is hard to develop 
a theory of logic wholly free of bias towards particular positions on 
metaphysical topics (SL, p.14), and his own leanings towards a radical 
form of empiricism led him^in the Logic to take up distinctive opinions 
on such disputed subjects as necessity and the nature of physical obj­
ects and their attributes. The difficulty of preserving metaphysical 
neutrality arose, he suggested, because metaphysicians must all employ 
arguments whose validity 'falls under the cognizance of logic* (ibid.). 
That, however, is the wrong explanation; as^he had himself recognised, 
logic, in so far as it is concerned purely with the validity of inf­
erences, need not get involved with debating the truth of premises.
The point is rather that logic as Mill conceived it is not a merely 
formal discipline; it is, he said, * the science of the operations of 
the understanding which are subservient to the estimation of evidence'
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(SL, p.12), and it provides not just a theoretical account of the 
conditions under which inference is valid, but also practical guidance 
in the pursuit of knowledge. But a logician with the aim of explaining 
how reasoning and the due consideration of evidence assist the search 
for truth can hardly remain neutral about the characterisation of 
the reality which is the goal of our truth-seeking, or about the kind 
of cognitive relations which it is in principle possible for us to 
have towards it. Logic this broadly understood will inevitably take 
stances, explicitly or implicitly, on what Mill termed 'speculative* 
matters.
Yet the commitments on ontological and epistemological issues one 
discovers in A System of Logic do not all take the direction one 
would have expected from a philosopher whose view of matter (which we 
shall explore later) as a *permanent possibility of sensation* ovmed 
Berkeley for its major inspiration. Book I of the Logic does indeed 
contain a chapter, * Of the Things Denoted by Names,* in which Mill*s 
taste for an idealist metaphysic is clearly demonstrated. But the 
dominant commitment of the work as a whole is to a form of realism 
which is quite incompatible with idealism.:This incompatibility bet­
ween realist and idealist elements is not merely a flaw in the Logic
but pervades Mill's whole philosophy of logic and reality. Surprisingly,
' ; :
he seems to have been wholly unconscious of its existence, and it is 
noteworthy that even in the Examination, where the idealism receives 
its fullest exposition, the chapters on the philosophy of logic still 
retain a realist tenor.
'Realism* is a favourite philosophers' term, but it has often been 
used very loosely. Recently, and largely under the stimulus of Michael 
Dummett, philosophers have become more careful in saying what realism 
does and does not involve. Dummett himself has written:
The primary tenet of^  realism, as applied to some given
class of statements, is that each statement in the class
is determined as true or not true, independently of our 
knowledge, by some objective reality whose existence 
and constitution is, again, independent of our 
knowledge (Dummett (198I), p.434)*
The central tenet of a realist account of a'class of statements is 
thus that the truth or falsity of statements in that class is deter­
mined by the way things are in objective reality, irrespective of any 
considerations about how human beings obtain knowledge of those state­
ments. An anti-realist about some given area of discourse - for instance, 
an idealist or a constructivist - wants, as Dummett puts it, *to
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narrow the gulf between what makes a statement true and that by means 
of which we recognize it as true* (Dummett, ibid., p.443). Realists 
believe in a wholly determinate objective reality, accessible to our 
faculties of knowledge but ontologically independent of them; anti­
realists, by contrast, view this or that aspect of reality as in whole 
or in part determined in its characteristics by human intellectual 
activity.
The realism which infofms Mill's philosophy of logic is of a quite 
generaJ kind; that is, it is realism about all statements without 
restriction of kind or content. It can be exhibited from a number of 
different angles, which each invite detailed consideration.
(a ) Mill spoke quite explicitly of logic being concerned with the 
’ascertainment of objective truth,' and proposed this as the crucial 
differentia of logic in distinguishing it from psychology (the latter 
study dealing with 'the analysis and laws of the mental operations')
(eh, p.301). Logic, as the science of proof or evidence (SL, p.$), is 
of assistance to reasoners who pursue knowledge about a reality which, 
in this context. Mill never talked of as being other than objective.
The importance of good reasoning, in his^view, was that thought could 
misrepresent reality unless inferences were made according to sound 
principles. The person who does not take care to observe 'what rel­
ations must subsist between data and whatever can be concluded from 
them, between proof and everything which it can prove,' will unfailingly 
draw 'inferences which are not grounded in the realities of things'
(SL, pp.lO-ll). Inferences, he insisted, could be 'rightly or wrongly 
performed* (SL, p.13), and the logician's task is to identify sound 
modes of inference - sound methods of * interrogating nature,* as he 
put it in Baconian phrase in the review of Whately (WE, p.13) - in 
order to assist us in the pursuit of a truth which is not of our creation. 
An inferred belief is true, ^if it is so, in virtue neither of being 
inferred nor of being a belief, but rather in virtue of how the world 
is. The truth of propositions is determined by an external standard, 
by the relationship they bear to a reality outside the mind; if they 
represent that reality as it is, they are true; if they misrepresent 
it, they are false. Mill, in short, committed himself to a realist 
theory of error. Yet the presupposition of ah objective, mind-indepen­
dent world which is the backdrop to this cannot be squared with the 
anti-realist idealism which he espoused in other places.
It would be quite wrong to suppose that the realist strain is 
merely an occasional aberration on Mill's part. On the contrary, it 
is a constant feature of his writings on the philosophy of logic from
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the review of Whately onwards. In the Logic he made it a crucial part 
of his defence of logical theory against those who accused it of 
triviality that it aids the ascertainment of true propositions, expl­
aining truth as consisting not in any relation of a proposition to 
human ideas, hut in its conformity to external fact (SL, pp.87-90). 
Some years later he wrote in the Examination that, * If thought he 
anything more than a sportive exercise of the mind, its purpose is 
to enable us to know what-oan be known respecting the facts of the 
universe,* Judgements aim to express those facts, and because there 
exist connections 'between one objective truth and another,' logic 
is useful because it makes it 'possible for us to know objective 
truths which have never been observed, in virtue of others which 
have' (e h , pp.370-71). Such was Mill's settled view of the concern 
of logic with the discovery of objective truth.
Hilary Putnam has stressed the importance to a realist concept of 
truth of the acceptance of such sentences as:
Venus might not have carbon dioxide in its atmosphere 
even though it follows from our theory that Venus has 
carbon dioxide in its atmosphere (Putnam, p.34).
Mill's concept of truth involves the acceptance of just such state­
ments; a belief of ours, no matter how sincerely held or how well 
supported by the evidence, may in principle still be false, because 
it may still misrepresent the character of reality. Mill would un­
doubtedly have acceded to Tarski's so-called 'Convention T':
(t) 'p ' is true if and only if p,
and have construed it as expressing the realist claim that an assert-
1
ion is true if and only if things are as it asserts them to be.
The realist notion of a 'gulf (to use Dummett's terra) between what 
makes a statement true and that by which we apprehend its truth in­
volves the notion of an objective reality existing independently of 
human mental activity. As we shall see when we come to examine Mill's 
understanding of the principle which he called, following Hamilton, 
that of the 'relativity of human knowledge,' he presented, as part of 
his radical empiricist program, strong reasons for withholding belief 
in such a mind-independent reality. Here he followed a line commonly 
encountered in contemporary debates between realists and anti-realists: 
the problem with positing a mind-independent, objective world, he 
suggested - as any modern anti-realist might suggest - is that in 
doing so we are operating beyond the bounds of our epistemic faculties 
(which are familiar only with sensible appearances). The surprising 
thing is that no such qualms about the limits of human knowledge
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appear to have held him back from taking a realist position on the 
philosophy of logic. In this context Mill believed in an objective 
world about whose nature we could be mistaken, and which was in no 
sense reducible to the sensory presentations by which we come to know­
ledge about it.
(b ) Further evidence of the realist strain in Mill is apparent in 
the evolution of his view of the nature of belief. From his empir­
icist forbears he had inherited a notion of belief as an inseparable 
association of ideas, and he seems to have remained reasonably content 
with this, as with most aspects of associationist psychology, until 
in the period following the composition of the Logic he began to 
reconsider this intellectual legacy more closely. But even in the Logic 
he expressed some doubts about the adequacy,of the associationist 
explanation of belief;
If the question be whether Belief is a mere case of close 
association of ideas, it would be necessary to examine 
experimentally if it be true that any ideas whatever,
provided they are associated with the required degree
of closeness, give rise to belief (SL, p.855)*
Sometime after the composition of the Logic, Mill*s.doubt about the 
associationist account sharpened as it occurred to him that it is 
not apparent how that account can make sense of the difference bet­
ween believing something to be so and merely imagining it. Both, on
the theory, could be the products of association, yet there is clearly 
some basic difference between them which cannot be explained simply 
in terms either of closeness of association or of vividness of the 
resulting mental content. What Mill had lighted on was what Bernard 
Williams has described by saying that it is a feature of believing 
that it aims at truth (Williams, pp.136-37), Mill put this somewhat 
less succinctly by asserting that, 'The difference between belief and 
mere imagination, is the difference between recognising something as 
a reality in nature, and regarding it as a mere thought of our own'
( M , vol. 1, p.418).
Associationism, then, falls down by ignoring the truth objective
of belief, and consequently the intimate connection between belief 
2
and evidence. Mill summed up the matter very cogently;
... it may be said that if belief is only an inseparable 
association, belief is a matter of habit and accident, 
and not of reason. Assuredly an association, however close, 
between two ideas, is not a sufficient ground of 
belief; is not evidence that the corresponding facts
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are united in external nature. The theory seems to 
annihilate all distinction between the belief of the 
wise, which is regulated by evidence, and conforms 
to the real successions and coexistences of the 
universe, and the belief of fools, which is mech­
anically produced by any accidental association 
that suggests the idea of a succession or coex­
istence to the mihd'T.. (AN, vol. 1, p.407)*
'... facts ... united in external nature*; *... the real successions 
and coexistences of the universe*; - such phrases testify to a fund­
amentally realist view of belief; beliefs aim at truth of an objective 
kind, not in any way determined by the psychological principles 
(e.g. the laws of association of ideas).which may produce them.
The order of reality, which we aim to capture in our beliefs, is an 
autonomous and mind-independent affair, to be sharply distinguished 
from the order of thought. No question about the truth of a belief 
could be settled by giving a description of the merely psychological 
conditions which produced it; what is important for the question about 
truth is the conformability of a belief t^ o an objective reality, and 
in adjudicating its truth it is its evidential basis ^hich must be 
considered. As Mill said in the review 'Bain's Psychology' of 1859, 
it is a 'strange anomaly' that some authors, after attempting to prove 
the existence of 'intellectual or moral instincts,' should 'proceed 
... to legitimate and consecrate everything which those instincts 
prompt, as if an instinct never could go astray.' A complete theory 
of belief, he continued, must explain what it is which moderates the 
force of association, and 'subdues belief into subordination and due 
proportion to evidence' (BP, p.370). Once again. Mill was expressing 
his conviction of the existence of objective truth, which belief aims 
at, but does not always succped in capturing. It does not follow from 
our believing that Venus has carbon dioxide in its atmosphere that
it really does so.
(c) In both the Logic and the Examination Mill took issue with the 
view, whose best known proponent was Herbert Spencer, that the ultim­
ate criterion that something is impossible is that its possibility 
is inconceivable to us. It is not important here to follow the det­
ails of the amicable but long-running debate between Mill and Spencer 
on the worth of the test of inconceivableness; both were willing to 
agree that 'axioms' (by which they meant the most fundamental prop­
ositions of deductive sciences) were learnt by induction from exper­
ience > but Spencer maintained that the inconceivability of its
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negation was the chief test by which an axiom could be justified. 
Mill’s objections to Spencer’s position once again reflect the spirit
3
of realism in his philosophy of logic. He claimed that inconceiv­
ability may simply be the product of a strong association of ideas, 
and that examples can be cited of things which people have found 
inconceivable (e.g. the existence of Antipodes) on the basis of 
strong association which have later been found to be true (EH, pp. 
67-68). But even more significantly:
... even assuming that inconceivability is not solely 
the consequence of limited experience, but that some 
incapacities of conceiving are inherent in the mind, 
and inseparable from it ; this would not entitle us to 
infer, that what we are thus incapable of conceiving 
cannot exist. Such an inference would only be warrant­
able, if we could know a priori that we must have been 
created capable of conceiving whatever is capable of 
existing; that the universe of thought and that of 
reality, the Microcosm and the Macrocosm (as they were 
once called) must have been framed in complete corr­
espondence with one another. That this is really the. 
case has been laid down expressly in some systems of 
philosophy ... but an assumption more destitute of 
evidence could scarcely be made, nor can one easily 
imagine any evidence that could prove it, unless it 
were revealed from above (EH, p.68).
Mill was specifically attacking the philosophies of Schelling and 
Hegel here, but his conception of independent realms of reality and 
of thought is incompatible with the doctrine of the relativity of 
human knowledge which elsewhere prompted him'to ; favour an idealist 
viewpoint.
II
The thesis that Mill’s philosophy, of logic is fundamentally real­
ist is likely to encounter opposition from those critics of his 
thought who have alleged that he committed what is often referred 
to as the ’psychologistic fallacy.’ ^ Psychologism is an exceedingly 
hazy doctrine about logic, and as it has been understood by different
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writers in diverse ways, it is often hard to "be sure just what position
is being ascribed to Mill when he is accused of it. At the core of
most versions of psychologism is the claim, which can be construed
and developed in various manners, that the laws of logic are primarily
descriptive of human psychology; usually this is explained as meaning
that logic describes the way in which human beings think - or, as
Theodore Lipps famously put it, that ’Logic is the physics of thought.’ ^
It must be admitted that some-things Mill said do raise a reasonable
suspicion that he was attracted to some form of psychologism. That he
often spoke of the Laws of Identity, Contradiction and Excluded Middle
as the ’laws of thought’ is not good evidence that he inclined to
psychologism, because in using this terminology he was, of course,
simply following ancient tradition. But more significant is the following,
often quoted passage from the Examination. Mill wrote that logic:
is not a Science distinct from, and coordinate with.
Psychology. So far as it is a science at all, it is a
part, or branch, of Psychology; differing from it, on
the one hand, as a part differs from the whole, and
on the other, as an Art differs from a Science. Its*
theoretic grounds are wholly borrowed from Psych­
ology, and include as much of that science as is req­
uired to justify the rules of the art (EH, p.359).
This passage contains obscurities, particularly in its reference to 
the distinction between a science and an art, but it is not surprising 
that it has been taken as important evidence that Mill accepted some 
form of psychologism. The impression that he favoured a psychologistic 
view of logic is further encouraged by a passage following shortly 
afterwards. Defining the phrase ’the Form of Thought’ as ’Thinking 
itself; the whole work of the Intellect,’ he declared:
Logic and Thinking are coextensive; it is the art of 
Thinking, of all Thinking, and of nothing but Think­
ing, And since every distinguishable variety of think­
ing act is called a Form of Thought, the Forms of Thought 
compose the whole province of Logic (EH, p,360).
Before we look more closely at Mill’s discussions of the connections 
between logic and thought, it is worthwhile posing the question 
how a psychologistic theory of logic would consort with other views 
he held. Psychologism, first of all, is not a form of idealism. It 
is not self-contradictory to affirm that logical laws are primarily 
descriptive of the way that people think, and to deny that there is
120
no objective, mind-independent reality. Nor is psychologism formally 
inconsistent with the claim that reasoning in accordance with log­
ical laws advances knowledge about objective reality; which is to 
say, it is formally compatible with a realist philosophy of logic 
which accepts that thought is not always in accordance with reality, 
but maintains that thinking according to the canons of logic will max­
imise, the probability of arriving at true conclusions about that real­
ity. It is, however, inconsistent with any view that logical laws 
are about the features of objective reality (rather than the proc­
esses of thought).
Now while there is no formal contradiction involved in accepting 
psychologism and rejecting idealism, it is not at all easy for a def­
ender of psychologism both to claim that logical reasoning assists 
us in the pursuit of truth, and to hold that the truth in question is 
truth about objective reality - two theses, it will be recalled, which 
Mill wished to maintain. There is a quite simple reason for the diff­
iculty. If laws of logic describe patterns of human thought, why 
should reasoning in accordance with them have any tendency to improve 
our chances of attaining to true beliefs? If the structure of the 
world is independent of how it is thought about, then it is quite 
obscure what guarantee there could be that logical reasoning, as und­
erstood on the psychologistic picture, would produce true belief about 
it. At best, it would seem to be a happy accident if reasoning prod­
uced any genuine enlightenment about the objective, thought-indepen­
dent world.
It would not be a satisfactory response to this line of argument to 
suggest that the laws of logic are psychological principles which 
have evolved in us over a long period of time, and which represent 
the fruits of a process of natural selection which has favoured these 
principles of mental working qver possible rivals because they have 
proved best able to assist us in our interactions with the objective 
world. The weakness of this answer is that, while it might indeed be 
plausible to suppose that human intellectual as well as physical 
features might be the result of evolutionary mechanisms, a psychol— 
ogistic account of what has evolved still leaves it quite unclear how 
reasoning logically can maximise the probability of our reaching true 
beliefs about objective reality. A disposition to reason according to 
logical laws could be a result of evolution, because logical reasoning 
does assist us in our interactions with the world by improving our 
chances of believing truths (true beliefs being undeniably more serv­
iceable to us than false ones). But the value of evolving a disposition
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to reason logically depends on logical laws expressing not merely 
regularities of thought (even regularities holding at the end of an 
evolutionary process), but in their having a meaning with a bearing 
on the character of objective reality (however in detail this should 
be explained). For if they expressed no more than the structure of 
thought, they could not apparently be of use in reasoning about the 
structure of things, which are the inhabitants of a world whose con­
stitutive principles are-not identical with the principles of mind.
In short, psychologism, whether or not abetted by an evolutionary 
hypothesis, fails to be able to explain the link between thought and 
an objective world, because it cannot plausibly explain how logical 
principles can be useful in maximising true believing about a world 
with a thought-independent structure.
The best prospect for psychologism, therefore, lies in denying the 
existence of a mind-independent, objective reality and embracing an 
idealist metaphysic. If the structure of reality is not distinct from 
the structure of thought, there will be no problem about how logical 
laws, conceived as psychological principles, promote the attainment of 
true beliefs: they will express aspects of the structure of reality 
simply by virtue of expressing aspects of the structure of the think­
ing mind. The worry about how psychologism could explain the linkage 
of thought and the world evaporates if there is no link between two 
separate realms to be accounted for; logical laws, in being express­
ive of the workings of mind, are ipso directed onto reality. And 
not only does idealism provide an appropriate metaphysical backdrop 
for psychologism: psychologism presents a highly inviting philosophy 
of logic for anyone inclined towards idealism, because of its charac­
terisation of logical laws as principles of mental working.
This recognition of the mutual affinity between idealism and psy­
chologism naturally prompts the question whether Mill may have delib-
»i
erately chosen to adopt a psychologistic theory of logic along with 
an idealist metaphysic, believing that in this way he could give his 
philosophy a satisfyingly unified character. But if this were so, what 
could be made of those passages in his writings where he seems to be 
defending the realist claim that the structure of thought and the 
structure of reality are quite distinct? Is it possible that he did 
not, after all, intend to maintain a realist view of logic, but merely 
expressed himself badly on some occasions?
Such an interpretation of Mill’s intentions cannot be sustained by 
a careful reading of the texts. In my view, he did not subscribe to
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psychologism in his philosophy of logic, and a fortiori did not att­
empt to conjoin psychologism with the idealist metaphysic to which 
at times he unquestionably did lean. Those statements:in the Logic 
and Examination which have an apparently psychologistic tenor have 
in fact been misunderstood — in some cases excusably, in others not. 
Whether or not psychologism is a mistaken doctrine, it is not a 
Millian one. Mill's philosophy of logic is thoroughly realist, even 
though its realism is a t 'odds with the idealist elements which also 
occur in his thought.
Ill
Discussion of whether Mill was psychologistic in his approach to 
logic has to some extent been hampered by the lack of any clear gen­
eral consensus on what detailed claims psychologism makes. R.P. McRae 
has suggested that as Mill's interest in logic was centred on the 
practical activity of reasoning - on inference (which is something 
people engage in) rather than on implication (a matter of formal 
relationships among propositions) — we might well wish to call his 
approach 'psychologistic* in recognition of his concern with human 
reasoning (McRae (1973), p.xlviii). While McRae is right to stress 
the practical orientation of Mill's philosophy of logic (though Mill 
could hardly neglect questions about implication in trying to tell 
a complete story about inference), it is not very helpful to stretch 
the already very slackly used term 'psychologism* to sum it up, part­
icularly as McRae is not disposed to think that he intended a reduc­
tion of logic to psychology in any profounder sense. But if McRae's 
idea of psychologism fails to be clarificatory, an account of psych- 
ologism recently published by John Richards is seriously misleading. 
According to Richards, Mill must be considered a 'logical psychol­
ogist’ because 'logical psychologism* involves two claims which he 
explicitly makes, namely the 'methodological claim* that, 'The logical 
laws are descriptions of experience and are to be arrived at through 
observation,' and the 'epistemological* one that, 'The logical laws 
are empirical generalizations^ They are grounded in the experience 
of the subject, are not necessary, and hence, are a posteriori* 
(Richards, p.20). Apparently it is the reference to experience in 
these claims which leads Richards to regard them as expressive of a 
psychologistic position. Unfortunately, he misunderstands how Mill
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intended that reference. For one thing, there is no justification for 
ascribing to Mill the belief that logical laws were 'descriptions of 
experience' in its subjective aspect - that is, were descriptive of 
the manner of experiencing rather than, more plausibly, of the reality 
experienced (a distinction quite slurred over by Richards), But fur­
ther, there is certainly nothing at all psychologistic about saying 
that knowledge of logical laws has an experiential basis, unless this 
is very implausibly read'as asserting, or implying, that what- we know 
about, when we know logical laws, is the modes in which we experience 
reality. Mill meant his thesis of the experiential basis of knowledge 
of logical laws to be understood the much more straightforward way, 
as claiming that it is through experience that our knowledge of those 
laws is acquired (a reading which leaves quite in a,beyance the quest­
ion of what it is which logical laws express). Richards forgets that 
v/e might similarly speak of an experiential basis of our knowledge 
of contingent matters of fact, without meaning to affirm that factual 
knowledge is all knowledge about subjective modes of experience. It 
would be reasonable to regard as psychologistic a doctrine maintaining 
that logical laws are about experiencing - that is, that they are 
about the mode or manner of experience; but it is not this doctrine 
to which Mill is committed if he espouses the twin principles Richards 
ascribes to him; those claims in fact convey an empiricist position 
we can with much cogency attribute to him, but not a psychologistic 
one.
It is not to be psychologistic, either, to point out that there is 
a psychological story to be told about our belief in logical laws, as 
there is about any other of our beliefs. Whether the psychological 
account of belief in logical laws can, as Mill held, dispense with 
claiming the existence of special faculties of a priori intuition, 
and provide an explanation/purely in terms of faculties of observation 
and generalisation, is a controversial question - but to assert that 
some psychological description of the processes responsible for our 
believing laws of logic must be right is not to take up psychologism. 
Much more plausibly termed 'psychologistic,' however, is the view that 
logical laws are reducible, in some sense, to psychological ones. The 
important question to ask about Mill is whether he accepted any such 
claim as this. If he believed that logical laws are not merely learnt 
in the course of experience (say, by natural and spontaneous psychol­
ogical processes of observation and generalisation), but that those 
laws are actually about psychological features of human beings, then 
it would indeed seem that he embraced a form of psychologism.
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But just how should the thesis that logic is reducible to psychol­
ogy be understood? The most straightforward way of reading it which 
captures the spirit of psychologism is to take it to assert that log­
ical laws really state regularities of believing. Thus the law of con­
tradiction, which states that two contradictory propositions cannot 
both be true, really asserts, on a psychologistic interpretation, what 
is more explicitly conveyed by saying that people do not believe 
contradictory pairs of propositions. A possible objection to this 
construal is that while the law of contradiction is unquestionably 
true, it is less than obvious that people never believe contradict­
ions. Inviting though this objection seems, it is not wholly clear 
that it is well founded. It is true, as Mill himself observed, that 
*a person may, in one sense, believe contradictory propositions, that 
is, he may believe the affirmative at some times and the negative at 
others, alternately forgetting the two beliefs'; or he 'may yield a 
passive assent to a form of words, which, had he been fully conscious, 
of their meaning, he would have knovm to be, either wholly or in part, 
an affirmation and a denial of the same facti'Nevertheless, 'when 
once he is made to see that there is a contradiction, it is totally 
impossible for him to believe it' (EH, p.373). If this/is right, it offers 
comfort to psychologism. ^ But even if people sometimes do believe 
direct self-contradictions (though at most this must surely be extremely 
rare), a bold defender of psychologism might claim that this only 
shows that the law of contradiction is not, after all, exceptionlessly 
true!
A more pressing problem for psychologism is that many laws of logic 
recognised by logicians would hardly be recognised by most people as 
being among their beliefs, (in fact, as there is an infinite number 
of logical laws.according to standard philosophies of logic, many - 
especially more complex ones -f are highly unlikely to have been bel­
ieved, or even thought about, by anyone.) There are even laws of logic 
which a majority of people might naturally wish to disbelieve, or at 
least remain agnostic about, such as 
(-pDp)Dp,
the so-called consequentia mirabilis, or 
pD(-pZ>q).
To secure his position, one response available to the defender of psy­
chologism here is to draw a distinction between explicit and implicit 
beliefs, and to claim that while only logicians are in the habit of 
making their beliefs about logic explicit, others manifest the same
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beliefs implicitly in their general intellectual behaviour. Someone 
who might reject the consequentia mirabilis were it set out explicitly 
before him could, on this view, be ascribed a belief in it if his 
thought structures as a whole implicitly relied on a system of logic 
of which this principle is an interdependent component. Even those 
logical laws which no one has explicitly formulated and recognised as 
true might be held to be implicitly believed by those who manifest 
behaviourally an acceptance of a logical system to which they belong. 
But if he had doubts about such a generous policy of belief ascrip­
tions, a proponent of psychologism might attempt a strategic retreat to 
higher ground, and maintain that logical laws represent patterns of 
believing not of humanity en masse, but only of such people as dis­
play a certain fairly substantial level of self-consciousness with 
regard to those patterns. Belief in logical laws would now be ascr­
ibed only on the basis of a degree of reflective awareness and under­
standing of them; thus a belief in the consequentia mirabilis could 
probably be only rarely attributed, and the existence of logical laws 
of which no one had thought reflectively would be denied. But whether 
much advantage would be reaped by a defensive move of this kind is 
very doubtful. It is, in particular, left very vague just how much 
and what sort of reflective awareness is required for the ascription 
of beliefs in logical laws; if the conditions are made too strict, 
many people will implausibly be counted as being devoid of beliefs 
in the laws of logic altogether, while if they are made too easy to 
fulfil, the revised position collapses back into the earlier one.
If the psychologistic reductive thesis is not without difficulties, 
it is nevertheless not obviously an impossible doctrine. A common 
ground for ascribing psychologism to Mill is that his account of the 
origin of belief in the 'laws of thought* offers some appearances of
accepting some form of reduction of logic to psychology. Whether this
>(
is so or not deserves some careful attention, though matters are made
difficult by the sketchiness of his discussions of this theme in both
the Logic and the Examination. 'The use and meaning of a Fundamental
Law of Thought, wrote Mill, 'asserts in general terms the right to
do something, which the mind needs to do in cases as,they arise' (EH,
p.374). Between the Logic and the Examination, to complicate the
situation further, his ideas about the use and meaning of the laws of
thought underwent some evolution, as he altered his opinion of their
importance to thought. In the Logic, the law of identity (given in the
form, 'Whatever is, is' (SL, p.175)) was characterised as trivial,
the law of contradiction as fairly unimportant (SL, p.277), and the
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law of excluded middle as true only in the case of meaningful prop­
ositions (SL, p.278) - a qualification which seemed to Mill to he 
a 'large* one, hut which testifies to his thinly disguised desire to 
dethrone all these laws from the exalted position they held in phil­
osophies which considered them as prime examples of necessary and 
n
a- priori truths. Disregarding the law of identity as being beneath 
notice, he claimed that the other two laws were generalisations from 
experience. In the Examination, the picture, was altered in two res­
pects: Mill had become willing to concede that the three laws of thought 
(even the law of identity) are truly fundamental to our thinking, as 
they encapsulate our most basic ideas about truth and falsity; and he 
no longer insisted upon the generalisation theory to account for our 
knowledge of them, suggesting as an alternative possibility that they are 
'laws of our thoughts by the native structure of our minds' (EH, ch. 
xxi; p.381). Now a charge of psychologism can seem reasonable against 
Mill first of all because of the manner in which in the Logic he exp­
lained the arrival at the law of contradiction, and secondly because
of the character of the alternative theory in the Examination of how 
the laws of thought are knoim.
The Logic's account of the law of contradiction/is that it is, 'like 
other axioms, one of our first and most familiar generalizations from 
experience' (SL, p.277). Mill explained:
The original foundation of it I take to be, that 
Belief and Disbelief are two different mental states, 
excluding one another. This we know by the observation 
of our own minds. And if we carry our observation out­
wards, we also find that light and darkness, sound and
silence, motion and quiescence, equality and inequality,
preceding and following, succession and simultan­
eousness, any positive phenomenon whatever and its 
negative, are distinct phenomena, pointedly con­
trasted, and the one always absent where the other 
is present. I consider the maxim in question to 
be a generalization from all these facts (SL, pp.277-78).
There are really two, complementary explanations here. The first and
*
more elliptical one is that we come to believe the law because we 
find that we never believe and disbelieve the same proposition. The 
second is that experience informs us that certain pairs of 'phenomena'
- e.g. sound and silence, light and darkness, etc. - are never co-inst- 
antiated, and from this we infer inductively that contradictory phen-
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omena are never co-instantiated (Kill's belief that all propositions 
are subject-predicate in form leads him to take this conclusion as a 
fair rendering of the law of contradiction).
Both explanations limp badly. The former suffers from the fairly 
obvious drawback that a disposition not to believe and disbelieve the 
same proposition is far more plausibly viewed as presupposing know­
ledge of the law of contradiction than as preceding and explaining it; 
at the very least, Mill-needs to do much more to defend his assump­
tion that people in a state of logical innocence will refrain from 
believing and disbelieving the same proposition. The latter explan­
ation encounters a similar difficulty by a different route. It is clear 
that Mill intended the pairs of phenomena sound/silence, motion/quies­
cence and the rest to represent pairs of contradictory phenomena, the 
theory being that from repeated experiences of finding that contrad­
ictory phenomena are never co-instantiated, we naturally infer the 
general law of contradiction. But when are phenomena contradictory?
Not merely when they are never co-instantiated, for some pairs of 
phenomena are never co-instantiated thought they are clearly not con­
tradictory; arguably, for instance, being happy and being mean, or 
being a man and being immortal, or containing sugar and being good 
for the teeth. To say that phenomena are contradictory when they are 
necessarily never found together would be profoundly- unMillian; it 
would in any case be quite obscure how someone could experience nec­
essary non-co-instantiation who lacked even such primitive conceptual 
equipment as knowledge of the law of contradiction. Mill himself gives 
a clue to what he has in mind when he talks of a positive phenomenon 
and its negative. The idea seems to be that two phenomena, darkness 
and light for example, are contradictory when one can be explained as 
the negation of the other. This works better for some of Mill's pairs
than for others; it is hardly obvious that preceding and following,
>f
or succession and simultaneousness are related in this manner. But even 
if we are prepared to waive this point, Mill's notion remains prob­
lematic. To comprehend a pair of phenomena as contradictory, the explan­
ation runs, one must be in possession of the concept of negation. But 
it is extremely hard to see how someone could properly be ascribed an 
understanding of negation who did not know tjie truth table for neg­
ation - yet to know that truth table is, in effect, to know the law 
of contradiction, which holds that a proposition and its contradictory 
are not both true. It is impossible for Kill to avoid this objection: 
he could not with any plausibility hold that the law of contradiction 
could be inferred inductively from any experiences of mutual exclus­
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ions of pairs of phenomena unless they are further grasped as being 
contradictory (standing, that is, as positive and negative to each 
other); but this presupposes the notion of negation to be understood,- 
and understanding this is integrally bound up with knowing the law of 
contradiction.
But our chief present concern is not with the correctness of Mill's 
theory so much as with the question of whether it is psychologistic.
The opening of the explanati-on gives a prima facie suggestion of psy­
chologism: the 'original foundation' of the law of contradiction.
Mill writes, is that 'Belief and Disbelief are two different mental 
states, excluding one another.' This might be read as asserting that 
what the law of contradiction expresses is a pattern of mental states, 
and if that is what Mill means then he is undeniably taking a psych­
ologistic view. Likewise, if the import of the second part of his 
story is that the law of contradiction generalises a disposition of 
the mind not to experience together both members of certain pairs of 
phenomena, it is hard to resist the ascription to him of psychologism. 
But neither of these readings has any plausibility unless Mill's con­
cern in the passage quoted is with the analysis of what the law of 
contradiction means - and it is very clear that it is, not. What the 
Is.w means, he had said, is 'that the same proposition cannot at the 
same time be false and true' (^, p.277); but that point got over at 
the outset. Mill turns to the epistemological question of its 'orig­
inal foundation,' and presents, in opposition to the school of a priori 
knowledge, an empiricist account of our knowledge of it. His discuss­
ion of the kinds of experience which give rise to a conviction of the 
truth of the law is wholly directed towards answering this epistemol­
ogical question. Whatever the merits and demerits of Mill's account, 
its intentions are very plain. It is significant, in his opinion, that 
we find ourselves never simultaneously believing and disbelieving 
the same proposition; it is relevant evidence too that we discover 
that the world never manifests contradictory phenomena, in the sense 
that it is never at one and the same time and place light and dark, or 
silent and noisy. From these experiences we then infer the.generalised 
law of contradiction - but this does not mean that the law is a psych­
ological one about states of mind, (it clearly does not follow from the 
fact that a proposition has an empirical basis that it asserts something 
about psychology.)
It is very likely that Mill's lack of insistence in the Examination 
on an empirical basis for the three laws of thought arose from a real­
isation of the weakness of the account of that basis in the Logic.
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Without ruling out his earlier explanation, he felt obliged to offer 
the reader an alternative, so he could take his choice; it might be 
that the laws in question are 'laws of our thoughts by the native 
structure of our minds' (EH, p.38l). Now this may seem even more 
readily than the inductivist account to invite a psychologistic inter­
pretation, yet once agin first appearances are misleading. To say 
that human beings by virtue of their native mental structure are dis­
posed to believe the law'5f■"'Contradiction does not entail that the 
logical law is about mental structure, even if there should be a psych­
ological law (a 'law of thought') to the effect that people do not 
believe contradictions, (Compare this with: Human beings might have 
been disposed by the native structure of their minds to believe the 
Second Law of Thermodynamics; but this would not make the Second Law 
a law about believing, even though we could speak of a psychological 
lav; that people believe the Second Law.) There are, admittedly, uncl­
arities in Mill's exposition, and maybe a certain equivocation over 
the notion of a 'law of thought,' but there is no evidence that he 
believed that laws of logic were merely principles descriptive of men­
tal operations. Indeed, he affirmed that ^ the 'Fundamental Laws' of 
thought v;ere:
laws of all Phaenomena, and since Existence has to 
us no meaning but one which has relation to Phaen­
omena, we are quite safe in looking upon them as 
laws of Existence (EH, p.382).
To say that basic laws of logic are 'laws of Existence' is at a con­
siderable remove from saying that they are psychological principles.
Even on the idealist construal of phenomena which Mill was sometimes 
inclined to press, phenomena are never simply identified with princ­
iples of mental operation; whatever the nature of the reality confr­
onted in experience, the phenomena of which it consists. Mill held, 
were to be distinguished from the experiencing mind. So even if we 
are psychologically obliged to believe basic logical laws, as he thought 
possible, this does not reduce those laws to laws of psychological 
operation, as distinct from laws of all existing phenomena.
Mill added that belief in a contradiction is, 'in the present con­
stitution of nature, impossible as a mental fhct' (EH, p.381). There 
is some obscurity whether by 'the present constitution of nature' he 
meant the state of the world at large, or just the existing state of 
human psychology, or even both of these together, the former, perhaps, 
bearing on the inductivist theory of the derivation of the basic
logical laws, and the latter on the nativist alternative. But the
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general sense of the statement is that only if the factors relevant 
to determining our beliefs in those laws changed would the beliefs 
be different. There is no evidence of psychologism here, yet this 
passage has sometimes been cited as exhibiting Mill's psychologism, 
most notably by Husserl, who wrote:
We conclude from this passage that the inconsistency 
expressed in the law of contradiction ... is seen by 
Kill as an incompatibiTity of such propositions in 
our belief. In other words, he substitutes for the 
impossibility that the propositions both be true, 
the real incompatibility of the corresponding acts 
of judgement (Husserl (l970)y vol.1, p.113).
I am in agreement with Dennis Christopher (Christopher, p.15) that 
Husserl's conclusion is a complete non sequitur. From the proposition 
that the 'present constitution of nature' would have to alter for us 
to start believing contradictions, it simply does not follow that a 
contradiction is nothing other than a psychological incapacity to 
combine certain propositions among our beliefs.
Perhaps there would have been less inclination on the part of read­
ers to ascribe psychologism to Mill had it not been for.the notorious 
passage, quoted earlier, in which he spoke of the science of logic as 
being 'a part, or branch, of Psychology' (EH, p.359)* If psychology 
concerns the mind and its operations, and logic is a part of psych­
ology, then logic - it follows - is about the mind and its operations 
too. Many students of Mill's thought must have felt that there was • 
no getting round this passage, and that it establishes beyond all 
possibility of question that his philosophy of logic is psychologis­
tic in tenor. And if this is so, then all attempts to argue for a 
non-psychologistic interpretation of other passages in his writings 
are really quite futile.
Yet once more the prima facie appearances are deceptive. The truth 
is that Mill was using the term 'Psychology' in an unusually broad 
sense, so that it covered not merely the descriptive theory of thought 
and other mental processes, but also the prescriptive theory of rules 
for correct thinking. That is to say, 'Psychology' for Mill embraced 
logic just because he understood it as the combination of what ^  
call psychology and logic. This conception of a combined science of 
psychology and logic may be non-standard, but it does not imply psych­
ologism, for it does not involve any reductive thesis that logical 
laws are descriptive of mental patterns. In the same paragraph as he 
declared that logic was a part of psychology, Mill described its part-
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icular concerns in a manner giving no whiff of psychologism;
Logic is not the theory of Thought as Thought, hut 
of valid Thought ; not of thinking, hut of correct 
thinking.... Logic has no need to know more of the 
Science of Thinking, than the difference between 
good thinking and bad....The properties of Thought 
which concern Logic, are some of its contingent 
properties ; thosey-mamely , on the presence of 
which depends good thinking, as distinguished 
from bad (ibid.).
And again;
it is only the validity of thought which Logic 
takes cognisance of. It is not with Thought as 
Thought, but only as Valid thought, that Logic 
is concerned (ibid.; Mill is reporting Hamilton's 
ideas here, but reporting them approvingly).
Such passages are identical in spirit to several found in the Intro­
duction to the Logic. 'Logic,' Mill said there, is the science
of the operations of the understanding which are subservient to the 
estimation of evidence' (SL, p.12). Those operations which would be 
of special interest to the logician were the ones bearing on the coll­
ection and estimation of evidence, in particular naming, defining and 
classifying. But the logician need 'not attempt to decompose the men­
tal operactions into their ultimate elements' ;
Logic has no interest in carrying the analysis beyond 
the point at which it becomes apparent whether the 
operations have in any individual case been rightly 
or wrongly performed (SL, pp.12, 13).
In a similar way, the science of music informs us how to discriminate 
between musical notes, and to judge of their acceptable combinations, 
but it need not.enter into the physics of sound which, though inter­
esting, is of no practical importance to the musician (SL, p.13). In 
short ;
The extension of Logic as a Science is determined by 
its necessities as an Arts whatever it does not need 
for its practical ends,.it leaves to dhe larger sci­
ence which may be said to correspond, not to any 
particular art, but to art in general; the science 
which deals with the constitution of the human 
faculties fl.e* psycholo^^ (g,, pp.13-14; £f. p.8?).
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If it remains odd, to modern ears, to hear logic spoken of as a 
branch of a grand science of psychology, it must nevertheless be und­
erstood that Mill, in speaking of it that way, intended no reduction ' 
of logical laws to principles of psychology in the narrower, present- 
day sense of that term. It seemed to him to be appropriate to classify 
logic as a branch of psychology because he saw the chief significance 
of logic as consisting in its providing a guide correct reasoning; 
and reasoning, as a mental process, came within the scope of psych­
ology. A fair objection to Mill's classification of logic, however, 
is that it lays a snare for the unwary: if logic is conceived as a 
part of psychology, it becomes quite easy to slip into psychologism, 
and to slur over the distinction between the logical properties of 
thought and its characteristics as a mental process. But Mill himself 
remained free from such confusions at all times. It can come as some­
thing of a shock to find that his substantive view of logic is really 
quite similar to Frege's, though the latter is often, and rightly, 
represented as the arch-foe of psychologism. In Frege's view, 'the 
laws of logic ought to be guiding principles for thought in the att­
ainment of truth,' and he permitted talk of 'laws of thought' so 
long as it was understood .clearly that logic's concern was with pro­
viding rules for valid thought rather than any description of psych­
ological processes (Frege (1953)> p.12). But this is no different 
from Mill's talk of logic as 'not the theory of Thought as Thought, 
but of valid Thought,' and as 'a collection of precepts or rules for 
thinking, grounded on a scientific investigation of the requisites of
valid thought ' (EH, pp.359*"60).
Hill, like Frege, believed in the objectivity of truth, and took 
truth to be the target of rational thought. The laws of logic should 
be the guiding principles of rational thought, because they are not 
descriptions of psychological regularities but rather laws of truth. 
That Mill's view of the status of logical laws was thus a perfectly 
standard one is a fact of the greatest importance about his philosophy 
of logic ; but it takes on some additional significance in the light 
of a recent attempt to reconstrue and defend a version of psycholog­
ism. According to Brian Ellis, a plausible form of psychologism takes 
logical laws to describe not actual thought'processes, but ideal ones, 
where an ideal system of belief is defined as one which is in a state 
of what he terms 'rational equilibrium.' Now on the face of it, this 
is a more promising doctrine than what Ellis terms the 'crude' psych­
ologism which identifies logical laws with actual psychological pro­
cesses, and one may wonder whether Mill, if he cannot be ascribed the
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cruder version of psychologism, can he ascribed an Ellis-type view 
instead. ^ Ellis concedes that no actual belief systems may fully 
realise the ideal of rational equilibrium, but he explains it as 
being;
like the concept of a system of bodies in thermal 
equilibrium, or of a perfectly balanced ecological 
system. Such states may never be realized in any 
actual systems, bufthese concepts are useful all 
the same in explaining the properties or structural 
features of actual systems. An ideally rational 
belief system is one which is in equilibrium under 
the most acute pressures of internal criticism 
and discussion (Ellis, p.4).
As Kill, like Ellis, recognises that laws of logic represent ideal 
patterns of thought, and recognises too that people do not always 
reason logically (which is why it is useful for them to learn logic), 
it might seem tempting to construe Mill as holding, just as Ellis 
does, that logical laws are descriptive of ideal belief systems in 
rational equilibrium. *
What makes this interpretation of Mill quite impossible, however, 
is that the feature of Ellis's theory which gives it its psycholog­
istic flavour is its construal of 'rational equilibrium' in a manner 
making no reference to truth - something which Mill would have found 
completely unacceptable. Ellis proposes to define a valid argument as 
one such that 'there is no rational belief system in which its prem­
isses are accepted and its conclusion rejected,' and adds that, 'for 
me, validity is an epistemic notion. It is a concept definable within 
rational belief systems' (Ellis, p.29). On Ellis's account, the 
foundations for logical systems
by-pass theories of^^truth. They do so in the sense 
that they leave open the question of whether any 
sentence of a given language can be said to be true 
or false in an objective sense (Ellis, p.102).
This is very different from any theory of Mill's. His philosophy of 
logic upholds a notion of objective truth and includes a realist theory 
of error; a belief system would be ideally National, or in 'rational 
equilibrium,' for Mill if and only if it were based wholly on logical 
principles which maximised the probability of the (objective) truth of 
its components. Ellis's theory is not only very different, but also 
very implausible. Its obvious, weakness is that it places no restric­
tions on acceptable modes for assessing beliefs other than,that they
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should preserve a system's 'rational equilibrium.' But it is clear 
that a belief system could be in 'rational equilibrium' in Ellis's 
sense, having gained and expelled members through processes of rule- 
governed criticism and discussion, and still be wholly crazy. There 
would be nothing to rule out, for instance, use of Arthur Prior's 
'tonk' rule - which permits the derivation of any proposition - for 
adding new beliefs to the system; for. there is no external criterion for 
determining what rules are-admissible in the processes of 'internal 
criticism and discussion.' But it is surely not begging any open 
questions against Ellis to insist that a belief system which util­
ised 'tonk' as a principle could not be regarded as rational in any 
intelligible sense of the word; yet as the use of this rule need not 
destroy 'rational equilibrium' as he understands it, there is no 
ground on which he could rule it out as being an unacceptable candidate 
for a rational principle.
Mill, by contrast, never said anything to suggest that he held 
validity to be definable without reference to truth. He very clearly 
did not mean to espouse anything like an Ellis-style psychologism 
with its rejection of any external and objective standards by which 
the rationality of a belief system can be measured. T^he only reason­
able final conclusion to draw is that Mill must be exonerated absol-
]"A ■
utely from all charges of psychologism; there is no particle of sound 
evidence to support the ascription to him of any form of that doct­
rine, but a great deal to suggest that his real view excluded it 
wholly. Whether, to preserve the unity and consistency of his phil­
osophical system, he might have done well to conjoin a psychologistic 
account of logical laws with a metaphysic of idealism is, of course, 
another, and a very complex, issue. But the fact of the matter is 
that in all his discussions of the philosophy of logic, his view of 
the nature of logical laws yas of a strictly orthodox kind.
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S I X
G L O B A L  E M P I"R "L G I S M
Bertrand. Russell once defined empiricism as the doctrine that 'all 
our knowledge is derived from experience* (Russell (19II), p.41). Yet 
not all thinkers who can reasonably be placed in the empiricist camp 
have held a view as bold as this. David Hume, for instance - though 
Russell cites him as a typical empiricist - asserted that proposit­
ions expressing 'relations of ideas* are not knoim through experience, 
but are rather 'intuitively or demonstratively certain.* 'That the 
square of the hypotenuse is equal to the square of;the two sides,' 
wrote Hume in the First Enquiry, 'is a proposition;which expresses 
a relation between these figures.' Such propositions of the mathem­
atical sciences 'are discoverable by the mere operation of thought, 
without dependence on what is anywhere existent in the universe'
(Hume (1902), p.25). What Russell was describing was a position which
can more accurately be termed 'global empiricism,' which denies that
1any knowledge has a non-empirical, a priori basis. Empiricism of 
this most radical kind denies that even logical and mathematical 
knowledge is a priori in nature; as Crispin Wright has put it, the 
'central motif of global*^  empiricism
combines a general scepticism concerning a priori 
knowledge and necessity with a desire to allow that 
logic and mathematics deal in truths of some sort 
which we are capable of knowing in an ordinary sense 
- this last phrase meaning experience (Wright, p.321).
Mill displayed in the Logic an allegiance not to the kind of mit­
igated empiricism embraced by Hume, but to empiricism of the global 
variety. All knowledge, according to the Logic, is the product of exp­
erience, and no exception should be made for that of logical and math­
ematical propositions. It is true that in his later years Mill did 
become more hesitant about the Logic's account of logical knowledge,
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and at the very end of his life felt obliged to surrender the induc- 
tivist account of our knowledge of the laws of contradiction and ex­
cluded middle which he had earlier defended (GA, pp.499-500).  ^ Yet ;
he never conceded that even these most basic of logical axioms have \
an a priori justification, and throughout his career his intention 
remained constant to press empiricist explanations as far as they 
would go. On his doctrine that the propositions of the mathematical 
sciences are to be justifiedempirically he never withdrew in the 
slightest degree.
The chief concern of the present chapter is the prospects for succ­
ess of a global empiricist epistemology of the sort Mill defended in 
the Logic. In particular, the cogency of the theory that experience 
is sufficient to bring us to knowledge of logical truths will be con­
sidered, though some incidental remarks will be made about Mill's 
account of mathematical knowledge. This concentration on his epistem­
ology of logic is warranted not just ly the fact that .his philosophy 
of logic is a special concern of this study, but also by the pecul­
iarly fundamental and determinative role played by our logical con­
ceptions in our theorising about the world. I^t would be the ultimate 
triumph for global empiricism if the laws of logic, which occupy, as 
it were, the ground floor of the edifice of knowledge, could be shown 
to be knowable through experience alone; and success herb would make 
it much harder to resist empiricist accounts of other categories of 
knowledge, including mathematical. As Mill himself said, accounting 
for logical knowledge empirically 'is indeed hunting the doctrine of 
a priori knowledge from its last refuge,' and would 'leave nothing 
standing which countenances the notion that there is a kind of know­
ledge independent of experience (ga, p.499).
Mill went to great trouble to make global empiricism seem plausible.
No fewer than three chapters at^the end of Bk.II of the Logic were 
devoted to expounding and defending it, and while what he had spec­
ifically to say about 'logical axioms' is relatively brief and comes 
only at the end of the Book, he explained that the general consider­
ations about knowledge of axioms which had been raised in the preced­
ing discussion of mathematical axioms apply to the logical ones also 
(SL, Bk.II.ch.vii.sect.5). However, it is unfortunate that he did not 
take more trouble over his account of the manner in which experience 
provides us with knowledge of the 'laws of thought.' We have seen 
already how slight and unconvincing that account is, and it is clear 
that the global empiricist needs to do much better than that if he is 
to persuade us to believe in an empirical basis for logic. Yet the
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failure of Hill's account does not entail that no empiricist theory 
could succeed, though a successful theory would have to surmount the 
most crucial difficulty to which his account succumbed, and establish 
that a person in a state of logical innocence could indeed interpret 
his experience in a manner capable of leading him to knowledge of basic 
logical laws. To say, for instance (which is not quite Mill's theory), 
that the law of contradiction is simply inferred inductively from 
experienced instances of-a.-proposition and its negation not both being 
true involves implicit ascription to the reasoner of the concept of 
negation; and it is highly implausible to suppose that someone could 
have the concept of negation who had no knowledge of the law of con­
tradiction. A viable empiricist theory of logic thus has a major -' 
and possibly an insurmountable - problem to overcome.
It is of some importance to realise that Mill conceived empiricism 
to provide a complete answer not just to questions of a causal-explan­
atory kind about the origins of our-.beliefs, but also to questions 
about their justification (though he did not always take care to keep 
these sharply apart). In modern parlance, his view was that empiricism 
is a theory operating in the context of justification as well as in the 
context of discovery. The empiricist is interested to enquire 'what 
is the ground of our belief in axioms/^* but also '.what is the evid­
ence on which they rest?' and he aims to show not merely that 'the 
truths which we call axioms are originally suggested by observation,' 
but also that it is experience, and not some faculty of a priori ref­
lection, which proves them (SL, p.23l). The proposition that two str­
aight lines cannot enclose a space is, as an induction from experience, 
not just 'suggested' but, in addition, justified by that experience: 
it receives confirmation in almost every instant of 
our lives; since we cannot look at any two straight 
lines which intersect one another, without seeing 
that from that point they continue to diverge more 
and more (^, pp.231-32).
We can say about this axiom, as we can about others too, that; 
Experimental proof crowds in upon us in such endless 
profusion, and without one instance in which there can 
be even a suspicion of an exception tq the rule, that 
we should soon have stronger reason for believing the 
axiom, even as an experimental truth, than we have 
for almost any of the general truths which we confess­
edly learn from the evidence of our. senses (SL, p.232).
But this being so, Mill drew his desired conclusion;
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Where then is the necessity for assuming that our 
recognition of these truths has a different origin 
from the rest of our knowledge, when its existence 
is perfectly accounted for by supposing its origin 
to be the same? (ibid.)
Kill was taking his stand on the undeniable fact that experience never 
conflicts with the 'axioms' of mathematics and logic, but always 
accords with their truth\"^But as that is so, it appears superfluous 
to seek some non-empirical warrant for them; if experience offers a 
sufficient justification of them, why look for something else to do 
the job? As Mill observed, with much justice;
The burden of proof lies on the advocates of the 
contrary opinion; it is for them to point out some 
fact, inconsistent with the supposition that this 
part of our knowledge of nature is derived from 
the same sources as every other part (ibid.).
Now the 'advocates of the contrary opinion'-do have, as Mill frankly 
acknowledged, some counterarguments to bring against global empiricism. 
Three of them seemed to him to be of particular importance, and worthy 
of careful rebuttal:
A. Experience is not necessary to warrantedly grasping the truth 
of axioms; pure thought is quite sufficient - and is,' moreover, the 
normal route to knowledge of them (SL, Bk.II.ch.v.sect.5).
B. Experience of a suitable sort is not always available to estab­
lish the truth of axioms; for instance, the axiom that two straight 
lines cannot enclose a space cannot be empirically verifiable, because 
we cannot have experience of lines of infinite length (which we would 
need to have if we were to be able to determine empirically that even 
infinitely prolonged straight lines do not enclose a space) (ibid.).
C. 'Axioms (it is asserte^d) are conceived by us not only to be 
true, but as universally and necessarily true. Now, experience cannot 
possibly give to any proposition this character. ... /Experience 
cannot offer the smallest ground for the necessity of a proposition.
She can observe and record what has happened; but she cannot find, in 
any case, or in any accumulation of cases, any reason for what must 
happen* (^, pp. 236-37). # ^
Kill's mode of answering the first two of these objections throws 
some new, and intriguing, light on what he understood by the notion 
of experience. Argument A aims to sap support for the empiricist 
account of axioms by alleging that mere reflection without experience 
(by which is here meant sense experience) is an adequate, and moreover
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our usual, ground for belief in them; this objection is not intended 
to demonstrate that an empirical basis for axioms is impossible in 
principle, but only that it is neither necessary nor usual in practice# 
It is a counter-claim to Mill's contention that a priori reflection 
is not required for knowledge of axioms, but by itself it is inadequate 
to refute global empiricism. A global empiricist.could criticise it 
for a lack of simplicity in its postulation of ^  priori sources of 
knowledge alongside empirical ones (which, of course, no a nriorist 
denies to be responsible for many of the things we know). But. the 
case against empiricism is greatly strengthened by production of obj­
ection B, which asserts that there are some axioms which could not
even in principle be verified by (sense) experience, and which must 
therefore be knovm, if they are known, in some a priori way.
Mill made a joint response to objections A and B, the nub of which 
was that both construe the concept of experience in too narrow a way.
As well as sense experience of outer'objects there is, in his opinion, 
inner experience of one's own ideas and other mental states, and both 
kinds of experience are available for the empirical basis of knowledge. 
Having observed features of reality by means of our senses, we can then 
learn more about that reality by means of a kind of mental experimen­
tation on the ideas thereby derived. Mill explained whit(he meant by 
use of the example of geometrical knowledge : one of the 'characteris­
tic properties of geometrical forms' is
their capacity of being painted in the imagination 
with a distinctness equal to reality: in other words,
the exact resemblance of our ideas of form to the
sensations which suggest them. This, in the first 
place, enables us to make (at least with a little 
practice) menta,l pictures of all possible combinations 
of lines and angles, wj^ iich resemble the realities 
quite as well as any which we could make on paper ; 
and in the next place, make those pictures just 
as fit subjects of geometrical experimentation as 
the realities themselves (SL, p.234).,
But Mill stressed that to uphold such a view was not to renege on emp­
iricism; for it remains true that' '
foundations of geometry would therefore be 
laid in direct experience, even if the experiments 
(which in this case consist merely in attentive
contemplation) were practised solely upon what we 
call our ideas, that is, upon the diagrams in our
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minds, and not outward objects (ibid.).
Mental experimentation, however, is not confined to geometrical 
ideas. Even ’recollections of colours or of odours' can be subjected, 
to such experiment; for instance:
A person in whom, either from natural gifts or from 
cultivation, the impressions of colour were peculiarly 
vivid and distinct, if asked which of two blue flowers 
was of the darker-tlnge, though he might never have 
compared the two, or even looked at them together, 
might be able to give a confident answer on the 
faith of his distinct recollection of the colours; 
that is, he might examine his mental pictures, and 
find there a property of the outward objects (SL, p.235).
Mill did not explicitly apply his theory of mental experimentation 
to the case of logical axioms, but there is quite possibly a reminisc­
ence of it in the suggestion that it is a basis of our knowledge of 
the law of contradiction that we find that pairs of incompatible 
'phenomena' exclude each other from the mental stage. And in writing 
that we do not find ourselves believing^and disbelieving the same 
proposition ('Belief and Disbelief are two different mental states, 
excluding one another' (SL, p.277))> he may have been inclined to reg­
ard it as by a similar form of experimentation on mental contents 
that we discover that propositions are not acceptable with their neg­
ations.
Mill's notion of mental experimentation is of considerable origin­
ality. Locke, to be sure, spoke of reflection as a form of experience 
productive of fresh ideas about 'the operations of our ovm minds,' 
and asserted that though reflection 'be not sense, as having nothing 
to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might prop­
erly enough be called internal sense' (Locke, vol.1, p.78). Yet Locke 
saw reflection as giving rise to knowledge only about our minds and 
their contents, whereas Mill regarded mental experimentation as able 
to lead us to new knowledge about outer reality. A closer parallel to 
Mill's theory is to be found in Berkeley's view that certain fundamen­
tal truths about reality can be elicited by a careful consideration 
of what we can and cannot conceive. If, for ^ instance, someone wants 
to know whether a body could exist without sensible qualities, Berk­
eley recommends him 'to reflect and try, whether he can by any abstr­
action of thought, conceive the extension and motion of a body, with­
out all other sensible qualities' - Berkeley declaring that he himself 
cannot conceive of a body.,existing 'without some colour or other sen-
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sible quality* (Berkeley, p.ll8). Mill, however, did not restrict 
mental experimentation to attempts to determine what is and what is 
not conceivable.
Having extended the notion of experience in this manner, Mill felt 
able to rebut objections A and B to global empiricism Tpy the ingen­
ious strategy of conceding their claims about the importance of thought 
and reflection in the arrival at knowledge of axioms, but construing 
the kind of thought and reflection involved as basically empirical in 
character. His response to the criticism that experience alone could 
not provide us with knowledge of the proposition that two straight 
lines cannot enclose a space is particularly interesting. He counters 
that while we admittedly are incapable of 'ocularly following' lines 
to infinity, we can perform the requisite tests in imagination, by 
transporting ourselves in imagination to distant - even infinitely 
distant - points to which given lines might be extended (^, pp.234-35). 
But we might feel less than contented with this response, while gran­
ting it to make an intriguing suggestion. A serious flaw to it is that 
it is thoroughly obscure what criterion could justify the claim that 
an imagined segment of a line accurately represents the character a 
real line would have if projected to, say, ten million,miles from the 
point at which we actually observe it; it seems wholly question-begging 
to assert that our imaginations will provide trustworthy information 
about the line at far distant points. More significantly still, it may 
be suspected that Mill missed this point only because he was inclined, 
in spite of himself, to ascribe to such mental experiments certain 
features of a priori processes. And that brings to the surface a very 
fundamental objection to the whole theory of mental experimentation 
as a form of experience: is Mill deceiving himself and his readers by 
classifying mental experimentation as an experiential rather than an 
^  epistemic mode? By conceding the importance, and indeed the
necessity, of mental experiments in the acquisition of knowledge of 
axioms, is Mill, despite his protestations to the contrary, really 
surrendering the citadel of empiricism to the a priorist enemy?
For Kill’s account of the mind's reflection on. its contents sounds 
dangerously similar to the a priorist’s notion of a route to knowledge 
through the analysis of concepts. Both Mill and many a priorists agree 
in acknowledging an ultimate origin for our concepts in outer exper­
ience, so Mill's insistence that mental experiments are carried out 
on ideas first presented in sense experience will not in itself est­
ablish any radical distinction between his and the a priorist's pos­
ition. And since, once it has its concepts or ideas, the mind, on both
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account s, can arrive at new knowledge without any subsequent sensory 
input being required, it becomes unclear how Mill can justifiably 
claim that his mental experimentation is truly an empirical process.
His extension of the term 'experience* to cover such experimentation 
can easily seem a mere intellectual sleight of hand, and it is certainly 
highly non-standard. Frege, for instance, specifically contrasted 
'sense perception' with a priori sources of.knowledge which are 'wholly 
within us,' the 'logical-eource of knowledge' and 'geometrical and 
temporal sources of knowledge' (Frege (1979), pp.267-74). Russell 
used 'experience' to mean sense experience, and described the thesis 
that some knowledge is a priori as maintaining that 'the experience 
which makes us think of it does not suffice to prove it, but merely 
so directs our attention that we see its truth without requiring any 
proof from experience' (Russell (19II), p.41). In allowing that sense 
experience is insufficient for the acquisition of knowledge of axioms. 
Mill might with some plausibility be taken to be in essential agree­
ment with the a priorist who argues that an empiricist account of 
axioms is untenable, and that reference must be made to certain fac­
ulties of the mind for the analysis of ideas - despite Mill's claim 
that the analysis in question is, or involves, a kind^of 'experience.'
Is Mill's global empiricism, then, merely soi-disant?. :
In fact it is not, though it is easy to mistake it-as such. Mill's 
notion of mental experimentation, properly understood, marks a consis­
tent development of an empiricism which makes no real concessions to
a priorism, however it may appear at first sight. His ovm statement
of the a priorist position is of interest in this connection. Dr Whew- 
ell and others of his opinion, Mill wrote, assert that it is not exp­
erience which proves an axiom, but that
its truth is perceived a priori, by the constitution 
of the mind itself, from the first moment when the
•I
meaning of the proposition is apprehended; and with­
out any necessity for verifying it by repeated trials,
as is requisite in the case of truths really ascert­
ained by observation (SL, p.231).
Now there is a genuine distinction between such a priori apprehension 
of truth and what Mill described.as experimentation on mental contents. 
His account of the latter process, and the examples he gives of it, 
make very clear that it is mental images ('mental pictures,' as he calls 
them) vHiich are the material on which experiments are performed; these 
images, preserved in memory, are of objects previously presented in sense 
experience, and provided they can be held in the attention in a suff-
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iciently steady and vivid manner, their careful scrutiny can give rise 
to new knowledge about those objects (and with the assistance of ind­
uctive inference, about other objects of the same kind). Such proc-• 
esses of examination of images, both singly and in complexes, are, as 
Mill maintained, not appropriately termed a priori, but are indeed 
much more closely related to empirical processes as standardly under­
stood - though whether they represent a powerful extension of the 
latter, as he thought, «or-rather a mere pale and degraded reflection 
of them, is likely to divide opinion.
By contrast, a priori thought, if there be any such, would operate, 
in Mill's opinion, not on mental images but on the meanings of prop­
ositions. The truth of axioms, on the a priorist picture, would be 
elicited by a purely intellectual and non—imagistic process of int­
erpretation of the propositions which express them. This is the view 
which Mill ascribed to Whewell and his followers, and he made it clear 
that he regarded it as involving neither the perceptual investigation 
of real objects nor the quasi-perceptual scrutiny of images of them. 
Kill would have expected an a priorist to say that we know that two 
straight lines, even infinitely extended ones, cannot enclose a space, 
because we discover from examining the meaning of the proposition that 
two straight lines cannot enclose a space that this; is not a real 
possibility (moreover, we can learn this in one single act of under­
standing, which we do not need to repeat in,order to confirm the truth 
of the proposition). But this is obviously very different from Mill's 
ovjn view that we come to know the axiom by mentally experimenting 
(maybe several times) on images of lines in a way closely analogous 
to scrutinising diagrams drawn on paper. ^
It is reasonable, then, to look on Mill's theory of mental experim­
entation as genuinely distinct from theories of a priori reflection, 
and to accept his claim that conducting mental experiments on images 
is a form of empirical investigation. The same may be said, incident- 
Berkeley's thought experiments aimed, at discovering truths 
abouo reality by trying what we can and cannot conceive to be possible 
states of affairs, provided that these experiments can be understood 
as conducted by the imagination. When Berkeley describes the experim­
ent of attempting to conceive of 'the extension and motion of a body, 
without all other sensible qualities,' it is certainly tempting to 
read him as relating an experiment on mental images; and if that is 
the correct interpretation, then it is wrong to consider him as making 
here a switch from an empiricist to a rationalist view, as it has 
sometimes been alleged he is doing (e.g. by Pitcher, p.220). For however
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a priori -thought processes can be characterised - whether in Mill's 
manner, as essentially concerned with the analysis of meanings, or in 
some other way - it seems desirable to regard them as being more than 
merely experiments on images, which are no more than mental copies of 
the presentations of sense.
Although Mill's account of mental experimentation on images is not 
an account of an a priori thought process, it may be questioned whether 
it is able to go as far'asHie wanted it to do towards sustaining the 
claim that a wholly empiricist theory of knowledge of axioms is att­
ainable. For one thing, it makes a very heavy demand on the psychol­
ogical capacity to produce mental images which are vivid and stable 
enough to serve as reasonable proxies for actual sense presentations. 
Most people are not gifted with the capacity to produce to order and 
to exert an adequate control over sequences of mental images suitable 
for the role Mill required of them; and indeed, there are people who 
claim never to have mental images at all. If Mill exaggerated the 
ability of people to produce, hold in attention and then 'experiment' 
on their mental images, he may well have been led to do so by his 
belief, inherited from the empiricist tradition, that ideas are images. 
Rather oddly, he never seems to have taken seriously.the possibility 
that this belief might be false, and in the Examination he took Sir 
William Hamilton severely to task for failing to admit that in all 
conceptual thought there is present to mind 'a concrete idea or image' 
(SH, oh.XVII; p.321). But if ideas are, one and all, images, and if 
anyone who can think can be ascribed ideas, it follows that anyone 
who can think can be ascribed mental images; and if thinking involves 
the controlling of sequences of ideas, then, on Mill's presuppositions, 
it involves the controlling of mental imagery. ^
A further consequence of Mill's conviction that all ideas are images 
is that he failed to recognise how unlikely it is that mental exper­
imentation on images could be productive of knowledge of axioms whose 
content does not lend itself readily, to any sort of imagistic represen­
tation. It is obscure, for instance, what mental experimentation on 
images we could undertake to convince ourselves of the truth of Peano's 
postulates, still less of the axioms of non—Euclidean geometries. But 
that we can sometimes be ascribed ideas where we cannot be ascribed 
corresponding images is a fact Mill never grasped; and he therefore 
did not realise that there are limits on the capacity of mental exper­
imentation to reveal truth. His account is most promising in connection 
with those simple geometrical propositions of whose truth we might 
find we can most readily become convinced by the scrutiny of diagrams
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- for whether those diagrams are drawn on paper or, as Mill put it, 
they are 'painted in the imagination* instead, should make no deep 
difference of principle to the character of the process. But it cannot 
he concluded from its prospects here that the account will work well 
with regard to axioms in general; and in fact it is hard to see how 
it could he applied with any plausibility even to the basic axioms 
of elementary arithmetic.
II
Objection G to the empiricist account of axioms was, it will be 
recalled, that experience cannot show axioms to be necessary - that 
it can provide us with knowledge only of what is, not of what must 
be. Kill quoted Whewell’s dictum that, 'To learn a proposition by 
experience, and to see it to be necessarily true, are two altogether 
different processes of thought' (SL, p.237). It is clear that Mill's 
extension of the notion of experience to dover mental experimentation 
on images will not be of assistance in the rebuttal ofÇthis object­
ion, whatever its potential for resisting objections A;and B. For he 
conceived experiments on images as closely analogous to experiments 
on objects known directly through the senses, and what is alleged 
against the capacity of the latter experiments to inform us about 
necessity can, mutatis mutandis, be alleged against the former.
Mill's response to the objection relies on one of the most radical 
and distinctive doctrines of his entire philosophy; it does not matter, 
he argued, that empiricism cannot account for knowledge of necessity 
- for there is no such thing as necessity! The feeling that some prop­
ositions are not just true but necessarily true, he explained, is a 
pure illusion stemming from the psychological difficulty of imagining 
to be otherwise something which has been found to be so by 'long est­
ablished and familiar experience' (SL, p.238). At the root of Mill's 
account is the alleged compulsive force of the powers of association 
of ideas:
When we have often seen and thought of two things
together, and have never in any one instance either
seen or thought of them separately, there is by the
primary law of association an increasing difficulty,
which may in the end become insuperable, of con­
ceiving the two things apart. ... If daily habit
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presents to any one for a long period two facts in 
combination, and if he is not led during that period 
either by accident or by his voluntary mental oper­
ations to think of them apart, he will probably in 
time become incapable of doing so even by the 
strongest effort; and the supposition that the two 
facts can be separated in nature, will at last 
present itself to " M s . mind with all the force of an 
inconceivable phenomenon (SL, pp.238-39).
Mill claimed that philosophers like Whewell who had defended the 
existence of necessary truths had no better ground on which to base 
their opinion than the fact that we do, in practice, find the negat­
ion of some propositions to be inconceivable. But inconceivability,
Mill urged, is a very bad criterion of impossibility, as experience 
had shovm that what was deemed inconceivable had sometimes come to pass 
our capacity or incapacity of conceiving a thing 
has very little to do with the possibility of the 
thing in itself; but is in truth very much an affair 
of accident, and depends on the past history and habits 
of our own minds (SL, p.238).
Still less can our finding the negation of certain propositions to be 
inconceivable establish that we have for those propositions an ^  priori 
warrant, or ’evidence of a higher and more cogent description than 
any which experience can afford' (ibid.). Once upon a time, Cartesians 
had rejected the Newtonian doctrine of gravitation on the strength 
of a proposition whose negation appeared inconceivable and against 
reason - the proposition that a body cannot act where it is not; yet 
Newton's doctrine had eventually overcome all opposition and achieved 
universal acceptance (SL, pp.239-40). Inconceivability is thus to 
be rejected as a quite unac^eptably subjective criterion of object­
ive impossibility.
Even if one has doubts about Mill's associationist explanation of 
why we find the negations of some propositions to be inconceivable, 
his criticism of the employment of inconceivability as a criterion of 
impossibility is likely to find few dissentients. It is perhaps a 
little surprising that he did not consider a,different theory of what 
makes necessary propositions necessary, the theory, namely, that they 
are necessary because they are guaranteed true by virtue of their 
meaning. We have seen that Mill understood the a priorist to hold 
that reflection on the meaning of axioms is sufficient to determine 
their truth, and it is odd that it did not occur to him that a likely
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line for a priorism to adopt is that it is in virtue of their meaning 
that axioms are true. Had he thought of this theoretical option for 
a priorism, he might well have considered it worth the trouble of 
refutation. Having asserted that axioms are true by virtue of their 
meaning, the a priorist can follow this up ly claiming that the mean­
ing relationships of their terms make such propositions not just true 
but necessarily true. For instance, it might be proposed that ’Two 
straight lines cannot ■enc-l-ose a space' is necessarily true, not because 
we are unable to conceive of two straight lines enclosing a space (which 
may be true, but is irrelevant), but because it is part of the meaning 
of the expression 'two straight lines' that two straight lines cannot 
enclose a space.
In the wake of Quine's essay 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', many 
philosophers have become very unsure whether there really are any 
propositions which are true by virtue of the meaning of their terms, 
or 'analytic.' It is hardly to be,supposed that Mill anticipated Quine',s 
worries about analyticity, which rely on the complex and sophisticated 
argument that analyticity and its close cousins synonymy, definition 
and necessity are only definable in terms of each other, in a closed 
circle of definitions from which there is no exit. It is more likely 
that Mill did not consider the view that axioms are true by virtue of 
meaning because it never occurred to him that there Could be any doubt 
that axioms, in almost all cases, express significant truths about the 
world, and are true not because of the semantic relationships of their 
terms but because reality is as they assert it to be. The exceptions 
to this generalisation - though in the Logic hardly thought worthy of the 
name of 'axioms' - were the law of identity ('Whatever is, is') and 
the Dictum de omni et nulle, which were trivial truths about words and 
verbal relationships, and not substantive claims about reality (^L, 
Bk.II.ch.ii.sect.2,3)* These propositions, though he did not put it 
in these terms, he might then have been prepared to regard as true by vir­
tue of meaning, for he held their truth to depend on facts about lan­
guage rather than facts about the world; and as such they attracted 
his unmitigated scorn. But the theory that all,those axioms standardly 
deemed necessary are true by virtue of the meanings of their terms he 
would have dismissed, had he encountered i%, as too obviously wrong 
to be worth discussing.
There is some irony in the fact that, if Mill in"1843 had been ready to 
say it of any propositions, he might have been prepared to say of the
law of identity that it was true by virtue of its meaning, for there
is good reason to think that this is quite impossible. It is plausible
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to think that the law of identity must be true for any other propos­
ition to be true by virtue of meaning. Take, for instance, the prop­
osition that two straight lines cannot enclose a space. For this to
be true by virtue of meaning would presumably require that an identity 
held between the meaning of the predicate expression and a part of the 
meaning of the subject expression; that is to say, being unable to 
enclose a space would have to be part of what is meant “by the expr­
ession 'two straight linéêV'‘"‘But now, what can be said about the law 
of identity itself? Although this is normally considered a necessary 
truth; it cannot be explained as being true by virtue of its meaning, 
if truth by virtue of meaning presupposes the truth of the law of iden­
tity, for such an explanation would be circular. But if the necessary
truth of the law of identity cannot be explained as relying on the mean­
ings of its terms, how then is it to be accounted for? The a priorist 
might suggest that, while it is clearly necessary, it is not necessary 
in virtue of anything at all; its necessity is in no way a derivative 
feature but one belonging to it in a way which neither invites.nor 
admits of any further explanation. The empiricist might reply that 
the a priorist is now just resorting to obscurantism and mystery to 
make up for his lack of a proper theory; and he will doubtless add _ 
that a priorism is now shorn to be without any quite generally service- 
able account of necessary truth. Why not, he will ask, simply drop 
talk of the necessity of the law of identity, and treat it as a prop­
osition empirically found to be true (but not necessarily true) about 
all reality? And if we can treat so fundamental and universally applic­
able a principle as the law of identity as an empirically discovered 
truth, what should prevent our treating all other so-called 'necessary' 
axioms in the same way?
As we shall see, the global empiricist's contention that all prop­
ositions can be tested againpt experience encounters very serious 
problems of its own; for the testing must rely on principles whose 
own justification can hardly be of an empirical kind without danger 
of circularity or vicious infinite regress arising. But there is in any 
case textual evidence to suggest that Mill himself did not always 
wish to press the claims of global empiricism of the boldest sort. It 
has already been mentioned that .his accounts in the Logic of the basis 
of our knowledge of the laws of contradiction and of excluded middle 
are quite brief (in fact, his treatment of the latter law consists 
largely of quotation from Spencer (SL, pp.278-79))? snd it may reason­
ably be wondered whether this brevity reflects a lack of confidence 
in the truth of the empiricist account of these axioms. Moreover, in
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the very paragraph in which he presented an empiricist explanation of 
knowledge of the law of contradiction, Mill also floated,the appar­
ently inconsistent suggestion that the law is really 'a mere identical 
proposition' (SL, p.277). It is significant too that in the rough 
draft of the Logic which he wcote before the version printed as the 
1st Edition, he made no reference whatsoever to an empiricist treat­
ment of the axioms of logic (SL, Appendix A),
The truth of the matter-is that Mill seems sometimes to have hes­
itated over the extension of the empiricist theory to logical axioms, 
not, however, because he thought that an a priorist account of them 
might be correct after all, but because he doubted whether any attempt 
to justify them was really in order. His failure to declare himself 
strongly in favour of an empirical account of the axioms of logic 
stemmed not from any suspicion that those axioms were, so to speak, 
beyond the power of empiricism to accommodate, but rather from a sus­
picion that they were beneath it. There can be little question that he came 
to believe this about the law of identity, which at least by the 
time he wrote the Examination he was willing to look on as 'an indis­
pensable postulate in all thinking' (EH, p.376), yet one of such sim­
plicity and fundamentality that the question of its, justification 
could not sensibly be raised. It was not that he believed that empir­
icism would give the wrong justification of the law> and some other 
theory the right one; instead, no question about its justification 
could appropriately be posed. The laws of contradiction and of
excluded middle appear to have given him more pause for thought. His cau- . 
tious view apparently was that these laws were in need of justif­
ication, then, of course, that justification must be an empiricist 
one; but perhaps they were .in reality : identical propositions and, 
as such, like the law of identity itself, did not admit of justification
in the way all non-identical propositions did. It-was ..the ; claim that no
•f
justification was needed which finally came to the fore in the review 
'Grote's Aristotle', where Mill argued that as identical propositions 
they did not need the support of 'a gathered experience' (GA, p.499? 
cf. a suggestion made many years earlier at SL,p.277). But if Mill took 
much time to make up his mind about the status of the basic logical 
axioms, he never displayed the. slightest tendency to weaken in his 
allegiance to the central tenet of an empiricism of global dimensions, 
that all justification is by reference to experience.
Kill-never explained why he thought that the law of identity, or such 
a proposition as ..the law of contradiction, if-merely, expressive of an 
identity, required no justification, but it may be presumed that he
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believed that nothing more primitive in the order of knowledge could 
be adduced in support of propositions of such fundament ality• Although 
he did not state it, he probably took the reasonable line that just­
ification has somewhere to come to a stop, and though he wavered about 
the precise location of the laws of contradiction and excluded middle 
in the edifice of knowledge, he saw clearly that any attempt to justify 
the law of identity in terms of something still more primitive was quite 
vain. But to allow that"experience is not the source of justification 
of the most primitive logical laws does not, of course, entail 
conceding to a priorism that those laws can be knovm in advance of 
experience, and Mill seems to have believed (see, for instance, GA, 
pp.499-500) that consciousness of the truth of the laws of logic arises 
only in the course of experience. (That is to say, while the most 
basic laws of logic are not justified empirically, they yet only become 
known experience. ) Yet he also believed,, as we saw, that these basic 
laws of logic are laws which we are under some psychological compul­
sion to accept ; that is, while laws of logic are not themselves psych­
ological principles. Mill thought that there are some psychological princi­
ples to the effect that we should believe certain of the most fundam­
ental logical laws - though perhaps only the three traditionally- 
labelled ’laws of thought.* At first sight, this mayfseem to represent
' . W : .a substantial concession to a priorism, but in fact it is no such 
thing. Mill did not consider that human psychology is of such a nature 
that a belief in some fundamental principles of logic can and will 
arise in the absence of experience; rather, he held that the human 
mind is so constructed that in interpreting its experience it will 
follow the patterns expressed by the most fundamental logical laws. 
Moreover, he did not take the existence of psychological laws to think 
logically to have any bearing on the justification of logical laws, 
and in particular he did noj suppose that logical laws were justified 
by the very existence of psychological compulsions to believe them.
Even so, one might wonder whether it was not superfluous (and mislead­
ing) on Mill's part to postulate psychological laws of logical thought; 
for if fundamental principles of logic, while not requiring experience 
for their justified belief (being, strictly, beneath justification-of 
any sort), are yet only learnt in the course#of experience, then exp­
erience would appear to offer a sufficient explanation of why human 
beings accept those principles, without needing any supplementation 
by a theory of psychological tendencies to think in accordance with 
them.
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For all,their hesitations and obscurities, Mill’s various disc­
ussions of our knowledge of the fundamental laws of logic comprise 
a suggestive and valuable contribution to empiricist philosophy.
While the precise nature of his theories in this area is often elusive 
(and may, indeed, have been far from wholly clear to himself), his 
ideas are worth careful attention, not least because they have a 
significant bearing on the important but far from simple question 
of what really distinguishes, empiricist from a priorist theories of 
knowledge.
It was suggested above that Mill inclined to construe the most 
fundamental la.ws of logic as incapable of any justification in terms 
of other principles - as being principles of so primitive a kind that 
they are, metaphorically speaking, ’beneath* justification. But an 
obvious question which arises about such a view is whether Mill has 
now abandoned global empiricism in making what appears to be a large 
concession to a priorism. Can a bona fide global empiricist really 
afford to allow that among the things we know are some propositions 
for which we do not possess an empirical justifica.tion? Maybe the 
kind of mitigated empiricism found, for .instance, in Hume’s vjritings 
can admit the existence of items of knowledge for which we have no 
a posteriori warrant; but the more thoroughgoing empiricism which 
Mill purported to espouse would appear to exclude thé possibility of 
such items.
Now it is a mistake to conceive the distinction between empiricist 
and a priorist theories of knowledge to be clear-cut. In reality 
there are not just two, sharply contrasted views which philosophers 
might hold, but a spectrum of positions running between extremes.
If Mill did not hold (or, perhaps more accurately, did not finally 
hold) the most extreme form of empiricism imaginable, it does not 
follow that he relinquished^the-jfield to a priorism; I shall argue, 
in fact, that even after his concessions on the score of knowledge 
of basic laws of logic, his position can still appropriately be des­
cribed as a global empiricist one.
Mill never relaxed his opposition to a strong, version of a priorism 
whose appeal to many philosophers has continued even to the present 
day. On this version, necessary, truths, including the laws of logic 
and mathema.tics, can be rationally known by the power of our intuit­
ive capacities - that is, we can just see, by the force of our und­
erstandings, that such and such propositions are true. Many great 
philosophers have had few qualms about proclaiming the existence of 
such capacities of rational intuition, and in the present century
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the authority of no less a figure than Frege has encouraged much unemb­
arrassed talk of a ’logical source of knowledge’ (see Frege (1979)) 
to account for our knowledge of elementary logic. Not many writers 
have talc en issue with such notions of a priori knowledge, though the 
same obscurantism which Mill condemned has occasionally spurred a 
philosopher to remonstrate with the supporters of the orthodox view. 
Among the limited company who continue the tradition of Mill is Max 
Black, who has strongly, criticised the idea of intuitive justification 
of the laws of logic. As Black has written, a tradition going back 
to Aristotle
claims the possibility, indeed the necessity, of 
providing a warrant for logical and mathematical 
truths. The position is dominated Ijy a supposed 
analogy between vision and an alleged process of 
’’mental insight,’’ characteristically expressed 
in a metaphorical terminology of ’’evidence,’’
’’intuition’’ (Latin; intuere, to look), ’’the 
light of reason,’’ ’’clarity,’’ ’’distinctness,’’ 
and so on (Black (I970), p.17).
One recalls here Mill’s description of the way in which a priorism 
opens the door to regarding ’every inveterate belief and every intense 
feeling’ as ’its o\m all-sufficient voucher and justification’ (AU, 
p.233). Black adds the observation that intuition could provide at 
most a private justification of a proposition, for someone who claims 
that the justification that two and two make four is a certain mental 
fact (the fact, namely, that it seems intuitively right him to 
affirm that two and two make four), cannot use that fact to convey an 
intelligible justification to anyone else. It might be countered that 
if in practice people agree in their intuitions, the lack of a strictly 
public justification for the proposition that two and two make four 
will not matter, as people will coincide in their private justificat­
ions for it. But even agreement in intuitions will not help to answer 
the deeper Millian objection that it is simply not clear why any men­
tal facts whatsoever should be taken as justifying propositions about 
extra-mental reality. To answer this objection, there would have to 
be supplied some account of why human intuitions should be trusted as 
sources of knowledge about ultimate logical and mathematical reality.
But nobody knows any way of vindicating the claims of intuition to 
provide knowledge, which consequently tends toLattract description in 
nothing better than the loose and hopeful metaphors dravm from ordinary 
visual perception which Black condemns.
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Black himself favours regarding a priori propositions as those 
whose truth is revealed in the very act of understanding them, so 
that in understanding such a proposition ’we necessarily know it to 
he true, and if we have any doubt we could not have understood what 
we thought we were doubting’ (Black (l970)> p.18). But what underst­
anding a proposition makes plain to us is the meaning of that propos­
ition; and in maintaining that when we understand an a priori propos­
ition we eo ipso grasp its" truth. Black is hinting strongly that he 
takes the truth of a priori propositions to be a function of their 
meaning. If Black accepts some form of the view that a priori prop­
ositions are true in virtue of their meaning, he has of course diver­
ged considerably from Mill’s position.-(for Mill did not believe that 
those propositions normally classified as a priori were in general 
true by virtue of semantic relationships rather than by virtue of the 
way the world is). But, as we have seen, it is unlikely that the notion 
of a priori propositions can be satisfactorily elucidated along these 
lines, both because of Quinean worries about analyticity, and because 
the truth-in-virtue-of-meaning theory cannot cope with the law of iden­
tity, surely the most prominent candidate of all for a priori status.
Thus in refusing to accept that there were any propositions which were 
a priori either in the sense of being knowable by a special faculty 
of intellectual intuition, or in that of being true by virtue of their 
meaning (unless, indeed, there was a very small number of the latter, 
as he may have believed in 1843), Mill occupied a highly defensible position 
But if some propositions are beneath justification, being warranted 
neither by experience, nor by intellectual intuition, nor by performing an 
act of understanding of their meaning, are they not then in some sense 
a priori (even if they are only grasped, as Mill held, in the course 
of experience), just because nothing more primitive is available to 
be cited in their justifierai ion? Perhaps it is an ultimate fact that 
human beings with normal faculties accept the basic logical laws, and 
vjhile other things they accept by inference can be justified by ref­
erence to their acceptance of logical laws, their acceptance of those 
laws themselves cannot meaningfully be said to be justified by any­
thing at all. Now it is reasonable to describe such propositions as 
a priori, and it is also plausible to suppdse that Mill accepted their 
existence. Thus Mill accepted the existence of some a priori propos­
itions, at any rate in his later (post-Logic) years. But it should 
immediately be said that the sense of ’a. priori’ in which he accepted 
that there were some _a priori propositions is of the thinnest kind, 
and his acceptance of the existence of a priori propositions of that
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kind is at no detriment to his adherence to the quintessential empir­
icist claim that all justification is empirical justification. To 
grant that some propositions are a priori in the ’thin* sense of 
being beneath justification is quite different from granting that 
there are any which are a priori in the ’thick’ sense of being know- 
able by an act of intuitive understanding - the view which Mill dev­
oted so much of his philosophical energy to combating. In admitting 
that there is nothing'dhtprior in the order of knowledge to the basic 
laws of logic, Mill in no degree withdrew his opposition to the 
view that there are special faculties of intuition or insight which 
provide our justification for believing logical laws. Such non-exper- 
iential routes to truth were, in his opinion, a myth — a dangerous 
myth, indeed — and experience was the only source of justified belief 
of all those propositions (unlike the basic laws of logic) whose just­
ification raises a genuine question.
The boldest form of global empiricism might be characterised by 
the conjunction of the following two propositions;
(gE l) No proposition is to be justified a priori 
(where ’a priori’ is understood in the ’thick’ sense distinguished 
above) ;
(GE 2) All propositions are to be justified by- experience 
(that is, by perception, or by inference.from perception).
Now (GE 2) is inconsistent with the maintenance of the existence of 
a class of propositions which are a priori in the ’thin’ sense of 
being beneath justification. If Mill accepted the existence of that 
class of propositions, he consequently cannot be ascribed a belief in 
(GE 2). But someone who accepts that there are some ’thin’ a priori 
propositions is not debarred from holding the following proposition, 
as an alternative to (GE 2):
(GB 2 ’) All propositions admitting of justification are to be just­
ified by experience.
It is obvious that the combination of (GE l) and (GE 2) represents 
a stronger form of empiricism than the combination of (GE l) and 
(GE 2’), for (GE 2) entails (GE 2’), but not vice-versa. (Note, though, 
that the less radical form, i.e. (GE l) & (GE 2’), does not actually 
assert that there are any propositions which do not admit of justific­
ation, but it leaves open the possibility that there are some.) There 
seems no good reason for refusing to retain the label ’global empir­
icism’ for the position represented by the conjunction of (GE l) and 
(GE 2 ’). Although it does not assert that all propositions have an 
empirical justification, it refuses to acknowledge the existence of
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any other kind of justification than the empirical, and in particular 
it has absolutely no truck with the notion that some propositions are 
a priori in the ’thick’ sense. While not the most radical possible 
form of empiricism, it is yet a doctrine of considerable boldness, and 
is in fact much bolder than the positions of many who have been reg­
arded or who have regarded themselves as empiricists. (We may recall 
again here how even David Hume, in whose philosophy experience plays 
so important a role, conceded*that propositions expressing ’relat­
ions of ideas’ can be known ’by the mere operation of thought.’) If 
Mill in his earlier work inclined towards the boldest form of global 
empiricism, in the years after the first appearance of the Logic he 
moved towards the less bold variety, but never beyond it ; that is, he 
never ceased to be an empiricist of the global kind, even when he came 
to admit that there might be propositions incapable of empirical just­
ification.
It is of some interest to note that Mill never brought himself to 
describe the basic laws of logic as necessary, even though in his 
later years he ceased to insist on their empirical status. Necessity 
continued to seem to him to be merely an illusion engendered by certain 
psychological pressures to think in particular patterns over which we 
have scant control. It may be quite inevitable that human beings, by 
virtue of their psychological make-up, will not in the' course of their 
experience fail to believe in the law of identity and the law of 
contradiction, though there is nothing available to justify these 
beliefs, but there is still no need, on Mill’s view, to regard those 
laws as necessary truths; a sense that they are necessary is nothing 
more than a reflection of the psychological inevitability that we shall 
believe them. In this abiding dislike of necessity, beloved of a prior­
ism, Mill further demonstrated his commitment to a highly radicad form 
of empiricism.
III
A natural response to Mill’s mitigated global empiricist epistem- 
ology is to view it as the result of a partial failure of nerve on 
his part, and consequently as a less satisfyingly uniform theory than 
the boldest variety of empiricism (the form, that is, which conjoins 
with (GE l) (gE 2) rather than (GE 2’)). Even granting the difficulty 
of identifying some empirical justification of the most basic laws of
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logic, might Mill not have done better to insist on the view proposed 
(though with a measure, of diffidence) in the Logic that all proposit­
ions are amenable to justification by experience? The problem of des­
cribing an adequate empirical basis for accepting the fundamental laws 
of logic could then, if necessary, be shelved for the present in the 
hope that philosophical techniques in the future might prove better 
equipped to solve it ; and the result would be a theory which was 
simpler, more unified and-more exciting than that for which Mill 
eventually settled.
It is a very fair objection to this line of thought that, even if 
the attractiveness of theories is largely proportionate to their 
simplicity and unity, to prefer (GE 2) to (GE 2') is hazardous unless 
some definite grounds can be supplied for thinking that the task of 
providing an empirical justification for the most basic laws of logic 
will not in the end prove an insuperable one - and no such grounds 
have yet been supplied. But even if that very considerable objection 
is waived, there is further reason for supposing that global empir­
icism of the boldest kind - the kind, namely, represented by the con­
junction of (GE 1) and (GE 2) — is untenable. Although misgivings 
about global empiricism are not always converted into the hard curr­
ency of argument, the philosophical literature does'contain one pow­
erful line of objection to global empiricism in its- most radical form. 
Crispin Wright has recently stated the objection in a cogent manner, 
and it may be that he does not know that a very telling version of 
it appeared earlier in Husserl’s Logical Investigations. Husserl’s 
special target was Mill and Wright’s is Quine, but the strategy of 
the attack is the same in both cases, and I shall accordingly speak 
of the ’Husser1/Wright objection’ (or the ’H/W objection’ for short) 
without much attention to the nuances of difference between the two 
presentations.
‘f
Husserl and Wright claim that unless there is a subclass of prop­
ositions possessing normative force and requiring for their accept­
ance no appeal to experience, there can be no purchase on the notion 
of confirmation, though empiricism crucially requires this notion in 
order to malce sense of the checking of statements against experience.
At first glance it may not seem that the gLobal empiricist need be 
much worried by this objection, as it is open to him to say that prop­
ositions of basic logic, on his theory as well as on rival ones, do 
have a special role to play as deep structuring principles of theor­
etical systems, and are accorded, once they have been (empirically) 
established, a normative significance in regard to the verification
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of propositions of other kinds. But the problem goes deeper than this.. 
Global empiricism of the boldest stamp maintains that logical propos­
itions are derived from experience - but now, what is supposed to gov­
ern their checking against experience? As Husserl writes;
If ... all proof rests on principles governing its 
procedure, and if its final justification involves 
an appeal to such principles, then we should either 
be involved in a Circle or in an infinite regress 
if the principles of proof themselves required 
further proof, in a circle if the principles of 
proof used to justify the principles of proof were 
the same as the latter, in a regress if both sets of 
principles were repeatedly different (Husserl (I97O), • 
vol.1, p.116).
Husserl concludes from this that ;
Plainly ... the demand for a fundamental justif­
ication of all mediate knowledge can only have a 
sense if we can both see and know certain ultimate 
principles on which all proof in^the last instance 
rests (ibid.).
Similarly Wright :
If a given theory is to be a structure which we 
know how to modify in the light of experience, we 
shall require, sooner or later, not hypotheses 
concerning the findings which a theory does or does 
not tolerate, but rules ... the underlying logic 
of a theory cannot be supposed to be itself under 
assessment when a key experiment is constructed; 
for it is only within the network of inferential 
and descriptive rulep which the logic supplies 
that we can give sense to the idea of an apparent 
conflict of the results of the experiment with 
the theory (Wright, p.328).
In short, how could we check any logical principles for their accord 
with experience unless we could presuppose we already had a logic to 
govern the checking? Circularity or vicious infinite regress could be 
avoided, it seems, only if we possessed a logic of which the warranty 
was not empirical.
The H/W objection may be seen as a special application of a thesis 
about proof which one often encounters in* a more generalised form.
This is the thesis that for proof to be possible, there has ultimately
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to be some principle of proof which is itself just accepted without
proof. It is likely that this thesis, or something close to it, was
intended by Lewis Carroll as the moral of ’What the Tortoise said to 
Achilles’, A more direct presentation of it is to be found in Ayer’s 
The Problem of Knowledge, where the view is defended that a process 
of proof ’cannot go on for ever,’ and that while we might defend a 
logical or mathematical proposition by deducing it from others, 
the proof must start- somewhere. There must be at least 
one statement which is accepted without such proof, 
an axiom of some sort which is knoim intuitively ...
There will come a point, therefore, when we are
reduced to saying of some logical statement simply
that it is valid (Ayer(l956), pp.20-22).
As Husserl and Wright portray his position, however, the global emp­
iricist in effect rejects this thesis about proof, because he means 
to claim that no propositions whatever are free of the requirement 
to be justified by reference to experience. Even the most basic laws 
of logic, in his view, can be justifiably believed only in so far as 
they are found to have an experiential warrant. But the difficulty 
with this is that if their fit with experience is to.be confirmed, 
the process of confirmation must be governed by a logic, and a quest­
ion then arises about the justification of the principles on which 
it relies; and it appears not possible for the empiricist to attempt 
to provide this justification without becoming embroiled either in 
circularity or vicious regress. The conclusion to be drawn is that
the global empiricist is gravely in error when he rejects the thesis
7
that proof must start from something unproved.
It should be apparent that the objection which Husserl and Wright 
offer to global empiricism is directed against that form of the view 
which demands an empirical,justification for all propositions - that 
is, which maintains the truth of (GE 2). In its insistence that all 
propositions are to be justified by experience, this strongest version 
of the doctrine does not leave open the possibility that there are 
any logical propositions which do not; hence, the logical propositions 
taken to govern the checking of propositions against experience are, 
on this view, themselves in need of checking empirically - which 
invites the charge that circularity or vicious infinite regress are 
now unavoidable. Husserl believed that this objection delivered a 
mortal blow to the variety of empiricism upheld by Mill. But if it 
is correct to ascribe to Mill (at any rate, in his later years) a 
belief in (GE 2’) rather than (GE 2), the objection is misdirected.
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For the weaker global empiricist position which Mill came to adopt 
does not close off the possibility that there are some propositions 
for which it would be inappropriate to seek any empirical warrant ; • 
and Mill thought that certain very basic laws of logic were among 
this number. To be sure, he allowed that a limited.set of very basic 
laws of logic were beneath justification not because he had grasped 
the force of the h/W strictures on the most radical form of empir­
icism, but because he h'ad"~to confess to failure in his search for 
a suitable empirical justification for them. Nevertheless, the con­
cession he made has the useful property that it enables him in prin­
ciple to sidestep the h/W objection.
But why only ’in principle’? The reason is that Husserl and Wright 
show that the empiricist must admit the existence of a sufficient 
number of non-empirically-justifiable laws of logic to be capable of 
governing the checking against experience of all other propositions.
Novj Hill was prepared to grant that the three traditional ’ laws of 
thought’ were amenable to no justification by experience, but he no­
where voiced any opinion that the same might be true of any further 
logical laws. It cannot be concluded fpom his silence, of course, 
that he would not have consented to expand the category of laws of 
deductive logic not open to empirical justification, if shoim good 
reason to do so. But the fact is that he expressed doubts about the 
empirical status of the three ’laws of thought’ alone, thus leaving 
it open to an opponent to protest that he has not held immune from the 
requirement of being vindicated by experience a sufficient number of 
logical laws to govern the processes of empirical confirmation.
Yet it is a difficult question how many laws of deductive logic the 
empiricist could be forced to accept as having no empirical justific­
ation. For there is an obvious and inviting move for him to make at 
this point which will be ^sputed by his opponents but which, if it 
were successful, would preserve him from the need to admit that any 
substantial number of deductive logical laws were unamenable to just­
ification by experience. This move consists of granting the point of 
the h/vI objection that ultimate logic has to be accepted without any 
attempt to justify it, but insisting that this ultimate logic comprises 
(along with maybe a few deductive principled, such as the ’laws of 
thought’) chiefly an inductive principle or principles. Thus Mill, 
if he had been confronted with the h/w  objection, might well have 
proposed to hold as beneath justification not just the ’laws of thought’ 
but also the inductive logic of inference from particulars to partic­
ulars. With this ultimate logic, not itself up for justification, the
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business of justifying all those propositions which are not beneath 
the need for it could proceed - and in the Millian epistemology, this 
would include a host of beliefs held by many philosophers of a rival 
persuasion to be _a priori in the ’thick’ sense.
Kill never actually declared that he held the soundness of infer­
ence from particulars to particulars to be a matter admitting of no 
justification. Yet he never treated inference from particulars to par­
ticulars as if it required "'justificatory argument. Believing that 
knowledge comes through the sources of observation and inference, and that 
deductive (syllogistic) inference was incapable of providing epistemic 
advance, he maintained that knowledge-by-inference was the product of 
inductive reasoning - and it must have seemed to him to be an obvious 
and unquestionable truth that inductive inferences just did lead to 
genuine new Icnowledge. It is true, as we saw in Chapter Four, that he 
proposed to regard the principle of the uniformity of nature (identif­
ied with the law of causation) as providing the warrant for all ind­
uctions; but we also saw that his account of how it did this was a 
highly eccentric one, the uniformity principle being characterised not as 
a premise in a justificatory argument, but as a proposition for which 
the evidence accumulates in the course of inductive reasoning. Now 
Kill’s failure to address issues about the basic soundness of inductive 
reasoning, and in particular his failure to respond to'Hume’s sceptical 
strictures on induction, seemed a legitimate ground for a strong com­
plaint against him: his sanguine acceptance of the truth-attaining 
capacities of inductive inference appeared.an objectionable feature in 
a philosopher who had proved himself a severe (and in fact over-severe) 
critic of the ability of deduction to advance knowledge. But in the 
light of the H/w objection. Mill’s cool assumption that knowledge is 
attainable by inductive methods (albeit his description of inductive 
inference in terms of arguments from particulars to particulars is 
an unappealing characterisation of that form of inference) can seem 
to take on a new colour. For if an ultimate logic just has to be ass­
umed (on pain of circularity or infinite regress), why should Mill not 
have his way in regarding a variety of inductive inference as the major 
component of such a logic, itself beneath justification though serving 
in the assessment.of all those beliefs which lack a simple observational 
warrant? And indeed, would it not be reasonable to propose that the 
H/w argument relieves us from the need to reply to Hume’s objections to 
induction altogether - could we not just say that, as we must treat 
some logical principles as beneath justification, we will treat some 
principles of an inductive logic that way, and relinquish the hopeless
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search for a justification of induction?
Unhappily, Hume’s criticisms of inductive reasoning cannot he so 
easily circumvented. It does not follow from the premise that some ■ 
logical principles must be held to be beneath justification that we 
can choose whatever principles we like to fill that position. It is 
far more plausible to suggest that the lav? of identity or the law of 
contradiction are beneath justification than to hold that our induc­
tive practices are. As'"Mill came to realise, it is impossible to cite 
any principles capable of justifying the laws of identity or contrad­
iction which occupy a more primitive or fundamental position in the 
order of knoviledge. Nov? it is true, in one sense, that we are equally 
at a loss for any principles to justify inductive reasoning. But there 
is an asymmetry between the cases in that v?e can at least state a con­
dition which has to hold if inductive reasonings are going to be by 
and large trustworthy; the condition is the uniformity of nature, v?hich 
is a presupposition of inductive inference. This condition, however, 
we cannot establish by any of the evidence available to us; we know 
only that nature has so far been a uniform system, but not that it 
will continue to be so. But in the absence of good reasons for relying 
on the uniformity of nature, inductive reasonings are without an adequate 
rational warranty. As Hume and Mill believed, it probably is true that 
human beings are psychologically disposed to draw inductive conclus­
ions, relying on an assumption of uniformity; and in this respect 
inductive reasoning is a primitive feature of human mental life, and 
one vjhich could probably not be discarded by an individual with even 
the greatest effort. But the inability of human beings (not shared, 
perhaps, by God) to produce a satisfactory demonstration of the unif­
ormity principle, v?hose truth is a conditio, sine qua non of the success 
of inductive inference, means that our inductive practices are properly 
regarded not as lacking a justification because they are beneath the
•I
need for one, but as lacking a justification which they ^  need but 
which cannot be supplied.
A fair assessment of Kill’s variety of global empiricism would be 
that it avoids the difficulties urged by Husserl and Wright against 
global empiricist epistemologies, but at the price of running foul of 
the problem about the soundness of induction raised by Hume. The prob­
lem of induction, of course, is by no means only a problem for empir­
icists; it besets all epistemologies which attempt to respond to the" 
fact that many of the propositions which human beings take themselves 
to know they arrive at by an inductive route. But if, to avoid the 
H/W objection, Mill’s empiricism seeks to rely on the soundness of
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inductive reasoning as its central dynamic principle, it exposes it­
self in a peculiarly direct way to the Humean difficulty; and it is 
quite impossible to mend matters by making the implausible claim that 
the soundness of induction can be held to be beneath the need for 
justification.
These problems for Mill might cheer the hearts of a priorists, but 
it would be very rash to suppose that their theories, by avoiding 
the pitfalls lying before'his, succeed where his fails. The attraction 
of a priorism is that it holds out ;thefhope of anchoring knowledge in 
infallible intuitions into the nature of things. Even philosophers 
normally regarded as being in the empiricist camp have found it hard 
to resist the appeal of the idea that certain ultimate truths can be 
known by a. priori intuition (that is to say, that certain proposit­
ions can be classed-as. a priori in the ’thick’ sense). Thus Ayer, after 
saying that proof must start somewhere, asserted that the starting 
point must be ’an axiom of some sort which is knoivn intuitively’ (my 
emphases), a view very close to Husserl’s that proof is only possible 
’if we can both see and know certain ultimate principles on which all 
proof in the last instance rests.’ Now as Max Black observed, the not­
ion of intuition or insight which is at issue here- appears to be mod­
elled on that of ordinary visual perception (an origin which a word 
like ’insight’ quite evidently betrays). Ordinary visual perception, 
however, is not always veridical, and it is a legitimate question to 
put to those who uphold the existence of a faculty of priori intu­
ition how they can be sure that a. priori intuition cannot likewise, 
lead us astray. Unfortunately, the nature of the faculty of a priori 
apprehension, though/ its existence has been accepted by many writers, 
has been clarified by none, so the question about its trustworthiness 
presently lacks an answer. Moreover, it is not clear that the quest­
ion is in principle answerable without running foul of the h/w objec­
tion. Someone attempting to defend the veridicality of a priori int­
uition must be able to appeal to some further intuitions or principles 
of a justifying kind, but it is hard to see how in this case he is 
going to avoid either circularity or vicious infinite regress. A def­
ender of a priori intuition is likely to object here that such intuition 
is not to be regarded as subject to the néed for such justification; 
rather, it represents itself the kind of ultimate stopping place in 
the order of justification called for by the argument of Husserl and 
Wright. The trouble with this rejoinder is that it embodies the same
kind of wishful thinking as proved unacceptable from a defender of 
inductive inference who should propose that the soundness of induction
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was to be regarded as beneath the need for justification. So long as 
the best available characterisation of ^ priori insight remains based 
on an analogy with visual perception, which is not always veridical, 
no adequate ground has been given for trusting the products of such 
insight as infallible.
If global empiricism of the boldest variety must be judged to succ­
umb to the H/w objection, the same cannot be said of the weaker version 
which can reasonably b"e‘“afecribed to the later Mill - though it enc­
ounters difficulties in respect of its use of induction as an ultimate 
logic. But rival a priorist views are hardly free from serious problems 
either, and there is some irony in the fact that the h/w objection 
can even be turned against one of its authors - Husserl - when he 
claims the existence of a faculty of intellectual intuition into the 
’ultimate principles’ on which all proof relies. It is interesting 
that Crispin Wright considers that it is conventionalism of the kind 
associated with the later Wittgenstein which is the chief beneficiary 
of the embarrassment he believes the global empiricist must suffer in 
the face of the H/w objection. Such conventionalism maintains that 
the truths of logic and mathematics are conventions, or truths by 
fiat, rather than the results of any process of discovery about the 
world; they are humanly created tools for dealing with the material 
of experience, and there is no opening for saying that they are false, 
or untrue to reality, once they have been taken, 1^ a general convent­
ion, into use. There are obvious difficulties with conventionalist 
views of this type, of which the most prominent is that convention­
alism seems to have unsatisfyingly little to say about why one set 
of conventions should be given preference over another (often a met­
aphysics of indeterminacy is brought in to assist here; the world is 
said to be not wholly determinate in character in advance of the sel­
ection of logical and mathematical principles). In the present state 
of research, it can hardly be said that any one school of thought 
about the character of the fundamental principles we employ in our 
reasonings has achieved the best of the argument. But in the continuing 
debate on this theme the voice of the global empiricist of Millian 
stamp has a right to be heard. His theory, to be sure, has great diff­
iculties to surmount ; yet it is not obviously more problematic than 
its rivals.
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S E V E N
T H E  R E L A T I F  I-T-Y. O P  K N O W L E D G E
Mill’s denial that any items of human knowledge are justifiable 
through the operation of rational faculties affording a priori in­
sight into truth represents one major strand of his empiricism. Here 
his quarrel was with a priorist views about the mode in which certain 
things which human beings know are warranted. He did not dispute that 
we do have genuine knowledge about logic and mathematics, but he chall­
enged the notion that the basis of that knowledge lies in any kind of 
a priori intuition. We saw that he was willing to allow that some 
propositions of logic may be beneath the call for justification alto­
gether ; but he never ceased to insist that experience alone could pro­
vide a justification for those propositions which required one.
There was, however, a second front on which Mill fought his war on 
behalf of empiricism against the a priorist foe. It seemed to him that 
inattention to the limits of our knowledge-gathering faculties had 
given rise to false views about what could be known. Empiricism, in 
his eyes, had to do battle not just with those who claimed the exist­
ence of non-experiential faculties by which we know some of those 
things which we indisputably do know, but also with the theorists 
who asserted that we can have certain kinds of knowledge which outrun 
experience - and which must therefore, according to Mill, be bogus. 
Prominent amongst the false views he believed to have arisen from 
neglect of the true limits of our knowledge is the view that there 
exist physical objects which are not reducible to the sensations by 
which we know them (or, as he sometimes put, it - for instance, in the 
first chapter of the Examination - that there exist noumena as well 
as phenomena). At the basis of his case for what amounts to a version 
of idealism (though we shall see that Mill’s development of this basis 
was not always consistently adhered to) is a principle which he adopted
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from Sir William Hamilton, who had expounded the ’great axiom that 
all human knowledge ... is only of the relative or phaenomenal' (Hamil­
ton (1865), vol.1, p. 136). Mill’s doctrine of the ’relativity of human 
knowledge’ and its implications for his views on semantic and meta­
physical questions will be the concern of the present and the follow­
ing chapter, by the end of which we will be in a position to evaluate 
his empiricist philosophy as a whole.
II
The relativity of knowledge is one of the most fundamental tenets 
of Kill’s empiricist philosophy, and his commitment to it never fal­
tered, But the expression the ’relativity of Icnowledge’ is vague (as 
Mill himself admitted (EH, p.4))? and it takes an effort of interpret­
ation to elicit precisely what it meant to him. While his account of 
the principle avowedly owes something to Hamilton’s treatment of it, 
it is offputting to find that Hamilton himself believed that almost 
all philosophers had accepted it; for if that were true, it would be 
difficult to see how it could then be taken by Mill to represent a 
distinctively empiricist thesis. According to Hamilton’s Discussions on- 
Phi 1 osophy/&c.7 it is a commonly accepted doctrine that ’ our knowledge 
of mind and of matter is relative, - conditioned, - relatively con­
ditioned, ’ by which is meant that ’as substances, we know not what is 
Matter and are ignorant of what is Mind,’ - our knowledge being prop­
erly not of substances but of phenomena. Indeed, ’this is perhaps the 
truth of all others most harmoniously re-echoed by every philosopher 
of every school’; and ’to attribute any merit, or any singularity to 
its recognition by any individual thinker, more especially in modern 
times, betrays only the ignorance of the encomiasts’ (Hamilton (I866), 
pp.639-40).
Hamilton provided some further characterisation of the relativity 
of knowledge in his Lectures. The term ’relative,’ he explained, was 
to be understood as opposed to the term ’absolute,’ and what the doc­
trine affirmed was that 'we know nothing absolute, - nothing existing 
absolutely, that is, in and for itself, and without relation to us 
and our faculties.’ Thus;
In so far as matter is a name for something knoi-m, 
it means that which appears to us under the forms 
of extension, solidity, divisibility, figure, motion,
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roughness, smoothness, colour, heat, cold, &c.; 
in short, it is a common name for a certain series, 
or aggregate, or complement, of appearances or 
phaenomena manifested in coexistence (Hamilton 
(1865), vol.l, p.137).
This parallels a passage in the Discussions on Philosophy in which 
Hamilton ivrote that, ’Existence absolutely and in itself, is as zero,’ 
and that all'our knowledge is of ’qualities, phaenomena, properties,
&c.,’ which ’exist, since they are known, and are known, because they 
exist* (Hamilton (I866), p.54).
How widely something like this relativity doctrine has been accepted 
is an interesting and difficult question for students of the history 
of philosophy, but one that cannot be pursued here. An obvious prob­
lem is that Hamilton’s various attempts to characterise the doctrine 
never managed wholly to dispel a certain mistiness surrounding it, 
and one might reasonably expect that the number of those philosophers 
who could be described as its adherents will be directly proportional 
to the degree of flexibility of its interpretation. As Mill noted, 
the relativity principle can be taken as an ’insignificant truism’ 
not really worth stating, as; ’we can only know what we have the power 
of knowing,’ or else that ’all our knowledge is relative to us inas­
much as it is we that know it’ (EH, p.12). Such propositions are 
scarcely likely to find dissenters, yet, as Mill said, they are ’hardly 
worth enunciating in words’ (EH, p.4): Hamilton in fact provided a 
long and learned series of quotations from famous writers in order to 
bolster his claim that the relativity of knowledge had been fairly 
universally accepted by philosophers; but Mill observed in a passage, 
appearing in the I856 and 1862 editions of the Logic that most of the , 
quotations indicated nothing more than that Hamilton’s authorities 
had accepted the principle that ’our knowledge of external things is 
necessarily conditioned by the laws of our knowing faculty’ (SL, p.
60).  ^ A careful scrutiny of Hamilton’s quotations does undoubtedly 
bear out Hill’s contention that they quite fail to establish that 
most previous philosophers had believed in any strong version of the 
relativity principle to the effect that all knowledge is knowledge 
of phenomena alone. #
Hill explained his own understanding of the relativity of know­
ledge with some care, though we shall see that even his exposition 
of thé doctrine, while greatly superior to Hamilton’s, presents certain 
exegetical problems. It is evidence of the importance which he ascribed 
to epistemological relativity that he made it the topic of the first
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major chapter of the Examination. What does it mean, he asked there, 
to ascribe attributes to objects? Someone who says of an orange pres­
ented to him that it is soft and yellow will say these things on the ■ 
basis of his visual and tactual sensations. But of the orange ’in 
itself,’ claimed Mill, he properly knows nothing; what his senses 
supply are but impressions or sensations of the orange’s phenomenal
appearance, and these are all he knows of it. Supporters of the rel­
ativity principle will maintain that
all the attributes which we ascribe to objects, 
consist in their having the power of exciting one 
or another variety of sensation in our mind; that 
to us the properties of an object have this and 
no other meaning; that an object is to us nothing 
else than that which affects our senses in a 
certain manner ; that we are incapable of attaching 
to the word object, any other-meaning; that even 
an imaginary object is but a conception, such as we 
are able to form, of something which would affect 
our senses in some new way; so thaj; our knowledge 
of objects, and even our fancies about objects,,, 
consist of nothing but the sensations which they 
excite, or which we imagine them exciting, in 
ourselves (EH, p.6).
Years before, in the Logic, Mill had upheld exactly the same doc­
trine (though he did not then label it ’the relativity of knowledge'). 
'All we know of objects,’ he wrote, ’is the sensations which they give 
us, and the order of those sensations’ (SL, p.59)5 snd a little later; 
... of the nature of either body or mind, further 
than the feelings which the former excites, and 
which the latter experiences, we do not, according 
to the best existing doctrine, know anything; ...
(SL, p.64).
In another early work, the essay on Coleridge, Mill very explicitly 
associated epistemological relativity with the other pole of his emp­
iricism, the attack on the notion of faculties of a priori knowledge: 
The nature and laws of Things in themselves, or 
of the hidden causes of the phenomena which are the 
objects of experience, appear to us radically in­
accessible to the human faculties. We see no ground 
for believing that anything can be the object of 
our knowledge except our experience-, and what can
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be inferred from experience by the analogies of 
experience itself; nor that there is any idea, 
feeling, or power in the human mind, which, in
order to account for it, requires that its origin
should be referred to any other source (CO, pp.128-29).
That is to say: Experience can only provide us with knowledge of phen­
omena, not of things in themselves (which is the relativity doctrine, 
though not presented under'"that name); yet a survey of the intellectual 
contents of human minds does not reveal anything whose presence there 
cannot be quite satisfactorily accounted for by experience. (Mill thus 
dismissed the idea of Coleridge and others that some of the things
we know could only be the fruit of a priori faculties.) This is one
of the most succinct statements of his empiricist philosophy that Mill 
ever gave, and he professed his indebtedness for his,ideas to Locke and his 
eighteenth century followers who, he said, believed that 'Sensation, 
and the mind's consciousness of it's own acts, are not only the excl­
usive sources, but the sole materials of our knowledge' (CO^ , p.l25).
It is clear that the relativity principle as Mill understands it is 
incompatible with direct realist theories of perception, which hold 
that we can have immediate perceptual contact with physical objects; 
and it is therefore incompatible with common-sense '.or 'naive' realism, 
which is a form of direct realism. But it is also inconsistent even 
with indirect realism, for that doctrine allows that we perceive phy­
sical objects, albeit indirectly through having sense-data of them, 
while Mill’s view is that we do not perceive those objects (as distinct 
from our sensations) at all. The sole knowledge we derive from percep­
tion, on his relativity analysis, is knowledge of the sensations we 
are actually having, and not of external objects (of which he employs 
the Kantian term ’things in themselves* and declares that they are 
'radically inaccessible to^^the human faculties'). Neither direct 
realists nor indirect realists would accept this, and it becomes very 
clear that Hamilton's claim that the relativity of knowledge had been 
accepted by virtually all philosophers, and even the much more modest 
proposal that the prevailing eighteenth century theory of knowledge 
had upheld it, are alike false. (Locke, for instance, though Mill 
hailed him as a precursor, can be most plausibly ascribed a form of 
indirect realist theory of perception.)  ^ It seems, however, that 
the radical character of epistemological relativity was not apparent 
to Mill when he produced his first expositions of it. He ventured in 
the Logic a claim scarcely less bold than Hamilton's, asserting that
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the relativity of knowledge ’is a truth both obvious in itself, and 
admitted by all whom it is at present necessary to take into consid­
eration’ (SL, p.62) - by which phrase he apparently intended to cap­
ture not just his British empiricist predecessors but also Kant, and 
his major continental followers. Although this passage was allowed to 
stand in later editions of the Logic, Mill added candid notes admitting 
that it was a mistake to ascribe the relativity doctrine to the gen­
erality of philosophers-^—and that ’dissentients have manifested them­
selves in considerably greater numbers than I had any knowledge of 
when the passage in the text was written' (SL, p.63).
Obviously feeling that the precise nature of the relativity doct­
rine remained in need of clarification, and hoping to sort out the 
muddles as to just who were the philosophers to whom it could reasonably 
be ascribed, Mill suggested in the Examination that there were really 
two variant forms of the doctrine, one appealing“more to philosophers 
of an idealist inclination (among which company he enrolled himself), 
and the other being preferred by the followers of Kant. On the ideal­
ist alternative, there is no positing of external, noumenal objects 
to serve in the role of causes of our sensations: this version of the 
relativity doctrine holds that there is
no evidence of anything which, not being itself a 
sensation, is a substratum or hidden cause of sen­
sations. The idea of such a substratum is a purely 
mental creation, to which we have no reason to think 
that there is any corresponding reality exterior 
to our minds (EH, p.6).
Kantians, on the other hand, say that while sensation provides no 
knowledge of noumena, these noumena or ’things in themselves’ never­
theless exist, and are the causes of our sensations. On the Kantian 
view, as Mill presented it, ’External things exist, and have an in­
most nature, but their inmost nature is inaccessible to our faculties.
We know it not, and can assert nothing of it with a meaning’ (gl, p.?)* 
Although both forms of relativity limit substantive perceptual know­
ledge to knowledge of our sensations, the latter form does permit the 
further claim that we know about noumenal objects the bare fact of 
their existence as the causal ground of o^r sensations. Mill took a 
dim view of noumena, thinking their postulation gratuitous, but he 
was willing to grant that so long as their defenders did not assert 
that we could know anything about what noumena were really like, they 
could still be ascribed a version of the relativity principle.
Both idealists and Kantians can accept the generalised expression
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of the relativity doctrine that 'All we know in perception are our 
sensations,' but this surface agreement masks the important divergence 
just below. (The most significant of Mill's criticisms of Hamilton is 
that he vacillated between these two forms of the doctrine.) let there 
is a further ambiguity about the sense of the relativity doctrine which 
kill never noticed, and which becomes apparent in his attempts to exp­
lain and defend his own favoured form of relativity. Sometimes he pre­
sents this as a theory abôut- evidence, to the effect that we lack 
adequate warrant for positing the existence of external objects not 
reducible to the sensations which are the exclusive material of our 
knowledge. But if here the doctrine appears to be fairly straightfor­
wardly epistemological in nature, concerned with delimiting the range 
of knowledge claims our experience entitles us to make, at other times 
it takes on much more of a semantic appearance, as if its primary con­
cern is to characterise the limits of meaningfj^'kuman discourse. Thus 
while Kill spoke, in one place, of the relativity principle as 'a 
proposition respecting the nature and limits of our knowledge' (EH, 
p.4) - which suggests the epistemological interpretation - we find 
him shortly after asserting that although it would be 'absurd to ass­
ume that our words exhaust the possibilities of Being,' still, there 
is no way in which we could speak meaningfully of those aspects of 
reality which are inaccessible to -our faculties: 'Bu^ we ought not 
to speak of these modes of Being by any of the names we possess. These 
are all inapplicable, because they all stand for known modes of Being' 
(e h , p.11). It would not even make sense for us, continued Mill, to 
assert that if there were noumena, God could know what their nature 
was, for to say this 'is to use language which to us has no meaning, 
because we have no faculties by which to apprehend that there is any 
such thing for him to know' (ibid.). ^ In presenting the Kantian alt­
ernative version of the relativity principle. Mill again found it inv­
iting to mention meaning, saying that while Kantiens upheld the exist­
ence of noumena as the causes of our sensations, they acknowledged 
that we cannot meaningfully assert anything about the inmost nature 
of noumena (EH, p.7). Yet the fact that he followed Hamilton's example- 
in speaking of the relativity of knowledge rather than the relativity 
of meaning suggests that the doctrine originally possessed for him a 
stronger epistemological than a semantic significance, and it might be 
fair to regard the more semantically orientated formulations of it as 
representing something of a development from his earliest conception of
the principle.
In its semantic guise. Mill's relativity principle appears to be
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extremely close to the position which a twentieth century empiricist 
philosopher, Jonathan Bennett, has termed 'meaning empiricism.' In 
Bennett’s view,
... to understand any statement, I must he able to 
connect the difference between its truth and its 
falsity with some difference it could make to me
- some difference in the data, the raw chunks of
reality, with whioh—I. am confronted, i.e. in the 
sensory states which I have or, as Berkeley would 
say, in the ideas I perceive (Bennett, p.136).
To accept meaning empiricism, Bennett claims, is to have a reason for 
adopting a phenpmenalist metaphysic; and he urges that someone who 
says, 'Whatever I know about my sensory states, there remains the fur­
ther question whether there is really a world of things outside me' 
has misunderstood the question, 'Is there a world of things outside 
me?' (ibid.). Bennett's point would seem to be that the phrase 'a world 
of things': could not be assigned an intelligible meaning unless it 
were explained as referring to sensory states, which alone form the
material of my experience. Such a thoughj; is exactly what Mill was
expressing when he spoke of the meaninglessness of language purporting
6to refer to noumenal objects which we cannot experience.
Ill
It is illuminating to consider Mill's principle of the relativity of 
human knowledge as a thesis of an anti-realist kind, in the sense of 
that phrase which has been expounded by Michael Dummett in a number of 
writings over the last few ^ears. Even when he shifts, apparently un­
consciously, between epistemological and semantic forms of the relat­
ivity doctrine. Mill can be credited with a degree of anticipation of 
the insight of modern anti-realists that questions about meaning, 
understanding, truth and conditions for warranted assertion are inter­
related in an intimate and highly complex manner. It is evident that 
in arguing for the relativity of knowledge. Mill was moved by the des­
ire, common among anti-realists, to 'narrow the gulf between what makes 
a statement true and that by means of which we recognize it as true' 
(Dummett (1981), p.443) - that is, he wanted to resist the idea that 
what needs to be the case for statements to be true might be quite 
different from what we have to be aware of in order to know that they
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are true. In Mill's view, all experience was of the phenomenal realm: 
but how could it, then, provide knowledge of the experience-transcen­
dent realm of noumena? Attempts to analyse the truth conditions of 
physical object language in terms of noumenal existence seemed to him 
to encounter serious epistemological and semantic difficulties which 
were to be avoided only by paying due attention to the relativity of 
human knowledge.
According to Dummettr'Fialisin maintains that the existence and con­
stitution of reality are objective and independent of our knowing fac-
ulties; thus, for instance:
Realism about the physical world entails that there 
is a determinate physical reality which renders true 
or false any statement we may make about material obj­
ects, independently of whether we can make any obs­
ervations directly or indirectly confirming or dis— 
confirming it (Dummett (198I), p.434)*
Dummett adds that realist views are views about the appropriate notion 
of truth for statements of a given class, and consequently, because 
of the close connexion between truth and meaning, about the kind of 
meaning they have. To clarify this account cf realism, he suggests 
that we do best to think of realist theories as based on 'a completely 
unmodified classical two-valued semantics,' according to which all 
statements of a given class are determined as true or false by the 
reality to which they relate, and wholly independently of whether or 
not we possess the ability to tell whether their truth conditions are
satisfied (Dummett (1981), p.44l)«
In Chapter Five, we saw that Mill's philosophy of logic is unmis­
takably realist in tenor, accepting unreservedly the 'completely 
unmodified classical two-valued semantics' which Dummett identifies 
as providing the quintessential basis of realism. And yet, v;hen he 
proclaims the truth of the principle of the relativity of knowledge, 
Mill shows himself strongly committed to an anti-realist position 
about truth and meaning* I think we just have to accept that there 
is a fundamental cleavage running tlirough Mill's philosophy, and one 
of which he never became aware. As a philosopher of logic, he never 
displayed the slightest tendency to deviate from realism; but it is 
likely that his consistent realism in this area was less the outcome 
of any reasoned rejection of anti-realist claims than of a simple 
failure to reflect that there.might be anything problematic about the 
realism traditional in logical studies. In metaphysics and epistem- 
ology, by contrast. Mill saw the lie of the land entirely differently.
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Here it seemed to him that realism was extremely problematic - so 
problematic, indeed, that it should be rejected altogether. Once the 
truth of the relativity principle was recognised, a realist persp­
ective could no longer be sustained - and, in Mill's view, the case 
for relativity was irrefutable.
Postponing for the present any further discussion of the inconsis­
tency of Mill's philosophy, it is worth asking further why he, or any­
one else, should want to’re-;ject realism about a given area of disc­
ourse. The general answer to this question is that realism encounters 
difficulties in explaining how statements of certain categories can 
be grasped and used by us, if their meaning is what the realist says 
it is. Realism involves the notion that understanding statements is 
knowing their truth conditions; and that is a prima facie plausible 
idea when we reflect that if statements are determined as true or false 
by the reality to which they relate, then what we need to know in 
order to understand them looks as if it must be what those condit­
ions are which determine their truth-value. But problems arise with 
this very natural line of thinking just because the truth conditions 
of some statements appear to be such that^ nothing we could do would 
in fact establish whether they obtained or not. Much pf the contempo­
rary debate between realists and anti—realists about '. the relationship 
between truth conditions and meaning goes, admittedly^ into issues 
of greater subtlety than were ever raised by Mill. He did not, for 
instance, consider the claim made by many anti—realists today, and 
inspired by Wittgenstein, that knowledge of the truth conditions of 
a statement cannot be ascribed in the absence of knowledge of how to 
determine whether those conditions obtain, on the ground that where 
the latter knowledge is missing, there is no criterion to justify 
ascription of the former. This claim has played a prominent role in 
recent debate, because it counters the realist's contention that und­
erstanding a statement always consists in grasping its truth conditi­
ons, even where it is not possible to establish whether those conditi­
ons obtain. Thus when the realist urges that understanding, say, Gold- 
bach's Conjecture (that every even number is the sum of two primes) 
is a matter of knowing its truth conditions, even though no mathemat­
ician currently knows how to establish whether those conditions hold, 
the anti—realist questions whether the realist account of understanding 
the Conjecture is properly intelligible. It seems that the realist is 
'being led to making knowledge attributions that lack defensible con­
tent' (Platts, p.12), for he is quite unable to provide any satisfac­
tory criterion to ground his ascription of knowledge of what the
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Conjecture means.
Kill's anti-realism had a somewhat more straightforward motivation 
than this very abstract Wittgensteinian argument about the criteria 
for ascribing knowledge of meaning. Mill wanted to know how it is 
that we actually manage to make statements about physical objects, 
and he realised that the explanation of this ability could not be that 
vje can determine how things are in the realm of noumena. If the truth 
conditions of physical ot)jfect statements consist in certain states 
of affairs holding in the noumenal realm, then it becomes, in Mill's 
vievj, utterly mysterious how we can make such statements, for the 
truth conditions are of a recognition-transcendent kind. It seemed 
quite clear to him, however, that what actually warrant our assert­
ions about physical objects are our experiences of phenomenal appear­
ances; and from here it is an easy step towards characterising the 
meanings of physical object statements in experiential (i.e. phenom­
enal ) terms. To be sure. Mill did nbt have on hand the Wittgensteinian 
argument to support the thesis that knowledge of the meaning of a 
statement should not be explained in terms of grasping any recognition- 
transcendent truth conditions; but he prpbably felt that such an acc­
ount of understanding a statement is uninviting because it divorces 
completely our understanding a statement from our knowing what enables 
us to assert it (that is, the realist account of understanding a phy­
sical object statement makes that understanding apparently quite idle, 
if our warrant for asserting it is our having certain phenomenal exp­
eriences). Mill's reflections on the conditions for making physical 
object statements thus led him towards the semantic form of the prin­
ciple of the relativity of knowledge, for if phenomenal experience pro­
vides the only available basis for making assertions about the phys­
ical world, there fails to be any motivation for explaining the mean­
ing of physical object language in any other than phenomenal terms.
It is always important in discussing the ideas of an- older philos­
opher in terms of a contemporary debate to avoid anachronistically 
attributing to him concerns which, at his date, he could not or would 
not have entertained in the manner in which philosophers of the present 
day entertain them. Yet while Mill's discussion of the nature of phy­
sical object language was not produced in the full awareness of the 
complex range of issues which modern realists and anti—realists debate, 
it is not unreasonable to classify him, on the basis of that discussion, 
as an anti-realist about the physical world. The epistemological form 
of the relativity principle is already anti-realist in so far as it 
brings into question the existence of objects of a recognition-transc-
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endent kind. But in espousing the semantic version of the principle,
Kill came still closer towards the position of modern anti-realism, 
for he held that the meaning of physical object language reouired 
analysing in a way which left it intelligible how human beings, with 
the epistemic faculties they possess, can grasp the senses of physical 
object statements: and that required, he thought, explaining the mean­
ings of those statements in sensational terms. Although he expressed 
himself with less explicithers than one might expect from the contem­
porary anti-realist. Mill was no less ready to reject the realist pos­
ition that physical object statements are determined as true or false 
by a reality which is independent of our ability to ascertain whether 
they are true or false - the view that there is a !gulf between what makes 
a statement true a,nd that by means of which we recognize it as true. '
To admit the existence of such a gulf seemed to him to be no less un­
empiricist than to allow the possibility of _a priori knowledge, an 
error which arose equally out of the failure to pay proper attention 
to the character and limits of human epistemic faculties.
IV
Mill's adherence to the principle of the relativity of knowledge 
led him in the Logic not to reject, but to reinterpret traditional 
theories of the 'varietytof things.' Though the relativity principle 
led him inexorably in the direction of idealism, it did not cause him 
to abstain from distinguishing substances, attributes, minds and feel­
ings. Nevertheless, when summing up the results of his study in Book 
One of 'the varieties of Things which have been, or which are capable 
of being, named’ (i.e. eithej* predicated of other things, or being 
made the subjects of predications themselves), he took care to give 
a reminder of his oi-m view that ' all we can know of Matter is the sen­
sations which it gives us, and the order of occurrence of those sen­
sations' (SL, pp.79-76). In addition, he suggested a relativised account 
of attributes, which, he declared, 'are to us nothing but either our 
sensations and other states of feeling, or something inextricably inv­
olved therein' (SL, p.76).
The Logic's account of attributes is interesting as an attempt to 
provide a fairly detailed relativistic theory of a most uncompromising 
kind. Mill distinguished three classes of attributes, namely qualities, 
relations and quantities, and explained each class relativistically.
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Thus :
Qualities, like substances, are known to us no 
otherwise than by the sensations or other states 
of consciousness which they excite: and while, in 
compliance with common usage, we have continued 
to speak of them as a distinct class of Things, 
we showed that in predicating them no one means 
to predicate anything but those sensations or 
states of consciousness, on which they may be
said to be grounded, and by which alone they
can be defined or described (ibid.).
Similarly, relations are said to be 'grounded on some fact or phen­
omenon, that is, on some series of sensations or states of conscious­
ness, more or less complicated* (ibid.). And: 'The third species of 
Attribute, Quantity, is also manifestly grounded on something in our 
sensations or states of feeling' (ibid.). Any non-relativistic view 
of attributes seemed to Mill to be out of the question; 'for the doc­
trine of the existence of a peculiar ^^on-re 1 ativisespecies of 
entity called quantities,' he wrote, *1 can see no foundation except 
in a tendency of the human mind which is the cause.of many delusions'
(SL, p.66). And in a note added to the I856 edition of the work he
associated his position with Herbert Spencer's, asserting boldly that 
'neither of us believes an attribute to be a real thing, possessed 
of objective existence,' and that 'The meaning of any general name 
is some outward or inward phenomenon, consisting, in the last resort, 
of feelings' (SL, p.l79)*
Just as the relativity doctrine for physical objects came, in var­
iant forms, so too does relativism about attributes admit of more 
than one interpretation. On the version which would have attracted 
Mill the least, and which^may be seen as the most Kantian, attributes 
are a real species of entity but, like noumena, are unknowable (or 
perhaps: incapable of being meaningfully spoken of) by us, even though 
we can, experience the sensations for which they are causally responsible. 
Mill never specifically discussed such a view, though it is unlikely 
tha,t he failed to recognise that the notion of what might be called 
'noumenal attributes' would be of some appeal to Kantians, In presen­
ting his own relativised theory of a,t tribut es. Mill showed a prefer­
ence for a semantic r at her than an epistemological rendering of relat­
ivity, possibly because the discussion of attributes is associated 
with an investigation into the semantics of general terms, and his 
attention was chiefly on questions about meaning at this point in the
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Logic. Thus he treated the postulation of a real species of non­
reducible attributes as a mistake about the meaning of general terms; 
our words, he maintained, can be applied only to our experience, and . 
the stuff of experience is sensation; and therefore it is wrong to
construe attribute talk as talk about a kind of entity of which we
can have no experience. Attributes have to be, on this view, identi­
fiable in some manner with sensations, and Mill went to some trouble 
to throw light on the nature, of the identity. Wishing at the same 
time, however, to retain the interest of non—idealist readers in his 
discussion of the semantics of general terms, he opted for saying, 
with deliberate and avowed ambiguity, that attributes are ’grounded
on' sensations - a form of speech which different readers would choose
to interpret in different ways, idealists like himself construing the 
'grounding' as the ontological reducibility of attributes to sensations, 
and non-idealists taking it to be a relation of an epistemic kind, 
sensations being our evidence for ascriptions of attributes. This 
language. Mill blithely declared, should be seen to be 'compatible 
with either view of the nature of qualities,' and to 'admit of no 
dispute' (SL, p.67; _cf. ibid. pp.69, 68,^  71» 73, 75> 76, 77)* It is 
true that even someone who rejected all forms of the relativity doc­
trine, and held that attributes were neither beyond,experience nor to 
be equated with sensations, would find it hard to deny that it is 
through sensation that we experience them. But Mill's evident satis­
faction at having discovered a form of words describing the relation 
of attributes to sensations which philosophers of conflicting views 
can agree upon hardly seems very justifiable; for the agreement is not 
only a purely verbal one, but is also dangerously liable to mislead 
those who are parties to it into believing that their views are in 
closer accord than they really are.
Mill's theory that talk about attributes is really talk about sen-
‘f
sations, which effectively reduces attributes to sensations, has to 
face a difficulty which he seems not to have noticed until his atten­
tion was drawn to it by Spencer. The source of the problem is that 
there are considerable differences between the ways in which we nor­
mally regard the identity conditions of attributes and sensations.
If I look at my bookcase now and in half an hour's time, I will be 
having numerically different sensations of it, but I will judge it 
each time to have the single colour quality of being brown. Again, 
if I look from the bookcase to a brown car passing outside my window,
I will ascribe the same colour attribute to both the bookcase and 
the car, though clearly my sensations of the two objects are numer-
179
7ically distinct. Spencer drew the somewhat curious conclusion from 
his reflections on examples like these that wherever we distinguish 
sensations as numerically distinct, we should refrain from speaking 
of numerically identical attributes, and talk instead of attributes 
which are only exactly alike (Spencer (l855)> pp.129-27). Mill would 
have none of this, and for sound reasons:
If every general conception, instead of being 
''the One in the Manyy'' were considered to be 
as many different conceptions as there are things 
to which it is applicable, there would be no 
such thing as general language. A name would have 
no general meaning if man connoted one thing when 
predicated of John, and another, though closely 
resembling, thing when predicated of William
(a, p.179).
But while Spencer's theory is an unsatisfactory one. Mill granted 
that he had raised a question which demanded an answer : 'What, then, 
is the common something which gives a meaning to the general name?' 
(ibid.). ^
In answering this question. Mill made use of the fact that sensat­
ions which are numerically distinct can yet be qualitatively similar 
- a fact which Spencer, too, had observed, though he found in it a 
different significance. Mill's solution to the problem of the nature 
of attributes was actually .to identify them'with--the similarities . 
among sensations:
The names of attributes are in their ultimate 
analysis names for the resemblances of our sen­
sations (or other feelings). Every general name, 
whether concrete or abstract, denotes or connotes 
one or more of these r^esemblances. ... The things 
compared are many, but the something common to 
all of them must be conceived as one, just as the 
name is conceived as one, though corresponding 
to numerically different sensations of sound 
every time it is pronounced. ... The general 
term man does not connote.the sensations der­
ived once from one man... It connotes the gen­
eral type of the sensations derived always from 
all men, and the power (always thought of as 
one) of producing sensations of that type (SL,
pp.179-80).
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Thus Kill in the I856 edition of the Logic. Thirteen years later in 
a note to his edition of James Mill's Analysis he repeated the claim 
that:
The only meaning of predicating a quality at all,
, is to affirm a resemblance. When we ascribe a 
quality to an object, we intend to assert that
the object affects us in a manner similar to
that in which we .,ar.e_.affected by a known class 
of objects (a n , vol.1, p,26l).
Mill was apparently unaware that in the I856 presentation of his 
theory of attributes, he was actually putting forward two non-equivalent 
views of the relationship of attributes to sensations. On the first, 
attributes are the resemblances among sensations, so that the attrib­
ute of being brown is identical to the resemblance or similarity bet­
ween all the numerically distinct sensations of brovm which I and others 
have. But the second account has it that attributes are to be identif­
ied with type (as distinct from token) sensations, the attribute broxm- 
ness being the type of which all your and my numerically distinct sen­
sations of broxfn are tokens. Both accounts aim to capture the gener-
■ ¥
ality which is characteristic of attributes, but x-jhereas one treats 
attributes as relations among sensations, the other construes them as 
a special sort of relatend to which sensations are related - related, 
moreover, by the logical relation of being tokens of a type, x-jhich is 
not identical xvith any relation of qualitative similarity between 
individual sensations.
Unfortunately for Mill, neither of these accounts works at. all well. 
Take first the theory of attributes as type-sensations. There need be 
no quarrel v;ith the claim that a type/token distinction can be dravm 
for sensations along the lines sketched above. But Mill cannot coher­
ently employ that distinction in support of his relativistic theory
•f
of attributes. The difficulty comes into view when we reflect on the 
conditions for saying that an individual sensation is a token of a 
certain type-sensation. Sensations have objects, and it can only be 
the identity of their objects which determines their status as tokens 
of the same type. If I have a sensation of brovm and you do so as X'jell, 
our sensations can be said to be tokens of tl^ e same type-sensation 
(in other words, they can be spoken of as the same sensation in the 
type sense of that phrase) because of the identity of their objects.
But what is the object common to your and my sensations? The answer 
to this question must surely be: the attribute broxmness. Yet this 
answer is not available to Mill, for it is in order to explain what
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attributes are that he has introduced the type/token distinction, and 
if he cannot expound this distinction without reference to attributes, 
then he cannot use it to say what attributes are, on pain of circul­
arity. It is inadmissible to characterise the attribute brownness . 
as a certain type-sensation, if identification of that type-sensation 
is to be in terms of its being the type of which individual sensations 
of the attribute brownness are tokens. If Mill could provide an account 
of what makes your and’-my- sensations of brownness tokens of the same 
type without referring to those sensations having as their common 
object the attribute brovmness, he could evade the present objection; 
but it is not clear that any such alternative account could be given. 
Someone might suggest that what makes individual sensations of brovm 
tokens of the same type is that they all have the same phenomenolog­
ic a.1 feel to their subject(s). But if the notion of the phenomenol­
ogical feel of a sensation is not to be a mere obfuscation of the 
issue, it needs an explanation which is naturally provided by saying 
that two sensations have the same phenomenological feel xvhen they 
have the same object; and specification of the common object of two 
sensations of broxm requires a reference to the attribute brownness.
(in support of this viexf note that any attempt to specify in xvhat 
the sameness of phenomenological feel of tvjo sensations of broxm 
consistsx^hich does not mention the fact that they' are both sensations 
of broxm appears essentially incomplete.)
Kill's alternative theory of attributes - and, indeed, the one on 
which he laid the greater stress - xfas that they are resemblances 
between sensations. But this theory faces the same difficulty as the 
other: it explains attributes in a manner which presupposes that the 
notion of an attribute is already understood. It is perfectly reason­
able to talk of resemblances among our sensations. But it is obscure
how we could do so unless we meant to refer to resemblances in resp-
.f
ect of their objects; my sensation of brown resembles yours, or res­
embles another sensation of mine at a different time, just because 
they are uniformly sensations of brovm - which is to say, because they 
are sensations of the same attribute of brovmness. In asserting that 
it is the resemblance itself which is the attribute. Mill forgot that 
there cannot be bare resemblance which is ]^ ot resemblance in respect 
of some common feature, and the feature common to two or more sensat­
ions of broxm is precisely that they have objects which need to be 
specified in terms of a common attribute. Mill erred in failing to 
see the truth stressed by Bradley among.others, that resemblance is 
posterior, not prior, to universais - that is, that we cannot speak
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of things resembling each other unless we identify a universal (a
8quality or respect) common to them.
It may be admitted that there have been philosophers xvho (for other 
reasons than Mill’s) have attempted to view resemblance as a primit­
ive relation not requiring for its analysis any reference to univer- 
sals such as attributes. Resemblance nominalists like H.H. Price 
have tried to argue that we can rightly call a number of things by 
the same general term in^-the case where all the things can be affirmed 
to resemble the members of a certain set of exemplars more closely 
than they resemble anything else (Price (l953), ch.l). There are sev­
eral- powerful objections to resemblance nominalism, among which is 
the insuperable one that resemblance nominalists cannot ultimately 
avoid treating resemblance itself as a universal.  ^ (it is of some 
incidental interest here that resemblance nominalists have appealed 
to a notion of primitive resemblance in order to dispense with univ- 
ersals, whereas Mill held that attributes could actually be analysed 
in terms of such resemblances’) But the notion of resemblance which 
is not resemblance-in-respect-of a common characteristic remains a 
basically obscure and uninviting one. As Richard Wollheim has said: 
Universals cannot be made to rest upon judgements of 
resemblance: for every judgement of resemblance 
presupposes a universal. Resemblance, so far from 
being the creator of, becomes a mere parasite 
upon, universals: universals are prior to resem­
blance (Wollheim, p.37)»
The objection to Mill’s theory can be put by rephrasing a part of this: 
Resemblance among sensations, so far from being the creator of, bec­
omes a mere parasite upon, attributes: attributes are prior to res­
emblance among sensations.
The problems with Mill’s account of attributes indicate that, in
.f
this area at least, his theory of the relativity of knowledge is very 
defective. It does not, on examination, prove at all plausible to aff­
irm that attributes are reducible to sensations. But it would not be 
a reasonable conclusion from this to infer that the relativity doc­
trine must be rejected altogether, or that the idealism for which it 
offers strong support is untenable. A more lenient verdict would be 
that Mill was mistaken in trying to apply the relativity principle to 
attributes, and should not have attempted to reduce them to sensations. 
He could, for instance, have identified attributes with concepts,
X'fhere these are construed as wholly mental, principles for sorting and . 
classifying the sensational content of experience. Such a theory would
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be consonant with idealism, yet would also do justice to the feature 
of generality which is characteristic of attributes, (it would be 
important, hoxvever, that the application of the same concept to diff­
erent particulars was not held to be justified by the possession by 
those particulars of a common universal, or the identification of 
attributes with concepts would break down.) Whether Mill could have 
been brought to sympathise with a view of this kind, or whether he 
would have regarded the--^failure of his attempt to apply the relativ­
ity doctrine to attributes a reason for backtracking from idealism, 
we can only vainly speculate.
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E I G H T
T H E  W O R L D  A N D  I T S  S U B J E C T
Mill’s fullest account of the nature of the-external world and of 
the relation to it of the knowing subject is to be found in the elev­
enth chapter of the Examination, ’The Psychological Theory of the 
Belief in an External World. ’ Mill was evidently very pleased X'jith 
this chapter, and a few years after its first appearance he reprinted 
it unchanged as an appendix to his edition of his father’s Analysis. 
Bain, too, was impressed by Mill’s discussion, and wrote in reference 
to it, ’I give him full credit for his uncompromising Idealism, and 
for his varied and forceful exposition of it’ (Bain'(l882), p.120).
Some critics, however, were less flattering; James M ’Cosh, for instance, 
scornfully classed Mill’s theory with the ’wire-drawn attempts to 
fashion all our ideas out of one or two primitive sources by means of 
association,’ which were among the more baneful products of the trad­
ition of Locke (M’Cosh, p.2l). But many of Mill’s readers from early 
days to the present have noted that it is actually far from easy to 
be sure ' just xfhat view of the external world he intended to maintain, 
and, indeed, whether he really had a firm view at all. R.F. Anschutz 
has claimed that he was trying to be all things to all men, and to 
satisfy both the Berkeleian and the realist (Anschutz (1953, p.178);
Alan Ryan holds that he simply could not make up his mind whether he int­
ended to deny the existence of the external world or not (Ryan (1974), 
p.222).
Some of the problems which readers have had with Mill’s chapter 
resolve themselves xvhen it is studied in relation to views which 
he urged elsewhere; but I shall argue that there remains one critical 
ambiguity about his theory of the external world which cannot be 
argued away, and also that he was more than' a little ambivalent about 
the importance of the role played by the laxfs of association in that
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theory. Yet despite these serious flaws, there is much that is insight­
ful and stimulating in Mill's discussion of the external world and of 
our relation to it, and it deserves far better than the glibly dis­
missive treatment which it commonly receives.
,11
One of the confusing features of Mill's chapter on the belief in 
an external world is that it has two objectives which he takes no
great pains to distinguish from each other. The first of these is to
provide a psychological explanation of our belief in the existence of 
a world of things outside us. The second is to justify an idealist, 
or alternatively (and, as we shall see, inconsistently) an immater- 
ialist interpretation of the nature of physical objects. These obj­
ectives are obviously not wholly logically independent of each other;
for instance, some possible psychological explanations of hoxv the 
belief in an external world arises would preclude the provision of any 
other than a realist meta>physical theory of the world, and Kill is 
able to present an anti-realist meta.physical account only because his 
psychological theory is not one of these. Still, the txvin tasks of the 
chapter are distinct, and Mill would have assisted his reader by ack­
nowledging the fact. ^
l/hat is the content of the belief that there is an external xvorld? 
Mill suggested that to hold that objects 'exist external to us, and 
are not a part of our ox-m thoughts’ amounts to holding that : 
there is concerned in our perceptions something 
x-diich exists x-fhen x-je are not thinking of it; which 
existed before xve ^ad ever thought of it, and 
would exist if x-je were annihilated; and further, 
that there exist things which we never saw, 
touched, or otherxvise perceived, and things which 
never have been perceived by man (EH, p.179)*
The psychological task Mill set himself was to explain how x-;e come 
to have such a conception of reality. One might then have expected 
that his metaphysical discussion would produce the arguments for 
regarding the common-sense belief in an external world so conceived 
as mistaken. But not so: Mill, like Berkeley, claimed that his purpose 
XVas not to reject, but to reconstrue (along suitably reductionist 
lines) the notion of an external world. How well he succeeded in this
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exceedingly difficult enterprise we shall examine hy and by; but it is 
hardly to be wondered at that the fact that he attempted such an 
act of philosophical tightrope-walking at all has led some commen­
tators to accuse him of uncertainty as to whether to accept the 
existence of the external world or not.
Kill claimed that his ’psychological theory of the belief in an 
external world’ rested on two postulates, the first that the mind is 
capable of forming expectations about the sensations it would feel 
under certain hypothetical conditions, the second that it is governed 
by the laws of the association of ideas (EH, p.177)« Associationist 
psychology was an inheritance from the British empiricist tradition, 
and in particular from the thought of the eighteenth century philos­
opher and physician David Hartley, whose Observations on Man (1749) 
had greatly impressed the youthful Mill (AU, p.7l)« Not just ’ideas’ 
but mental phenomena in general, including sensations and ’reminisc­
ences of sensation,’ Kill thought were subject to the force of ass­
ociation. In the Examination he identified four laws of association 
as playing a role in the development of the belief in an external 
world:
(1) Similar phenomena tend to be thought of together;
(2) Phenomena, which have either been experienced or conceived in 
close contiguity to one another, tend to be thought of together;
(3) Associations produced by contiguity become more certain and 
rapid by repetition;
(4) When an association has acquired the character of inseparab­
ility, the idea called up by association becomes inseparable from the 
idea which suggested it, and the facts or phenomena answering to those 
ideas come to seem inseparable in existence (EH, pp.177-78).
Mill praised Hartley for discovering that ’mental phenomena, joined 
together by association, mqy form an ... intimante, and as it were, 
chemical union,’ and by so doing greatly increasing the explanatory 
potential of psychology (BP, p.347)» Among the mental phenomena which 
Mill believed the laws of association could account for were the notion 
of and the belief in an external world, There are, he proposed, 
associations naturally and even necessarily gen­
erated by the order of our sensations and remin­
iscences of sensation, which, supposing no int­
uition of an external world to have existed in 
consciousness /which had been Hamilton’s theory/, 
would inevitably generate the belief, and would 
cause it to be regarded as an intuition (EH, p.178).
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Having stated the laws of association, Mill apparently felt it to 
he unnecessary to go into much detail about exactly how those laws 
operate to produce the belief in an external world. He did, however, 
feel it incumbent upon him to say something about the origin of the 
conviction that objects persist in existence when we are not perceiv­
ing them. The conception of the 'perdurability* of objects, he wrote, 
is but the form impressed by the known laws of 
association upon thé conception or notion, obt­
ained by experience, of Contingent Sensations; 
by which are meant, sensations that are not in 
our present consciousness, and individually 
never were in our consciousness at all, but which 
in virtue of the laws to which we have learnt 
by experience that our sensations are subject,
we know we should have felt under given supp­
osable circumstances, and under these same 
circumstances might still feel (EH, p.179)»
Headers of the first editions of the Examination found this still in­
sufficiently enlightening, and Mill felt compelled to add an appendix 
to the third (I867) edition of the work in order to," clarify this and 
other elements of his theory. If I have been accustomed, he explained 
here, to receiving simultaneous visual and tactual sensations from 
some object, e.g. a cast-iron ball, then on some occasion when I am
having only visual sensations of it, the laws of association lead me
to believe that the taotual sensations are possible as well - in other 
words, to believe the ball to have tangible qualities though I am 
not now touching it (EH, p.200). Yet one might object that this is 
still not sufficient for Mill’s purposes. Association might lead us 
to believe that the visible ball has tangible qualities, but can it 
explain our believing thatf the ball continues to exist xvhen we are 
having no sensations of it at all? Perhaps Mill could have strengthened 
his case by citing an example of the following kind. Suppose that I 
am used to walking down the High Street and seeing the baker’s shop 
to the left of the draper’s. If, then, on some occasion I happen 
to be so placed that I have only the baker’s shop in my visual field, 
association, as Mill explained it, could ca.use me to believe, or 
rather sustain me in believing, that the draper’s is still in exist­
ence on the right, though I am having no sensations of it.
But a further obscurity in Mill’s account is how association is 
related to expectation, the second postulate which he held to be
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necessary to the explanation of the belief in an external world. An 
apparently plausible suggestion would be that the two postulates are 
not really independent, and that expectation is itself governed by - 
the mechanisms of association; but if that was Mill’s view, he did not 
say so. Alternatively, one might wonder whether he could have thought 
that association raises ideas of ’contingent sensations,’ and that 
expectation is a separate mental principle which creates belief that 
those sensations are truly possible. But once again. Mill gave no ind­
ication that he thought this. In fact it is an important objection to 
his account that it quite slurs over the distinction between ideas, 
notions and conceptions on the one hand and beliefs on the other, and 
betrays no recognition that it is one thing to have a notion of a kind 
of thing, for instance of unicorns, and quite another to believe that 
things of that kind exist. If, when I am having sensations of the 
baker's shop, association brings to my mind ideas of the draper's 
establishment next door, does it require an input from another mental 
faculty (expectation?) for me to believe that if I alter my visual 
field in a particular wa;^'-, I will have sensations of the draper's?
If Mill had any thoughts about this, he did not reveal them.
The picture becomes rather more than less confused by the resume 
of his theory which Mill provided in the 1867 appendix. Here, aston­
ishingly, association is not mentioned at allI The'’Psychological 
Theory' is now said to postulate;
first. Sensations; secondly, succession and simul­
taneousness of sensations; thirdly, an uniform order 
in their succession and simultaneousness, such that 
they are united in groups, the component sensations 
of which are in such a relation to one another, 
that when we experience one, we are authorized to 
expect all the resj, conditionally on certain 
antecedent sensations called organic, belonging 
to the kind of each (EH, p.20l).
It might be thought that the theory expressed in this passage cannot 
be essentially different from before - that it must be associationism 
in all but name. Yet there is actually a crucial difference. Although 
mention is still made of the grouping of sensations, and of the mind 
moving from ©cperienced sensations to thoughts of possible sensations, 
there is no longer any reference to mechanical or quasi-mechanical 
principles of mental organisation to govern the process. The restated 
theory leaves it open that there are no'associative principles of 
mental states at all; rather, the proposal is that given a supply of
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sensations forming a uniform sequence, one is entitled to infer 
(’authorized to expect*) that other sensations would occur in certain 
specifiable circumstances. But this suggests that to form a belief in 
the existence of the external world, what one requires besides a stream 
of sensations is a logical faculty enabling one to draw inferences of 
the appropriate sort. Yet it seems unlikely that Mill was deliberately 
altering his theory as a result of some reasoned dissatisfaction with 
associationism. It is more-.likely that both in the I865 and l86? 
editions of the Examination he was simply failing to think through 
his ideas in a sufficiently careful way, and that he never made the 
’Psychological Theory* precise enough for it to be easily evident, 
even to its a.uthor, when a deviation from it was taking place.
A plausible explanation of Mill’s seeming carelessness in presen­
ting his ’Psychological Theory’ is that he was not ultimately very 
interested in the task of explaining the origin of our beliefs about 
external reality, and was much more concerned with the second of the 
two objectives I ascribed to him - that of providing an anti-realist 
metaphysical analysis of the nature of the external world. Probably 
he saw the first objective primarily as serving the second, and was 
no,t concerned to develop a psychological theory beyond the point at 
which it became apparent that explaining our belief in an external 
world did not positively require the postulation, of an external reality 
of an obnoxiously realist kind. Despite their differences, neither 
the psychological theory of Chapter XI nor that of the later appendix 
are committed to realism in any sense in which Mill wanted to deny 
it. Perhaps he would have been content enough to settle in their place 




Like Berkeley, Mill claimed that his metaphysical theory of the 
external world marked no deviation from the common-sense belief in 
objects outside the mind: . *
Matter, then, may be defined, a Permanent Possibility 
of Sensation. If I am asked, whether I believe in 
matter, I ask whether the questioner accepts this 
definition of it. If he does, I believe in matter: 
and so do all Berkeleians. In any other sense than
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this, I do not. But I affirm with confidence, that 
this conception of Matter includes the whole meaning 
attached to it by the common world, apart from phil­
osophical, and sometimes from theological, theories.
The reliance of mankind on the real existence of 
■ visible and tangible objects, means reliance on the 
reality and permanence of Possibilities of visual 
and tactual sensations, when no such sensations 
are actually experienced (EH, p,183).
Dr. Johnson’s ’argumentum baculinum’ is based on a complete misunder­
standing of Berkeley, in Mill’s opinion, and all that the ’most est­
eemed metaphysical champions* of matter, such as Reid, Stewart and ' 
Broxm, have in effect been arguing for is the existence of permanent 
possibilities of sensation (ibid.). It is the belief in these perman­
ent possibilities on which alone any practical consequences depend.
Mill maintained, and * if nobody believed in a material universe in any 
other sense, life would go on exactly as it does now* (EH, pp.183-84)•
It is clear that Mill’s metaphysical theory of matter is not entailed 
by his psychological theory of the origin of the belief in an external 
world, in either its Chapter XI or appendix forms. Por^it is conceivable 
that our conviction of the existence of a world of things outside us 
arises from our sensations and our expectations of sensations accord­
ing to one of the modes which Mill described, but this would leave it 
quite open xvhether or not there existed a world of objects outside us 
and irreducible to sensations. So what entitled him to put forx-xard his 
Berkeleyan, or quasi-Berkeleyan, theory of matter as a, sequel to his 
psychological reflections on the belief in external reality? Did he 
confusedly believe that the psychological theory does entail the 
metaphysical one?
There is no ground for as^cribing to him such a gross confusion. The 
real justification he saw for his metaphysical theory of matter was 
the principle of the relativity of knoxfledge. Rather surprisingly,
Kill noxihere in Chapter XI or the appendix referred to the principle 
by name, and yet its presence is everywhere felt. The possibility of 
noumenal existence is dismissed on the basis that we can knov; nothing 
beyond our sensations, all knowledge being ndt only ^  sensation, but 
also jof sensation. Consequently, our knoxvledge of the existence of an 
external world cannot be knowledge of the existence of something x-xhich 
is, as Kill put it, ’intrinsically distinct * from sensation (EH, p.182). 
But hox'j, then, in conformity to the relativity principle, is our know­
ledge of an external x-'iorld to be construed? The exceedingly ingenious
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suggestion Mill made is that external physical objects are to be und­
erstood as possibilities of sensation, which remain in existence even
in the absence of actual sensations of objects. Why we should believe 
in the independent existence of possibilities of sensation he thought 
could be explained by the psychological theory; but the metaphysically 
significant point about the possibilities, in his opinion, was that 
they could be held to constitute a real, external world which was, how­
ever, in no way a world..of, noumenal substances. We come to think of 
our actual sensations as connected with ’groups of possibilities of 
sensation' (SH, p.l8l). But our sense of natural sequences of phenom­
ena (whether a product of association, or of inference from experience) 
leads us to imagine changes taking place within the possibilities of 
sensation even when our attention is elsexvhere:
Whether we are asleep or awake the fire goes out, 
and puts an end to one particular possibility of 
warmth and light. Whether,we are present or absent 
the corn ripens, and brings a new possibility of 
food. Hence we speedily think of Nature as 
made up solely of these groups of possibilities, 
and the active force of Nature as manifested in the 
modification of some of these by others (ibid.).
And after a little while it is quite inevitable that we should come to 
think of the actual sensations xve have, though they are in fact 'the 
original foundation of the whole,' as merely the 'representations, 
appearances, or effects’ of the possibilities of sensation, which 
thus are thought of as 'much more real than the actual sensations’ 
(ibid.).
IV
Mill’s metaphysical theory of the external world was very greatly 
influenced by the idealism of Berkeley. Mill always expressed the 
most enthusiastic admiration for Berkeley’s philosophy, and in a review 
essay he wrote near the end of his life acjnially said of him that 'of 
all who, from earliest times, have applied the powers of their minds 
to metapliysical enquiries, he is the one of greatest philosophic gen­
ius’ (^, p.451). Berkeley, Mill said - and he compared him here to 
Malebranche - had realised that the hypothesis of physical substance 
irreducible to sensation was by no means essentialnto- account for)the
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character of our experience; indeed, such substance would be merely a 
'superfluous wheel in the machinery' on which nothing depended (BL, 
p.462; cf, p.204). ^ And Mill claimed Berkeley's authority for 
the viex"7 that: ,
in the case of matter there is no ground in 
experience or in anything else for regarding 
the sensations we are conscious of as signs 
of the presence of "'anything, except potential­
ities of other sensations (BL, p.459)*
Yet in one important respect .Mill believed that his ovm metaphys­
ical theory of matter was an improvement on that of his admired pre­
decessor, Berkeley, he suggested, had had a difficulty in accounting 
for the continuing numerical identity of an object xfhich we have for 
a time ceased to perceive:
He supposed that the actual object of a sensible 
perception, though, on his own showing, only a 
group of sensations, and suspended so far as we 
are concerned when we cease to perceive it, comes 
back literally the same the next time it is per­
ceived by us; and, being the same, must have bepn 
kept in existence in another mind. '
What Berkeley failed to grasp, however, is that:
the sensations I have to-day are not the same 
as those I had yesterday, which are gone, never
to return; but are only exactly similar ...
(m, p.464).
Berkeley's theory, then, cannot make good sense of the common belief 
that objects are not merely ephemeral like sensations, but retain 
their numerical identity over extended periods of time. (This objec­
tion is more fundamental tha]^  the objection, often heard and quite 
correct, that Berkeley's introduction of God to perceive objects no 
one else is perceiving is inadmissibly ad hoc.) .
Mill saw that Berkeley's problem arose because he identified phy­
sical objects X'xith groups of actual sensations; and the solution to 
it, Mill thought, was to identify those objects rather with possibil­
ities of sensation, which were neither transient like actual sensations,
nor required for their existence that they should be held within some 
mind. So, when an object has existed unperceiyed,
what has been kept in continuous existence is but 
a potentiality of having ... sensations, or, to 
express it in other words, a law of uniformity of
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nature, by virtue of which similar sensations might 
and would have recurred, at any intermediate, time, 
under similar conditions (ibid.). ^
Yet those sensations which I might have had but did not during some 
temporal interval. Mill added, are not 'a positive entity subsisting 
through that time'; there is not really 'any permanent object, mental 
any more than material, to keep up an identity which does not really 
exist'; they have only '^potential' existence (ibid. ).
On the basis of his divergence from Berkeley over the analysis of 
existence unperceived, Hill has often been referred to as ,a phenomen- 
alist rather than as an idealist ; he has even been called by some the 
'father of phenomenalism.' Although the difference between Mill's and 
Berkeley's views is a significant one, it is not at all clear that 
Mill is better described as a phenomenalist than as an idealist. For 
one thing, he himself preferred to stress the similarities rather than 
the differences between his theory and Berkeley's, and classed his 
position with that of the 'Berkeleians.* It is noteworthy too that 
while he never used either of the labels 'idealist' or 'phenomenalist' 
of his own philosopliy, he did not object ^ to a critic's terming it 
'pure idealism. '  ^ (Bain too, we have seen, referred,^to Mill's 'un­
compromising Idealism.') But the sense of labels for- philosophical 
views can change subtly over time, and it would be unsafe to conclude 
that nineteenth century usage of the term 'idealism' is the same as 
our ovm; probably, in fact, 'idealism' was employed vxith a wider sense 
then than nox-x, so it could have covered as well: as theories of the Ber­
keleyan type, those others xfhich would nowadays attract the label 'phen- 
omene>list.' What is more important than how nineteenth-century writers 
described Kill's viexfs, hovxever, is the point that those vieX'XS are not 
in full accord with modern phenomenalist theories. Phenomenalists of 
the present day have a great^ deal to say about possible sensations ;
Kill, by contrast, spoke most frequently of possibilities of sensation. 
What he intended by this phrase often appears to have been somewhat 
different from what phenomenalists normally mean by talking about poss­
ible sensations.
Admittedly, this is not always so. Sometimes he used 'possibilities 
of sensation' as if this was only a stylistic#variant for 'possible 
sensations.' For instance, at one place in the Examination he moved 
swiftly from speaking of 'a great number and variety of possibilities 
of sensation' to the statement that 'The whole set of sensations as 
possible, form a permanent background to any one or.more of them that 
are, at a given moment, actual' (EH, p.l8l). Then shortly aftervxards:
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The permanent possibilities are common to us and to 
our fellow-creatures; the actual sensations are not.
That which other people become aware of when, and on 
the same grounds, as I do, seems more real to me than 
that which they do not know of unless I tell them.
The world of Possible Sensations succeeding one 
another according to laws, is as much in other beings 
as it is in me; .i4;.-Jias therefore an existence out­
side me; it is an External World (g, p. 182).
Such passages as these, though, are uncommon; Mill spoke continually 
of permanent possibilities of sensation, but only rarely of possible 
sensations, and hence it is reasonable to take seriously the prospect
that he did not generally consider these as amounting to the same 
thing.
The usual impression Mill gave of possibilities of sensation was 
that they have a valuable flavour of objectivity, of externality and 
of publicity about them, and it is likely that he felt that possible 
sensations do not (or at least, do not in an equal degree). In the 
^ 26^G he talked of body as *a set of sensations, or rather,, of possib­
ilities of sensation,' and his preference for the second disjunct is 
worth noting (^, p.58)., Then in the Examination he wrote that:
The conception I form of the world existing M  'any 
moment, comprises, along with the sensations I am 
feeling, a countless variety of possibilities of 
sensation ... These various possibilities are the 
important thing to me in the world. My present sen—
^acions are generally of little importance, and are 
moreover fugitive: the possibilities, on the contrary, 
are permanent, which is the character that mainly 
distinguishes our idea of Substance or Matter from 
our notion of sensation (EH, pp.l79-80).
JEDZ just a way of saying that bodies cannot be identified with 
our actu^ sensations (something Mill explicitly maintained: 'our 
actual sensations and the permanent possibilities of sensation, stand 
out in obtrusive contrast to one another' (EH, pp.186-87)); but it
may indicate a deeper distaste for identifying them with sets of sen-
sations actual or possible.
Phenomenalism in its modern manifestations holds that sentences 
about physical objects can be translated into sentences about the 
sense-data we actually have, or would have if certain conditions were
fulfilled. The phenomenalist claims that the sense-data sentences
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offered as translations of physical object sentences are logically 
equivalent to the sentences they translate; and a common way of exp­
ressing the claims of phenomenalism is to say that, for the phenomena- 
list, physical objects are logical constructions out of sense-data. 
Phenomenalism is thus a reductive theory of physical objects. This is 
superficially similar to Mill's account:
I believe that Calcutta exists, though I do not per­
ceive it, and that-it would still exist if every per- 
'oipient inhabitant were suddenly to leave the place, 
or be struck dead. But when I analyse the belief, all 
I find in it is, that were these events to take place, 
the Permanent Possibility of Sensation which I call 
Calcutta would still remain; that if I were suddenly 
transported to the banks of the Hoogly, I should 
still have the sensations which, if now present, 
would lead me to affirm that Calcutta exists here 
and now. We may infer, therefore, that both philosoph­
ers and the world at large, when they think of 
matter, conceive it really as a Permanent Possibility 
of Sensation (EH, p.184).
Like the modern phenomenalist, Mill placed great weight on subjunctive 
conditional analyses of the form: If a percipient Were placed in 
such-and-such circumstances, then he would have so-and-so sensory 
experiences. Yet it cannot just be assumed that ,when Mill cited the 
availability of such conditionals in support of his claim that phys­
ical objects are permanent possibilities of sensation, he was defending 
just the same claim as is the phenomenalist who holds that physical 
objects are logical constructions out of sense-data. ^
What is obscure about both Mill's theory and modern phenomenalism
is the precise nature of their ontological commitments. Common sense
4
has no doubt that physical objects remain in existence when no one is 
having sensory experiences of them. Berkeleyan idealism maintains the 
odd but at least forthright view that objects remain in existence when 
no finite subject is perceiving them, because God continues to perceive 
them. But it is hard to resist the impression that phenomenalism is 
merely evasive about the nature of objects,which no one is perceiving. 
Phenomenalists say that they do not want to deny that objects can 
exist unperceived, and claim that construing objects as logical con­
structions out of actual and possible sense-data enables them to sus­
tain this position. Yet consider the following pair of sentences:
(a ) There is a table in my bedroom
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(b ) If anyone were suitably situated in my bedroom, he would 
have certain sense-data as of my bedroom table.
A phenomenalist might offer (,B) as an analysis of (a ) (or more strictly, 
he might offer it as a partial analysis, since the expression 'suitably 
situated in my bedroom* is itself open to phenomenalist reconstrual).
Now an important question to pose is: Does (b ) entail (a )? The answer 
to this is surely that it does not, for (b ) is actually consistent 
with the negation of (A)".""“Froperly considered, (b ) does not rule out 
that the world is such that objects come into existence when certain 
patterns of sense-data commence, .and go out of it again when those patt­
erns cease. But this is bad news for the phenomenalist, for it shows 
that the production of conditionals like (b ) is inadequate to estab­
lish that phenomenalism really can accommodate the common sense belief 
in the persistence of unperceived objects: phenomenalist conditionals 
could be true yet physical objects still not exist unperceived. And it 
would not be acceptable for the phenomenalist to counter this criticism 
by noting that it would be a very odd kind of universe in which obj­
ects were brought into being by perception and went out of it when 
perception stopped. Certainly such a universe would be quite different 
from the universe posited by common sense; but the phenomenalist
9cannot heln himself to common sense conceptions in rejecting it.
Does this mean that phenomenalism really lacks the resources to 
provide any positive account of what it is for an object to exist 
unperceived? That depends on how bold an ontologist the phenomenalist 
is prepared to be. An option open to the determined phenomenalist is 
to accept a, certain kind of realism about possible sensations, and to 
reify them in something like the way that some philosophers have wan­
ted to reify possible worlds. For such a theorist, the table which no 
one is perceiving does continue in existence, but as a set of possible 
sensations which are, thougji non-actual, real. Not all phenomenalists 
who have talked of possible sensations have intended to reify them in 
this manner; many would hold that the language of possible sensations 
is fully analysed by the production of conditionals of the style of
(b ). But on a strongly realist view of possible sensations, condition­
als like (b ) are true just because unperceived objects remain in 
being as sets of really existent possible sensations (which are avail­
able to be had - and thereby become actual sensations - by subjects 
who situate themselves suitably). Many philosophers will have no 
stomach for the reification of possible sensations, and will hold that 
if an unperceived table were no more than a set of such possible sen­
sations, it would in any case be quite different from the kind of
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object which common sense believes to persist when unperceived. But 
a phenomenalist who wants to reify possible sensations may claim supp­
ort from the realism about possible worlds which has appealed to some 
philosophers, notably David Lewis (see, e.g., Lewis, pp.84-91)» Lewis 
holds that we can talk about existence which is not actual existence; 
possible worlds, or *ways things could have been,* exist, though not 
actually. Now if unactualised possibles which are possible worlds can 
exist, can they not, too, when they are possible sensations? However, 
most philosophers have had too robust a sense of reality to look kindly 
on the notion of unactualised but real possibles; and if that response 
should seem to have something of an air of prejudice about it, it 
can still very reasonably be said that if phenomenalism is reduced to 
the strait of preferring such odd candidates for existence as reified 
possible sensations to common sense physical objects, it is a sing­
ularly unappealing doctrine.
Furthermore, it seems to be a non—contingent feature of actual 
sensations that they have subjects, and the strangeness of reified 
possible sensations appears greater still when we ask the question 
whose sensations they are. Some defenders’* of reified possible sens­
ations might wish to say that these sensations are, unlike actual sen­
sations, subjectless; but this point of analogy with actual sensations 
is abandoned only at the price of their becoming even more difficult 
to comnrehend. Or it might be suggested that they can be ascribed 
actual subjects, that they can be mine or yours, in that they are the 
sensations which you or I would have in certain circumstances. But 
this seems wrong; what we would have in those circumstances would be 
antual sensations, and it is highly strained to say that we are now 
the subjects of reified possible sensations, which are alleged to exiot 
yet without being actual. Alternatively, possible sensations could be 
ascribed possible subjects ('likewise suitably reified), but this pro­
posal leads us deep into a Quinean * ontological slum*, (a Quinean quest­
ion would be: How many possible people are now having possible my- 
bedrdom—table sensations?) (of. Quine (I9ÔI); p.4)* The wise philos­
opher will leave reified possible sensations well alone.
V
Gan possibilities of sensation fare better than possible sensations 
in a theory of the external world? More specifically, is it more
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plausible to reify the former than the latter? If Hill’s theory is to 
be more successful than standard phenomenalism in analysing the nat­
ure of unperceived objects, it needs to be able to speak of reified - 
possibilities of sensation. But how cogent is such talk?
Hill showed little hesitation in the Examination in speaking of 
possibilities of sensation as real, objectively existing things. The 
’groups of possibilities,’ he wrote, are ’the fundamental reality in 
Nature,’ and ’though the^v-sensations cease, the possibilities remain in 
existence; they are independent of our will, our presence, and every­
thing which belongs to us.’ Furthermore, they are ’common to us and 
to our fellow-creatures* ; while ’the active force in Nature’ is ’man­
ifested in the modification of some of these by others’ - such pro­
cesses of modification being able, he stressed, to take place even 
when no one is in sensory contact with them (EH, pp.181-82). Occas­
ionally Kill waxed quite lyrical about the permanent possibilities, 
though at some cost to precision, as when he wrote that: 
the possibilities are conceived as standing to the 
actual sensations in the relation of a, cause to its 
effect, or of canvas to the figures painted on it, 
or of a root to the trunk, leaves, and flowers, or 
of a substratum to that which is spread over, it, or, 
in transcendental language, of Matter to Form 
(m, p.i8i).
The purpose of this effusion was to reinforce the message that perman­
ent possibilities of sensation are the basic stuff of reality, the 
prime existants, and that actual sensations are in some manner depen­
dent on them or secondary to them (though precisely what this relation­
ship was Mill appears never to have wholly decided).
Critics have not on the whole been very kind to Mill’s possibil­
ities of sensation. According to Geoffrey Warnock:
it ^ e e m ^  inadequate to regard the actual table in 
my empty study as a possibility of sensation. For 
surely, when I say there is a table in my study,
I am saying what actually the case, not men­
tioning merely the possibility of anything 
(Warnock, p.227). *
And John Hospcrs has complained:
That which is actually before me exists, but in what 
way can possibilities exist? The mountain that no 
one is perceiving exists ... but what at this moment 
exists, assuming that no one is perceiving the
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mountain? A possibility? But what is that? Can a 
possibility-of-sense-data hold a tower on top of 
it, which we may see even if we don’t see the 
mountain? Surely there is something wrong here.
There is something that exists now, not just a 
mere possibility of something, whatever that may 
be (Hospers, pp.542-53)•
These are natural criticisms, and it is clear that they take their 
origin from a common sense conception of reality which it is hard to 
deny. (However, Hospers is unreasonable in complaining that Mill is 
implying that a possibility of sense-data, or sensation, could support 
something of entirely different ontological status, namely a physical 
object such as a tower ; for Mill, of course, physical objects are all 
to be analysed as possibilities of sensation.) It is unlikely that 
criticisms like these could be deflated unless some solid sense could 
be given to the thesis that possibilities of sensation can really 
exist in the absence of sensation - in other words, to a Mill-type 
reification of them. Hill’s theory apparently makes an inadmissible 
switch of modalities, from actual objects to possibilities of sensa­
tion. Only if reification of permanent possibilities^ of sensation can
' 10 be made plausible will this impression be countered.'
Now we frequently do talk about possibilities as real. It would be 
silly to deny that there is a real possibility of death if one jumps 
from a plane without a parachute. The existence of a strong possibility 
that unemployment in Britain will remain high until the end of the 
century is denied by no major political party. And the anaesthetist 
monitors the sleeping patient’s state carefully, because he knows that 
the possibility of pain (veritably a ’possibility of sensation’) ben­
eath the surgeon’s knife is real. Moreover, it would not be stretching 
language too far to speak" oij physical objects as offering real possib- - 
ilities of sensation, where one simply meant that they can be seen, 
felt, heard and so on. Mill’s view that physical objects are possibil­
ities of sensation is intended to have a more radical, reductionist 
slant than this ; but our initial sense of the strangeness of possibil­
ities of sensation may to some extent be mitigated when we reflect 
thcit (pace Hospers) we do sometimes feel it to be acceptable to speak 
of possibilities existing, or being real.
Ihirthermore, possibilities of sensation have two ostensible advan­
tages over possible sensations as the fundamental posits of a metaphy­
sical theory of the external world. The first is that no problem arises 
over the ovmership of possibilities of sensation. There is no opening
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for talk of a subject of possibilities of sensation, so there can be no 
embarrassment over the identification of their subject such as arose 
for the theory that physical objects are groups of possible sensations.
But, secondly, as there is no temptation to say that possibilities of 
sensation must be oivned, they are prima facie better candidates than 
possible sensations for being objective constituents of a common world. 
Actual sensations, having a subject, are subjective in nature; reified 
possible sensations, though, it is hard to identify a subject.for them, 
can make-at most a dubious claim to objective status; but permanent 
possibilities of sensation (while they may have other problems) do indeed 
appear, as Kill said, to be ’common to us and to our fellow-creatures.’
Now it is undoubtedly a great advantage of a theory of the external 
world that it is able to represent that world as being objective in 
nature; one of the problems of a theory like Berkeley’s is that it is 
incapable of making proper sense of the objectivity of the world (strictly 
speaJcing, it is a consequence of Berkeley’s view that there are as 
many worlds as there are subjects of ’ideas’). On the other hand, as 
we shall see later, Hill’s philosophy faces the problem that represen­
ting the world as objective and common to different subjects is not 
at all obviously consistent with rigorous adherence to the principle 
of the relativity of knowledge. ;
Hill never intended to hold that all permanent possibilities of sen­
sation can be identified with physical objects, though he held that 
all physical objects are identifiable with permanent possibilities 
of sensation. There is, for instance a permanent and not merely ephem­
eral possibility of getting a nasty shock if you feel about at the 
back of your television set with wet hands, but that possibility cannot 
intelligibly be identified with an object. Mill’s view was that we 
form the concept of a physical object where the possibilities
have reference, not to single sensations, but to sen-
*f ■
sations joined together in groups. When we think of 
anything as a material substance, or body, we either 
have ha.d, or we think that on some given supposition 
we should have, not some one sensa.tion, but a great 
and even an indefinite number and variety of sensat­
ions, generally belonging to different senses, but 
so linked together, that the presence of one announces 
the possible presence at the very same instant of 
any or all of the rest (EH, p,l80).
This, though vague, is promising. It is a reasonable supposition that 
only certain kinds of groups, or complexes, of individual possibilities
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of sensation constitute the possibilities of sensation which could at all 
plausibly be identified with objects. But which groupings might we be 
inclined to think of as objects? Like other philosophers before and- 
since, Mill considered that sensations which correspond to the primary 
qualities of things, that is, sensations of resistance, extension and 
shape, are peculiarly important for our belief that we are confronted 
with a world of external objects. He did not believe these to be 
necessary for the formation, of the idea of matter (’I am disposed to 
believe,... that any of our senses, or at all events any combination 
of more than one sense, would have been sufficient to give us some 
idea of Matter’ (ICH, p.213)); but he did allow that:
The Permanent Possibilities of sensations of touch 
and the muscles, form a group within the group - 
a sort of inner nucleus, conceived as more fundamen­
tal than the rest, on which all the other poss­
ibilities of sensation included in the group seem 
to depend (ibid.).
Bain thought this part of Mill’s account on the right lines, but ’too 
short for the theme.’ What he should have done, suggested Bain, was 
to make more of ’the contrast of active energy and passive feeling 
as an important constituent of the subject and object distinction,’ 
instead of relying on an undifferentiated notion of ■resistance (Bain 
(1882), pp.120-21). This is fair criticism, and though it may be said 
that Mill was less interested than Bain was in the construction of 
detailed psychological theories, his sketchiness in the present inst­
ance carries over into a weakness in his metaphysical account of what 
objects are.
A common sense view of the world may happily accept the proposition
that physical objects provide complex possibilities of sensation; though
it will stress that these possibilities exist only because objects have
4
qualities which enable them to be touched, seen, smelt, and so on. But 
Mill’s theory maintains that objects are real possibilities of sensation 
and no more than that; and common sense will object that there cannot 
exist bare possibilities of sensation without a basis in the tangible, 
visible, olfactible, and other qualities of things. However, in the 
appendix added to the I867 edition of the Examination, Mill made an 
intriguing supplementary proposal about the nature of object-constitut­
ing possibilities of sensation: a body, as a group of possibilities of 
sensation, is, he said, ’a power of exciting sensations* (EH, p.201). 
Unfortunately, he did not elaborate on this suggestion, either in the 
Examination or elsewhere. Yet it does hint at a strategy for construing
202
reified possibilities of sensation which is worth some attention. Per­
haps what Mill was gesturing vaguely towards was a variety of dispos-
itional analysis of objects.
To say of a glass bottle that it is fragile is to ascribe to it a
disposition to shatter in certain specifiable circumstances; its dis­
positional quality of fragility can be characterised by means of such 
subjunctive conditionals as, ’If it were hit with a heavy hammer, it 
would (probably) shatter.’ À way in which one might redescribe the 
bottle’s fragility is to say that it has associated with it a perman­
ent possibility of shattering (under certain conditions). Fragility is 
uncontroversially a disposition, but many other qualities of things 
can also be regarded as dispositional without stretching that notion 
unduly. Take, for instance, a physical object’s tangibility: ascribing 
this quality to it can be explained by saying that were we to bring 
parts of our bodies in contact with it, it would provide us with sen­
sations of a tactile sort. And just as we might say that a bottle has 
associated with it a permanent possibility of shattering, we might say 
that it has associated with it too a permanent possibility of providing 
tactile sensations. An object’s other sensible qualities can likewise 
be construed dispositionally, and described in terms"of associated 
permanent possibilities of providing sensations of various kinds.
To say that a body is a ’power of exciting sensations’ may thus seem 
an acceptable, if unusual, way of referring to certain of its dispos­
itional qualities. But for Mill, of course, this form of words conveyed 
a radically reductionist theory of matter. In his view, a physical obj­
ect was not a power of exciting sensations in virtue of having other 
qualities which provided a.basis or ground for its sensible qualities, 
but was to be identified with a set of, sensible qualities construed dis­
positionally. Bodies do not just have the power to, affect our senses, on 
this account ; rather, they .fare that power and nothing more. One might 
be reminded here of Locke’s view of secondary qualities, ’which in truth 
are nothing in the objects themselves but powers to produce various 
sensations in us’ (Locke, vol.1, p.l04). But Locke believed that the 
secondary qualities of objects arise from the ’original or primary 
qualities of body,’ namely solidity, extension, figure and mobility; 
and he held that it is only on the basis of the existence of these pri­
mary qualities that objects affect our senses (ibid.). Unlike Locke,
Mill thought that even the primary qualities of bodies are powers to 
produce sensations, and. not a non—dispositional basis of dispositional 
qualities.
Common sense will find this divergence from Locke the fundamentally
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objectionable feature of Mill’s, concept of objects. It is very natural 
to think that dispositional qualities cannot exist by themselves, but 
must be founded on something non-dispositional.'One might put this 
natural vi ew by saying that where this is a disposition, something 
must be disposed. Locke’s secondary qualities are powers which things 
have by virtue of their primary quaJities; and indeed it is plausible 
to hold that a disposition presupposes not just that there is something 
disposed, but also that'^ *the thing disposed is disposed in virtue of 
its possessing a quality or qualities forming an appropriate causal 
basis for the disposition. Thus a bottle’s fragility, for instance, is 
a dispositional quaJity of the bottle, and it is causally grounded in 
its physical microstructural qualities. But Kill’s view appears to be 
that there can exist bare powers to cause sensations which lack both 
possessors and causal grounds. This is not, on the face of it, an att­
ractive doctrine ; and it is barely clear that it makes any sense at all 
( a  claim which Hartry Field has recently supported, though without 
reference to Mill). Mill’s picture seems to be that subjects who at 
some time are suitably spatially related !to atpartiicular location will 
then experience certain sensations, because there is at that place 
then a power to produce such sensations; yet there,is nothing else 
there besides the bare causal power itself, and this is seriously out 
of line with our normal understanding of powers as-grounded in other 
(non-dispositional) qualities of objects.
There is, however, a conceivable move which Mill could make at this 
point to put his theory in a better light. To the objection that he 
has posited dispositions without foundations, he could reply that it 
is spatial locations which, though immaterial, are the possessors of 
dispositions to produce sensations. As a subject moves around space, 
this line of thought would run, his presence serves to provoke differ­
ent locations to manifest .the dispositions they possess to excite sen- 
sations. In this way, space is the groundwork or basis of possibilities 
of sensation, conceived as powers to cause sensations, and the poss­
ibilities lose their uncomfortable appearance of being ontologically 
free-floating. Moreover, if space is objective and common to different 
subjects of experience, it becomes easy to see why permanent possibil­
ities of sensation have that status too : it is precisely because they 
are powers of objective and common locations in space. To be sure.
Kill himself never developed his theory along the present lines. Yet 
it is tempting to see this extension as offering-a promising underpinning 
of many of the things he did say. We can now see just why it should be 
that:
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VJe find other people grounding their expectations and 
conduct upon the same permanent possibilities on which 
we ground ours. But we do not find them experiencing 
the same actual sensations. Other people do not have 
our sensations exactly when and as we have them: but 
they have our possibilities of sensation ... The 
permanent possibilities are common to us and to our 
fellow-creatures;-the actual sensations are not 
(EH, p.182).
And it now becomes more reasonable to hold that :
Our sensations we carry with us wherever we go, and 
they never exist where we are not; but when we change 
our place we do not carry away with us the Permanent 
Possibilities of Sensation: they remain until we ret­
urn, or arise and cease under conditions with which 
our presence has in general nothing to do (EH, p.186).
But such a view of the nature of objects is nevertheless very prob­
lematic. One counter-intuitive consequence of it (though conceivably 
one which Mill might have been happy to ^ live with) is that our normal 
criteria for the identification and reidentification of objects are 
merely fictitious, and quite out of accord with reality. For where we 
would naturally spealc of an object moving through spàce without loss 
of its numerical identity, the present theory can accommodate only 
the notion of a pattern of qualitatively similar sensations to be obt­
ained through a sequence of adjacent spatial locations; nothing in what 
is experienced actually preserves numerical identity while moving thr­
ough space, though regularity in the sequence of experiences leads us 
to ascribe a fictitious identity (somewhat similarly to the way in 
which in response to seeing a rapid successive illumination of single
bulbs in a series of bulbs, as in some advertising displays, we natur-
/ d. 2
ally speak of a ’moving dot’ of light).
There remains, too, a fundamental unclarity about how bare spatial 
locations can support powers to cause sensations. There seems to be 
no answer to the question of what it is in virtue of that spatial loc­
ations possess such dispositions; and it is thoroughly obscure how 
two different spatial locations, should possess different causal powers, 
or why a single location should possess different powers at different 
times. Merely asserting that spatial locations are available to play 
the role of bearers of dispositions to cause sensations is not good 
enough in the absence of. any explanation of what qualifies them to do 
this. It seems reasonable to insist that dispositions can only coherently
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be ascribed to things which have other qualities which provide a suit­
able causal ground for the dispositions in question. But it is imposs­
ible to see how spatial locations, merely qua spatial locations, can 
have any qualities which are able to support powers to cause sensations.
Now Mill himself did not put forward the view that permanent poss­
ibilities are dispositional powers of spatial locations; in fact, he 
did not even believe in the objectivity of space. His philosophy of 
soace and time is one of the less rewarding areas of his thought, 
being very sketchy and obscure, but his refusal to admit that space 
and time exist objectively is clear enough. He admitted that time is 
d. condition of experience, without which it would be impossible to 
recognise an order within our sensations, yet he denied the 'reality 
of Time,' insisting that 'an entity called Time ... regarded as not 
a 'lUcceGsion of successions, but as something in which the successions 
take place, I do not and need not postulate» (eH, p.199). Having 
quickly summed up time as 'an indefinite succession of successions, 
unequal in rapidity' (ibid.). Mill very oddly defined space in terms 
of time, holding that 'the idea of Space is, at bottom, one of time»
(M? P-223). The theory here is that ideas of space are 'constructed 
by the mind's laws out of the notion of length in time»; according to 
Mill, we derive the concept of spatial extension through the sensation. 
Ox muscular motion involved in, for instance, passing aur hand between 
tv7o objects: the greater the length of time the muscular motion takes, 
the greater the distance we conceive there to be between the objects 
P»222, and Ch.XII passim). This is exceedingly questionable as 
psychology, though that is not our present concern. What matters here 
is that Kill's subordination of the idea of space to that of time, 
counled witti his refusal to allow time an objective status, led him 
to deny objective status to space too: 'we have no reason for believing 
ühao Spctce or extension in itself, ' he concluded, 'is anything differ­
ent from that which we recognise it by’ - that is to say, certain sen­
sations of the muscles (EH, p.222).
Clearly Mill could not have held that objective spatial locations 
were the seats of causal dispositions to produce sensations if he did 
not believe in the objectivity of space. Yet his denial of the object­
ivity of space greatly hampers a view which he^definitely did wish to 
I"? namely, that permanent possibilities of sensation are common 
to different subjects of experience. He often reiterated the claim 
that while actual sensations are private to individuals, possibilities 
of sensation have a public status. But it is extremely hard to accord 
any content to the notion that possibilities of sensation are common
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to different subjects if no reference is allowed to their situation in 
an objective, common space. In the 1867 edition of the Examination 
Hill added a note containing the admission that the 'real externality' 
of permanent possibilities was strictly incapable of proof, but he 
ventured the suggestion that
the Permanent Possibilities are external to us in the 
only sense we need care about; they are not constructed 
by the mind itself, but merely recognised by it; in 
Kantian language, they are given to us, and to other • 
beings in common with us (EH, p.187)*
Whatever else the importation of what Kant termed 'empirical realism' 
can do for Hill's theory, it cannot justify the last eight words of 
this statement - it cannot, that is, vindicate the contention that 
permanent possibilities are truly public entities. A combination of 
Kant's empirical realism and Hill's theory of permanent possibilities 
does not disallow that different subjects may have 'given' to them 
oualitatively similar but numerically distinct permanent possibilities; 
but as Hill was fully aware of the distinction between qualitative sim­
ilarity and numerical identity of sensations, he should have been 
sensitive to the difference between subjects' experiencing numerically 
identical permanent possibilities and their experiencing merely qual­
itatively similar ones. Different subjects might experience qualitat­
ively similar permanent possibilities in their ovm private spaces, 
but a public space is required for them to experience numerically the 
same ones.
Should Kill, then, have been willing to acknowledge the objectivity 
of space? In trying to answer this question, we should become more 
clearly aware of what we might already have suspected, that there is 
a profound ambiguity of intention about his theory of the external 
world. Sometimes the target *fof his criticism is the realist doctrine 
of the external world, with its underpinning doctrine of objective 
space and time; at these moments. Mill is arguing for a variety of 
idealism. But at other times his target appears rather to be the real­
ist notion of matter, and his theory of permanent possibilities of sen­
sation seems to play the role of showing that an objective and public 
world need not be a world of material objects as the realist conceives 
them; and here we might describe Mill as arguing for a version of imm­
aterial ism. The logical relationship between these views is that Hill's 
idealism entails his immaterialism, but the converse entaiIment does 
not hold. The imnortant similarity between the two positions is that 
neither countenances the realist notion of matter; the critical differ-
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ence is that only the idealism is committed to denying the real exter­
nality of a world outside the mind. It is not common for philosophers 
to distinguish between these two positions, yet it is clear that they
malce importantly different claims — claims with, in fact, a world of
14difference between them. Now when it is immaterialism rather than
idealism that is Kill's concern, it would serve him very well to admit 
the objectivity of space and time; and indeed, if he does not do so, 
then it is very dubious whether he can accommodate the notion of per­
manent possibilities of sensation as common to different subjects of 
experience. It is interesting that although he never actually said 
that space.is objective, he often talked as if he believed this when 
it was the case for immaterialism which he was presenting (as, for inst­
ance, when he spoke of permanent possibilities remaining put when the 
subject changes his place, and of their being available to other sub­
jects even after he has died (EH, p.186)).
Kill's immaterialist position is thus a half-way house to his more 
radical idealism. It represents, moreover, a more limited employment 
of the principle of the relativity of knowledge. Construed as maint­
aining the reducibility of bodies and their attributes to sensations, 
the relativity principle is compatible with an immaterialist philosophy 
which yet continues to affirm the existence of an objective spatio-temp­
oral framework external to the mind. But understood more broadly as 
insisting upon the total elimination of the extra-phenomenal in favour 
of the phenomenal, the relativity principle is a charter for idealism.
An objective spatial matrix, containing within it causal powers to 
produce sensations in suitably placed subjects, hardly seems to differ 
essentially from a common sense realist world of physical objects in 
respect of being no merely phenomenal affair; both are truly external 
to the mind in a fully realist sense of 'external.' Yet if our only . 
source of knowledge is sensation, and if sensation informs us solely 
about phenomenal appearance, as Kill claimed, then even to affirm the 
existence of an objective spatial matrix is to affirm something of a 
recognition-transcendent kind - which was presumably Mill's point when 
he said that the 'real externality to us' of permanent possibilities 
is incapable of proof. To say that permanent possibilities of sensation 
are objective causal powers common to all subjects of experience (whether 
or not one adds that they are dispositions of spatial locations) is 
to say what cannot, on Mill's presuppositions, be established by sen­
sational means. In its most forthright form, the relativity principle 
prohibits all inference from.subjective experience to objective reality, 
and it is indifferent whether reality is taken to consist of common
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sense physical "bodies or reified possi"bilities of sensation in the 
shape of causal powers to produce sensations.
But could Mill not have opted to accept the relativity principle in 
the weaker form which, calling merely for the reducibility of bodies 
and their attributes to sensations, is compatible with the postulation 
of a common external space? This suggestion meets trouble because it 
is not clear why someone inclined to find the basic thrust of the rel­
ativity doctrine bersuasive, should wish to limit its application to 
knowledge about bodies and their attributes only, while accepting 
certain recognition—transcendent claims about the nature of space.
If knowledge is limited to the phenomenal given, as the relativity 
doctrine at its boldest and at the same time most straightforward holds, 
it is to make a recognition-transcendent, and thus illicit, claim 
to posit any kind of objective but unsensed entities. Mill therefore, 
though he was unaware of it, properly faced a dilemma; he should either 
have abandoned relativity (or attempted the uninviting task of showing 
why it should only be accepted in regard to knowledge of bodies and 
their attributes), or he should have accepted a thoroughgoing idealism 
which rejects a common objective space,^ and drops the common sense 
belief that objects stay in existence- when no one is perceiving them.
VI
At least one of Mill's early critics realised that his metaphysical 
theory of the external world had an ambiguity of purpose about it.
Francis O'Hanlon, whom Mill quoted in order to refute in his I867 
appendix to the Examination, pointed out that a truly idealist theory 
of the world, such as Mill^had at first seemed to be putting forward, 
had no "business talking about modifications taking place in permanent 
possibilities of sensation 'whether we are asleep or awake, present or 
absent' (EH, p.203). Mill rather patrpnisingly praised 'my young ant­
agonist ' for the acuteness of his criticism, yet wholly failed to grasp, 
what O'Hanlon had apprehended, that his theory was not a consistent one, 
but rather a confused mixture of idealist and immaterialist elements.
O'Hanlon saw, rather better than Kill did, that a professed Berkeleyan 
should leave no room for non-mental principles as laws of phenomena; 
for if reality is mental in nature, its laws should be mental too.
Yet Mill, though calling himself a Berkeleyan, was happy to admit the 
existence of lawlike interactions between permanent possibilities of
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sensation which were outside and independent of any minds, and thus 
by implication the existence of laws which were not laws of mind. That 
an idealist philosophy should regard 1aws of mind as the only laws of 
reality was naturally assumed by James M'Cosh, another of the Examin­
ât ion'8 early critics, who complained that it was implausible to main­
tain - as he supposed Mill to be doing - that the laws of association 
of ideas are the sole governing principles of things. He objected to 
Mill’s theory that;
there is a palpable omission here, for it omits 
those powers by which one body operates upon an­
other ; thus the sun has a power to make wax white,
and fire to make lead fluid (M'Cosh, p.118; quoted 
at EH, p.201).
In a similar vein, W.H. Smith asserted that 'The qualities by which 
they /thing^ act upon each other, cannot be resolved into any recep­
tivity or subjectivity of mine' (quoted at EH, ibid.). In the appendix
of 1867, Mill replied very scornfully to these critics that they would
not have said what they did had they 'entered even a very little way
into the mode of thought' which they were attacking (ibid.). But this
¥
was hardly fair. It is true that Mill had never explicitly claimed tha,t 
the laws of association were the sole laws of reality, but as he had 
classed himself as a follower of Berkeley and condemned as naive the 
common sense realist view of the external world, it was scarcely un­
reasonable for M'Gosh and Smith to infer that he rejected the existence 
of any mind-independent laws. In his reply to them, however, Mill made it 
quite clear that permanent possibilities of sensation were objective 
existants capable of exerting causal influences on each other even 
when they were not producing sensations in any subject. He thus rejected 
M'Gosh's claim that his theory was flawed by a 'palpable omission’ to 
recognise that bodies interact in ways not determined by the laws of 
association (or any other mental principles). But what he did not say about 
his theory so construed was that it was no longer idealist in character 
but rather immaterialist; and he did not say that because he was himself 
unaware that he had changed his ground.
Mill's shift from idealism to immaterialism also has implications 
for the I'ole of associationism in the psychological theory of the origin 
of the belief in an external world, though once again Mill seems to 
have been oblivious to the fact, or very nearly so. Association was 
initially introduced by him to explain why we form the idea of 'Gontin- 
gent Sensations' which we would obtain in appropriate situations which 
v:e are not actually occupying. It is our ability to form such an idea,
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Kill thought, which is chiefly responsible for our coming to believe 
in a reality beyond the mind. But he also suggested, with consiaerable 
plausibility, that the notion of an external world is the notion of . 
a reality which is ’not constructed by the mind itself, but merely 
recognised by it,’ or, in Kantian phrase, 'given to us' (]^, p.l87)j 
and his original view was. that the laws of association were instrumental 
in producing a belief in the existence of an external world which is 
not a. mere product of mind*. But if permanent possibilities oi sensation 
are truly objective and external existants of the sort envisaged by 
Mill's immaterialist theory, it ceases to be clear why the laws of ass­
ociation should be needed at all in setting up the belief in an exter­
nal v/orldj for one's experience of a world of causally interacting 
permanent possibilities of an objective character should be quite suff­
icient in itself to produce a conviction that what.one is encountering 
is a world in which things happen quite independently of one's mind, 
or, in other words, a world which is given to, and not made by, us, 
Associationism would appear, then, to have a greater role to play in 
a psychological theory of the origin of belief in an external world 
where an idealist metaphysical theory of the nature of that world is 
preferred to an immaterialist one. ^
Is this perhaps the reason why associationism is no longer in evidence 
in the I867 appendix restatement of Mill's views? Had the appeal of 
an immaterialist metaphysic, apparently greater in 1867 than in I865, 
led Mill to discard his earlier thoughts on the role of association?
It seems unlikely. After all, he was quite happy to reprint Chapter XT 
with its associationist doctrines intact as an appendix to his I869 
edition of James Mill's Analysis, and it is improbable that he would have 
done this if he had come to believe that those doctrines were incorrect. 
It is more probable, as was suggested in section 2, that Mill's int­
erest in providing a psychological theory of the belief in an external 
world (as distinct from a metaphysical analysis of the nature of ext­
ernal reality) was not very considerable, and that he was much less 
committed to proving that the laws of association played a crucial rqle 
in producing the belief in question than he was to showing that psych­
ological explanations of it were in principle possible which did not 
presuppose the truth of a common sense realj.st conception of the world.
That being so, it seems right to conclude that Mill had no intention to 
change his mind about the significance of associationism in his psychol­
ogical theory once he had become well disposed to an immaterialist view 
of permanent possibilities. The fact is that both his metaphysical 
and his psychological theories have an ambiguity of intention about
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t h e m  o f  w h i c h  h e  n e v e r  d i s p l a y e d  a n y  r e c o g n i t i o n .
VII
Chapter XII of the Examination hears the somewhat curious title:
'The Psychological Theory-'O-f the Belief in Matter, How Par Applicable 
to Mind.' Like its predecessor, it contains discussions of both psych­
ological. and metaphysical issues, but it is very brief, and its argum­
ents are, with one exception, rather sketchy. The exception is the 
analogical argument for the existence of other minds, which was power­
fully stated by Mill, and is happily detachable from the other argum­
ents of the chapter (EH, pp.l90—92). Of present concern to us, however, 
is the central metaphysical thesis of the chapter that mind, equally 
with matter, is explicable as a permanent possibility of sensation.
Mill's theory of the mind was explicitly grounded on the principle 
of the relativity of human knowledge: 'It is evident, in the first 
place,' he began, 'that our knowledge of mind, like that of matter, is 
entirely relative' (m, p.188). So just as the relativity doctrine 
obliges us to reject any recognition-transcendent conception of matter, 
it compels us, too, to deny that mind is any kind of unknowable, myst­
erious substance causally or otherwise supporting a succession of 
conscious states. Accordingly Mill adopted a form, of '.bundle theory' of 
the mind - or of the Self or Ego, as he alternatively and without dis­
tinction called whatever is the subject of mental states:
We have no conception of Mind itself, as distinguished 
from its conscious manifestations. We neither know nor 
can imagine it, except as represented by the succession 
of manifold feelings which metaphysicians call by the^^ 
name of States or Modifications of Mind (EH, p.I89).
But for all that, he continued, an adequate account of the mind needs 
to acknowledge that we think of minds as retaining their identity 
over time, aa i_f there were an underlying mental substratum which was 
the mind itself and the real subject of mental states; we naturally 
believe in 'a something which we figure as remaining the same, while 
the particular feelings through which it reveals its existence, change' 
(ibid.). We even believe that this something persists through passages 
of dreamless sleep, when there is no feeling or thinking going on at 
all. But how, consistently with the relativity of knowledge, can such 
a notion be accommodated? Mill suggested that what we should say about
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the mind or self during dreamless sleep is that:
my capability of feeling is. not, in that interval, 
permanently destroyed, is suspended only be­
cause it does not meet with the combination of con- 
.ditions which would call it into action: the moment 
it did meet with that combination it would revive, 
and remains, therefore, a Permanent Possibility 
(ibid. ). •’
And that issue clarified, there was now no apparent hindrance. Mill 
proposed, to characterising the mind or self as:
nothing but the series of our sensations (to which 
must now be added our internal feelings), as they 
actually occur, with the addition of infinite poss­
ibilities of feeling requiring for their actual 
realization conditions which may or may not take 
place, but which as possibilities are always in 
existence, and many of them present (ibid.).
In fact. Mill did not adhere with complete consistency to this account 
of mind, sometimes in Chapter XII speaking of it as nothing but a 
permanent possibility, rather than as a combination of actual sensations 
and a possibility - or possibilities - of sensation (e.g. ’The Perm­
anent Possibility of feeling, which forms my notion of Klyself * (ibid. ) ; 
’neither Kind nor Matter is anything but a permanent possibility of 
feeling’ (m, p.l^l).)
A theory which treats mind as wholly or partially definable in terms 
of possibilities of sensation faces some very considerable.problems.
One particularly thorny difficulty for Mill is that as he also wanted 
to explain physical objects as being really nothing more than possibil­
ities of sensation, it is unclear how he could distinguish physical 
objects from minds. Alan Ryan ha.s written that it was very natural for 
Mill, after having construed matter as ’a permanent possibility of 
being sensed,’ to go on to characterise mind in a similar fashion as 
’the permanent possibility of having sensations* (Ryan (1979)? p.xlvii). 
But this makes it sound as if Mill recognised two varieties of perm­
anent possibilities - possibilities of being sensed, and of having 
sensations -, and tha.t is something he never did. Moreover, he would 
have rejected the notion of a possibility of having sensations as , 
being comprehensible only on a model which construes the mind as a 
substratum not to be identified with the sensations which belong to 
it. A ’possibility of having sensations’ can only be understood as a 
possibility of something’s having sensations, and even though committing
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oneself to the existence of such possibilities would not necessarily 
involve committing oneself to the notion of real mental substrata 
existing during periods of dreamless sleep, it would still involve - 
acceptance of the possibility of such substrata to have sensations 
in those periods. But for Mill, minds are quite incorrectly conceived 
on a model of substrata plus mental states which belong to or inhere 
in them, and he could not have meant to consider them, as Ryan suggested, 
as possibilities of hâViïrg sensations.
Yet if both bodies and minds are, as Mill held, composed wholly or 
partly of permanent possibilities of sensation, it becomes unclear what 
the difference is between them, and indeed obscure how there can be 
any significant content to the distinction between subjective and obj­
ective which is so fundamental a part of our normal conceptual scheme.
In a paragraph found only in the first two editions of the Exam in a-t ion, 
and deleted later without rep 1 acement (as if he had given up in the 
face of an insuperable difficulty). Mill proposed that whereas those 
possibilities of sensation which are external objects form ’small* and 
’perfectly definite’ parts of the series of possibilities which I might 
experience under certain conditions, my notion of myself includes ’all 
possibilities of sensation, definite or indefinite,.... which I may im­
agine inserted in the series of my actual and conscious states’ (EH, 
p.189). But this, as Mill apparently came to realise, is perfectly 
hopeless. I do, as a matter of fact, recognise certain ’actual and con­
scious states’ as my own; and I also recognise that there are experien­
ces which I have not had but might have done. Now to identify myself 
with the series of ’actual and conscious, states’ I regard as my ovm, 
as simpler forms of bundle theories would enjoin me to do, may be to 
make a mistake about my self-identity, but it is hardly to make an 
egregious one ; views of the mind as a bundle of actual sensations may 
be ultimately untenable, ]^ ut they are not transparently false. But it 
seems strikingly less plausible to suppose that my self consists not 
just of such actual sensations, but in addition of the indefinitely 
large and perhaps infinite number of experiences which would be poss­
ible experiences for me to have, though in fact I do not have them.
For instance, I may never visit Australia, and if I never do, then I 
shall never have the visual and other sensations that I would have if 
I were to ascend Ayers Rock. On Mill’s view, however, my self partly 
consists in the possibility of those sensations of Ayers Rock. But, 
mirabile.dictu, that viev: becomes even more stunningly implausible 
when we reflect on the nature which Mill ascribed to permanent possib­
ilities of sensation. They are, for one thing, public in status, ’common
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to ourselves and other beings’ (EH, p.202), which means that my self 
cannot be wholly constituted out of components unique to me (for while 
my actual sensations are mine alone, the possibilities of sensation of 
which I am also composed are not). Moreover, in so far as the same 
public possibilities which are part of me are part of you also, it 
seems that to that extent we are literally identical! Nor does Mill’s 
talk of external objects being composed of ’small’ or ’definite’ groups 
of possibilities, whiïê^'selves contain ’definite or indefinite’ poss­
ibilities, help matters ; if this vague language could capture anything, 
it would be the difference between, on the one hand, such ’small and 
definite’ objects as tables, and, on the other, such complex objects 
as toims or such fuzzy ones as sunsets.
It is only a. very superficial improvement when Mill adds that selves, 
unlike external objects, are composed of possibilities of ’thoughts, 
emotions, and volitions’ as well as of possibilities of sensation (EH", 
p.189). This acknowledges the complexity of human mental life, but 
achieves little more. For one thing, it is not clear that external 
objects could not be regarded as possibilities of thoughts or emotions 
or volitions with as much (or as little) plausibility as they can be 
regarded as possibilities of sensation; thus one might speak, in an 
extended Mi H i  an vein, of objects as possibilities, of those mental states 
which, in more standard parlance, one might talk of their causing in 
people - of £5 notes as possibilities of pleasure, or of guns as poss­
ibilities of grief, for example. But, further, it seems just as incred­
ible that I should be partly composed of the possibility of a sense of 
awe before the massive bulk of Ayers Rock as that I should be partly 
composed of the possibility of certain visual sensations of it. And if 
selves include not merely myriads of possibilities of sensation but also 
myriads of possibilities of other mental states, they are even more 
flabby and indistinct ent^^ies than they appeared to be on Mill’s first 
idea of them.
Apart from the special difficulty about the distinction of selves
which Kill’s theory meets because of the public status he ascribed to
possibilities of sensation, it encounters the general problem of bundle
theories about how to determine the boundaries between selves. If there
is no real substratum to link my mental stages together as mine, then
it looks as if the unity of my self is either arbitrary or fictitious
(which latter idea Hume held), in which case the boundary between
myself and others could be drawn elsewhere without violence to the facts.
But the faculty of self-consciousness which we all possess makes it 
impossible to accept that the boundary between ourselves and others
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could have been equally well drawn in another place; I cannot believe 
that those states I ascribe to myself could with just as much correct­
ness be alternatively ascribed to some different subject ; I recognise 
my mental states not just as instances of perceptions, satisfactions, 
pains, and so on, but as perceptions, satisfactions, pains, etc.
Now Mill was aware that his theory faced a weighty difficulty arising 
from the fact of self-consciousness, and considered it to surface in a 
specially sharp way in-connection with memory and expectation:
The thread of consciousness which composes the mind’s 
phaenomenal life, consists not only of present sensat­
ions, but likewise, in part, of memories and expect­
ations. Now what are these? In themselves, they are
present feelings ... But they are attended with the
peculiarity, that each of them involves a belief in
more than its own present existence, ... Nor can the
phaenomena involved in these two states of conscious­
ness be adequately expressed, without saying that the 
belief they include is, that I myself formerly had, 
or that I myself, and no other, shall hereafter have, 
the sensations remembered or expected (EH, pp.193-94)* 
Consequently, Mill concluded, we must either accept ’the paradox, that 
something which ... is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself 
as a series,’ or concede that ’the Mind, or Ego* is, after all, ’some­
thing different from any series of feelings, or possibilities of them’
(eh, p.194). Oddly enough, he declined to pursue the matter further, 
and having destabilised his own theory of the mind, he complacently
ended by declaring that ’we are here face to face with that final inex­
plicability, at which, as Sir W. Hamilton observes, we inevitably arr­
ive when we reach ultimate facts’ (ibid.). In his I867 appendix, he
returned very briefly to the theme of mind, reiterated the need to rec-
•f
ognise the existence of a sense of self (even though this is apparently 
in breach of the relativity principle), and raised the ’Kantian* possib­
ility that the self is not a real something of which we are conscious, 
but only v'hat we are ’compelled to assume ... as a necessary condition 
of Memory’ (EH, pp.207-08). Unsurprisingly, Mill’s trea,tment of the 
mind has not been among the most praised of #his philosophical discuss­
ions, and perhaps has satisfied no one except Bain, who confessed him­
self unable to grasp what the difficulty over memory and expectation 
was (Bain (I882), pp.121-22).
Mill may not have realised that his problem about memory and expect­
ation is just an aspect, or a special case, of a general problem about
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self-awareness. Memories and expectations which concern past or future 
states of myself raise a specific puzzle about the nature of the tem­
poral continuity of the self. But many other mental states have, a
content which includes a sense of self; feelings of pride, jealousy, 
remorse, ambition and many others have an essential reference to one­
self, and could not be had by a subject who - if this were possible - 
lacked a sense of his ovm identity. Such mental states have an element 
of internal direction -on—the self, yet even mental states without that 
direction are experienced not as isolated and unconnected, but as forming 
part of the history of a continuing self. If I see a tree, or hear a 
bird sing, or think of Napoleon, the content of my states has no refer­
ence to myself, but I am nevertheless aware of them as my states. If 
I were asked whose was the sighting of the tree, or the hearing of the 
bird, or the thinking about Napoleon, I would without hesitation reply 
my ovm, and I would do that not on the basis of any evidence that they 
could be ascribed to me, but simply because I had experienced them as 
my states. The nature of self-consciousness in all these cases, and 
not just in those of memory and expectation, calls for elucidation.
Bertrand Russell, vrhose penchant for reductive metaphysics Vfas highly 
reminiscent of Mill’s, submitted reluctantly to the view that we are 
probably aware of ’bare selves’ which are distinct from our particular 
thoughts and feelings (Russell (19II), pp.27-28). Mill too felt forced to 
acknowledge this to be probable, though he did not entirely relinquish 
hope that the mind might yet be established to be a self—aviare bundle 
of mental states and their possibilities. Is there in fact any promise 
in the idea that self-awareness could be explained in terms of a series 
of feelings (leaving aside for now possibilities of feelings) being 
avjare of itself? Philosophers have often dismissed the notion of a 
reflexi'vely-aware series of feelings as transparently nonsensical (Mill 
himself thought it was ’paradoxical’), but Don Garrett has recently 
argued that there is less of a difficulty here than is usually thought. 
’For a perception to become itself an object of thought,’ he suggests,
’is for an idea of it to occur,’ and his claim is that for a bundle of 
feelings to become aware of itself, all that is required is that an 
idea of the bundle should be incorporated into it (Garrett, pp.343- 
44n). Now could Mill have adopted this acco;unt of self-awareness, and 
so explained his ’final inexplicability’?
It is very dubious whether he could. There is surely more to self- 
awareness than is captured in the notion of a bundle of feelings (or 
other mental states) containing an idea of itself. One problem is that 
it fails to explain the kind of self-awareness involved in those mental
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states like jealousy or pride which have an intrinsic reference to the 
selfFurthermore, an idea of a bundle of mental states, even if it 
collects together all and only the mental states which as a matter of 
fact belong to oneself (and it is hard to believe that one could act­
ually frame such an idea), would still seem to lack the extra content 
provided in the thought that all those states are one’s ovm. This pro­
blem is not removed even if the following modification is made to 
Garrett’s proposal to Tender it more plausible. One could frame the 
idea of tlie bundle of mental states (which need not now be each sep­
arately represented in the idea) which are associated with a partic­
ular body, say Smith’s, in the sense of being those states which one 
would naturally ascribe to Smith on the basis of the behaviour exhib­
ited by that body. For Smith to have self-awareness, it might then be 
suggested, is for him first of all to have,that idea, and next to be 
able to recognise which mental states fall under it. (it might be added 
that Smith vjill have a sharp concept of his oim self-identity, because 
he, has the idea of a bundle of mental states distinguished from all 
others by the very clear-cut criterion that they are all associated, 
in the appropriate ways, with a certaip body). ’
But this is still inadequate. In thinking of the^bundle of states asso­
ciated with Smith’s body, and in being able to identify mental states
a =
as belonging to that bundle. Smith is not in any position which others 
could not in principle occupy - though they could not have the idea of 
those states as their ovm. Yet Smith, too, on the theory, is said to 
have the idea of those states as his own only by virtue of recognising 
them as members of the bundle of states associated with a particular 
body. But this is not very plausible; after all, I can have the idea of 
the mental states associated viith Smith’s body, and recognise particular 
states of anger, or jealousy or pleasure as being among them, but this 
does not give me Smith’s splf-awareness. How, therefore, should Smith’s 
having the same idea and making the same recognitions constitute him 
self-aware? It might be objected that we should really describe what 
happens in Smith’s case in terms of his forming an idea of the bundle 
of ment al states associated with his ovm body (that is, with a body he 
recognises first-personally as his ovm, rather than third-person ally 
as Smith’s). But this is unacceptable on two counts. First, it illicitly 
presupposes that Smith already has self-avjareness (this is required 
for him to be able to take up a first-personal perspective on the body 
in question, and regard it as his ovm), vrhereas the purpose of the 
theory was to explain self-awareness in terms of the possession of a 
certain idea v/hich, if petitio is to be avoided, clearly must not already
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involve that awareness. But secondly, even if that objection is 
waived, it still appears untrue to the psychological facts to suggest 
that one’s sense of oneself as a unitary and persisting subject of 
experiences is derived from one’s sense of oneself as the possessor of 
a body. There is an often noticed difference between my ascription of 
mental states to myself and to others: while I might ascribe anger to 
John because I see the rapid workings of his face and his clenched fists, 
when feel anger I am "'aware of it without having to seek the evidence 
of my physical behaviour. It is highly plausible to suppose that my 
primitive command of a sense of myself as a subject of experiences 
is likewise independent of any reference to my body; just as I can 
ascribe anger to myself without having to consult my behaviour, so too 
can I ascribe myself a mental identity without needing to think of 
myself as the possessor of a particular body.
Given the difficulties facing bundle theories of the self. Mill can 
hardly be blamed for doing as other writers have done, and acknowledg­
ing the possibility that minds or selves are substances which are irr­
educible to their states. F.H, Bradley scoffed at Mill for calling 
mind a ’final inexplicability’ (Bradley (1924), P»40n), but it might 
be fairer to praise him for his candour in admitting the severe prob­
lems involved in producing a satisfactory account of the subject of 
experience and of the nature of self-awareness. Russell is not the only 
later writer to have conceded that what we are aware of in self-consc­
iousness may be a ’pure’ self, which is a simple and irreducible bearer 
of mental states. A recent influential writer on the mind, Colin McGinn, 
has suggested that:
Short of a direct demonstration of incoherence in the 
naive conception of the self, we therefore seem entitled 
- or perhaps driven - to the conclusion that the self 
should be conceive^ as a simple mental substance whose 
identity over time is primitive and irreducible 
(McGinn, p.122).
This is essentially Mill’s conclusion of eighty years earlier. Yet it 
deserves repeating that such a conclusion sits uneasily with his acc­
eptance of the relativity of knowledge, which leaves no room for what 
is not reducible to the sensations which alone are accessible to 
our episternic faculties. Mill refused to admit the existence of a tension 
when he touched on this issue at the end of his I867 appendix to the
Examination, but it is hard to resist the impression that the refusal
-----------  18
was no more than an act of politic bluff.
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N I N E
M I L L’ S I N G 0 N -S H  S T E N T  E M P I R I C I S M
Philosophy, for Mill, was a Manichean struggle between two opposed 
schools of thought, that of a priorists who believe it to be possible 
’by direct intuition, to perceive things, and recognise truths, not 
cognizable by our senses,’ and that of the empiricist followers of 
Locke, who maintain that, ’Of nature, or anything whatever external 
to ourselves, we know nothing, except the facts which present them­
selves to our senses, and such other facts as may, by analogy, be inf­
erred from these’ (£0, p.125), Between these conflicting parties. Mill 
reported, ’there reigns a helium internecinum,’ one side accusing its 
opponents of being ’beasts,’ while the other condemns its rivals as 
’lunatics’ (CO, p.126), His ovm allegiance to the ’school of experience’ 
was unwavering, and he believed that whatever shortcomings were to be 
found in the writings of Locke, Hartley, Bentham and other of its inf­
luential protagonists could be removed without’ any fundamental devia­
tion from the spirit of their doctrines. In I84O, when Mill published 
his essay on Coleridge, the position of the experience school, or emp­
iricists as we would call them, was, in his view, an embattled one, 
’Coleridge, German philoso/phers since Kant and most English philosophers 
since Reid’ dissenting from the theory that sensation offers ’not only 
the exclusive sources, but the sole materials of our knowledge’ (CO, 
p.125), Three decades later he felt able to record, with some justified 
self-satisfaction, that his own efforts, coupled vdth those of his 
father and Alexander Bain, had greatly improved the public reputation 
of empiricism (AU, p,270).
Mill’s unswerving and effective support for the empiricist cause in 
the struggle against the a priorist forces of darkness testifies to a 
consistency of intention which is beyond dispute. But v;hile he was, 
throughout his career, consistently an empiricist, he was not consis­
tent in the form of empiricism he espoused. Several indications have
220
"been p:iven in earlier chapters of this study as to the nature of the 
inconsistency which runs through his philosophy of logic and reality; 
in this final chapter an attempt will he made to hring it into sharper 
focus.
The problem with a priorists, Mill held, is that they make * imagin­
ation, and not observation, the criterion of truth,* and install their 
prejudices as truths known independently of experience, and as neither 
needing nor admitting empirical justification; they lay d o ™  * principles 
under which a man may enthrone his wildest dreams in the chair of 
philosophy, and impose them on mankind as intuitions of the pure reason* 
(go, p.127)0 To what he regarded as the systematic error of a priorism. 
Mill opposed a systematic empiricist doctrine of *the superfluousness 
of assuming an instinct to account for that, which knowledge derived 
from experience will so well explain* (BB, p.255)5 and he denied that 
there was in the human mind any idea, feeling or power *which, in order 
to account for it, requires that its origin should be referred to any 
other source* (CO, p.129)* This represents a stalwart stand against 
a priorism, yet it leaves the precise contrast between that position 
and empiricism still unclear. Mill*s claim was that empiricists are 
right in affirming, and a priorists wrong in denying, the adequacy of 
experience as the source of all genuine knowledge..But what did Mill 
intend by the term * experience*? The truth is that he did not employ 
it with a constant sense, but sometimes used it as a shorthand exp­
ression for something like observation and inductive reasoning, while 
at other times it appears to have been intended to stand, more narrowly, 
for what he alternatively referred to as *sensation,* meaning by this 
mere phenomenal appearance. This ambiguity in the use of the word * exp­
erience* might not have mattered much had the two usages simply rep­
resented broader and narrower applications of the same idea. But un­
fortunately this is not the case; Mill*s two employments of the term 
* experience* reflect two different and incompatible philosophical 
stances - in fact, two different and incompatible varieties of empir­
icism.
II
It is reasonable to see Mill as dravm. towards two forms of working 
out empiricism which he had encountered in other -writers. One of these 
is a kind of scientific realism which eschews all postulation of
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entities, and all employment of ideas, which cannot he justified in 
a straightforward manner by observation, experiment and inductive 
reasoning, these being conceived to reveal the characteristics of a 
common, external world. The other form of empiricism to which Mill 
leant on occasions is, by strong contrast, a reductionist doctrine 
which represents reality as a construct out of phenomenal appearances. 
This second, more radical variety of empiricism is chiefly supported 
by the doctrine of the-relativity of knowledge, and it brings Mill 
fairly close to Berkeleyan idealism.
An idea of the first, more realist variety of empiricism is given 
in the following passage:
If we would know the works of God, we must consult 
themselves with attention and humility, without daring 
to add anything of ours to what they declare. A just 
interpretation of nature is the only sound and orthodox 
philosophy: whatever we add of our oim, is apocryphal, 
and of no authority.
All our curious theories of the formation of the earth, 
of the generation of animals, of the origin'of natural 
and moral evil, so far as they go beyond adjust induction 
from facts, are vanity and folly, no less than the 
Vortices of Des Cartes, or the Archaeus of Paracelsus.
Were it not for the pious reference to the works of God, this could 
come from the pages of the Logic; but it is actually a quotation from 
Reid (Reid, pp.97-98). Although Mill disapproved of Reid's philosophy 
from the point of view of his more radical reductionist empiricism, 
there are striking similarities between Reid's dislike of the more 
extravagant flights of philosophy and natural science and Mill's opp­
osition to those who make 'imagination, and not observation, the crit­
erion of truth' (CO, p.127).
But the greatest influence on Mill's realist empiricism was undoubt­
edly Sir John Herschel, whose famous work, the Preliminary Discourse 
on the Study of Natural Philosophy, he admitted to have been of 'great 
help' in writing the Logic (jm, p.217). Herschel, in his turn, confessed 
a debt to Bacon, to whom, he said, we owe
the development of the idea, that the whole of natural 
philosophy consists entirely of a series of inductive 
generalizations, commencing with the most circumstan­
tially stated particulars, and carried up to universal 
laws, or axioms, which comprehend every subordinate
degree of generality 
- and from which we then deduce testable consequences (Herschel (l83l),•
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p.104). Mill's owTL philosophy of scientific method is clearly in the 
Baconian tradition, as transmitted by Herschel, and it is worthy of 
note that both his inductivist account of mathematical knowledge and 
his statement of the canons of inductive reasoning find their origins 
in Herschel's book. Mill admired Herschel too for his uncompromising 
rejection of a priorism; 'The high priori Pegasus,* Herschel had written, 
'is a noble and generous steed who bounds over obstacles which confine 
the plain matter of fact-roadster to tardier paths and a longer cir­
cuit.' A priorism possesses more 'verve and energy' than the empirical 
philosophy, and hence its popularity. But its glamour is delusive and 
dangerous (Herschel (l857)j p.227). ^
Herschel conceded, and Mill followed him here, that the scientist 
must produce hypotheses or conceptions - though only testable ones - 
in order to unify his observations. 'The general proposition,' Herschel 
said, 'is more than a sum of the particulars. Our dots are filled in 
and connected by an ideal outline- which we pursue even beyond their 
limits, - assign it a name, and speak of it as a thing' (Herschel (l857)> 
p.246). In this way we might, for instance, come to speak of the force 
of gravity, which our observations and^inductions have led us to believe 
to be universally operative among physical bodies.But Mill insisted 
that while scientists may reasonably devise new conceptual modes for 
accommodating the facts of experience, they must never impose purely 
imaginary schemata on reality. Thus when Kepler conceived that planet­
ary orbits are elliptical, he did not 'put something into the facts'
- which, according to Mill, was what Whewell would have thought of him 
as doing; on the contrary ;
Kepler did not put what he had conceived into the facts, 
but saw it in them. A conception implies, and corres­
ponds to, something conceived: and though the conception 
itself is not in the facts, but in our mind, yet if it 
is to convey any knowledge relating to them, it must be 
a conception'of something which really is in the facts, 
some property which they actually possess, and which 
they would manifest to our senses, if our senses were 
,able to take cognizance of it (SL, p.295)«
Both Herschel and Mill were deeply opposed to the neo-Kantian, 
non-empiricist views of Whewell, who believed that the combination of 
observation, experiment and what could be inferred from these was 
quite inadequate to unlock the nature of reality. In Whewell's opinion, 
the mind can only make progress in understanding the world because it 
interprets it in accordance with its own 'Fundamental Ideas,' which it
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does not discover in experience but imposes _a priori. Such ideas as 
those of space, force, motion, and cause and effect 'are not derived 
from experience'; rather:
these ideas possess a power of infusing into their 
developements Spelling sic7  that very necessity 
which experience can in no way bestow. This power 
they do not borrow from the external world, but 
possess by their own nature (ifhewell (l847)j P*74)*
Inspired by Kant's theory of the categories, Whewell asserted that these 
'Fundamental Ideas' provide bounds for our thought within which we 
must think, and beyond which we cannot go; and that it is for this 
reason that we are disposed to look on certain relationships in nature 
as necessary (a response, he claimed, which the empiricist cannot sat­
isfactorily explain)(ibid.). Mill was perfectly correct to declare the 
difference between Whewell's view and that of those who believe that 
experience is a sufficient basis of all our knowledge to be 'fundamen­
tal' (SL, p.297).
The kind of empiricism which, influenced by Herschel, informs Mill's 
philosophy of science provides the background, too, for his philosophy 
of logic. We saw in Chapter Five that Mill held that logic is concerned 
with the 'ascertainment of objective truth,' and thatIhe.believed its 
study would assist us in avoiding 'conclusions which are not grounded 
in the realities of things' (EH, p.301; pp.10-11). The purpose of
inference is to supplement simple observation in the business of att­
aining knowledge about a world whose characteristics are fixed indep­
endently of the constitution and operation of our minds, and which are 
all in principle discoverable by a combination of observation and. inf­
erence from observation, without assistance from any faculties of a 
priori intuition. Mill’s theory of logic incorporates a realist theory 
of error: it is held to be>f possible to infer and believe false propos­
itions, which misrepresent reality. Thus the account of inference dev­
eloped in the early Books of the Logic is a major contribution to the 
empiricist methodology which the work as a whole presents; it serves 
the essentially practical role of demonstrating how our knowledge of 
an objective world can be advanced by inference from the observations 
we make of it. But nothing about this world'can be learnt except by 
observation and sound inferences; no intuitive avenue to truth exists, 
and it is mere delusion to think that it does. Mill made clear, moreover, 
that logic tells us how we ought to think, and that logical laws are
not descriptive of psychological processes. The structure of thought 
is not identical with the structure of things, but the study of logic
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should help us to capture the structure of things more accurately in 
our thinking. Idealism carried into logic would naturally construe the 
structures of thought and of things as one and the same ; as Bradley 
remarked, it would account for the truth of the conclusions of our 
inferences hy maintaining that 'the facts are themselves inferential' 
(Bradley (l883), p.530. No such idea ever surfaces in Mill's philosophy 
of logic, which is undeviatingly realist in tenor.
Also anti-a priorist-while at the same time realist is the immateri- 
alist theory of permanent possibilities of sensation in the eleventh 
chapter of the Examination. Admittedly this is a very spartan form of 
realism about the external world, and far from the kind of common sense 
realism espoused, for example, "fcy Reid. Yet it is realism all the same, 
for while it rejects matter, it preserves the notion of a world outside 
the mind, and holds that world to be common to different subjects of 
experience. On this theory, there remains a distinction between how 
reality actually is, and how it is thought to be; even though the world 
is composed of immaterial causal powers to produce sensations, it is 
objective in character, and whatever the physics of such a world, it 
is logically possible for subjective representations of the world to 
fail to coincide with the objective facts. A hasty^view of this theory 
might have it that Mill is indulging in an extrav^ant speculation 
quite as rébarbative as the flights of metaphysical and scientific 
fancy condemned by Reid as 'apocryphal, and of no authority.' But this 
would not be wholly fair. Strange though the theory is, it is inspired 
rather by a spirit of caution than of daring. Maybe there are more 
things' in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in this philosophy, but 
it is another manifestation of the basic empiricist desire to eliminate 
whatever is not sanctioned by experience. The immaterialist theory 
nevertheless seems to suffer by having a foot in both of the empiric­
ist camps which Mill, in different moods, favoured: its retention of
>(
an objective, external world relates it to the form of realism he 
shared with Herschel, and even with Reid, yet its elimination of matter 
draws it towards the more radical and reductionist empiricism to which 
he alternatively leant.
Ill
Mill's reductionist empiricism is anchored in the principle of the 
relativity of human knowledge. This principle, as he carefully pointed
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out, had been understood in different ways by different writers, but 
for him it expressed the fundamental proposition, which he represented 
as a legacy from the Lockian tradition, that sensations, and the mind's 
reflective awareness of sensations as resembling and contrasting, and 
as falling into particular sequences and groups, were not only the sole 
sources, but also the sole materials of our knowledge. As we saw, Mill 
never made up his mind whether to treat the relativity principle as a 
purely epistemological "'thesis about the bounds of the knowable, or as 
making, rather, a semantic claim about the limits of meaningful lan­
guage (to the effect that we cannot speak meaningfully of what is not 
reducible to a sensational basis). But in spite of this vagueness 
about the precise sense of the principle, in adopting it he committed 
himself to a variety of empiricism which adds to the claim that all 
knowledge comes from experience, the further claim that, in the last 
analysis, what is loi own is only sensations, and the mind's reflective 
awareness of them. On this more radical empiricist line, both matter 
and mind are held to be explicable in sensational terms.
Idealism is, indeed, the inevitable consequence of Mill's relativity 
principle. If sensation is not merely j;he sole path to knowledge but 
its sole object, it is impossible that the world which confronts us in 
experience should be an external world in any realist sense of 'ext­
ernal '; for external objects as realists would construe them exist 
independently of our sensations of them, while by the relativity prin­
ciple what we know when our experience presents us with sensations of 
sha,pe, colour, texture and so on is that subjective reality has the 
presented characteristics. In his most resolutely idealist moments.
Mill spoke of permanent possibilities of sensation, his favoured proxies 
for objects, as external only in the non-standard - and common sense 
would hold, very thin - sense that they are not deliberately constructed 
by the mind, but 'given' -Jo us (presumably in accordance with the laws 
of mental operation). Of course he did not always adhere to this literal 
and rigorous application of the relativity principle, and often exchanged 
an idealist for a merely immaterialist account of the permanent possib­
ilities. Maybe he felt qualms about idealism once it was spelt out 
starkly. But be that as it may, idealism is the natural destination 
of anyone who accepts the relativity principle understood Mill's way.
It is the relativity doctrine rather than associationism which 
supplies the basic theoretical underpinning of Mill's bolder empiricism. 
This is not to deny that Mill believed that the laws of association 
play a very important role in the formation of many of the mind's 
conceptions and convictions. Nor is it to ignore the fact that at the
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beginning of Chapter XI of the Examination he went so far as to pro­
pose that the laws of association play a central part in our arrival 
at the belief in an external world. Nevertheless it is not association­
ism which Mill saw as justifying a reductionist empiricism. The assoc-
iationist account of the origin of the belief in external reality is
not logically incompatible with the denial of Berkeleyan or MiHian 
idealism; to say that certain psychological laws are responsible for 
our forming a particurai''“*0‘onception of reality is not to say anything 
which in itself entails that an objective and external world either 
does or, does not exist. Once idealism is accepted, associationism 
could be.taken (as Mill presumably meant to take it) to double as an
account of the structure of things as well as of the structure of
thought ; but while associationist principles might be utilised in the 
enterprise of articulating an idealist world view, they have no proper 
role to play in establishing that view. The sensationalistic reduction- 
ism which issues in Mill’s idealism takes its origin in the relativity 
doctrine with its explicit limitation of our knowledge of reality to 
our knowledge of sensations. ^
At this point it is appropriate to repeat the claim made in the 
Introduction to this study, that the importance ofassociationism in 
Mill’s philosophy has often been overrated. As a determining element 
of his thought, the relativity doctrine - which commentators have ten­
ded to neglect - is of much greater significance than associationism.
Mill certainly thought that associationist principles were of much 
importance to the thinker of the school of experience eager to provide 
a unified and anti-a priorist account of the psychological origin of 
many of our ideas and conceptions. Yet associationism is not the fund­
amental principle of his reductionist empiricism, and even less.does 
it establish his alternative scientific realist empiricism, which has 
its roots rather in a disl^ike of claims to knowledge which are not groun­
ded on observation or on inference from observation. Mill had little 
doubt of the superiority of associationist psychology (such as that 
expounded in Bain’s major work) to all rivals, and would have seen it 
as forming an important component of a scientific realist theory of
the world; but he did not treat it as vindicating the truth of scien­
tific realism. - *
Prom an early date Mill had serious reservations about the wisdom 
of building a system of philosophy on associationist principles, as 
his father had done, and he confided to John Sterling in 1839 that
’I am very far from agreeing, in all things, with the ’’Analysis,’’
even on its ovm ground* - meaning by ’its own ground’ its reliance on
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the laws of association (EL, p.406). The chief source of his doubts 
about associationism as the foundation of a philosophical system we 
examined in Chapter Five: the laws of a.ssociation, being purely mech­
anical in operation, cannot produce rational belief (this being essen­
tially sensitive to evidence in a way for which associationist prin­
ciples leave no room); therefore associationism fails to be able to 
account for a crucial aspect of our mental natures. The view that bel­
ief is but an ’inseparable association,* wrote Mill,
seems to annihilate all distinction between the belief 
of the wise, which is regulated by evidence ... and 
the belief of fools, which is mechanically produced 
by any accidental association (AN, vol.l, p.407)«
But this being so, associationism is irrelevant to logic, its laws 
neither being identical with the laws of logic nor in any way illumin­
ating them; in fact they do not even throw light on the psychology of 
rational thinking.
It is curious how often Mill’s works have been approached with a 
set of preconceptions about the significance in them of associationist 
principles. John Passmore claimed that^Mill never questioned the ade­
quacy of associationism, which is quite untrue (Passmore, p.I5). Richard 
Nollheim supposed him to believe that logical thinking involves a move­
ment of ideas in accordance with the laws of association: equally un­
true (Wollheim, p.23). Indeed, the view that Mill founded logic on 
associationism, though utterly without any textual sanction, appears 
in several commentators, among whom J.H. Randall Jnr. is perhaps the 
most serious offender. According to Randall, Books I and II of the 
Logic show Mill applying the associationist psychology as an ’empir­
icist logic’ - an extraordinary claim, given that his only reference 
to associationism in those Books (at Bk.I.ch.iii.sect.7) is contained 
in a brief anticipation of the theory of the belief in an external 
world later developed in Chapter XI of the Examination (Randall, p.65). 
Randall’s opinion that in Books I and II Mill ’undertakes the dialec­
tical elaboration of the laws of Association, attempting to reduce all 
mental operations to those laws,’ is possible only for someone whose 
Mill is wholly a creation of his own fantasy (Randall, p.67). Ernest 
Nagel appears to come close to a similar view when he writes that ’it 
is the psychological assumptions of sensationalistic empiricism that 
are made to support the principles of evidence which emerge in the 
Logic  ^ (Nagel (1950), p.xxxii). If by ’psychological assumptions’
Nagel means associationism, this is false; and it would still be false 
to say, even without reference to associationism, that Mill’s bolder
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version of empiricism underlay his theory of logic. (However, Nagel 
is much more accurate about the kind of empiricism which informs the 
Logic when he writes that:
The chief emphasis of the Logic is upon the final 
authority of experience as the general warrant for 
beliefs, and upon the necessity for verifying prop­
ositions by observation of facts if futile speculation 
is to be avoided-"(-ibid. ). )
More careful critics have avoided these misreadings, Dennis Chris­
topher has recently pointed out the importance of Mill’s reservations 
about associationism in his notes to James Mill’s Analysis. And half 
a century ago O.A. Kubitz observed that Mill did not base logic on 
association:
Eventually his doctrine was that while association 
accounts for the manner in which we come to believe, 
it does not tell us ’when’ we ought to believe. It 
may provide a description of mental processes, but it 
cannot supply any norms for the operations of the 
mind in the pursuit of truth. Casual association must 
be superseded by the more accurate method of obser­
vation, analysis, and experiment, of which the ind­
uctive methods are the test. Thus for Mill the System 
of Logic helped to answer the questions left him by 
the psychology of association (Kubitz, p.24),
This is a great improvement on the views of such commentators as Ran­
dall, though it still clouds the issue somewhat over Mill’s ideas about 
the causal role of association in producing belief; as well as it can 
be ascertained, his view was that rational believing was not even cau­
sally dependent on any mechanical force of association: ’I disclaim, 
as strongly as Dr Whewell can do,’ he wrote in an I85I note to the 
Logie,
the application of such terms as induction, inference, 
or reasoning, to operations performed by mere instinct,
that is, from an animal impulse, without the exertion
of any intelligence (SL, p.28?).
Rationally based beliefs, that is, are nob produced by association, 
but must rest on the evidence of one’s observations, or on sound pro­
cesses of inference from them. Kubitz is wrong in suggesting that Mill 
held that rational beliefs were normally set up by association and just­
ified subsequently by the application of logic; Mill (apparently) supp­
osed that rational beliefs were initially attained by the use of reason,
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with association playing no part in their causality; though here he 
was arguing a stronger claim than an adequate distinction of the causal 
explanation and the justification of beliefs really demands. ^
There is a slight excuse for the mistakes of commentators in the 
fact that Mill himself on one occasion gave a misleading impression of 
the intentions of the Logic. In the Autobiography he spoke of the need 
he had felt for a book which would argue for the derivation of ’all 
knowledge from experience;--and all moral and intellectual qualities 
principally from the direction given to the associations’ (^, p.233), 
Kubitz remarked that this ’overlooks one of his chief contributions, 
namely, the construction of a method by means of which associations 
are to be tested’; and he suggested that in the long interval which 
elapsed between the vnriting of the Logic and the Autobiography, Mill 
became more interested in psychology (a doubtful claim), and so more 
ready to emphasise the associationist elements in the earlier work 
(Kubitz, p.54). Now a better explanation of the passage in question, 
and one which avoids any claim that Mill had changed his mind about 
the relationship of the laws of logic and those of association, is 
that he was merely writing rather carelessly in that place, and threw 
out some phrases more roughly descriptive of the ’school of experience’ 
which he supported generally against the a priorist philosophers than 
of the real doctrines of the Logic. Bht whatever Mill'later thought 
he had achieved in that work, a close reading of it quite fails to 
support the interpretation that it bases logic on associationist psych­
ology.
IV
Mill’s realist and reductionist forms of empiricism, though differ­
ing from each other in the way they render the notion of experience, 
have in common the important feature that they are global empiricisms, 
rejecting the possibility of ’thick’ a priori knowledge, and insisting 
that all justification is empirical justification. In Chapter Six we 
saw that Mill remained constantly committed to global empiricism, 
granting at most to his a priorist opponents that some basic principles 
of logic might be a priori in the ’thin’ sense of being beneath the 
possibility of justification altogether. Experience, and only experience, 
is able, on global empiricist thinking, to provide the justification 
of those beliefs which are amenable to it. Mill’s inconsistency arose
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over the manner in which he conceived of empirical justification. If,
<as the relaoivity principle holds, all we can really know are our ovjn 
sensations, then all justifiable beliefs must possess a content canable 
in principle of being analysed in sensational terms — for any proposition 
not open to such an analysis must outrun our capacity to settle whether 
it is true or false. Inspired by the relativity principle. Mill rep­
resented propositions about matter and mind as being warrantedly asser— 
tible by us only beeapsp_.they are really about sensations, and not 
about any recognition-transcendent noumenal objects or egos.  ^ (This 
did not, of course, rule out the possibility of justifying propositions 
Lnferentially; but sound inferences would always be from sensorily— 
analysable propositions to other sensorily—analysable propositions.) 
Alternatively, however. Mill talked about empirical justification in 
a manner indebted not to such radical empiricist forbears as Berkeley, 
but rather to the kind of scientific realist tradition exemplified by 
Herschel. Writing in this vein, he demanded that beliefs be supported 
by observation, or by inference from observation, but without adding 
any strong reductionist thesis about the content of justifiable bel­
iefs. Observation, on this picture, is our mode of access to a real, 
external world which is ontologically independent of our mental states.
On both of Mill’s accounts, it is human sensory capacities which enable 
us to have any knowledge at all, but on one of those accounts they inf­
orm us about something other than and independent of our sensations, 
vfhi 1 e on the other- what we know when we have sensations is nothing more 
than the sensations themselves.
It is a plausible speculation (though like many counterfactuals, 
difficult to prove) that if Mill had not been sympathetic to the rel­
ativity principle, he would not have been a global empiricist. This may 
seem an odd suggestion in the light of the fact that I have represented 
him as being, in one mood, inclined towards a non-reductionist, scient- 
ific realist view of the world, while at the same time fiercely opposed 
to the concept of ’thick’ a priori justification. Yet it is possible 
that tnis combination of positions results from a certain unclarity of 
thought, and indeed from the same unclarity which disguised from him 
the presence in his philosophy of inconsistent forms of empiricism; for 
a concept of empiricism as global in quantijjy seems more naturally to 
flow from a concept of it as reductionist^ rather than realist, in quality. 
The reason for this is that the relativity principle offers a rationale 
for global empiricism which it otherwise lacks. To the a priorist who 
demands to know why all justification should be by experience, and just 
V7hat is supposed to be wrong with the notion of ’thick’ a priori (i.e.
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intuitional) warranty for beliefs, the global empiricist who accepts 
the relcitivity principle can reply that it is precisely because all 
that human beings can know is their own sensations. Now if that is 
true, there is no longer any opening for the idea of a, priori faculties ; 
for evidently the sole required or indeed possible mode of access to 
a wholly sensational reality is sensation. If, on the other hand, the 
global empiricist favours scientific realism, it is much less easy for
him to respond to the a'^prXbrist*s challenge. As he does not hold that
all reality is sensational in nature, he has to explain how knowledge 
of a non-sensational leality is possible. But his view that it all comes 
via observation faces problems. Does observation involve anything be­
yond bare sensation? If it does not, it needs to be explained how sen­
sation can reliably inform us about an objective, external reality, 
and a response needs to be made to the sceptical challenge that maybe 
(for all we know) there is no external world at all, and our sensations 
are merely items in a long, coherent dream. The difficulty is to see, 
how the global empiricist could answer the sceptic, given that he can­
not , without surrendering his position, appeal to any intuitive or 
innate conviction that there is an external world which is the object 
of sensations. (Having only sensations to go by, it is obscure how 
the global empiricist could verify any hypotheses about the relation 
of sensations to a putative external world.) If, by contrast, observa­
tion is represented as being something more than mere, sensation, and 
as capable, as sensation alone would not be, of bringing us knowledge 
of external reality, the a priorist may fairly complain that whatever 
it is which observation has and sensation by itself does not is either 
tacitly intuitional and a priori, or else is something no less myst­
erious than the rational intuitions which the global empiricist crit­
icises him for upholding. He who elects to combine a global outlook on 
empiricism with a scientific realist rendering of justification by exp­
erience does not, it is true, maintain a logically inconsistent pos­
ition; but the tension between the two components of his view will make 
its defence a matter of considerable difficulty for him.
V
Now the claim that Mill’s two empiricisms are incompatible with 
each other may appear to be resistible on a ground more sophisticated 
than any we have so far considered in arguing their inconsistency. It
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is worth reflecting whether some defence of,Mill’s position can he 
mounted on the basis of a distinction between empirical and transcen­
dental levels of analysis of the kind Kant presented in the Critique 
of Pure Reason. In Kant’s opinion, realism and idealism are reconcil­
able provided that the realism is of the ’empirical’ variety and the 
idealism of the ’transcendental.’ Is it possible to apply such a dis­
tinction to Mill’s philosophical doctrines? And if it is, can it be 
used to draw those doctrines into consistency?
There is admittedly something ironic about defending Mill by ref­
erence to Kant, for Mill regarded the Kantian philosophy with a good 
deal of disfavour, believing its employment of a priori categories of 
the understanding to bring it into sharp conflict with the tenets of 
the ’school of experience.’ Moreover, in a note to the final edition 
of the Examination to be published in his lifetime, he specifically 
took issue with Kant’s thesis that bodies exist in an external space 
which, however, ’does not exist out of the mind’; the reasoning behind 
this position seemed to Mill to be ’strangely sophistical* (^, p.154),. 
Yet this objection is reminiscent of the condemnations which politic­
ians often feel it to be rigueur to make of the policies of their 
rivals, when privately they favour, those same policies themselves. 
Indeed elsewhere in the Examination Mill quite openly supported the 
view that while we cannot prove the real externality of bodies, we are 
entitled to say that they are external ’in the only sense we need' care 
about: they are not constructed by the mind itself, but merely recog­
nised by it’ - and he added, significantly, that ’in Kantian language, 
they are given to us’ (^, p.18?). Evidently Mill, while officially an 
anti-Kantian, occasionally felt it convenient to allow that the devil 
has the best arguments.
’By transcendental idealism,’ wrote Kant in the Fourth Paralogism,
I mean the doctrine that appearances are to be regarded 
as being, one and all, representations only, not things 
in themselves, and that time and space are therefore 
only sensible forms of our intuition, not determinations 
given as existing by themselves, nor conditions of 
objects viewed as things in themselves (Kant, A369; KS, p.345).  ^
On this theory that time and space are not objective constituents of 
reality, but rather the ’sensible forms of our intuition’ (sinnliche 
Formen unserer Anschauung) which we impose on our experience as its 
framework, the common sense view that we perceive by our senses objects 
in an objective, common space and time existing independently of our 
perceptions falls. But Kant did not leave the matter there. For he
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believed that the doctrine of transcendental idealism could be acc­
epted quite consistently with the view that, in one perfectly legit­
imate sense of ’external,* the objects of perception are external -
they are external in the sense that they are represented as being in
space; thus on this ’empirical* level - the level, in other words, on 
which they are experienced as phenomena - objects are real inhabit­
ants of a space. In Kant’s words, ’empirical realism’ holds that: 
Matter is ... only-,.a_.species of representations 
(intuition), which are called external, not as 
standing in relation to objects in themselves ext­
ernal, but because they relate perceptions to the
space in which all things are external to one 
another, while yet the space itself is in us 
(Kant, A370; KS, p.346).
However, Kant did not believe that, even at the transcendental level,
there was nothing outside the mind... For as the causes of our ’intuit­
ions’ (i.e., roughly, sense impressions), noumena are admitted to the 
Kantian scheme, though these objects cannot be directly experienced 
and are not in space and times
I*
We see a thing in a place, not because the Ncumenon,
the Thing in itself, is in any place, but because it
is the law of our perceptive faculty that we must see
as in some place, whatever we see at all. Place is
not a property of the Thihg, but a mode in which the 
mind is compelled to represent it.
(This is, in fact, not Kant, but Mill, giving a succinct and accurate 
account of Kant’s doctrine (EH, p.$).) Kant was, then, a realist about 
noumena, and one might even be tempted to describe him as a ’transc­
endental realist’ about them, in so far as he meant to accept the 
reality of a species of existents which are recognition-transcendent, 
being incapable of being experienced; yet his denial that noumena are
in space and time precludes his being described as a transcendental
realist about noumena in his own sense of that expression, as will 
become clearer below.
Mill distinguished in the Examination two different accounts of 
noumena. He noted that the term.’noumenon’ had been ’borrowed from 
the Schoolmen by the German Transcendentalists,* and meant primarily 
’the permanent Reality, of which the other /i.e. the phenomenon/ is 
but the passing show’ (EH, p.7). But Kant had employed the term with 
an extra bit of content: the Kantian noumenon is not situated in space 
or time (EH, p.9)* On Mill’s preferred version of the relativity prin­
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ciple, noumena in neither the original nor the reformulated Kantian 
sense were acceptable. But despite this difference over noumena, there 
are interesting parallels between Mill’s and Kant’s metaphysics. Mill' 
took care to stress that his view that reality is phenomenal is not 
antagonistic to another one, namely that what is presented to us in 
perception is a world of objects standing in spatial relations to one 
another and to us as percipients. But this is just what Kant termed 
’empirical realism.’ On ¥he”'empirical level, the level of description 
of how things appear in experience, there is a world of external obj­
ects; and Mill repea/tedly emphasised that he did not wish to deny 
what the plain man believes about externality when he supposes that 
in his experience he confronts a world which is apparently objective 
in character, and not a mental construct. As Mill said, experience 
is of ’Matter’ (EH, p.l83). At the empirical level, therefore, there 
is an external world; and Mill and Kant agreed not just about this, 
but also that at a deeper level of analysis (which Kant termed the 
’transcendental’) experience is of phenomena only, and phenomena are 
not occupants of an objective spatio-temporal world. It seems reason­
able to conclude that Mill, like Kant, combined empirical realism with 
transcendental idealism — which is a position one may - or may not feel 
to be extravagant, but which is at least not crudely;inconsistent.
!r: ■
Kant scholars, however, are likely to point to an obvious problem 
with this attempt to draw a resemblance between Mill and Kant. Mill 
expressed great admiration for the philosophy of Berkeley, and regarded 
the Berkeleyan account of matter as very similar to his ovm (ibid.).
But Kant argued that Berkeley had tried to defend the combination of 
empirical idealism vzith transcendental realism, and that such a com­
bination was unsound. Yet if Mill’s theory is in fact close to Berkel­
ey’s, the questions arise whether it is only superficially similar to 
Kant’s, and whether it merit,p the same objections to which Kant thought 
that Berkeley’s account succumbed.
At first sight it is obscure why anyone should want to maintain 
realism at the transcendental level with idealism at the empirical.
This would — apparently — involve implausibly combining a rejection of 
the ordinary conceptualisations of experience as presenting us with 
an external v/orld of things in objective spacë and time, with a claim 
of the reality of an objective world of objects in space and time v/hich 
it transcends our pov;ers to know. But it was not this curious and un­
attractive position which Kant intended to attribute to Berkeley. 
Transcendental realism, for Kant, is a view about space and time: it 
is the view that they are ’properties which, if they are to be possible
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at all, must be found in things in themselves* - and so must have obj­
ective reality (Kant, 370; KS, p.89). Berkeley, ,according to Kant,, was 
a transcendental realist because he maintained this view about space, 
even though he regarded space as ’impossible* and things in space 
’merely imaginary,’ once it was regarded in that realist way. There­
fore Berkeley, in Kant’s view, was a transcendental realist without 
having to assert the existence of objective space and time; transcen­
dental realism invo1ves..rnther the acceptance of the conditional that 
if space and time exist, they exist as properties of things in them­
selves (and so as objective and outside the mind, and not merely as 
forms of intuition). And Kant went on to propose that it was precisely 
acceptance of transcendental realism that would naturally lead one to 
empirical idealism: for once one had granted such a theory of space 
and time, one would be forced to recognise that it was quite obscure 
what basis there could be for asserting that the objects of the senses 
were situated in that objective, noumenal space and time whose reality 
we are unable to establish through our human epistemic powers:
After vrrongly supposing that objects of the senses, if 
they are to be external, must have an existence by them­
selves, and independently of the senses, he /the transc­
endental realisj^ finds that, judged from this point of 
view, all our sensuous representations are inadequate to 
establish their reality (Kant, A369; KS, p.346).
Consequently he will adopt the position which Kant calls ’empirical 
idealism.’
This is not the occasion for any extensive criticism of Kant, but 
it is relevant to note that his definitions of transcendental idealism 
and transcendental realism are not on an equal footing, and neither 
are his definitions of their empirical counterparts. Transcendental 
realism was defined by a conditional; transcendental idealism, on the 
other hand, involves not just the conditional that space and time 
exist, they exist as forms of intuition, but also the categorical 
claim that they exist (and so exist as forms of intuition). More 
seriously, because more confusingly, empirical realism and empirical 
idealism seem to be doctrines in different problem areas. The former-, 
in the version in which Kant accepted it - ,and also, in my opinion.
Mill and Berkeley - is the doctrine that the world presented in exper­
ience is a world of things in spatial and temporal orderings; this 
doctrine is acceptable to all these philosophers because it is about 
appearance only, that is, about how our experience represents the world 
to us. (We might rephrase it by saying that phenomena are intrinsically
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temporally and spatially ordered.) But empirical idealism, as Kant 
explained it, is not straightforwardly a denial of this doctrine; 
what it asserts is not that phenomena do not appear as temporally and 
spatially ordered, hut rather that despite appearances, the objects 
of our perceptions (phenomena) are not constituents of an objective 
spatio-temporal framework (and they are not this because, according 
to the transcendental realism with which empirical idealism is twinned, 
space and time are not capable of being directly experienced, but, if 
they exist, are essentially recognition—transcendent structures). It 
is true that on empirical idealist—cum—transcendental realist tenets 
there is something bogus about the apparent spatio-temporal ordering 
of experience: but so there is, too, according to transcendental idea- 
lisml If empirical idealism is really to counter empirical realism, 
it looks as if it must take issue even with the claim tha.t our exper­
ience seems to confront us with a world of spatially and temporally 
ordered items, yet this is a claim which it is highly implausible to 
deny.
Even transcendental realism, with its implication that space and 
time are really recognition-transcendentoffers scant basis for deny­
ing the empirical realist claim, for while an acceptance of transcen­
dental realism might prompt a change in the terminology of space and 
time, it lacks a bearing on the fact that our experience presents us 
with what we would before accepting any terminological change describe 
as an apparently spatially and temporally structured world; and empir­
ical realism is asserting no: more than that-,fact. For even if a transc­
endental realist who had fully thought through his position and its 
implications felt obliged, as Kant alleged he ought, to deny the pro­
priety of describing the situation at the empirical level in terms of 
the representation of a world of spatially and temporally ordered objects,- 
on the ground that space and^time correctly understood are nothing to 
do with the appearances of things, he would still not be entitled to 
deny the fact to which the empirical realist was alluding when he aff­
irmed that at the empirical level experience has this character of 
spatio-temporal structure. Thus we reach the unexpected conclusion that 
empirical realism and empirical idealism are at most in verbal disagreement 
with each other (disagreement, that is, over how to employ the terms 
’space* and ’time’). Perhaps the empirical idealist would permit it to 
be said that at the empirical level, we experience a quasi-spatial, 
quasi-temporal world; and I suggest that the empirical realist could 
happily reconcile himself to accepting that description of things at 
the level of appearance.
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Providing that a certain liberty is allowed with the ipsissima 
verba of the First Critique, it seems least confusing to describe 
Mill, as before, as a transcendental idealist in so far as he denies 
the existence of any objective space and time outside the mind; the 
chief difference between this position and Kant’s own transcendental 
idealism is that the latter involves not just the claim that space 
and time do not exist objectively, but the further positive character­
isation of them as forms-^ -of intuition. And Mill, like Kant, was also 
an empirical realist, in the sense that he accepted that at the level 
of description of the phenomenal content of experience, what is exper­
ienced is a spatio-temporally (or at least a quasi-spatio-temporally) 
ordered world of things (see, for instance, gl, pp.9, 199, 223). Despite 
the fact that Mill, like Berkeley, lacked Kant’s doctrine of space and 
time as forms of intuition, he shared Kant’s view of the appropriate­
ness of a rea.list description of experience at the level of appearance, 
along with his belief that experience is really only of phenomena. In 
my opinion, the similarities between Kant’s and Mill’s views in this 
area are more considerable than has usually been supposed.
Is it possible to utilise the distinction between idealism at the 
transcendental level and realism at the empirical to draw Mill’s two 
forms of empiricism into mutual consistency? The problem which faced 
Hill’s philosophy was that it contained apparently irreconcilable 
realist and idealist elements. But if the strain of scientific realism 
in his thought could be identified with empirical realism, and the idea­
lism classified as of the transcendental variety, that seeming incon­
sistency would vanish. Instead of appearing as an inconsistent empir­
icist, Mill would now emerge as the sophisticated defender of a subtle, 
double-level analysis of knowledge and reality. The realism of his phil­
osophy of logic and scientific method could now be thought of as per­
taining to the phenomenal appearances presented to us in experience,
•I
which constitute for us a world whose characteristics we can learn by 
observation, assisted by inference and experiment, even though at a 
deeper level of analysis a realist interpretation of that world would 
be discarded in favour of an idealist one.
Unfortunately, this attractive reconciling suggestion will not work. 
The fundamental problem is that empirical realism - albeit a view 
which can undoubtedly be ascribed to Mill - is not identifiable with 
the kind of realism defended in his discussions of logic and the meth­
odology of science ; and the latter form of realism remains incompatible 
with idealism.
The essential difference between the two realisms is that while one
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maintains the existence of a real, objective, external world, the other 
is committed merely to the claim that objects appear to occupy pos­
itions in a world of objective space and time. Empirical realism does 
not, of course, deny that an objective, external world exists; but it 
does not assert that it does either, and it is precisely this aspect 
of metaphysical neutrality which enables it to be consistently combined 
with transcendental idealism. As we have seen, the form of empiricist 
realism present in the treatment of inference and scientific method in 
the Logic accommodates the notion of a possible lack of agreement bet­
ween statements and the world - that is, it incorporates a realist theory 
of error. By this theory, it does not follow from our taking a state­
ment to be true, that it is true; for it takes as the condition of a 
statement’s being true not that it should seem true to us, but rather 
the (Tarskian) condition that the world should be as the statement 
affirms it to be. The practical purpose of logic then becomes that of 
assisting us to secure maximum accord between those of our beliefs 
which are the product of inference, and the world they concern. But 
empirical realism, by contrast, abstains from positing such a gap bet­
ween belief and reality; it is not commijjted to a realist theory of 
error - though equally it is not committed against it. The combination 
of empirical realism and transcendental idealism, however, is another 
matter: this does exclude a realist view of error, for it eliminates 
the idea of an external and objective world with which belief can in 
principle fail to accord. Moreover, the principle of the relativity of 
knowledge, while compatible with the conjunction of empirical realism 
and transcendental idealism, remains at variance with Mill’s realist 
form of empiricism: for relativity points the way towards a sensation­
alistic reductionism which attempts to close the gap between belief
7
and reality which a realist theory of error posits.
It is not ultimately possible, then, to defend Mill’s empiricist 
philosophy against a charge of inconsistency. The question which this 
identification of a conflict of intention at the deepest level of his 
thought obviously raises is: Was Mill too confused about the direction 
of his philosophy to be counted as a major thinker about logic and 
reality? I suggest that the answer to this question should be a decided 
negative. Inconsistency is, clearly, not a happy feature of a phil­
osophical system; inconsistent claims cannot all be true, and a phil­
osophy which contains some therefore contains some untruths. On the 
other hand, the pitfall of inconsistency is hard to avoid for any. phil­
osopher who produced, as Mill did, a great range of stimulating and 
imaginative ideas on a variety of topics. Mill’s importance was not.
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that he produced a philosophy of impeccable consistency within more 
or less narrow limits, but that he invented and defended a multitude 
of povjerful and original conceptions about the nature and role of 
logic, the grounds of knowledge and the nature of reality, which have 
had a significant bearing on subsequent debate. In particular, he 
investigated, more thoroughly perhaps than any other British philos­
opher, the extent to which empiricist responses to these perennially 
interesting topics could^be.developed in a plausible manner. It is 
hard to believe that anyone nowadays concerned to explore the possib­
ilities and prospects of empiricism could fail to learn much from 
Mill, even where it has to be confessed that he did not reach satis­
factory conclusions. For, as Mill himself Said, even mistakes can ' 
sometimes be illuminating - and the mistakes of a philosopher of Mill’s 
richness of invention can be very illuminating indeed. He himself 
spoke of his ’willingness and ability to learn from everybody’ (AU, 
p.253), and we do well to approach.him in the same spirit as he appr­
oached other writers, making a point of
examining what was said in defence of all opinions, 
however new or however old, in the conviction that
i*
even if they were errors there might be a substratum 
of truth underneath them, and that in any case the 
discovery of what it was that made them plausible, 
would be a benefit to truth (ibid.).
•f
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N O T E S
Introduction
1. Time, 12 August 1974, p.63; quoted in The Mill News Letter, vol.X, 
No.l (Winter, 1975),
2. In a- letter of 1834 to John Pringle Nichol, Mill candidly admitted 
his ignorance of mathematical and experimental science; hut he added 
that while his knowledge was 'extremely superficial,' it was neverthe­
less 'sufficient to have enabled me to lay hold of the methods and 
appropriate to myself fully as much as any metaphysician has ever done, 
the logic of physical science* (EL, p.?ll).
3. W .S. Jevens' savage and influential attack on Mill in the Contemp­
orary Review in 1877“"79 (reprinted in Pure Logic and Other Minor Works) 
was probably the prime source of the rumour that Mill's philosophy is 
peculiarly inconsistent. See, for instance, Jevons, p.201.
4* In fairness to Locke, it might be added that Mill's account of math­
ematical knowledge, while superficially more straightforward, turns 
out on examination to be no less problematic than the Lockian theory.
5. Mill generally spoke of defenders of a priori knowledge as belong­
ing to the 'school of intuition.' In the present study I shall normally 
label his opponents *a priorists.' Of alternative possible names, 
'intuitionists' could mislead because of its current use for defenders 
of certain specialised views in the philosophies of morals and of math­
ematics, while 'rationalists* seems inappropriate as Mill saw himself 
much less as countering the theories of such 'classic' rationalists
as Descartes, Spinoza and Leibniz, than those of Kant and British phil­
osophers inspired by him, such as Hamilton, Coleridge and Whewell.
6. Mill also privately avowed the existence of a polemical purpose 
to the Logic in an 1842 letter to Auguste Comte (EL, pp.530-31).
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7. Hill noted in the second Book of the Logic that he had no intention 
in that work of compiling a manual of deductive logic, which could 
easily he obtained elsewhere (SL, p.164). He always considered that 
Whately's Elements of Logic was a wholly adequate account of the fig­
ures and moods of syllogism.
8. Hamilton himself probably based the expression on a passage from 
Thomas Reid, in which our notion of body or matter is said to be a 
'relative' one (Reid, p.322).
9. For Kill's opinion of Berkeley, see especially his late essay 
'Berkeley's Life and Writings.*
10. The Logic contains a short discussion of Hume's doctrine of mir­
acles, but even here Hume is mentioned only twice. Mill's references 
to Hume are never more than passing.
11. James K'Cosh anticipated in the nineteenth century the views of 
modern commentators that Mill's philosophy was founded on association­
ism, and particularly criticised his 'wire-drawn attempts to fashion 
all our ideas out of one or two primitive sources by means of assoc­
iation' (M'Gosh, p.21).
12. Thus I do not entirely agree with Brand Blanshard's estimate of 
Mill's style: 'he fights, thinks, and writes fairly, even to the point 
of writing clearly enough to be found out' (Blanshard(1954), p.24). Mill's 
facility of style certainly merits praise;, but the careful reader will
soon discover that his meaning is often far from easy to determine.
Chapter One
1. Mill said more about inference in perception in his essay 'Bailey 
on Berkeley's Theory of Vision.'
2. In lieu of a theory of reasoning, Locke merely offered visual met­
aphors: in inferring, we see a'connexion of ideas; we take a view of 
ideas to discover what linkages there are among them; we use the 'per­
ceptive faculty of the mind' to see ideas 'laid together, in a juxta­
position' (Locke, Bk.IV.ch.xvii).
3. Ryan accused Mill of thinking of 'new knowledge' ambiguously as
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'the previously unperceived implications of existing knowledge and as 
knowledge which was not logically implied hy what was known.' But the 
charge is unmerited; Mill did not succumb to this confusion.
4. Gf^ . Susan Haack, p.226.
5. For the relationship of Mill's use of 'connotation' to those of 
earlier writers, see W.R. de Jong, Chapters 2 and 3-
6. Mill denied the status of entities 'per se' not just to classes, 
but also, to universals, genera and species, which he treated as 
classes under other names (they all have 'individual objects classed 
under them')(8b, pp.174-75). Note that by 'universal' Hill expressly 
did not mean attribute; a universal, being in his terminology equiv­
alent to a class, is no more than a set of individual things, and con­
tains nothing real besides; but what entitles a set of things to be 
called by the same name is their, possession of the 'common attributes' 
connoted by it. (For Mill's theory of attributes, see Chapter Seven, 
below.)
7. Nota notae was a traditional non-extensional principle of syllog­
istic validity, with its origin in Aristotle's Categories, 1^ 10-12.
While I argue that Mill's employment of it is ultimately unsuccessful, 
it is worthwhile to defend him against the strange misunderstanding of 
his reading of the principle which H.W.B. Joseph has made standard
(see Joseph, p.308; cf. Kubitz, p.119, Jackson (1941a), pp.74-75)* Joseph 
argued that Mill wholly fumbled the principle - which properly means 
that 'whatever qualifies an attribute qualifies the thing possessing 
it.' Joseph's reading of Nota notae can be represented (where S, M 
and P stand respectively for the minor, middle and major terms) as;
Nota (?) notae (m) est nota rei ipsius (s); and his criticism was that 
Mill very eccentrically undferstood it instead as; Nota (s) notae (m) 
est nota rei ipsius (P), which, in Joseph's opinion, is 'impossible,' 
as necessitating the 'violent* measure of reading res ipsa as the major 
term. If this is Mill's reading of Nota notae, it is indeed a strained 
one. But Mill's discussion suggests that he read the principle not in 
either of the foregoing ways, but rather a s Nota (m) notae (?) est 
nota rei ipsius (s). This may be less traditional than Joseph's fav­
oured reading, but it is not absurd in the manner in which the reading 
he ascribed to Mill is. Mill and Joseph understood the notion of marks 
or notes rather differently; thus Mill talked of the attributes of 
man as evidence or marks of mortality, whereas Joseph preferred to say
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that mortality is a mark of the attributes of man.
Chapter Two
1. The label 'the hidden^oonsequences problem' I owe to John .Corcoran, 
though he cannot be held responsible for the formulation of the problem.
2. Mill always discussed the problem of syllogistic petitio in connec­
tion with syllogisms with universal major premises, neglecting the 
fact that in some third and fourth figure forms it is the minor, and 
not the major, premise which is universal. However, those forms do not 
escape the problems of hidden consequences and petitio, and are in any 
case easily convertible, by traditional methods, into equivalent
first figure forms with universal major premises, which raise the prob­
lems in just the manner Mill described. (Second figure forms, all with 
universal major premises, are likewise convertible into first figure 
forms.) Like Mill and most others who have discussed the alleged petitio 
of syllogistic proofs, I shall concentrate on the case of first figure 
syllogisms.
3. Note that Dummett is describing Mill's belief here, not his own.
4. I take this opportunity to correct a common misreading of Mill. It 
might have been the half-sentence beginning 'Whoever pronounces the 
words ...' that suggested to Russell (Russell (l95l), P*3), as it has 
done to Arthur Prior (Prior (1962), p.163), that Mill took the view 
that a universal proposition like 'All men are mortal' is equivalent
in meaning to a conjunction of singular propositions, here propositions 
about the mortality of individual men; there is no other evidence to 
support the ascription of this view to him. Elsewhere (SL, p.97) Hill 
plumped clearly for the more plausible view that what a universal 
proposition expresses is that 'whatever has the attributes connoted 
by the subject, has also those connoted by the predicate.' In my opin­
ion, Mill's real meaning at p.206 of the Logic was that someone who 
asserts 'All men are mortal* thereby commits himself to a certain 
judgement about any individual man to whom his attention may later 
be drawn; but as he immediately went on to say that this universal 
proposition could be asserted by someone who had never heard of Soc­
rates, it is unlikely that he believed that its meaning was to be
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analysed as a conjunction of propositions about Socrates, the Duke of 
Wellington, etc.
5. Stewart misquotes Campbell slightly, but preserves his drift. Camp­
bell thought that a syllogism, as a condition of its validity, must 
commit a petitio, and thus cannot 'forward us in the knowledge of things 
a single step* (G. CampFeTl, vol.l, p.175)* Syllogising, however, can 
assist us in * the adjustment of our language, in expressing ourselves on 
subjects previously knovm’ (ibid., p.l74), and so is not entirely useless,
6. I am grateful to John Corcoran for the Descartes reference.
7. Mill was quoting from the first edition of Whately's Elements, p.179*
Whately later changed his wording somewhat; _cf. eighth edition, p.l63.
8. For further historical observations on the fallacy of petitio prin- 
cipii, see C.L, Hamblin's Fallacies.
9. It can, of course, be said of this syllogism, as it can of other
suasive syllogisms, that in accepting the premises we have already
determined the conclusion, and it is because he misunderstood the sense 
in which this is true that Mill believed there was'- a petitio problem 
for suasive syllogism. But in the present case there is no likelihood 
of misunderstanding the claim to mean that the conclusion must be known 
before the premises; so suspicion of petitio does not arise.
10. I assume that on Mill's view, all syllogistic major premises which
are not stipulâtive are empirical.
11. Private communication. I have developed and recast Corcoran's 
argument somewhat. ,(
12. Mill appears to have forgotten at this point that syllogisms with
stipulâtive major premises are not preceded by an inductive first stage.
13. For instance, if I know that a complete enumeration has established 
that all students present at the Professor's logic lecture last Friday
f
were asleep, but I only subsequently learn that Mary Thinkwell had 
been present then, I can now without petitio deduce the illuminating 




1. See note 2 to Chapter Two for the simplification involved here.
2. There is a large literature, inspired hy,Nelson Goodman^s Fact, 
Fiction, and Forecast, Ph*“why we consider some predicates to he more 
projectihle than others, and frame our expectations ahout natural reg­
ularities in terms of them. Relevant though this literature is to a 
thorough study of the rationality of our inductive projections, reas­
ons of space prevent its investigation here, where it must suffice 
simply to assume that there are in nature patterns which are lawlike 
and capable of identification as such.
3. Well known presentations of this view are to he found in Ryle (1950), 
Toulmin, and Nagel (196I). For some sensible criticisms of the notion.
of material rules of inference, see Kyburg. Chapter Eight.
4. Hence I disagree with H.G. Alexander,” who has argued that the quest­
ion of the truth of inference rules is always logically inadmissible.
He probably believes this because he wants to construe rules of inf­
erence as having the nature of imperatives or permissions which cannot, 
logically, be true or false. But if an indicative proposition like 
'All men are mortal' can be treated as a genuine rule of inference, 
Alexander's claim must fall. (See Alexander, p.318).
5. If Mill can be ascribed the view that neither the Dictum nor the 
Nota notae are required as rules of inference, it is an interesting 
if obscure question whether he would have held that the Nota notae, 
while not thought in an inference, still provides in some sense a des­
cription of the semantic relationships of the syllogistic propositions. 
Certainly the Nota notae captures neither the use of the major propos­
ition as a rule, nor the fact that the syllogism is now conceived as
a process of 'interpretation* of an inference whose premises include 
more than just the syllogistic minor. But Mill did not refer again to 
the Nota notae after proposing that the majoh proposition of a syllog­
ism is its rule, and it is impossible to be sure what his final view 
of it was.
6. The Kneales have described Mill as holding that the rules of syll­
ogism are second-order principles about the principles of inference
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which people actually use (W. & M. Kheale, p.377)- The precise sense 
of their interpretation they do not clarify, hut it is doubtful whether 
it accommodates Mill's insistence that syllogising is of concern to 
the practitioner, and by no means only to the theorist, of reasoning.
The Kneales appear to beliaye that Mill thought of the rules -of syll­
ogism as providing a theoretical articulation of the movement of thought 
in which people are engaged when they are reasoning from particulars 
to particulars; but they failed to note that he considered an actual 
reference to the syllogistic forms necessary to keep reasonings on the 
rails.
7. In admitting the real existence of kinds. Mill was not retracting 
his opposition to the quasi—Platonic entities he variously termed 
'classes,' 'universals,' 'genera" and 'species' and rejected in Book 
II (SL, pp.174-75; Çf. note 6 to Chapter One, above). Mill believed 
that natural kinds were not arbitrary groupings of objects, because 
they depended on the possession by theii^ members of certain common 
attributes; but he never held that they had reality as transcendental 
substances, existing over and alongside their members.
8. Beddoes' book was a polemic against those who had argued that the 
mathematical sciences were deductive in nature, and should thus be 
taught as deductive theories. In Beddoes' view, such a science as geom­
etry should be presented as standing on an empirical basis, a real con- ' 
viction of the truth of geometrical propositions only being attainable
by a close scrutiny of actual geometrical diagrams. 'I hope to be able 
to show,' he wrote, 'that the mathematical sciences are sciences of 
experiment and observation,^ founded solely upon the induction of part­
icular facts, as much so as mechanics, astronomy, optics or chemistry' 
(Beddoes, p.15). Beddoes evidently thought that because the examin­
ation of diagrams may be of considerable help in learning the rudim­
ents of geometry, the appropriate justification: of geometrical prop­
ositions cannot be a priori, but must be via 'experiment and observ­
ation' - a claim which by no means follows, because it may be that, 
however we learn them, the truth of general geometrical theses can be 
established fully and finally only by a priori explication of basic 
geometrical concepts. The tone of Beddoes' book is immoderate, even 
virulent (Plato, for instance,, is referred to as- the 'father of myst­
icism' and author of 'ravings' (p.l20)),
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Chanter Four
1. I am indebted for this information to Miss Pauline Adams^ custodian 
of Mill's books now at Somerville College, Oxford. Harriet R. Holman 
records that the American novelist T.N. Page purchased at Avignon in 
1906 an annotated copy of 'Hume's Essays' which had belonged to Mill, 
the present location of which is unknown (Holman, p.20). This book might 
well have been Hume's Essays, Moral & Political (first issued in 1741)j 
a work in Addisonian vein which contains nothing about the problem of 
induction. In an I868 letter to the publisher William Longman, Mill 
praised Hume's philosophical works, mentioning his Essays and the 
Treatise by name, but made no reference to the nature of their contents 
(LL, p.1388).
2. It becomes clear from an examination of Mill's references to the 
law of causation that he understood it to assert not barely that every 
event has a cause, but also that causal relationships follow regular 
patterns.
3. Strictly speaking, this was not the view which Reid and Stewart were 
pressing. They did not deny that uniformity can permissibly be pre­
supposed, experience will then be a guide to the future ; but they dis­
agreed with the claim that knowledge of uniformity itself is a product 
of experience. Our knowledge of uniformity, it seemed to them more 
plausible to say, was either instinctive, or the result of rational intu­
ition, or a gift of divine providence. (For more on these authors, see 
the appendix to this chapter.)
4. Mill's example of the belief in the sun's rising tomorrow was prob­
ably drawn from Reid, who used it when discussing the psychological 
character of belief about the future; Reid actually cited Hume's Treat­
ise in his account, but without seeing that Hume's most important 
contribution concerned the justification of belief about the unobser­
ved, rather than its psychological explanation (Reid, p.199). Hume
*
himself may have been stimulated to discuss the belief in the sun's 
rising tomorrow by the use of the example in Archbishop Tillotson's 
Rule of Faith (Tillotson, who was not discussing induction, cited it as 
an instance of a belief which, though it cannot be known with infallible 
certainty, can be knoivn with a lesser 'moral certainty' (Tillotson,
p.559)).
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5. Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, I.sect.258 
and passim.
6. It is hard to see Max Black's well known defence of self-supporting 
inductive arguments as anything more than a philosophical jeu d'esprit; 
certainly it has convinced' very few people that an inductive justific­
ation of induction need not he circular. (See the contributions of 
Black and Peter Achinstein to the symposium 'Self-Supporting Inductive 
Arguments' in Richard Swinburne (ed.). The Justification of Induction.
7. Rational inductive thinking could be practised without any explicit 
employment of the principle of the overall uniformity of nature. But 
it would need to consider the kind of lawlike regularities expressed 
by local uniformity principles, and it is more plausible to hold that 
it should treat them as genuine premises, rather than as 'memoranda,' 
as in Mill's account.
8. This, of course, is why he held tha^ major premises could be dropped 
from arguments without detriment to the cogency of the proof.
Chapter Five
1. At one place in the Examination, Mill made what initially appears to 
be an awkward attempt to combine the realism of his philosophy of logic 
with his leanings towards idealism in metaphysics. 'Concepts, Judgements, 
and Reasonings,' he ;n?ote, 'should agree with the reality of things, 
meaning by things the Phaenomena or sensible presentations, to which 
those mental products have reference' (EH, p.365)# As Mill generally 
used the term 'phaenomena' in Kantian fashion, in contradistinction to 
'noumena' (though he was unwilling to countenance the existence of 
noumena), this sentence seems to show him reneging on the realist view 
that truth is conformity to objective, mind-independent reality. His 
subsequent discussion, however, gives no indication that he had altered 
his view that truth is conformability to objective fact, but suggests 
rather that what he was misleadingly expressing in the quoted sentence 
was the thought that it is the conformity of propositions to the pres­
entations of sense which is our criterion that they conform to objective 
fact and so are true (of. EH, p.366).
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2. .For further discussion of these features of belief see Bernard 
Williams, 'Deciding to Believe,' and my own 'A Simple Argument for 
Faith Requiring Reasons.' ’
3. For the controversy between Mill and Spencer see the Logic, Bk.II. 
ch.vii; the Exami n at ion? "Ch.VI; the early pages of Spencer's Principles 
of Psychology; and Spencer's article 'Mill versus Hamilton The Test 
of Truth.*
4. That Mill is guilty of committing the psychologistic fallacy has 
been alleged by, inter alia, Husserl (1969 and 1970)> Blanshard (1948), 
Nagel (1950)? Nordquest and Richards.
5. Quoted by Husserl ((l970), vol.l, p.93).
6. How very odd it is to believe a direct self-contradiction has been 
well brought out by John N. Williams in his paper 'Inconsistency and 
Contradiction.' Like Mill, Williams doubts whether such beliefs are 
really possible (Williams, p.600).
7. Mill might with equal reason have held that the other two laws of 
thought, and logical laws in general, apply properly only to meaning­
ful propositions, to which alone truth values can be assigned.
8. Ellis himself mistakenly thinks that Mill accepted the 'crude' form 
of psychologism (Ellis, p.lOO).
Chapter Six
j
1. The label 'global empiricism' I have taken from Crispin Wright 
(Wright, p.321); the statement of the position will be refined in the 
course of the present chapter. It is worth noting that a global empir­
icist is not committed, qua global empiricist, to denying the possibil­
ity of deductive inference (though this is, in fact, a denial that Mill 
wanted to make). A deductive inference may^be described as a priori 
on the basis that the conclusion dravm expresses a logical implication 
of the premises (and not a projection from them, as in inductive reas­
oning). However, a global empiricist need not find anything objection­
able in the process of deducing the logical implications of a set of 
premises, though he vjill insist on regarding members of premise sets,
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and those laws of logic on which the soundness of inferences rests (in 
so far as the question of justification can arise about these at all - 
a point taken up later in this chapter), as finally dependent for their 
justification on experience alone. He will allow that propositions can 
be known by being deduced from premises, but he will nevertheless class­
ify all deduced propositions as empirical, holding that at no stage in 
their derivation have premises not themselves ultimately justified by 
experience been employed.
2. The review essay 'Grote's Aristotle* was published in the final year 
of Mill's life (l873). The discussion of the 'logical axioms' is not 
very perspicuous. Mill suggested that the laws of contradiction and of 
excluded middle 'do not need the support of a gathered experience'
(p.499), but he also ventured thé (presumably psychological rather than 
epistemological) observation that people normally need to have exper­
ience before.they can apprehend the truth of these laws (p.^OO). Neither 
of these ideas is developed at length.-
3. Mill's construal of the a priorist position strongly suggests, though 
he was not explicit about this, that he understood' a priorism to main­
tain that axioms are true by virtue of meaning - a doctrine of which 
much has been heard in the present century. His own view, in contrast, 
was that basic propositions of logic and mathematics are true rather
by virtue of the way the world is- than by the linguistic conventions 
which bestow meaning on them.
4. Mill was less acute than Berkeley here. While Berkeley thought that 
ideas were in general, to be equated with, images, he did acknowledge 
that to certain of our 'nations,' for instance those of the mind, of 
spirit and of God, no images corresponded. (See, for instance, Berkeley 
pp.157-58; Berkeley thought, incidentally, that the term 'idea' was 
not strictly appropriate for imageless 'notions.')
5. Mill no doubt believed the same of the law of identity when he vrrote 
about it in the Logic - but then he would Aave thought of the law as 
beneath justification because too trivial to require it.
6. A global empiricist is likely to place special weight, as Mill did, 
on the capacity of inductive inference to lead us to knowledge of prin­
ciples of the kinds held by a priorists to be known by 'thick' a priori
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intuition. But note that he need not follow Mill in disallowing the 
possibility of knowledge attained by deductive methods, though he will 
insist that the ultimate basis of deductive demonstrations is in exp­
erience (cf. note 1 to the present chapter).
7. It may have been the H/w objection towards which Russell was gest­
uring in his terse remark in The Problems of Philosophy that empiricism 
about mathematics fails because 'the validity of the inductive prin­
ciple itself cannot be proved by induction* (Russell (19II), p.47)»
And in his protestation of the need for the demonstrative reasoner to 
have an intuitive apprehension of the agreement or disagreement of
two ideas, 'for if it were not so, that yet would need a proof,' Locke 
too may have been showing some awareness of the objection (Locke, vol.2,
p.140).
8. See Wright, op.cit., for an extended discussion of these themes.
Chapter Seven .
1. Hamilton's quotations from authors alleged to have accepted the rel­
ativity principle are in his Discussions on Philosophy /&c.7, pp.640- 
42, Mill's criticism of Hamilton's use of these authorities is rather 
oddly absent from post—1862 editions of the Logic ; possibly Mill felt 
that the material was more appropriately reserved for the Examination 
(first edition I865), where Hamilton's views of earlier writers are 
given adverse notice at pp.18-19*
2. _Gf. Hamilton: 'Of things absolutely or in themselves, be they ext- 
ernal, be they internal, we know nothing, or know them only as incog- 
nisable' (Hamilton (1866), p.638).
3. But Mill, unlike Hamilton, at least admitted that some major eight­
eenth century philosophers had not accepted the relativity of knowledge, 
among whom he singled out Reid for special mention (SL, p.6l). Hamil­
ton's treatment of Reid is very curious. Reid proposed that from the 
sensation of smelling a rose, 'I am led, by my nature, to conclude some 
quality to be in the rose.' This is fairly evidently intended as an 
indirect realist analysis, yet Hamilton, who as Reid's editor should 
have understood his author rather better than this, construed Reid as
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asserting that the quality in the rose 'is, in fact, except as an 
imaginary something, unknown' (Reid, p.310).
4. Note that the Kantian version of the relativity doctrine is still 
inconsistent with indirect realist theories of perception, which do 
not accept that the external objects which cause our sense impressions 
are unknowable,
5. Mill's argument is not, in fact, very convincing. It is not clear 
why our not having suitable faculties to apprehend the inner nature of 
noumena, if there are any such, should prevent our saying meaningfully 
that God could know that nature, on the basis of his superior faculties. 
A more plausible assertion Mill could have made is that if God were 
able to apprehend the inner nature of noumena, he could not convey his 
understanding to us (or not, at any rate, unless he provided us with 
suitable faculties).
*
6. A similar line of thought informs John Foster's recent book The Case 
for Idealism. Foster claims that 'to construe the physical world as 
non-mental is to put its intrinsic nature beyond the'scope of positive 
transparent specification of even the most generic kind' (p.122). 
Non-mental space and its non-mental occupants are simply outside the 
range of meaningful human discourse, though we usually make the mistake 
of believing that ordinary physical object language can refer to them. 
Mill would have regarded Foster's argument as a powerful application
of the relativity doctrine.
7. And a further kind of case, which Mill did not consider: if you and 
I both look at the bookcase,our sensations of its broivn colour are 
numerically distinct, though we take them to inform us of a single 
colour quality of the bookcase.
8. Godfrey Vesey, in 'Sensations of Colour,' has noted further diffic­
ulties arising from Mill's view that attributes are to be explained as 
mere resemblances among sensations. One problem is that the possibility 
of a common meaning for words like 'brown' employed on the basis of 
sensation becomes dependent upon the coincidence in the subjective 
senses of resemblance of different individuals; for there is no reference 
allowed to resemblances being resemblances in some common, non-subjective 
respect to ground the claim that a term like 'brown' is univocal (cf.
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Vesey, p.l2l). But it less clear that Vesey*s criticism finds the right 
target when he makes the further objection that it is obscure how, on 
Mill's theory, a person can describe a sensation he is having for the 
first time as a sensation of brown, it being an implication of that 
theory that someone who applies an attribute term must satisfy the 
condition that he be aware of a resemblance among sensations (such res­
emblances being what attribute terms stand for) (Vesey, p.122). For 
it would be open to an individual in this circumstance to suppose that 
his sensation resembles those previously had by other people, providing 
that he is entitled to assume that other people do have sensations 
which resemble his own; the true difficulty, however, is that his right 
to assume this can be challenged-(because what is required is that he 
be justified in supposing that other people's qualia resemble his own; 
and it is not clear that he can have this justification).
9. For a full account of resemblance nominalism and its difficulties, 
see /o’mstrong, ch.5. *'
Chanter Eight
1. That Mill is engaged in two tasks in Chapter XI of the Examination 
has been noted by J.P. Day in his paper 'Mill on Matter.'
2. The first three laws have been given in Mill's own words, the fourth 
in a summary form. For variant statements of the first three see.SL,
p.852, p.360. (The fourth law appears only in the Examination.)
3. Sir William Hamilton had held that we become aware of the existence 
of external objects by a species of intuition. Mill, with some justice, 
thought the reference to a faculty of intuition wholly obscurantist,
and urged against it Hamilton's own 'Law of Parcimony' that 'Where there 
is a known cause adequate to account for a phaenomenon, there is no 
justification for ascribing it to an unknown one' (EH, pp.182-83).
By a 'knovai cause,' Mill meant to refer to sensation and reflection on 
sensation,, as described by the ' Psychological Theory' - which, for all 
the ambiguity and vagueness of its presentation, does manage to avoid 
postulating anything as mysterious as Hamiltonian intuition to account 
for our belief in an external world.
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4- Malebranche, however, Mill noted, still believed in the existence 
of this superfluous wheel because he thought its existence asserted 
in scripture (EH, p.204)« (For a recurrence of the 'superfluous wheel' 
metaphor, see Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, I.sect.271).
5. Berkeley, as Pitcher has observed (Pitcher, ch.lO), himself held 
early in his career a view similar to this. But in the vrritings he pre­
pared for publication he asserted that objects only exist when they are 
present as ideas in some mind (see, for instance, Berkeley, p.1^8).
This is ,a highly unsatisfactory view, not redeemed by Berkeley's helping 
himself to the thesis that ideas no one else is thinking about continue 
to exist in the mind of God; for it is not plausible to hold that the 
idea of a tree now in God's mind is numerically identical with the
idea of a tree formerly present in mine, and God's now having an idea 
of a tree qualitatively similar to an idea I formerly had does not serve 
to maintain my idea (and thus my tree) in existence.
6. The critic was Francis O'Hanlon, who wrote a pamphlet entitled
A Criticism of John Stuart Mill's Pure Idealism, to which Mill replied 
in a note added to the third edition of the Examination (p.203ff.).
7. This is a prospect which commentators have ignored. Typical of 
many in this connexion are H.H. Price and Alan Ryan. Price noted that 
Mill held that matter consists of sensations and possibilities of sen­
sation, but immediately after referred to 'this vast mass of actual 
and possible sense-data* (a sense-datum presumably being for Price
closer to a sensation than to a possibility of sensation) (Price (1926/27), 
p.112). Ryan, after recording Mill's definition of matter as a perman­
ent possibility of sensatic(n, proceeds to assert that 'Mill's identif­
ication of objects with possible sensations seems almost more shocking 
than their identification with actual ones' (Ryan (1970), p.97)«
8. There appear to be no significant differences between Mill's use of 
'sensations' and the modern phenomenalist's talk of 'sense-data'; acc­
ordingly I shall here treat the two terms a^ equivalent in meaning.
9. For an objection in similar vein to 'idealism,* see Venn's Empirical 
Logic, p.16.
10. At least one commentator has become very confused over Mill's talk
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of possibility. J.P. Day has written: *to say that there is a possibil­
ity of snow is simply to say in other words that snow exists potentially: 
it is not to say that a possibility, or anything whatever, exists 
actually' (Day, p.57)« It is not clear what it means to say - still 
less, 'simply to say' -^^that snow exists potentially. Yet Day's diff­
iculties indicate how great the need is to clarify the notion of poss­
ibilities of sensation before Mill's theory can be properly assessed.
11. See Hartry Field, 'Realism and Relativism,' p.559- Field's target 
is actually a little more restricted than mine. He is reacting to Put­
nam's suggestion that we cannot properly relate properties of phenom­
enal objects to the powers of individual noumenal objects, but are 
forced to say, more vaguely, that they are related to powers of the 
world. Field contends that 'it makes no sense to say that something has 
a dispositional property without having a ground for the disposition,' 
and that, whatever precisely Putnam meant by his claim, he should at 
least be ready to allow that dispositional properties to affect our 
senses are grounded in 'lower-level' properties, perhaps of a noumenal 
sort. Now Mill appears to rule out not just that there are such lower- 
level properties to be the grounds of powers to cause sensations, but also 
that there is anything having properties of either level - even anything 
referred to by such an unspecific phrase as Putnam's 'the world.'
12. To be remotely plausible, the theory must allow that objects, as 
causal powers to produce sensations, are able to operate on subjects 
at a distance. The physics of such interaction at a distance are obs­
cure, but it is evident they could hot involve any passage through 
space of numerically identical 'objects' such as photons. It would be 
reasonable to refuse to accept the theory until some explanation had 
been provided of the nature of the causal relationships between sub­
jects and spatially removed objects, and also of how permanent possib­
ilities interact with each other (as Mill claimed they do).
13. This view of time is similar to Berkeley's ('Time, therefore, being 
nothing, abstracted from the succession of ideas in our minds ...' 
(Berkeley, p.162)).
14. Thus Dummett oversimplifies the situation when he writes that
idealism stands opposed to materialism (Dummett (I98I), p.504). The 
opposite of materialism is immaterialism, and immaterialism is not
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logically committed to denying the existence of objective space and 
time.
15. Some readers will have qualms about Mill's interchangeable use of 
'mind,' 'self and 'ego.' But it is questionable whether these words 
have acquired sufficient'll' sharp boundaries of employment for any very 
substantial objection to Mill's practice to be pressed. His project is 
to enquire whether human mental life can be analysed without remainder 
in terms of bundles of mental states, or whether room has to be left 
too for some form of substratum or base to support or collect mental 
states, and to serve in addition as the principle of unity and dist­
inction of human subjects. Once his intentions are grasped, it seems 
unnecessary and distracting to quibble about his usage of an inevitably 
imprecise terminology.
16. See David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Bk.I.pt.iv.sect.6.
Hume voiced doubts about his theory in an appendix to the work. (For 
an interpretation of that appendix, and for further discussion of 
bundle theories of the mind, see my note 'What Was Hume's Worry About 
Personal Identity?') ■
17. Mill may not have noticed that not all memories and expectations 
concern the self: not, for instance, a memory of the date of the Battle 
of Hastings, or an expectation that the Conservative Party will win 
the next election.
18. Alan Ryan has argued that Mill's failure to clarify the nature of 
personal identity is a weakness 'at the heart of the metaphysics on 
which his system of ideas^rests' (Ryan (l970)j p.xx). He justifies this 
by saying that for Mill, the identity of physical objects 'is parasitic 
upon the mind of the percipient who, so to speak, builds his expect­
ations into things' (p.xvii), so that if Mill cannot explain personal 
identity, he cannot explain object identity either. This calls for two- 
comments. First, Ryan's criticism can apply at most to the idealist 
view that the principles of the unity of objects are psychological 
principles, such as the laws of association, operating within a single 
mind. While Mill occasionally took this line, he frequently maintained 
that objects are permanent possibilities of sensation of an objective 
kind within a common world, and with a nature independent of any mind. 
On this view, the unity of objects is the product of certain objective
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causal relations forming into groups possibilities of sensations of 
(primarily) resistance, extension and shape; and while minds.can rec­
ognise the unity of objects, they do not construct it. But, secondly, 
Ryan's objection really fails to have any force even against Mill's 
idealist theory of objectSo For what that theory actually requires is 
not that he should have explained personal identity, but merely that 
he should presuppose the persistence of selves to be a fact. Now Mill 
did indeed presuppose tbi^^' though he confessed himself ultimately 
unsure how to analyse the identity of the self. His failure to analyse 
personal identity does not entail that he failed to analyse the iden­
tity of objects, even if the identity of objects presupposes the exist­
ence of personal identity. Ryan appears to be confusing the situation 
here with one in which the first stage of a two-stage argument delivers 
as its conclusion a proposition which then becomes an essential pre­
mise of the second stage; clearly, if the first stage fails, the sec­
ond will fail too, as it contains an unsupported premise. But Mill was ■ 
not trying to prove the thesis of continuing self identity, but to 
analyse it; he followed the common belief of philosophers and laymen 
alike that it is true.
Chapter Nine :
1. See Herschel (l83l), P P .75-76, 151ff. For Herschel's account of math­
ematical truth see too his essay 'Whewell on the Inductive Sciences,' 
reprinted in Herschel (1857). Herschel's empiricist view of mathematics 
was preceded by the much cruder ideas of Thomas Beddoes (on whom see 
note 8 to Chapter Three, above).
2. With his other borrowings. Mill even took over from Herschel the 
punning phrase 'high priorji' (at SL, p.187).
3. Mill noted that some philosophers of the school of experience had 
thought that associationism supported the relativity principle (^, 
p.343) - but his discussion gives no hint that he shared this view, 
which he mentioned only in the course of a passage about the limits 
of associationist explanations. ^
4. A possibility Mill failed to see is that a belief can be produced 
by a causal process, such as association, unsuitable for constituting 
it a rational one, yet be justified subsequently by. observation or 
inference. Beliefs can alter their status as rational or irrational.
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For instance, a belief originally founded on prejudice may sometimes 
be confirmed later by appropriate evidence; while one initially supp­
orted on seemingly solid grounds will become irrational if maintained 
after stronger evidence to its falsity has come to light.
5» Though we saw in Ciiap^ *er Eight that, faced with the difficulty of 
constructing one, Mill eventually wavered in his confidence that a 
satisfactory bundle theory of the mind or self was possible.
6. References in the text to the Critique of Pure Reason follow con­
vention in denoting the First Edition of the work by ’A* and the Sec­
ond Edition by *B*. *KS* abbreviates 'Kemp Smith,' whose translation 
is quoted.
7. In an article of scant cogency ('John Stuart Mill and Immanuel Kant 
on Nature'), Bernard Lightman has argued that Mill's philosophy is 
consistent because it combines transcendental realism with empirical 
idealism. According to Lightman, to accept transcendental realism as 
Mill does is to accept the existence of 'nature' as 'a self-existing, 
independent entity' (Lightman, p.6). But this is npt, though it purports 
to be, Kant's notion of transcendental realism, and in fact Lightman 
fails to ^ show that he has the slightest grasp of the Kantian termin­
ology of 'empirical*’and 'transcendental,' 'realism' and 'idealism.'
He also neglects to consider Mill's relativity principle, which leads 
him falsely to assign to him the view that there is 'an unknowable ext­
ernal world which exists independently of man and acts as the ''exciting 
cause of sensations'' * (p.7) - a view which Mill mentions only to asc­
ribe it not to himself but to Kantians (though even then it is not 
identical, as Lightman claims, with what Kant calls 'transcendental real­
ism*). As no clear distinction between transcendental and empirical 
levels ever emerges in Lightman's discussion, he cannot succeed in 
demonstrating the consistency of Mill's philosophy when he attributes 
to him, alongside the fore-mentioned view, the belief that, at the 
'empirical' level, 'nature becomes each man's individual illusion'
(p.9) (which is, in any case, not at all the way in which Mill would 
have wanted to express his idealist thesis). It is also difficult to 
take seriously Lightman's claim that 'One searches in vain for any 
indication that Mill viewed nature as related to man' (pp.6-7), a 
statement which fails to have any discernible connexion with either of
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Mill’s two forms of empiricism. (Lightman is also apparently quite 
oblivious to Kant’s reasons for dissatisfaction with the combination 
of transcendental realism with empirical idealism, as he could hardly 
avoid being given that he has no understanding of Kant’s doctrine of 
space and time from which that dissatisfaction emanates.)
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